Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.01.022 Byline: Rudolf Berghammer (a), Agnieszka Rusinowska (b)(c), Harrie de Swart (d) Keywords: Game theory; RelView; Relational algebra; Coalition formation; Feasible government; Dominance; Stable government Abstract: We present an application of relational algebra to coalition formation. This leads to specifications, which can be executed with the help of the RelView tool after a simple translation into the tool's programming language. As an example we consider a simplification of the situation in Poland after the 2001 elections. Author Affiliation: (a) Institute of Computer Science, University of Kiel, OlshausenstraAe 40, 24098 Kiel, Germany (b) Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands (c) Department of Mathematical Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 162, 02-554 Warsaw, Poland (d) Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands Article History: Received 29 June 2005; Accepted 13 January 2006 Article Note: (footnote) [star] Co-operation for this paper was supported by European COST Action 274 'Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments' (TARSKI). We are grateful to two anonymous referees for some useful suggestions.