Back to Search Start Over

Stochastic Differential Game Model Analysis of Emission-Reduction Technology Under Cost-Sharing Contracts in the Carbon Trading Market

Authors :
Qiang Hou
Yue Guan
Shan Yu
Source :
IEEE Access, Vol 8, Pp 167328-167340 (2020)
Publication Year :
2020
Publisher :
IEEE, 2020.

Abstract

Climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction have become pressing concerns in recent years. Carbon trading systems and emission-reduction cost-sharing contracts are important emission-reduction measures, under the two mechanisms, this paper considers a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem in a dyadic supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. In considering the influence of consumers’ low-carbon preferences on market demand as well as the impact of uncertainty on carbon emission-reduction behaviour, this paper (1) constructs the investment game model under cost-sharing coordination between manufacturers and retailers; (2) adopts differential game and dynamic optimisation methods to obtained investment strategies for manufacturers and retailers under cost-sharing contracts.; and (3) uses a numerical simulation method to simulate the path evolution process of each state variable and, by analysing the sensitivity of various parameters, to determine the influence of various parameters on the decision making of emission reduction among stakeholders. The study finds that under the carbon trading system, cost-sharing contracts have a regulatory effect on enterprise emission-reduction investment and enterprise profits, and that the impact of regulatory effects increases over time. Likewise, the evolution path of the parameters used for various indicators presents a strengthened trend over time. The results show that it is necessary to enhance the cooperative development and exchange of carbon emission-reduction technology among enterprises.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
21693536
Volume :
8
Database :
Directory of Open Access Journals
Journal :
IEEE Access
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
edsdoj.996701911dc6441396611bf8fc7c7bf5
Document Type :
article
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3023391