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Knight--Walras Equilibria

Authors :
Beissner, Patrick
Riedel, Frank
Publication Year :
2016

Abstract

Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlinear expectations. We introduce a corresponding equilibrium concept with sublinear prices and establish their existence. In general, such equilibria lead to Pareto inefficiency and coincide with Arrow--Debreu equilibria only if the values of net trades are ambiguity--free in the mean. Without aggregate uncertainty, inefficiencies arise generically. We introduce a constrained efficiency concept, uncertainty--neutral efficiency and show that Knight--Walras equilibrium allocations are efficient in this constrained sense. Arrow--Debreu equilibria turn out to be non--robust with respect to the introduction of Knightian uncertainty.

Subjects

Subjects :
Quantitative Finance - Economics

Details

Database :
arXiv
Publication Type :
Report
Accession number :
edsarx.1605.04385
Document Type :
Working Paper