Continental Policy of Japan as Seen From France: Indochina Crisis of 1940 and Politicians of the Vichy Regime (Part Two)

The present work, consisting of two parts, deals with the little-studied aspects of the Indochina crisis of 1940 in Japanese–French relations – Japan’s claims to control and military presence in French Indochina in the summer and autumn of 1940. During the previous years, ensuring the security and stability of Indochina was at the heart of French policy towards Japan, which was necessarily characterized by a willingness to compromise. The military defeat of France in June 1940 changed its international status: weakened, but not deprived of the colonies and the Navy. The new authoritarian regime of the French state (the Vichy regime) decided to make concessions to Japan in Indochina, given the inequality of forces in the region and the lack of any outside help. The second part of the work begins with the principled decision of the French government to make concessions to the demands of Japan, whose expansionist policy acquired a new scope after the formation of the second cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro, and ends with the entry of Japanese troops into Indochina during September 1940. The author examines the process of the policy of the Vichy regime developing in this direction and the actions of its leaders and main executives: Head of State Marshal Philippe Petain, Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin, Ministers of the Colonies Henry Lémery and Charles Platon, Governor-General of Indochina Jean Decoux. The emphasis is on “politicians,” not on “politics.” The work is based on diaries, memoirs, and other testimonies of the actors, insufficiently studied in Russian Japanology, combined with the latest works of historians.