Research on distribution strategy of logistics enterprise alliance based on three-party evolution game

Abstract Currently, collaborative distribution models have not reached the optimal state of carbon emissions. The cost of additional low-carbon expenditures and the problem of carbon data verification have led to the lack of motivation for reducing emissions among collaborative distribution enterprises. Therefore, how to incentivize them to adopt the low-carbon model is crucial for achieving low-carbon goal. By relying on a government-led digital platform, this paper designs a dual low-carbon incentive strategy to encourage enterprise-alliance to adopt a low-carbon distribution model. In this paper, we first construct an evolutionary game model of the government, enterprise-alliance and end-users; then we explore the conditions of the three-party equilibrium evolution strategy by solving the model and analyzing the stability; and finally, we conduct simulation validation and results analysis with the help of MATLAB. In summary, we found that government punishment is more effective at regulating enterprise-alliance than reward. End-users’ behavior is affected by the costs they need to bear, and they no longer support enterprise-alliance to carry out collaborative low-carbon distribution above a certain threshold.