Search

As China faces a rising tide of separatist movements and terrorist activities within its own borders, Beijing has sought closer cooperation with the governments of the Central Asian republics. In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan declared the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with anti-terrorism, extremism, and separatism being its central task. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the US further enhance the need for close collaboration among these countries. Indeed, the SCO will a critical part of Chinese efforts to stem and eradicate external links to domestic separatist and terrorist cells. While the immediate focus of the SCO would be to fight terrorism, the larger issue for the longer term would whether the organization could evolve into a sub-regional arrangement that would contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity. Beijing has already suggested the organization’s uniqueness in promoting common goals and indeed has great interest in seeing it succeed as a counter model to US-led military alliances. However, the path to success may not be smooth and problem-free as is hoped. This paper will seek to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles in achieving key objectives sought by SCO member states: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; nuclear nonproliferation; and promotion of economic prosperity. Within this broader context, the paper will examine whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using SCO as a vehicle and the implications for US interests in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies George W. Bush?s narrative; the relationship between U.S. national security and information technology after the painful experience of 9/11. Bush?s phrases of national security and information technology are in the nucleus of international and national political challenges, yet they are in many ways problematic and controversial. I am asking if they even are a central part of the problem of global war on terror itself. Nevertheless my intention is rather to try to understand what I suggest as Bush?s narrative of ?nightmare? by generating questions from political philosophy that challenge and open up these fundamental phrases. As President Bush is boldly able to simplify the complex phenomenon of terrorism, his acts will raise a question more fundamental in the West: how far he can go with the phrases. Colonizing a cyberspace with totalitarian surveillance activities maintains a paradoxical silence; a vast amount of information without knowledge. In this sense, President Bush has taken in his ?ride? American national security culture to the new frontiers. This has a potential to lead to the deterritorialization of national security. Using Lyotard?s thoughts, the paper discovers questions of putting the phrase ?take the battle to the enemy? into practice. On an information technology level of analysis this can be seen as total accident, in Paul Virilio?s terms, with the pragmatism of permanent cybersurveillance (Patriot Act) of the Americans and not just terrorists. It is a logical step for modernity to define information technology as a tool in this battle in which ?freedom does not come free?. On a narrative level of analysis, I suggest that phrases of information technology should be turned into recognizing a differend. These phrases put forward the unpresentable which, even though it opens up a question of the concept of ?enemy?, reveals how the United States in its travel is struggling not with the enemy but with itself. Bush?s disputable phrases of information technology occupy an important place in U.S. national security culture because of their contradictory relation between state and individual to western expansion of freedom. This is enabled in Bush?s narrative which is legitimated by a possible ?nightmare?. By ?discovering? this ?frontier? in Bush?s universe, we can better understand the modern project grounding its legitimacy in the imaginable future ? and not in 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is diplomacy an art of compromise or enterprise? This is the main challenge towards today’s Chinese foreign policy especially its American policy. The paper argues that the key to this question is how to manage the two basic goals: security and development. During the Iraq war, China focused on development factor more than security one. For the development means oil supply and Iraq market demand; the security factor has three basic meanings of state-power-will. Based on a survey on How Chinese View the Iraq War, one can see that China won the hard power in the short term and lost its soft power in the long term. The paper argues in the second part that from the Iraq war we can see that China considers the U.S. both as opportunities (which focus on America’s investment and export market) and challenges (America’s anti-terrorism campaign makes pressures on China’s strategic security environment) and explores what this means to the future Chinese-American relationship and international politics? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PLEASE NOTE: This paper is still undergoing the required prepublication review by the U.S. Department of Defense. Upon completion of that review and clearance for public release, the paper will be posted in its entirety. You may also request a copy of the paper by emailing Dan Gressang at either Daniel.Gressang@dia.mil or Gressang@aol.com. Upon clearance for release from DoD, the paper will be emailed to you. Thank you for your patience. Bringing strategic level and tactical level analysis and prediction together are not easy tasks. Yet it is in strategic and predictive analysis that we need for effective threat recognition and effective homeland defense and security. And it is strategic and predictive analysis which are the least developed and leveraged at all levels of government. Terrorists are hard targets, constantly adapting, constantly changing, constantly threatening us and our interests in a variety of ways. The target ? terrorists ? is here, there, everywhere and nowhere. The threat seems to change daily, certainly with each new attack. Effective preparation demands broad cooperative efforts involving local, state, and national authorities. It demands the incorporation of law enforcement, intelligence, public health, first responder, and policy perspectives. It requires broad consensus on mission, goals, objectives, and processes if it is to be successful. It must, above all else, be dedicated to the predictive, the anticipatory so that threats can be identified before violent acts have a chance to highlight our shortcomings in security. Responding and reacting to terrorism is a necessary practice of government. Effective homeland defense and homeland security, however, revolve around anticipation of those threats and around efforts to disrupt and deter. Disrupting and deterring terrorists while securing the homeland from attack from within or without, in turn, requires the effective cooperation and coordination across jurisdictions, across perspectives, across levels of government. This paper examines one such effort, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, and uses it to draw some operative lessons for building and operating an effective multi-jurisdiction analysis and warning effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'National Vision' of the Bush Administration with regard to homeland security aimed to 'prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating the legal flow of people, goods, and services'. International implications of homeland security measures have resulted in the emergence of new class of foreign policy makers: Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and other units in the Department of Homeland Security whose exposure to international partners increased considerably. This paper challenges a reader to make a certain conceptual shift and look at homeland security as a foreign policy issue as well as the internal security one. The analysis of transatlantic homeland security progresses in two steps. First, it explores the post-September 11th development of homeland security cooperation between the US and the EU in order to identify challenges to the transatlantic governance of homeland security. Then, the attention is paid to internal challenges stemming from domestic politics on each side but also to external ones posed by the international environment and third parties. Issues under discussion in this paper include aviation security and customs cooperation which represent most impressive but at the same time most problematic dimension of the contemporary transatlantic homeland security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will explore some of the general political and economic dynamics of contemporary border management in North America from a comparative perspective. It operates both in terms of some basic policy analysis but mostly offers commentary on theoretical and research approaches to these issues. The paper will take as its framework the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent actions by some national governments around the world to reinforce their borders (re‐territorialization). In this regard, the paper pays particular attention to the issue of securitization of borders and mobility, both at the state's frontiers and within it, as a method of counter‐terrorism policy, migration control, and for other exclusionary ends. The securitization process will be traced through several key examples, particularly in North America and Europe. While noting the emergence of new forms of border management such as cross‐border policing in the European Union and bi‐lateral border management in North America, it will also acknowledge the persistence of more traditional border control efforts in many parts of the globe—particularly in the developing world—which are generally less technologically‐driven and often are much less strict as they deal with different security concerns. As such, the paper argues the emerging politics of border management remains differentiated and complex. The paper surveys several of the more interesting conceptual attempts to describe what is going on. To add my voice to this dialogue, I suggest that in order to have more meaningful and robust analysis of these developments, border scholarship needs to move beyond the de/re‐territorializing duality and consider a hierarchy of border security threats. Given the complexity of this picture, the paper ends by calling for a reinvigorated interdisciplinary approach to research on border security. I also suggest we need to think in terms of "risk management" rather than traditional "border security" as such. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the way in which Russian security agencies approach the issue of terrorism both within Russia and beyond its borders. Who is leading the fight? Is it the military or are civilian bodies such as the FSB to the fore? Does Russian practice mirror that in the West or are there uniquely Russian characteristics? What is coordination like between those various agencies across the civil-military divide tasked with counter-terrorism? How successful have the Russians been? Are there lessons that Western bodies can learn from them? This paper suggests that there are and that the Russian 'way', while being criticised for some of its excesses, can provide useful models for Western agencies to borrow from. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the role of the private company in the fight against terrorism. It argues that the private company has become political important for counter-terrorism, but that the economic logic of the company is hardly compatible with the aim of providing national security. By examining how corporate actors conceptualize the risk of terrorism, the paper investigates whether it is possible for a private company to assume responsibility in the fight against terrorism; and what political dilemmas that arise when the private company is given a political role in the provision of national security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US/Canada border has been the object of a compex of new policies, politics, and discourses in the post-9.11 world. Based on my previous research into American border and homeland security policy shifts, this paper examines how the US/Canada border has become a contentious site of mobility, freedom, and restrictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the events of September 11, 2001, critics of globalization were already up in arms over the supposed siege of state sovereignty by the economic forces of the process. Specifically, they lamented about the deferment by national governments on the domestic and international stage to the economic forces of globalization. Since 9/11, however, we have witnessed the "return" of big government on the national and world stage. One only needs to point to the greater emphasis on national security and the so-called global war on terrorism to see that the political realm has "regained" the mantle of leadership it had "surrendered" to the invisible hand of economics. Yet, at the same time while state sovereignty had re-exerted itself, we are also witnessing a loss of sovereignty as the world becomes more of a community. This paper examines this paradox and the implications it will have on the prospects for greater global integration as well as peace and stability of the world system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Fight against Terrorism has traditionally been considered a constituent element of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Yet although macro-strategic decision-making is mainly located within the Council's Secretariat and Council of JHA Ministers, its external dimension reserves a role for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This rhetorical 'spill-over' of an internal security concern onto the CSDP is an interesting yet under-researched development. It is argued in this contribution that this is partially due to its relative under-development when compared to other aspects of the European anti-terrorist response. Accordingly, the paper aims to highlight the intervening factors that explain this paucity of policy outcomes. In addition, and building on recent debates in the field of terrorism studies, it provides a critical assessment of the conceptual foundations that link CSDP and C-T in the EU's discourse while evaluating the short and medium term potential for a more vigorous evolution of these policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides an historical examination of the creation and evolution of the post-9/11 White House homeland security machinery. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the themes of terrorism andcounterterrorism as they are manifest in the popular culture of the United States and United Kingdom, by focusing on two televisual representations of the dialectics of terrorism and counterterrorism. In each of the works I have chosen, the dilemmas posed by counterterrorist mobilization of the security apparatus are either implicitly or explicitly confronted in fictional spaces. I compare similarities and differences in the representation of agents (individuals)and agencies (organizations) involved in terrorism and counterterrorism, and how this impacts democratic polities, by examining two different cultural products. 24 (US Fox Network), and Spooks (UK BBC), are television series based on fictionalized narratives that try to simulate the activities ofcounterterrorist operations either in: a wholly fictional Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU); and fictionalized MI-5 agents, respectively. In both of these works, the dangers to civil liberties, privacy, and human rights posed by both terrorist attacks, and overt and covert internalsecurity operations, lie at the core of their narrative structure. Each of these works deals with issues of intra-organizational competition and factionalization within intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the elite networks which direct these agencies. Additionally, 24 and MI5/Spooks take a somewhat ambiguous stance vis-a -vis dissident and/orsecurity agent tactics that at times verge on the level of terrorist, or at the very least, criminal behavior. Both of these works have received much critical attention and debate about their significance for interpreting the cultural aftereffects of the "war on terror", the role of intelligence and military services, and violence and suspicion and paranoia in the political culture of early 21st centuryUnited States and United Kingdom. These programs and films were in development, or being broadcast, during a time period which spanned the before and after of September 11th, 2001, and the attacks of July 2005 in London, providing an opportunity to detect cultural shifts or the durability of certain themes. Scripts and airdates were altered in certain instances, raising questions of censorship and the possible conflation of the real and the fictional. By examining these works, andhow the represent the motivations and activities of agents and agencies, I seek to answer the following questions: are these works subversive, merely the commodification of anxiety, or do they in certain cases contribute to the legitimacy of internal security and intelligence agencies? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to set out some general parameters for coming to grips with a central homeland security concern: the effort to make potential targets invulnerable, or at least notably less vulnerable, to terrorist attack. It argues that protection makes sense only when protection is feasible for an entire class of potential targets and when the destruction of something in that target set would have quite large physical, economic, psychological, and/or political consequences. There are a very large number of potential targets where protection is essentially a waste of resources and a much more limited one where it may be effective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between democracy and security has been central to Western understandings of global relations, and current arguments about making the world safe for democracy, or for the family of "civilized nations", are by no means new. Today's "war on terror", and prevalent fears of terrorism, establish a culture of emergency, or (nation) states of anxiety, creating conditions ripe for the erosion of democratic principles and values. This paper presents the findings of a study examining the relationships among self-reported democratic values, critical thinking dispositions, psychological distress, prejudice, and attitudes toward armed militants and terrorists. In a sample of 949 social science students, low scores on democratic values, and high scores on prejudice, ethnocultural zeal, dehumanization of armed militants, social dominance orientation, and militarism, accounted for 72% of the variance of the stance "security at any cost", in which a university educated sample went so far as sanctioning the use of torture on "suspected terrorists" and supporting military actions that would cause the death of thousands of civilians overseas if such policies and actions would help ensure their own safety. The relationship between democracy and antiterrorism, and implications of the study for understanding how zeal, prejudice, and insecurity precipitate constraints on democratic action and expression, are discussed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper interrogates changes and constancies in the meaning of terror in India with a specific reference to the train blasts in Mumbai in 2006. It examines borders broadlyâ€"as shifting thresholds in legislation and as boundaries erected to equal 'war on terror' with 'war on Muslim terror'. In 2002 India launched a new anti-terror law (POTA), which was repealed in 2004; and India is constantly torn between blaming domestic Islamic organisations and 'cross-border terrorism' for involvement in terror acts. In the Indian case the vagueness and ephemeral character of where to draw the frontiers of blame is placing Muslim citizens in an especially precarious situation. Are Indian Muslims collaborators of extremist groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh; where should the boundary between external/internal be erected? Questions unfolding in the wake of terror acts appear to pertain to a complex set of borders linked to a more general reconstitution of the parameters of the Indian nation-state and its ambiguous place in the global war on terror. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In mainstream security studies, the threats of the nation are often defined by the state, deemed existential and with the acquiescence of the rest of the nation. However in the case of Singapore today, this is not to be with regards to the assessment of the resilience of its multicultural to withstand a terrorist attack. Repeated opinion polls indicate that people think that inter-racial relations are good even though they also believe that an imminent terror attack is possible. However, the state still believes that inter-racial relations are vulnerable and fragile and thus the need to step up on the building of social resilience. By examining the manner in which state-led initiatives to enhance communal relations are justified and implemented, this paper contends that the programmes are based on inflated threat perceptions that serve to accentuate the disconnect pertaining to the state of multicultural resilience perceived by the state and the people. The first section provides a brief overview of the concept of security understood by the state and the people. It shows that the public is excluded from the process of defining national security threats and the strategies to mitigate them, a responsibility that is conventionally exclusively relegated to the state. As a result, the citizens' feeling of insecurity is likely to stem from worries pertaining to their daily lives rather than state-centric national security concerns. The second section locates the Singapore case study within this framework. It demonstrates that the state's alarmist threat assessment of communal relations frames key policies for communal bonding, despite evidence to the contrary on the ground. The conclusion will discuss the implications for consolidating social resilience. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing campaign against foreign terrorist groups has presented a number of key issues for members of the intelligence community in their support of diplomatic and military operations. Although most attention by analysts has been paid to necessary changes to the intelligence community in support of homeland defense, foreign intelligence operations in support of what might be called offensive counterterrorism also require assessment and analysis. Particular areas of attention include the desirability of direct intelligence agency counterterrorism missions versus support of military special operations forces; restructuring intelligence support for non-traditional missions; US intelligence support for foreign nations facing a terrorist threat (including some countries with less than stellar human rights records); and intelligence coordination of a highly complex series of new missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Re-conceptualizing security beyond the traditional idea of “national security” is a defining characteristic of the post-9/11 environment. In scholarly communities and amongst practitioners, the international nature of current and emerging threats is incr ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creatively utilizing the modern technological environment, transnational terrorist networks like al Qaeda pose a unique challenge to international security in the age of globalization. With recent developments in weapons and information technology, non-s ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly involved in protecting the security and safety of European citizens. The latest additions to this new policy space are counter terrorism policies and critical infrastructure protection. A central role for the EU in guarding against global terrorism and infrastructural breakdowns may seem evident. In reality, the precise nature of such a role remains unclear. Enthusiastic rhetoric is not always matched by firm action, and the political commitment of national leaders to supranational policies is often vague. One way to gauge the possibility of a "capability and expectations" gap is to compare the institutionalization of these two sectors, to understand the degree to which new structures, rules, and norms are becoming embedded - and thus influencing behaviour. Not only does an institutionalization approach shed light on the nature of European integration in this fairly recent policy space; it also indicates the degree to which supranational policies are actually making Europeans safer. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For over a decade, Russia has been battling against the threat of terrorism. The Russian authorities has adopted and revised extensive counterterrorism legislation, repeatedly modified institutions responsible for the realization of counterterrorism policies, and changed tactics of counterterrorism operations. Despite these attempts to organize Russia's counterterrorism efforts, there has been no steady decrease in the number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the scourge of terrorism has spread from the embattled Chechen republic into previously unaffected parts of Russia. What explains this lack of success of the Kremlin's counterterrorism strategy? This study argues that despite the significant changes in the nature of terrorist threat and the geo-political strategic environment, the Soviet era security principles and institutions continue to underlie Russia's counterterrorism responses. This continuity of the Soviet/Russian counterterrorism policy is further explained by the endurance of imperial tradition in the Russian political thinking. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the institutional peculiarities of a small Member State may affect the defense of the EU against terrorism. It tracks the institutional characteristics of the national security actors in Ireland, determines what key pressures have formed such characteristics and designs how they may color the actors' inputs EU level. The EU has accelerated the development of strategic and tactical responses to the challenges of countering international terrorism, since the train bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004.

The article discusses the indications and warning for the U.S. homeland security. It claims that despite major changes in the country's bureaucracy after several attacks on the homeland, it still remains ill prepared for detecting the next attack. It provides an overview of the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) following the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii by the Japanese. Also cited is that almost every state and major cities in the country have some form of anti-terrorism task force (ATTF).

The article focuses on the impact of the U.S. War on Terror campaign on global democracy. It notes that the global war on terror resulted to security decisions made privately by states and not to consensual decisions made in open and inclusive global political processes. It discusses how the country's unilateral exercise of power resulted to a legitimacy crisis. It stresses the potential of deliberative democracy to legitimize the country's foreign policy.

[America’s] autobiography begins with the love of freedom--to paraphrase Agnes Heller. This paper takes as its focus the repetitive, pervasive rhetoric of freedom mobilised by the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11. What is its purpose? Does it have any meaning, or is it just an Orwellian signifier of ruthless security-seeking, neocon paranoia and imperial ambition? While seeing the rhetoric of freedom as a powerful technology of persuasion and consent, the paper locates its meaning in the metanarratives of Manifest Mission and American Exceptionalism - peculiarly American mutations of Hegelian freedom, Baconian science and Clausewitzian strategy that have now coalesced into a potent ontology of permanent war. Can we escape and refigure a geopolitical ontology in which, to quote Levinas, ‘everything that is possible is permitted...a miracle of modern western freedom unhindered by any memory of remorse’? This paper explores ethical alternatives to counter-terror, security and freedom, both to imagine more just and durable policy responses and to imagine a different kind of post-9/11 Enlightenment based on the question: Must the terror of anti-terror be permanent, or freedom be enduringly fleeting? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will analyse the American discourse on so-called terrorism in focusing on the resort to the network as a mode of description both of terrorist groups organizations and of our western societies. Since the beginning of the 90’s, US Intelligence agencies insist on the networked organization of so-called terrorist groups. This discourse partially took the place of another one that have largely focused on state sponsored terrorism and which tended to territorialize the terrorist threat, to associate terrorism to territorial spaces from a certain number of states (so-called Rogue States) to specific areas (Middle East).. With the discourse in terms of networks, the terrorist threat is both de-territorialized and presented as globalized. Since the middle of the 90’s and the reflection on the necessity to protect Critical Infrastructures, has appeared an other side in the US anti-terrorist discourse which points out the necessity to protect computer networks against cyberattacks. Here, the threat is much more than de-territorialized. It is virtualized and the question now raised is to know how to protect so-called cyberspace. In addition to the National Security Strategy and to the National Strategy to Protect Homeland Security now exists the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. I will try to explore how are linked the protection of the American national ground and of the cyberspace.. Is the cyberspace part of the Homeland? If it is the case, does it make sense? Can we speak of a national cyberspace? How does it affect the notion of frontier? What are the effects of such an evolution on security agencies and especially on intelligence agencies? More generally speaking, the goal of this paper is to show how this evolution in the US anti/counter-terrorism discourse reveals a transformation of our relation to the territory and space and how it affects security analysis and practices.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two seemingly different security policiesâ€"the US national security strategy (2002/2005) and the European Security Strategy (2003) make similar claims about security or the lack thereof. According to these akin, yet also distinct, narratives, the world has become a more dangerous place. The ‘new’ dangerous world necessitates the securing of spatial borders that separate political communities as well as distinguish friend from foe. Additionally, both danger and safety are written through and in time as well as space; security, the texts convey, implies temporality, in intimate and inseparable relation to its spatial dimensions. Different notions of time (relationship of past, now and future) structure the strategies into stories which seemingly makes sense, and which establish the subject of security (The ‘US’, and ‘Europe’) as knowable and securable into the future. They thus ensure a semblance of order and inevitability, and pave the way for seemingly ‘sure’ security strategies and futures. Perhaps most strikingly, the ways in which security has been inscribed in the US and European security strategies in the wake of the September 11th (2001) terrorist attacks raise questions about the politics of commemoration, the making of history, the narratives written to ensure safety, the identities inscribed through those stories, and the futures implied in their plots. In light of these considerations, this paper aims to engage with questions of security, identity and timeâ€"specifically, the gendered politics of writing security in time, or ‘spacetime’ (Weston). In particular, the paper will query into the temporalities which inform the US National Security Strategy (2002/2005) and the European Security Strategy (2003). It addresses how the (arguably impossible) securing of a subject is promised through a gendered narrative of the subject as already existing and known, ontologically stable throughout time, and securable. Importantly, looking closely at two similar yet distinct security strategies, the paper will show how modern security narratives rely on the inscription of memory and the writing of a reliable and knowable temporal trajectory, in part, through the markings of gender. It explores how through particular discursive moves in both of these strategies, the ‘subject of security’ is formed, ‘remembered’, and thus gains presence in space-time. This presence is projected into the future and particular strategies, as well as the certain subjects these strategies shall protect, emerge as both inevitable and possible. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I investigate four regional multi-lateral security assistance and treaty entities’ activities in Eurasia generally, and specifically in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). I pay particular attention to both differences and similarities in how these entities, and their respective member states, balance effective management of transborder threats (especially counterterrorism and counternarcotics activities), and human rights considerations. In the first section of my paper I examine how the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) have developed into regional coordinating entities designed to support member states development of capacities and policies to deal with transborder threats. Each of these organizations have not only served as a forum for discussions and policy harmonization (or attempted harmonization) between member states, but has also served as an umbrella organizations for coordinating joint counterterrorism and counternarcotic operations, training exercises, and the distribution of other forms of security assistance and training. Bilateral and multilateral joint counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations and training exercises are just one example of joint counterterrorism and law enforcement operations in the region, among various constellations of member states of these entities. This paper will be based on a series of four case studies examining how each of these regional multi-lateral security assistance and treaty organization have evolved since the collapse of the Soviet state and alliance systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s, until the present (early 2008). These cases will seek to examine not only the evolution of these organizations in a rapidly shifting and incredibly complex security environment spanning the collapse of a major power (the Soviet state), the “global” and other “wars on terror,” and the resurgence of active peer competitors (Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China) to the United States within the context of a security environment defined and shaped by the nexus of interests defined by these overlapping and at times competitive and antagonistic multilateral entities. A key goal of these papers is to examine the impact of these multilateral entities on Central Asian member states national and internal security institutions, historical and contemporary critical incidents, and evaluations by various NGOs and other entities about how regional cooperation activities and multilateral and bilateral security activities either reinforce, or erode, human rights in member states in Central Asia specifically, and Eurasia more generally. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil or homeland security provides an interesting case for the study of norms transmission. The ‘norm-takers’ in these cases are often officials in cities or arms of government not typically responsible for foreign policy or defence: transportation, civil infrastructure protection, and emergency management. These levels and branches of government are not an obvious site for international relations and security policy, but they have become the focus of policy for preventing and responding to terrorism. However, there is some precedent for civil security norms penetrating arms of government not typical seen to be engaged in international security: the civil defence policies of the cold war. I apply Amitav Acharya’s idea of norm localization, whereby local norms-takers engage in a dynamic process of interaction to adapt local and transnational norms to match each other, to civil security. How do local officials localize regional and global anti-terrorism norms to environments where global security is a new priority, but which already have well-established norms for dealing with natural disasters, crime, and other emergencies? The literature on norms diffusion typically posits a trickle-down effect, with transnational norms-entrepreneurs generating norms to be implemented domestically. But in this situation where local actors possess expertise in emergency response, is there evidence of a trickle-up effect, with local practice influencing regional or international norms? This paper will also contribute to the literature on the life-cycle of norms because it will focus on a case where localization may include re-invigorating the dormant norms of civil defence. Empirically, the paper will examine Canadian civil security policy, with a focus on the all-hazards norm for responding to emergencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the challenges and opportunities presented to U.S. counter proliferation strategies in a new security environment.This paper finds that following the terrorist attacks of September 11; the security landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In this new era, key regional states and terror organizations seem increasingly determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology. The multilateral framework of nonproliferation treaties and regimes established over the past several decades have failed to prevent determined states from developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. As a result, the United States has taken an increasingly active role in attempting to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, using a wide variety of strategies (Proliferation Security Initiative) in an attempt to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration?s national security strategy starts with the reality of a post-proliferated international security environment and in September 2002, preemption was enshrined as a part of American counter proliferation policy in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. While security interests and prestige are motivating factors for states to acquire nuclear weapons, economic needs and social desires are strong incentives for desisting from doing so. While the United States has successfully dissuaded some countries (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey) from going nuclear by forging stable alliances, it has failed on other fronts. For example, Iran is already a reason for immediate concern. As Tehran seeks nuclear weapons, it simultaneously continues to increase its trade and sees such diversification as a buffer against external efforts to isolate it. In dealing with Pakistan, the United States has to balance between its strategic interests and non-proliferation concerns. On the other hand, the refocusing of economic and foreign policy of Russia and China (key suppliers of nuclear technology) have continued to change in ways that raise questions and cause problems for the United States. I use case study methods to compare theoretical predictions and argue that dealing with global proliferation presents both challenges and opportunities to U.S. counter proliferation efforts. I aim to demonstrate two issues. First, that each country mentioned above, presents a unique set of challenges and that a military solution while not always the best option can often be counterproductive. On the other hand, including economic and social benefits present a splendid opportunity for the United States to limit the supply of nuclear technology and compel nations to fulfill their international obligations. I also seek to demonstrate the tensions or potential for cooperation between existing multilateral non-proliferation regimes such as the NPT and counter proliferation strategies of the United States such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Are their policies at odds with each other or can they function in conjunction to achieve a common goal of a nuclear free world? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the 11 September attacks on British Defence and Security Policy and how the Government has responded to the challenges posed by this threat. The aim is to examine the extent to which the UK has developed an effective strategy to counter the threat posed by the 'new terrorism' and explore alternative strategies that might be employed. As such, the paper will analyse the nature of the threat, whether we understand the nature of the phenomenon and its causes. iIt will then examine The means employed by the state to defend the people and interests of the UK and how these means have been combined in terms of developing an effective strategy. Finally it will also attempt to identify areas of tension between the UK and US approach to GWOT and assess the role of the UK's actions within the broader context of the US grand strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two of the most significant developments in the U.S. national security landscape since 9/11 have been the increase in size, budget and responsibility of the Special Operations Forces on the one hand, and the movement for reform of the intelligence community on the other. This paper seeks to investigate the largely unexplored intersection of these two trends and how they are reacting to one another. The White House and the Pentagon have designated Special Operations Forces (SOF) as the lead organization in the ?war on terror.? However, as they have gotten more involved in fighting terrorism, SOF have become increasingly active in intelligence and direct action operations (manhunts, for example) that have traditionally been the CIA?s bailiwick under the rubric of ?covert action?, where the key factor is that the U.S. role in the operation is unacknowledged. Beyond triggering the predictable bureaucratic turf battles, this has effectively meant a decrease in congressional oversight since that system?s rules are somewhat vague and have been interpreted by the Pentagon as applying to the CIA but not to the military as it prosecutes the war on terror.At the same time, the intelligence failures of 9/11 and the nonexistent Iraqi WMD created a broad consensus on the need for intelligence reform. Among the various reform proposals, there has been a consistent call for stronger congressional oversight of intelligence and covert action decisions. Nonetheless, when Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004, one aspect that was notably absent was any substantive strengthening of Congress?s oversight authority. There is some evidence, however, that after several years of turning a blind eye to the Pentagon?s growing intelligence role, Congress is finally beginning to reassert itself in the oversight arena. At the same time, though, the Pentagon has been busy developing a variety of new classifications of programs that by definition do not have to be reported to Congress but under which it can conduct operations that, if they were conducted by the CIA, would be called covert action (and thus would be subject to congressional oversight). It seems, therefore, that the Pentagon is managing to remain two steps ahead of Congress in keeping the military?s most sensitive programs out of its view. This paper will analyze the congressional committees? halting efforts at strengthening oversight and the reasons improving oversight has proven so difficult, and the Pentagon?s creative ways of avoiding oversight. Additionally, it will elucidate why SOF?s involvement in intelligence causes particular problems for congressional oversight since it inherently involves both the intelligence and defense committees. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations on how to improve oversight in this new era of SOF-dominated intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explore the multilevel transformation of the US surveillance and control agencies in digital times and under the heading of ?Homeland Security?. It shows how these agencies are engaged in a networking process that is rooted in old routines that were at play long before September 11. The paper analyzes various discourses, documents, reports, laws, and congress hearings in relation to ?security issues? to show how linguistic practices ?spatialize? the threat by territorialisation, de-territorialisation and ?technologisation?. It then considers the hierarchical structure constituted by the intelligence and antiterrorist related agencies to highlight the intriguing relation they have with space and technology while facing the terrorist threat. It finds that what is at stake in the United States and also in Europe is the attempt to articulate the geographical skeleton of the borders and the technical network of data-bases which contains data on people, so as to achieve the security of some forms of national discontinuous territories. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The creation of the Office of Homeland Security shortly after September 11th has demanded a fundamental rethinking of war, not least of which because there has been an explicit rearticulation of the frontiers of military security practices. Not only are these frontiers at or outside of the territorial borders of the United States, but they are also now on the inside of the United States as well. Indeed, the National Strategy for Homeland Security is an explicit attempt to coordinate all levels of government, the private sector, the American people, and importantly the US military, all in the name of securing the American way of life. In the words of President Bush: ?Every American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this fight.? Fundamentally, resignifying the military as a direct participant in the domestic affairs of the state, and constituting the homeland as a battleground in the war against terror. What does it mean, however, and what are the effects of constituting the homeland as battleground? While this response appears as rather unambiguous in terms of the who, the where, the what, the when, and the how, what this paper seeks to explore is how the war on/of terror is actually profoundly ambiguous. Put differently, the power at work in the idea of homeland security rests not in its clear vision, but rather in its very ambiguity. It is at one and the same time about securing a spatial fixity and also securing a radical spatial mobility. It?s about expanding the frontiers of homeland as much as it is about contracting and tightening borders. It?s a highly mobilised and deterritorialised war against terrorism played out on multiple bodies. It?s about constituting racialised and hyper-masculinised ?stranger dangers? and ?dangerous strangers,? where not everyone gets to call this imaginary place called America home. Thus, this paper also seeks to explore homeland security as a fundamentally exclusionary and explusionary practice ? a terrorising practice ? and as a new source of knowledge about multiple Others which serves to produce radical insecurities both within and without. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a controversial aspect of broadening definitions of security and, by extension, the security and development nexus. It addresses the purpose of foreign assistance, which shifted in the wake of 2001. One consequence has been that Washington has resurrected practices previously associated with police aid during the Cold War. In particular, it has broadened the remit of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in a way that goes beyond the reform of public policing. The consequences could be significant, for today?s threat-driven policies are part of a trend, which in the past has had worrying consequences. This paper argues that using USAID to improve the counter-terrorist capacity of Africa?s police in the pursuit of US national security objectives is seriously flawed. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores security as a gendered and temporally discursive practice. Drawing upon examples from security discourses written in part in response to ?traumatic? experiences of violence (e.g. the US security strategy in its on-going 'Global War on Terror'), it addresses how the (arguably impossible) securing of a subject is promised through a gendered narrative of the subject as already existing and in need of security. Importantly, this subject is not only located in space, but also?as an integral part of space?in time: ?space-time?. Specifically, the paper will explore how attempts to ensure a subject of security rely on the inscription of memory and the writing of time through the markings of gender. It argues that instead of the gendered subject of security being separate and existing prior to the act of ?speaking? or writing security, it is through the very naming of threat and danger, that the ?subject of security? is formed, ?remembered?, and thus gains presence in space-time. In sum the paper aims to question how space-time and subjectivity are configured in distinct discourses of danger/security marked by gender, and for raising questions about the political ramifications of such spatio-temporal constellations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of widespread agreement among observers both inside and outside of government circles that information sharing is critical to homeland security, U.S. counter-terrorism agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, and the newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center, continue to experience considerable difficulty sharing tactical and operational intelligence among relevant stakeholders. Drawing on theories of organizational behavior and the author?s interviews with counter-terrorism officials, this paper examines the institutional and individual constraints that continue to hamper information sharing across federal agencies. These limitations include knowledge-based routines that agencies use to control (and hoard) intelligence, such as ?originator control? (or ORCON, as it is widely known in the intelligence community), inter-agency turf battles that remain alive and well since 9/11, and impact of bounded rationality on government officials working in this dynamic, stressful environment. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of research for homeland security, suggesting that efforts at reforming intelligence agencies should focus less on reorganizing and centralizing existing bureaucracies and more on redesigning incentive structures and knowledge-based routines created during the Cold War. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, changing U.S. national security concerns and institutions has placed a heavy emphasis on Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican border. However, it is not clear what is Mexico's nation security agenda, to what extent this is a cohesive and widely-shared agenda, or how Mexican security priorities have evolved in response to both domestic concerns and new U.S. priorities.This paper examines the ways that the Mexican security agenda and apparatus has changed since 2001, and the extent to which there is a cohesive vision of Mexican security priorities in the new context of global terrorism. In the process, this paper will attempt to catalogue and assess current domestic security concerns --e.g., insurgent movements and organized crime-- as well as those that represent possible threats to U.S. interests. This paper will also examine the security agenda professed by public officials and key institutions in Mexico. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the emergence of the Department of Homeland Security in a historical comparative perspective, and argues for the utility of using a ?second-image reversed? perspective to examine the impact that systemic level changes have on domestic institutional development. The paper thus brings together literatures from international relations and American political development to explain the origins of institutional change in domestic security institutions. A punctuated equilibrium model is used to understand four critical junctures in the emergence of new ?homeland defense? policies in the United States. The first period examined is the late 19th century and the US domestic response to the rise of transnational anarchist networks in North America and Europe. Secondly, the US domestic response to domestic security concerns raised by the Russian Revolution is examined through a discussion of the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Sedition Act, and the subsequent Palmer Raids of 1919-20. The third case study examines the expansion of a national security state in the aftermath of World War II, focusing particularly on institutional development during 1947-51 in response to the early Cold War period. Finally, we examine the emergence of a Department of Homeland Security bureaucracy, and employ Lowi and Hacker?s work on policy layering to understand the nature of the bureaucratic apparatus that is currently materializing. In the conclusion of the paper, we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of our case studies ? arguing for the necessity of integrating international systemic and domestic institutional perspectives for understanding the nature of US internal security responses, and, from a historical comparative perspective, discussing the efficacy of current policies as responses to the post-9/11 international security environment. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary standards applied to determine whether a state’s recourse to military force is legally and ethically permissible have been described as highly problematic given the current international environment. One reason for this is that the relevant positivist and natural law doctrines ultimately frame this determination in mutually exclusive terms such as legal or illegal, just or unjust. However, as the War on Terrorism demonstrates, the ambiguity of modern threats and the subjectivity of new fears may not be compatible with such black-and-white categorization schemes and thus these frameworks may not be as helpful in guiding national security decision-making as they could be. We see, for example, that each new use of force (2001 Afghanistan, 2003 Iraq) is typically accompanied by opposing, twin advertisements from prominent scholars and policymakers, each arguing that their competing judgments are definitive. Thus, new questions need to be formulated to help us move beyond such seemingly incommensurable claims to determine when modern war may be reasonably justified in an era of high stakes and collective uncertainty. This paper seeks to fill this gap by proposing a new just war framework that narrows in on how to decide whether a use of force should be initiated if relative certitude about intentions, capabilities, and outcomes may not be attainable. Because I find the UN Charter paradigm on the use of force to remain binding international law that imposes continuing obligations on states and because traditional just war theory poses useful ethical barriers limiting state resort to force, this proposal may be interpreted as adding to rather than negating current authorities and standards shaping the jus ad bellum. Toward these ends, this essay defines three new criteria drawn from diverse legal and ethical discourses relevant to today’s international climate and examines the historical consequences that befell those who engaged in unjust wars as a practical warning for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine public opinion and the war on terrorism. It will examine trends in public opinion at six month intervals as well as report finding of an in-depth analysis of views of residents of Portland, ME concerning the relationship between liberty and security inherent in anti-terrorist policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the theory behind and the structure of public security response to the new civil challenges of the erratically globalizing community in the information age.. Major wars for territory will largely be a thing of the past. Rather, major city-like states will vigorously struggle in less than full scale competitions for resources, accesss, and influence. Borders will be porous though monitored. The integrated nature of future states will provide plenty of internal, complex system insecurities without threat of major war and national security forces will play more technically intrusive roles. Most economic exchange will occur between the fully globalized city-state economies, but the need for extracted resources or exploitive production will keep economic interests plunging into the less integrated suburb states and ungovernable badlands. From these areas, as populations and economic desires wax and wane, periodic disease, drugs, and despair will rise and spread through in dense marginalized populations. Coupled with inadequacies in medicine, education and hope, the badland difficulties will seep and sometimes explode across porous borders or economic pathways to cause disruptive ripple effects in the more integrated advanced national systems. In particular, organizations using violence as a way to remedy their suffering or grievance will rise, flourish, and die, or transform with regularity. In the process, centers of power in the integrated states will be required to respond to the extent that the turbulence will spill over into the myriad of otherwise stable interactions of their own communitiesThe new world will have few big enemies and many smaller threatening societies, all competing for the world’s limited economic resources. The threats constituting possible trends in a large global complex system may be channeled using the knowledge tools of these societies. The design of these responses, however, must be guided by knowledge of human history in international relations and political-economic development, and grounded by organization theory. The discussion begins with two theoretical literatures which together form the starting points of this work: complexity theory (knowledge, surprise, trends), and social theories (motivation, violence, organizing). From theory, the discussion quickly moves to how populations sprout violent organizations, how conflicts may be fought by knowledge-enabled organizations, and how war, economies, and states may grow together over time. The argument here is that future national insecurities will be faced in wars of “disruption”, not destruction. These threats will be chronic, possibly even tidal, but not singularities across time. Meeting security threats therefore will focus on dampening hot spots before they spread, generally preemptively, and always with a vigorous blend of advanced technologies and in-depth knowledge of consistent human frailties, cultures, and institutionalizing tendencies. The emerging global mass society will never look like the quiet harmony of an evening stroll in downtown Quietville. Rather, the noisy byways around pockets of relative calm of a Berlin, Paris or San Francisco are more analogous. Within each state will be swathes of lesser and barely surviving populations, increasingly likely to be immigrants. These points of direct human connection to the less well off suburb states or badlands will often constitute the main source of entry into the populations of the larger city-state. There, turbulence will always be multicultural, surprising, and challenging in terms of both the knowledge needed and tools required to respond. This future world will require meeting complexity head on and disrupting the worse emergent trends first, but with a human face and understanding ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 set in motion extensive efforts to improve the quality of U.S. intelligence for homeland security. Most attention has focused on the U.S. intelligence community (IC), which is comprised of the 17 federal agencies traditionally tasked with gathering foreign intelligence. While this focus was necessary, it was not sufficient to protect Americans from future terrorist attacks because â€" unlike during the Cold War â€" States and municipalities now play a vitally important role in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. Many States and local governments were swift to recognize this fact and, in the absence of federal leadership, initiated actions to establish intelligence fusion centers and train their first responders as intelligence collectors. The result has been that, while these new entities have filled a potentially serious gap in the homeland security intelligence effort, they have developed in highly individualized ways. While some degree of uniqueness is salutary to optimize them for local conditions, other aspects of this developmental process are potentially harmful. For example, the adoption of different IT software and operating procedures makes it difficult for state fusion centers to communicate with each other. A proliferation of communications channels from the federal IC has compounded this problem. The paper will describe the evolution of this situation and explain where problem areas exist. It will identify options for addressing problems at each level of government, analyze these options, and make recommendations to avert this new gathering storm in the U.S. homeland security intelligence enterprise. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tentacles of the ‘war on terror’ agenda extend far beyond military action and relationships between the Christian west and Islamic regions of the world. It has also significantly impacted the ability of humanitarians to carry out their mission and mandate. Drawing upon research conducted in the occupied Palestinian territory in the summer of 2006 as part of the HA2015 project, this paper reflects upon some of the challenges of providing assistance in the context of the war on terror. These challenges, in particular, concern funding and partnerships, as restrictions have made humanitarian actors more cautious and limited in their activities and partnership relationships have suffered as a result. Furthermore, the discourse of the “war on terror” and resulting tensions between the west and Islam have created a more difficult security environment for humanitarian actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mexico was unable to develop a national security doctrine before and after9/11 under the Vicente Fox administration. In fact, the lack of a national security doctrine and an unclear foreign policy illustrated the limits of the Fox administration internally as well as abroad. This paper will explore the implications and consequences of a new government in December 1st 2006 to 2012. In Mexico is urgent a State reform to consolidate democracy, redirect the foreign policy and develop a national security doctrine and structure to anticipate the threats and vulnerabilities of the XXI century. Under this circunstances, I will examine the coordination â€"or lack of- the Calderon administration on national security and foreign policy towards North America, Central America and Cuba. Finally, I will conclude with some policy recommendations on national security and foreign policy as well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addressing the rise of terrorism as a global threat has become a top priority for governments throughout the world. Yet the presence of an issue on a policy agenda, no matter how salient the issue, cannot explain how policies are subsequently processed and adopted. For that explanation, scholars must look at the interface between new agenda issues and pre-existing institutions, interests, and ideas. This paper proposes to examine the case of counter-terrorism policy in the European Union through the lens of bureaucratic politics. Different bureaucratic organizations within government often "see" issues in different ways, thus influencing the definition of the problem and the search for solutions. Preliminary research in the EU case suggests the presence of pre-existing "policy frames", or social constructions of a particular issue, within the EU administration that mediate how terrorism as an agenda item has been addressed. Using in-depth interviews and documentary analysis, we propose to map the presence of different EU-level policy frames related to counter-terrorism. Drawing from the literature on policy framing, agenda setting, new institutionalism, and bureaucratic politics, we will then explore the prospects for policy change as the result of frame change or convergence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom about post-9/11 American foreign policy is that it was captured briefly by a band of neoconservative ideologues, who pursued an aggressive new Middle East agenda to the detriment of older, time-tested orthodoxies. While there is much to recommend this view, it places considerable emphasis on an odd assortment of individuals determining U.S. policy. Was the Iraq war, as the most consequential projection of American power in a generation, a result of the machinations of a small political faction allied with the Bush administration? If so, how could so few people?none elected or appointed to the highest offices?have such power? If not, what exactly was the place of policy intellectuals and activists in shaping the administration?s approach to the Middle East?This paper uses a Constructivist approach from political science to examine the role?and theoretical place?of policy intellectuals and activists in the run-up to the Iraq war. Building on new work in this area, I use an agent-structure heuristic to locate the relative importance of policy entrepreneurs in explaining the American drive to war in 2003. Such individuals operated in a permissive political environment that gave them an exceptional opportunity to transform the dominant ideational structures constraining or enabling an American invasion of Iraq. As important as these activists were, however, it was a set of policy ideas more than the individuals themselves that precipitated the war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-9/11 approach to international issues in general, and with specific attention to the security-development nexus, an innovative and often controversial framework for addressing conflict mitigation as well as stabilisation and reconstruction is emerging. It is called 3-D, whole of government, joined up government, and/or conflict pooling. This paper interrogates theoretical constructs used to inform the development of policy and processes with attention to impact on the operationalisation in decision-making among the three main government departments most involved in operationalising foreign policy. Evolution of doctrine in war-fighting (3BW), development assistance and humanitarian responses, as well as non-State actors provides the basis of determining how foreign policy decision-making is operationalised using this framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]