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Union bargaining in an oligopoly market with Cournot-Bertrand competition: Welfare and policy implications
- Source :
- Economies; Volume 2; Issue 2; Pages: 95-108, Economies, Vol 2, Iss 2, Pp 95-108 (2014)
- Publication Year :
- 2014
- Publisher :
- Basel: MDPI, 2014.
-
Abstract
- We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output ( a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price ( a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the results from the Cournot-Bertrand model with those found in the traditional Cournot and Bertrand models reveals that firms and the union have a different preference ordering over labor market bargaining. These differences help explain why the empirical evidence does not support any one model of union bargaining. We also examine the welfare and policy implications of union activity in a Cournot-Bertrand setting.
- Subjects :
- Cournot-Bertrand model
media_common.quotation_subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
jel:E
Development
Cournot competition
jel:I
Competitive advantage
jel:F
Bertrand paradox (economics)
Oligopoly
Microeconomics
symbols.namesake
C72
jel:J
union bargaining
jel:Q
jel:O
Economics
ddc:330
Empirical evidence
media_common
L13
lcsh:HB71-74
lcsh:Economics as a science
Nash equilibrium
Bertrand competition
symbols
Welfare
D43
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Economies; Volume 2; Issue 2; Pages: 95-108, Economies, Vol 2, Iss 2, Pp 95-108 (2014)
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....965093d02c34f5f029f8000eed01accc