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Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities

Authors :
Belloni, Alexandre
Deng, Changrong
Pekec, Sasa
Source :
Operations Research. May-June, 2017, Vol. 65 Issue 3, p577, 18 p.
Publication Year :
2017

Abstract

Abstract. A revenue-maximizing monopolist is selling a single indivisible good to buyers who face a loss if any of its rival buyers obtain it. The rivalry is modeled through a [...]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
0030364X
Volume :
65
Issue :
3
Database :
Gale General OneFile
Journal :
Operations Research
Publication Type :
Periodical
Accession number :
edsgcl.503310652
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1585