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Strategic Interactions in a One-Sector Growth Model
- Source :
- Dynamic Games and Applications. 6:209-224
- Publication Year :
- 2015
- Publisher :
- Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2015.
-
Abstract
- We study the effect of dynamic and investment externalities in a one-sector growth model. In our model, two agents interact strategically in the utilization of capital for consumption, savings, and investment in technical progress. We consider two types of investment choices: complements and substitutes. For each case, we derive the equilibrium and provide the corresponding stationary distribution. We then compare the equilibrium with the social planner’s solution.
- Subjects :
- Statistics and Probability
jel:D81
0209 industrial biotechnology
Economics and Econometrics
Sequential game
02 engineering and technology
Microeconomics
jel:O40
020901 industrial engineering & automation
Capital accumulation
0502 economics and business
Economics
050205 econometrics
Consumption (economics)
jel:D92
Capital accumulation, dynamic game, growth, investment, technical progress
Applied Mathematics
jel:C72
05 social sciences
jel:C73
Investment (macroeconomics)
Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
Social planner
Computer Science Applications
Technical progress
Computational Mathematics
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Capital (economics)
Capital accumulation, Dynamic game, Growth, Investment, Non-excludable capital
Externality
Subjects
Details
- ISSN :
- 21530793 and 21530785
- Volume :
- 6
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Dynamic Games and Applications
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi.dedup.....e1bec42e210600265fe164f076b3aed3
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0150-6