Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform

Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection. Palguta gratefully acknowledges financial support from Comunidad de Madrid (Spain), grants 2017/T2-SOC-5363 and EPUC3M11 (V PRICIT). Pertold acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic), grant SHARE-CZ+ (CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_013/0001740).