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The Status of Leibniz's Theodicy in Kant's Pre-Critical Thought

Authors :
Zahra Farzanegan
Farah Ramin
Source :
پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین, Vol 21, Iss 1, Pp 105-128 (2023)
Publication Year :
2023
Publisher :
Imam Sadiq University, 2023.

Abstract

Immanuel Kant has addressed the problem of evil in many of his works. The neglected part of Kant’s thought -especially among Muslim scholars- is his philosophical objections and defenses regarding the problem of evil in pre-critical and early critical periods. Many of his ideas in this subject remained unchanged until the end of his scientific life and were inspiring for the formation of his later theories. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines the principles of Leibniz’s Theodicy (i.e., evil as privation, theory of the best of all possible worlds, natural evil as punishment, and linking moral evil to free will) from Kant’s viewpoint and shows their role in the formation of his Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Contrary to Leibniz, he defends the positive reality of evil by distinguishing between logical contradiction and real contradiction. Moreover, based on the principles of Newtonian physics, Kant does not consider natural evil as punishment. However, he is in agreement with Leibniz in justifying moral evil according to mankind’s free will. Regarding the best of all possible worlds theory, it plays the most important role in Kant’s Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Although some objections to this theory are found in Kant’s articles, he seriously has upheld it even at the beginning of the critical period and after his Copernican revolution.

Details

Language :
Persian
ISSN :
22286578 and 22286586
Volume :
21
Issue :
1
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.1f98a1f9a86a4f36848db0092469e14a
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.30497/prr.2022.242687.1752