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Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics
- Source :
- Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2022, 9 (4), pp.499-528. ⟨10.3934/jdg.2022021⟩
- Publication Year :
- 2022
- Publisher :
- arXiv, 2022.
-
Abstract
- The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.<br />Comment: 27 pages, 7 figures
- Subjects :
- FOS: Computer and information sciences
Dominated strategies
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Imitation
Evolutionary game theory
Game dynamics
[MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC]
Primary: 91A22, 91A26
Rationality
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 21646066 and 21646074
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Journal of Dynamics and Games, Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2022, 9 (4), pp.499-528. ⟨10.3934/jdg.2022021⟩
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....22cac4c83b453a6fa6a39777386db3a6
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2209.08416