The Regulation of Charter Schools: National Patterns and Causal Effects. Technical Report

There is considerable debate and evidence about how governments should regulate contractors and other firms, but little on how government should regulate schools. In the first phase of this study, we focus on the correlation between indices of state charter school policies and measures of charter quantity (market share) and three measures of quality: statewide student achievement growth from CREDO, closure of low-performing charter schools, and charter entry into low-performing school districts. States with no charter caps, multiple charter authorizers, and stronger contract renewal standards have higher charter market shares. We also see evidence of a quality-quantity trade-off. The regression coefficients on eight of the 11 policy variables are of opposite signs in the quality and quantity analyses. The positive correlation between charter market share and the number of charter authorizers motivates a follow-up analysis in which we test whether this correlation reflects causation. Using difference-in-differences analysis, we find evidence that adding a statewide authorizing body increased the statewide charter market share gradually over time.