Il problema della significazione del nulla in Anselmo d’Aosta

This paper aims to highlight some aspects of the Anselmian thought, that is, those that deal with the problem of the signification of nothingness. Anselm think over this problem in some of his main writings, in particular in the Monologion and in the De casu diaboli: considering the signification interpreted as adaequatio rei et intellectus, i.e. of a correspondentist theory of truth, it is problematic for the early-medieval philosopher to establish in what way there are names (such as "nothing") which, although they have no referent in objective reality, nevertheless seem to perform some function in language. In order to fully understand the theoretical procedure carried out by Anselm, it is also essential to take into account other works, such as the De grammatico and the De veritate, in which, even if there is no real discussion about nothingness, some foundamental assumptions of Anselmian thought are made explicit. They are essentials to fully understand his speculation around these problems. Next, we will try to show how Anselm comes to identify some constitutive characteristics of logical negation, aware of the distinction between the sometimes improper form that language can take in its ordinary use and the "straight" one, that is the logical one, which correctly expresses how things are in reality for him.