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Allocation rules for coalitional network games

Authors :
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Jean-François Caulier
Ana Mauleon
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES)
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] (CORE)
Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)
CEREC
Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles
UCL - SSH/IMMAQ/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
USL-B - Centre de recherche en Economie (CEREC)
FUSL - Autre
Source :
Mathematical Social Sciences, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2015, 78, pp.80-88. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003⟩, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 78, p. 80-88 (2015)
Publication Year :
2015
Publisher :
HAL CCSD, 2015.

Abstract

International audience; Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
01654896
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Mathematical Social Sciences, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2015, 78, pp.80-88. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003⟩, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 78, p. 80-88 (2015)
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....7a07a525fb714ec30409b6ab945d9966
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003⟩