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Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model

Authors :
Eric Fesselmeyer
Leonard J. Mirman
Marc Santugini
Source :
Dynamic Games and Applications. 6:209-224
Publication Year :
2015
Publisher :
Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2015.

Abstract

We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.

Details

ISSN :
21530793 and 21530785
Volume :
6
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Dynamic Games and Applications
Accession number :
edsair.doi.dedup.....e1bec42e210600265fe164f076b3aed3
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6