Visual Intuitions in the Absence of Visual Experience: The Role of Direct Experience in Concreteness and Imageability Judgements

The strongest formulations of grounded cognition assume that perceptual intuitions about concepts involve the re-activation of sensorimotor experience we have made with their referents in the world. Within this framework, concreteness and imageability ratings are indeed of crucial importance by operationalising the amount of perceptual interaction we have made with objects. Here we tested such an assumption by asking whether visual intuitions about concepts are provided accurately even when direct visual experience is absent. To this aim, we considered concreteness and imageability intuitions in blind people and tested whether these judgments are predicted by Image-based Frequency (IF, i.e. a data-driven estimate approximating the availability of the word referent in the visual environment). Results indicated that IF predicts perceptual intuitions with a larger extent in sighted compared to blind individuals, thus suggesting a role of direct experience in shaping our judgements. However, the effect of IF was significant not only in sighted but also in blind individuals. This indicates that having direct visual experience with objects does not play a critical role in making them concrete and imageable in a person’s intuitions: people do not need visual experience to develop intuition about the availability of things in the external visual environment and use this intuition to inform concreteness/imageability judgments. Our findings fit closely the idea that perceptual judgments are the outcome of introspection/abstraction tasks invoking high-level conceptual knowledge that is not necessarily acquired via direct perceptual experience.