New Plant Breeding Techniques Under Food Security Pressure and Lobbying

Different countries have different regulations for the approval and cultivation of crops developed by using new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) such as gene editing. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between global food security and the level of NPBT regulation assuming a World Nation Official (WNO) proposes advice on global NPBT food policies. We show that a stricter NPBT food regulation reduces food security as measured by food availability, access, and utilization. We also find that political rivalry among interest groups worsens the food security status, given the NPBT food technology is more productive and the regulatory policy is influenced by lobbying. When the WNO aims to improve food security and weighs the NPBT food lobby contribution more than the non-NPBT food lobby's in the lobbying game, the total lobbying contributions will be the same for the WNO, and the NPBT food lobby will be more successful in the political process. The NPBT food lobby, however, under food security loses its advantage in the political competition, and this may result in a strict NPBT food policy. Under food security problems implementing stricter NPBT food regulations results in welfare losses. JEL Code: D04, D43, D72, P16