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Ultimatum Game Behavior in a Social-Preferences Vacuum Chamber
- Publication Year :
- 2021
- Publisher :
- Munich: Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), 2021.
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Abstract
- We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the behavior of human players from the previous wave. We apply our method to investigate trembling-hand perfection in a normal-form version of the ultimatum game. We find that behavior remains far off from a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium under selfish preferences even towards the end of our experiment. The likely reasons for our findings are strategic uncertainty and incomplete learning.
Details
- Language :
- English
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Accession number :
- edsair.od......1687..d6845ae6223ec23923b5bdb23bca8241