Immanuel Kant e l’etica ambientale. Tre proposte per rivisitare (e una per riattualizzare) la morale kantiana

The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate that in order to claim that Kant’s ethics is neither speciesist nor anthropocentric there is no need to reinterpret Kant’s theories pushing them over their anthroposcopism. I start by exploring the most relevant references to non-human animals and nature in Kant’s moral theory. Then I highlight the main reasons behind the critics of speciesism and anthropocentrism often referred to Kant’s philosophy. I show how non-anthropocentric environmental ethics reinterpretations of Kant’s moral theory offered by Christine Korsgaard, Sharon Anderson-Gold e Marc Lucht reply to the critics. In conclusion, I claim that staying with Kant’s anthroposcopism and formal approach to moral ethics could be enough to provide a stronger theoretical framework for an already widespread and widely accepted weak anthropocentric reformist environmental ethics.