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Explanations and Causal Judgments Are Differentially Sensitive to Covariation and Mechanism Information

Authors :
Ny Vasil
Tania Lombrozo
Source :
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 13 (2022)
Publication Year :
2022
Publisher :
Frontiers Media S.A., 2022.

Abstract

Are causal explanations (e.g., “she switched careers because of the COVID pandemic”) treated differently from the corresponding claims that one factor caused another (e.g., “the COVID pandemic caused her to switch careers”)? We examined whether explanatory and causal claims diverge in their responsiveness to two different types of information: covariation strength and mechanism information. We report five experiments with 1,730 participants total, showing that compared to judgments of causal strength, explanatory judgments tend to be more sensitive to mechanism and less sensitive to covariation – even though explanatory judgments respond to both types of information. We also report exploratory comparisons to judgments of understanding, and discuss implications of our findings for theories of explanation, understanding, and causal attribution. These findings shed light on the potentially unique role of explanation in cognition.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
16641078
Volume :
13
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
Frontiers in Psychology
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.40ea7446bc0e4160bedb84f36872f1b8
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.911177