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The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Authors :
Masahiro Kumabe
H. Reiju Mihara
Source :
Social Choice and Welfare. 31:621-640
Publication Year :
2008
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2008.

Abstract

The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.<br />Comment: 24+1 pages

Details

ISSN :
1432217X and 01761714
Volume :
31
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Social Choice and Welfare
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....46e862696880e4f9e830d65ea021f33c
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5