Developing CBTC system safety requirement hierarchy through STPA methodology

Safety-critical systems, such as the railway signal system, are subject to potentially high costs from failures, including loss of life and property damage. The use of new technology, including communication-based train control (CBTC) systems with software and computers, has changed the types of accidents that occur. Software-related issues and dysfunctional interactions between system components controlled by the software are increasingly the cause of incidents. Developing a “safe” safety-critical system requires accurate and complete safety requirements, which are the foundation of system development. Traditional hazard analysis techniques are insufficient for identifying the causes of accidents in modern railway signaling systems. Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a powerful new hazard analysis method designed to address these limitations. Building upon this foundation, a hierarchical approach to safety requirement development has been further developed. This approach combines STPA analysis with a hierarchical modeling approach to establish traceability links from safety requirements to specific architectures, refine and allocate system-level safety requirements to relevant subsystems, and abstract safety requirements at higher hierarchical levels to enable easy changes to lower-level implementations. This paper employs the aforementioned methodology within the context of the CBTC system, thereby enhancing risk management and hazard analysis, enabling early insights, and facilitating the generation of safety requirements of CBTC System.