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The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- Source :
- Social Choice and Welfare. 31:621-640
- Publication Year :
- 2008
- Publisher :
- Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2008.
-
Abstract
- The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.<br />Comment: 24+1 pages
- Subjects :
- FOS: Computer and information sciences
Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science
jel:C71
Economics and Econometrics
jel:D71
Nakamura number
voting games
the core
Turing computability
axiomatic method
multi-criterion decision-making
Axiomatic system
Monotonic function
Aggregation problem
91A12, 91B14 (Primary), 91A13, 91B12, 68Q05 (Secondary)
jel:C69
Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO)
Ranking
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Simple (abstract algebra)
If and only if
F.4.1
Mathematical economics
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Mathematics
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 1432217X and 01761714
- Volume :
- 31
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Social Choice and Welfare
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....46e862696880e4f9e830d65ea021f33c
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0300-5