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Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games
- Source :
- Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. 79:204-225
- Publication Year :
- 2015
- Publisher :
- Elsevier BV, 2015.
-
Abstract
- In this paper, we propose an evolutionary model of oligopoly competition where agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions. We formalize the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted (monomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity , where it is more profitable for the agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state).
- Subjects :
- Gradient dynamics
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
Class (set theory)
Bounded rationality
Evolutionary games
Local Monopolistic Approximation
Oligopoly
Computer science
General Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
General Physics and Astronomy
Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
Settore SECS-S/06 - METODI MATEMATICI DELL'ECONOMIA E DELLE SCIENZE ATTUARIALI E FINANZIARIE
Competition (economics)
Monopolistic competition
Gradient dynamic
Attractor
Invariant (mathematics)
Heuristics
Mathematical economics
Invariant (computer science)
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 09600779
- Volume :
- 79
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....9942012c798f99190328a3a588c522c2