The normative and the evaluative : a defence of the buck-passing account of value submitted

The buck-passing account of goodness and value analyses goodness and value in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes. In this thesis I defend the buck-passing account of goodness and value. The buck-passing account is ordinarily thought of as an account of good simpliciter and final value. In chapter 1 I defend the notion of good simpliciter and final value against scepticism about good simpliciter in particular. In chapter 2 I introduce and elucidate what seems to me to be the strongest understanding of the buck-passing account of good simpliciter and final value. In chapters 3 and 4 I discuss the most famous objection to the buck-passing account, the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and offer two different responses to this problem. In chapter 5 I discuss and respond to several other objections to the buck-passing account of good simpliciter. Some philosophers hold that (1) if a buck-passing account of good simpliciter holds, then a buck-passing account of all other types of goodness must hold. (2) But buck-passing accounts of other types of goodness are implausible. So, the buck-passing account is implausible. In chapter 6 I argue for (1) but contest (2) by defending new buck-passing accounts of other types of goodness. In chapter 7 I argue that if the buck-passing account of good simpliciter and final value holds, it does not follow that a buck-passing account of thick evaluative concepts holds. But, nevertheless, a buck-passing account of thick concepts is not implausible. In chapters 8 and 9 I explore the arguments for the buck-passing account. I argue that there are problems with all other plausible accounts of the relationship between reasons for pro-attitudes and value, that the buck-passing account has explanatory advantages over these other accounts, and helps to demystify goodness and value in a way that they do not.