Corruption, public order and economic regulation in Colombia

espanolEl articulo se propone demostrar que el diseno legal de las autoridades de regulacion economica en Colombia permite su captura por parte de autoridades politicas y de operadores economicos. La captura del regulador es una forma de corrupcion que implica un desvio de las instituciones que dejan de proteger el interes general para atender intereses privados. Para llevar a cabo la reflexion se utilizo una metodologia analitica y comparativa. La primera se centro en la nocion de orden publico y la segunda en la comparacion de la configuracion legal de las instituciones de regulacion economica en Colombia y Francia. Encontramos que se ha confundido la nocion de orden publico lo que ha generado una concentracion de poder economico en torno al Presidente de la Republica, hecho que facilita la corrupcion. Se concluye que el diseno institucional frances puede servir de guia para disenar autoridades que regulen de manera imparcial la actividad economica. EnglishThe article intends to demonstrate that the legal design of the economic regulation authorities in Colombia allows their capture by political authorities and economic operators. The capture of the regulator is a form of corruption that implies a diversion of the institutions that fail to protect the general interest to serve private interests. To carry out the reflection, an analytical and comparative methodology was used, the first focused on the notion of public order and the second on the comparison of the legal configuration of economic regulation institutions in Colombia and France. It was found that the notion of public order has been confused which has generated a concentration of economic power around the President of the Republic, a fact that facilitates corruption. It is concluded that the French institutional design can serve as a guide for designing authorities that regulate economic activity impartially.