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Security Games in Network Flow Problems
- Publication Year :
- 2016
-
Abstract
- This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker) simultaneously disrupts one or more links to maximize her value of lost flow but also faces cost of disrupting links. Linear programming duality in zero-sum games and the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem are applied to obtain properties that are satisfied in any Nash equilibrium. A characterization of the support of the equilibrium strategies is provided using graph-theoretic arguments. Finally, conditions under which these results extend to budget-constrained environments are also studied. These results extend the classical minimum cost maximum flow problem and the minimum cut problem to a class of security games on flow networks.<br />Comment: The results in this paper only hold under a restrictive assumption on the class of networks (Assumption 1 in page 7). This makes the results inapplicable in practice, and further work is needed
Details
- Database :
- arXiv
- Publication Type :
- Report
- Accession number :
- edsarx.1601.07216
- Document Type :
- Working Paper