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Decentralized Strategies for Finite Population Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games and Teams
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- This paper is concerned with a new class of mean-field games which involve a finite number of agents. Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of the decentralized open-loop Nash equilibrium in terms of non-standard forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). By solving the FBSDEs, we design a set of decentralized strategies by virtue of two differential Riccati equations. Instead of the $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in classical mean-field games, the set of decentralized strategies is shown to be a Nash equilibrium. For the infinite-horizon problem, a simple condition is given for the solvability of the algebraic Riccati equation arising from consensus. Furthermore, the social optimal control problem is studied. Under a mild condition, the decentralized social optimal control and the corresponding social cost are given.<br />Comment: 18 pages, 5 figures
- Subjects :
- Mathematics - Optimization and Control
Subjects
Details
- Database :
- arXiv
- Publication Type :
- Report
- Accession number :
- edsarx.2206.05754
- Document Type :
- Working Paper