Search

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the States, Prime Minister Koizumi had been invited to join CIA’s intelligence brief with President Bush for the first time among the Japanese prime ministers. The invitation had been recognized as President Bush’s way of thanking Koizumi for his timely staunchly statement to indicate Japan’s support for U.S. and British actions against Iraq without the U.N. resolutions. Between Bush and Koizumi, they seem to be enjoying the hey day of the alliance, but in reality, what is happening between two countries can be explained that Japan has been much more deeply placed in American Grand Strategy while Japan has not realized that it does not have its own. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not the product of American and Japan’s grand strategies. It is a part of the American grand strategy, and Japan happens to be in the strategy. In the aftermath of 911, the United States changed its military policy from the threat based one to the capability based one. Under the circumstances, not having its grand strategy, Japan will soon face the problem of rationally deciding what Japan should do for the sake of Japan’s national interest whenever the United States calls for contribution. In this paper, I would argue that it will be high time to recognize the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. For the States, it might not become the issue as long as Japan has been following Washington’s order blindly, but for Japan, it means that Japan has missed another prime opportunity to establish its grand strategy after 911 and the swift victory of American and British war against Iraq. In this paper, I will trace back how the expectation and reality of the alliance has shifted since its establishment to the present. Then, I will point out the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between policy makers in Washington and Tokyo and its impact on the future U.S.-Japan security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Japan have maintained their strategic alignment for nearly an half century. This is the longest alliance ever for Japan and the second longest one for the United States besides NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, theoretical understanding of this bilateral relashionship is relatively poor. In particular, existense of the alliance after the Cold War generated further explanative disturbance. This paper attempts to grapes U.S.-Japan alliance as an "security community," modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that is more convincing theoretical framework than neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Although his model was created upon "transatlantic" relationship between the United States and Western Europe, the author considers the model is largely applicable to "transpacific" alignment. This paper argues a mechanism of peaceful change on multilateralism, military planning, and common definition of threats by examining institutions, norms and identity between the two countries in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, nuclear debates in the United States have centered on the “unspeakability” of nuclear war drawing this silence from the apocalyptic power of nuclear technology. This “unspeakability” is mirrored institutionally and, ultimately, this silence leads to depoliticized and sanitized policy paths and political realities. This can manifest itself in greater secrecy in policy decisions concerning nuclear technology and the phenomenon of “nuclear reclusion” in the public realm. Given the undisputed destructive power of nuclear weapons, the US tendency toward depolitization and secrecy short circuits democratic accountability. I will examine two cases toward this end: This paper compares the memorialization of nuclear weapons in Japan and the US. How do our collective memories differ? Can methods of remembering history lead us toward different policies or aid us in creating memories of the future that include open debate and de-sanitized nuclear policy? This paper seeks to analyze how nuclear memory operates within the democratic state, and how we bridge the apparent incongruity with global nuclear realities and the (re)creation of democratically accountable nation-states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the legitimacy of the analogical reasoning by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war based upon on an assessment of the commonalities across Japan, Italy and Germany. The paper mentions different meanings of path dependence theory according to several authors.

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, free trade agreements concluded between developing and developed countries have proliferated rapidly. By including rules for investment and services, these recent FTAs comprise much more than tariff elimination. Why the sudden proliferation of these agreements, when most-favoured-nation tariffs are at a historically low level? This paper identifies the interests behind these agreements, arguing that they are a reaction to the liberalization taking place in advanced developing countries, conditioned by specific institutional features of the global trade regime. Motivated by an accelerating competition over markets and access to foreign direct investment, countries conclude more and more bilateral agreements out of fear of being left behind. The central finding is greatly increased role of interests around foreign direct investment, a factor that has been overlooked in previous analyses. The study is based on comparative case studies of FTAs concluded by Japan, the US, and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Fuji-Kodak photo film, port business, and NTT interconnection charge disputes, which developed between the U.S. and Japan around and after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), significantly increased the importance of multilateral trade rules. The Japanese government?s response to U.S. pressure varied in each of these disputes; it was more conciliatory in the NTT interconnection charge dispute than the other two. To explain this variation, this paper presents an argument: the timing of a trade dispute in the development of multilateral rules is an important determinant of the response, because the timing determines the gap between multilateral rules and Japanese domestic government and business practices. The case analyses of the three disputes demonstrate that, since a smaller gap exists in the early and late stages of multilateral-rule development than in the intermediate stage, the Japanese government resisted U.S. pressure more effectively in the former than in the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States has accelerated over the last few years, with the first foreign ministerial meeting held in early 2006. Not unexpectedly, the new cooperation between Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington is often characterized as a revival of Containment (against China, this time) or a mini-NATO in Asia. The paper will examine this latest development in East Asia’s security relations, with a specific focus on Japanese policymaking. The concept of a democratic state as one form of state identity will be given particular attention for understanding Tokyo’s attitude toward trilateral security cooperation, as well as the new security order in Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores contemporary multilayered processes and the gradual development of shared norms, principles, and targets with regard to energy security among China, Japan and the United States, at both the bilateral and multilateral level, behind a seemingly worsening energy rivalry. It examines the degree to which the three powers have acquired knowledge of multiple aspects of energy security, yet still found common interests―for instance the diversification of energy sources and energy conservation―, and its implication for the future regional cooperation, regardless of their independent national energy strategies.Against the backdrop of widespread “resource nationalism” in major supplying countries and growing global concerns about the availability of hydrocarbon resources and volatile energy markets, it can be hypothesized that China, Japan, and the United States―three big energy consumers― would increasingly find grounds for cooperation simultaneously while they compete for energy equities in some cases. For example, technology transfers in the fields of energy conservation and environmentally-friendly use of energy have become one of mushrooming industries in Sino-Japanese business despite the virtually deadlocked East China Sea dispute. The United States and China have begun talks on the promotion of ethanol production, clean use of coal for power generation, technological assistance for nuclear power plant, etc. Energy dialogues among the three countries have also been bolstered by various multilateral frameworks, including the Asia-Pacific Partnership since June 2004 and the annual meeting of five energy ministers, involving India and South Korea since December 2006.Policymakers and scholars have debated whether the rise of China will pose a threat and destabilize the power configurations of the Asia-Pacific. (Neo-)realists assume that the increase in material capabilities would enable Beijing to seek hegemonic power more vigorously: a geopolitical zero-sum game would be likely to escalate between China on the one hand and Japan and the United States on the other. Neoliberal institutionalists suppose that establishing some form of institutional structure would ameliorate conflicts of material interests, leading to a positive-sum game.The author sheds light on the social construction process of ideas at both diplomatic and energy experts’ levels in the three countries, implying that reckless competition over energy resources would lead only to the advantage of supplying countries and cooperation would more effectively serve energy security as a whole. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over forty countries have provided military, economic, and moral support for the 2003 U.S- led war with Iraq and the earlier U.S. led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The United States has solicited cooperation from Japan and other key allies that are part of the industrialized world, as well as support from developing countries. Among the group of industrialized country allies, Japan’s direct contributions to the “coalition of the willing” and OEF have been minimal. A long standing hypothesis, however, is that Japan responds to U.S. pressure in the allocation of Japanese official development assistance (ODA). In this paper we examine the determinants of Japanese ODA since the U.S. led actions began. Our primary goal is to determine whether gaiatsu (outside pressure) from the United States has affected the distribution of Japanese ODA since 2001 to developing countries that are part of the U.S. coalition in Iraq and OEF. If gaiatsu is present we expect Japanese ODA to members of the coalition of the willing and OEF, on average, to have increased since 2001. We will examine this hypothesis using a pooled cross-sectional time-series (that is cross-sectionally dominant) data set. The model will include covariates to control for the possible influence of other factors, e.g., recipient wealth, trade with Japan, etc. The model will be estimated using ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors, and will include tests to control for unit effects. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1980’s, the Soviet threat in Asia was publicized and Tokyo’s need to increase contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance was emphasized. At that time, Japanese universities rushed to establishing International Relations departments. System level had an impact on the focus of teaching and research in Japanese universities. Even tough the field of International Relations holds both “low facilities” and “higher facilities” perspectives, what stands out lately in the study of International Relations in Japan is the one close to “higher facilities.” While 2007 marks 60th anniversary of atomic bombs devastated Horoshima and Nagasaki, “lower facilities” aspect of International Relations has not yet prevailed and been suppressed by “higher facilities” aspect. To make a situation worse, Japanese politics is about to give “higher facilities” aspect of International Relations another big push. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently set up an advisory panel which will study the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. At the same time, he is moving toward revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The panel gathered by Prime Minister Abe consists of 13 members, mainly of people who support the concepts. It appears to be a rigged race with a foregone conclusion. Majority of the members is university professors. Generally professors believe that being chosen as a member of the government, it gives them prestige outside the universities and in turn gain more respect in the universities. Consciously or unconsciously, these professors are serving to make Abe’s wish come true. However, eventually they might regret what they had done was a political act which delimited political imagination and political transformation. By using Prime Minister Abe’s group as a case study, this paper sheds a light on the crisis of the Japanese universities today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In postwar Japan, idealism and realism have developed within the framework of Japanese Constitution and the US-Japan security system. At first glance, the current Japanese Constitution seems unrealistic whereas the drafting reveals it was not only influenced by GHQ’s unilateral compulsion. This paper examines the circumstances where the constitutional thought was formed based on the political thought of modern Japanese political thought. And it examines how their idealism has been transformed while conflicting with realism in the Cold War and the reality of the US-Japan security system. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a global economy, regulatory costs spill over beyond domestic markets. This presents a particular dilemma this presents for the European Union. While the major industrial competitors of the EU, the United States and Japan, face a tension between regulatory objectives such as environmental protection and the costs imposed on industry, the European Union confronts the challenge of triangulating such regulation with the objectives of competitiveness AND European integration. For policy makers in the EU, the scope and approach to regulation can not simply be the product of a weighing of costs to industry and benefits to the environment; regulation also serves the larger purpose of advancing European integration. How does the EU accommodate this tension between economic integration and international economic competitiveness? One response is noncompliance of industry with EU regulation. A second response to the single market-external competitiveness tension is for the EU executive, the European Commission, to seek to “soften” proposed regulation so that it responds to the cost concerns of industry. This paper examines the conditions under which these first two responses occur in order to illuminate the conditions for a third response to the dilemma of creating a single, competitive market withinin a global marketplace: efforts by the European Commission to internationalize its regulatory regime. Under what conditions does the European Commission seek to establish EU regulation as the global regulatory standard? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an examination of the dynamics of multilateral military alliances or 'coalitions'. Framed within the wider debate over the future security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region, it has the dual objective of both enriching the academic debate and offering guidance to policy-makers by investigating the theory and practice of coalition behaviour. The article expounds the case for the American-Japanese-Australian combination and analyses the issues that confront such an alliance-coalition using two competing theoretical perspectives of allied behaviour: 'balance of power' and 'intra-alliance politics'. The main propositions of these perspectives are empirically tested against policy statements based on American, Japanese and Australian foreign and defence policies and associated academic writings. The paper demonstrates the continued validity of realist-conceived approaches to security provision and concludes that both theoretical perspectives are useful tools of analysis in this case. Focusing on separate levels and therefore different aspects of allied behaviour, they can in fact be viewed as complementary, rather than competing, and clearly exhibit strong potential for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the meaning and significance of four key concepts heavily used to characterize the nature and essence and to reveal the core structural properties through Japanese diplomatic discourse for the last four centuries. They are anarchy, hierarchy, community and civilization. Some American theories of international relations are referred to in my discussion of how Japanese used these concepts in their understanding and discussion of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Explaining Allied Attitudes Toward U.S. Missile Defenses: Canada, Japan, and Britain," prepared for the "Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It offers to help fill part of the gap in the literature with respect to the attitudes of U.S. allies. It investigates such developments in a comparative manner with special focus to Canada, Japan, and Great Britain. It also probes the central factors in the national debates of the countries.

The Yoshida Doctrine is perhaps the most important concept in the study of Japanese foreign policy covering the Cold War period. Yet, its conceptual structure has received little systematic analysis. This paper reports that even among mainstream writers, the content of the Yoshida Doctrine as a concept is far less consistent, coherent, or complete than we have long assumed. The conceptual weakness has two specific dimensions. First, the constituent principles of the concept, as well as their mutual relationships, vary widely among key writers, to the extent that some empirical cases cannot be properly diagnosed whether they violate or corroborate the Yoshida Doctrine. Second, while the Yoshida Doctrine is commonly characterized as a national strategy, the goal of such a strategy is either unclear or contested in the literature. Consequently, empirical analysts cannot properly identify the change of the Yoshida Doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. The role of absolute and relative gains in the making of Japanese foreign and security policy will be examined in light of alternative security issues. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper will examine Japanese security policy in light of Japan's attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US, South Korean, and Japanese interests in coping with North Korea’s nuclear agenda overlap, but there also are substantial differences. Each country’s policies shall be assessed in terms of its bilateral objectives versus North Korea. Based on that assessment, the historical record of trilateral cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea and the prospects for future cooperation shall be evaluated. In addition, North Korea’s responses to each category and its options shall be analyzed. In each of these instances salient domestic and international factors shall be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan security alliance has faced major challenges over the last decade, including the post-9/11 transformation of the international security environment, the changing balance of economic and military forces in East Asia, and growing popular disc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in the OECD have played a significant financial role in providing foreign aid for HIV/AIDS. In accounting for the convergence of AIDS funding behaviors, constructivist international relations theories w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does innovation affect war outcomes? Kenneth Waltz has noted that successful methods of warfare are soon widely imitated on the international stage, while William McNeill has demonstrated that innovation leads quickly evaporate. Scholars such as Barr ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended and ruined lives, leading to traumatic memories. Currently, Hiroshima symbolizes a metaphor and catalyst for public anxieties over nuclear war in U.S. popular culture (Farish 2003 and Trushell 2004). The Smithsonian’s 1995 nationally funded exhibit, in response to Congressional pressure, framed Hiroshima to fit the mainstream perspective that the nuclear bombings prevented U.S. and Japanese casualties (Hubbard and Hasian 1998, and Wittner 2005). In light of this, this essay explores how discourses of Hiroshima remembrance operate in spaces not wholly controlled by considerations of U.S. national politics. Of special attention will be a collection of survivor testimony poems, Outcry from the Inferno: Atomic Bomb Tanka Anthology (1995) published by a small federally and state funded-printing press, Bamboo Ridge Press, in Hawai’i. This anthology is connected with the Japanese Diaspora communities and, while not necessarily wholly representative, shows attempts by Japanese Americans to learn about the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki outside of national-level politics. This process will be analyzed in comparison to discourses in poetry from Japanese Americans who were not survivors of the attack, such as Yamada’s (1983) Dessert Run, Hongo’s (1993) “Shadow in Stone,” and the use of Hiroshima as a background to U.S. Japanese-American experience in Naomi Hirahara’s (2004) mystery novel, Summer of the Big Bachi. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the ever growing international human rights norm against the death penalty, two advanced industrial democracies, Japan and the United States, shy away from global collaboration to abolish this "inhuman and degrading" punishment. I ask why the international human rights norm that prohibits capital punishment seems to have little impact on the United States and Japan. Why have these two advanced democracies been averse to implementing the international human rights norm? What are the salient similarities between these two cases that may help explain their divergence from other advanced democracies? How do these similarities play out in the particular context of noncompliance? In presenting these questions, I do not purport to revisit wider historical and sociological debates about why some countries exempt themselves from international human rights provisions. Instead, I highlight several of the most important characteristics. A careful comparative analysis of the similarities of these two cases may help to illuminate the forces that are likely to be brought to noncompliance of these countries beyond the area of human rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military rule, military occupation, and land grabs for military bases (even if sanctioned by international executive agreements or legislatively ratified treaties) vitiate and undermine democratization. On the one hand, democratic theorists from John Locke to Robert Dahl contrast pluralist theory with rationales for authoritarian governance. On the other hand, historical pluralism evinces elitist practices. A focus on the diversity of power sharing is missing or underdeveloped. To what extent do anti-militarist social movements demonstrate the ability of popular activity from below to outstrip elitist liabilities embedded in much pluralist theory? And how effectively have civil society organizations in Asia opposed the continued, expanded and renewed presence of the U.S. Armed Forces? This paper focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the larger anti-militarist social movements within which they have contended in the Philippines and Japan (especially, Okinawa). The paper further distinguishes among DJANGOs (Development, Justice and Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations) and POs (People's Organizations) with only passing attention to QUANGOs (Quasi Nongovernmental Organizations) supported by government funding and sponsorship. Amplifying a preferred future for a totally demilitarized Okinawa, trend analysis and focused structured comparisons identify likely and unlikely obstacles and opportunities to a totally demilitarized Okinawa by 2025. Similarities and differences between the two cases appear policy-relevant! In turn, that identification generates prescriptions useful in guiding practical activities of organizations advocating removal of foreign military bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that examines the rationales and substance of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance. It cites the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It examines the special role that Japan plays in the U.S. security strategy in the region.

The article focuses on the position of Japan with regard to nuclear weapons and its acceptance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It cites the factors that mold Japan's security identity during the first half of the 21st century. It mentions the continuing effort of the country to acquire a national security identity during the postwar period. It details the implications of the move of Japan to assist the U.S. in the global war on terrorism.

The article analyzes the responses of the Japanese public to the participation of Tokyo, Japan in the War on Terror of the U.S. It considers whether the war on terrorism has changed preexisting beliefs in Japan about the efficacy of utilizing military force. It examines comparable data on public opinion in the U.S. and Germany for the sake of placing Japanese mass opinion in comparative perspective. Public opinion in Japan remains skeptical about the use of military force for purposes other than national defense, such as for combating terrorism.

The article discusses the autonomy in the foreign policy of Japan. It presents a historical background of Japan's relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the immediate post-World War II period. It summarizes the domestic factors within Japan that led to a different North Korea foreign policy to that of the U.S. It mentions how Japanese autonomy is maintained in policy regulations.

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the antimilitarism culture of Japan. It notes that the country is reluctant to translate its economy into military capabilities and to develop nuclear weapons despite its technological competence. It looks at the arguments by constructivist on the antimilitarism of Japan, which they claimed is a product of the experience of the World War II. It tackles the seeming erosion of Japanese antimilitarist culture indicated by its cooperation with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system.

The article discusses the influence of judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure on bargaining behavior of countries. For the U.S., the two primary concepts in bilateral negotiation to force other countries to liberalize sector-specific trade are aggressive unilateralism and aggressive multilateralism. A comparative case study of U.S.-Japan negotiation on automobiles in 1981 and U.S.-Japan negotiation on automobile and parts in 1995, which illustrate various bargaining strategies used by both nations, is also presented.

The 1990s has been called the age of apologies due to the escalation of political apologies beginning in this time period. Apologies by governments include the British apology to the Irish and the Maoris, Japan's apology to the Korean comfort women, and the apology of the United States to the native Hawaiians. These apologies are deemed to be part of reconciliation processes for past wrongs. It is notable, however, that official acts of forgiveness rarely accompany these apologies. In fact, forgiveness is not something that nation-states or their representatives seem to do. Why not? What possibilities exist for nation-states to forgive, as part of reconciliation and justice-seeking processes? What would it look like and what meaning would it have? Drawing from literature on state apologies and on forgiveness in societal reconciliation processes, a framework is developed for forgiveness in international relations. Historical and current cases are used as illustrative examples to demonstrate the application of the framework. Five main issues guide inquiry. How does this merciful act of forgiveness fit with the primary requirements of justice in dealing with past wrongs, as evidenced by the institutionalization of war crimes tribunals and truth commissions? How can the collective nation-state forgive on behalf of individual victims? Is forgiveness applicable to inter-state as well as intra-state processes? What is the strategic value of forgiveness for nation-states? Finally, what are the possibilities of unilateral forgiveness? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study which examines the framework of gaiatsu or foreign pressure and other competing explanations of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements in Japan. It states that the country has emerged as an important actor in the international aid community since the early 1970s and its contributions to the World Bank and other multilateral organizations have increased appreciably. The results of the study suggest that aid policy in Japan responded partially to U.S. security and economic interests during the study period.

An essay is presented on post cold war foreign and security policy being implemented by Japan. It discusses the changes in international security threat level and the responses of Japan. It mentions that the factor that contribute to the active participation of Japan in security issues is its enhancement of the U.S. and Japan alliance relations after the cold war.

The article focuses on the ongoing Japanese discussion on soft power and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance is presented. It discusses the concept of soft power which was developed by author Joseph Nye and its potential and limitations as an instrument of national policy. It examines how the Japanese are utilizing the concept in dealing with their nation's security policy.

This paper examines public and elite attitudes toward security policy in Japan. While focusing on the US-Japan security alliance, Japan's relations with East Asian countries, and Japan's role in the United Nations, the paper addresses three questions: (1) How have public and elite views evolved since the 1990s?; (2) what is the relationship between mass and elite opinion?; and (3) how do mass and elite opinion relate to security policy? The paper argues that a particular group within the security elite has shaped national security policy and that the public has generally followed that group’s leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1952 Japan's sole guarantor for national security was the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Against strong public opposition after many compromises with opposition as as well as government coalition parties , the widely popular Japanese prime minister Koizumi was able to deploy about 600 Ground Self Defense Forces for the reconstruction of Iraq. This paper analyzes the way public opinion changed before and after deployment, and what the long term effects for Japanese security and alliance arrangements will be. The paper takes advantage of a opinion survey conducted by the author in Japan and the US, which was innovative because it focued on foreign and defense policy questions, as well as public risk perceptions. The paper will also include context analysis of Japanese mass media and official government statement. This papers argues, that increased threat perception in Japan does have very little effect on support for more activist foreign policies, but that 9/11 and he Iraq War has triggered a public debate about Japan's international role. This indicates that the bi-lateral US-Japan security cooperation might eventually be weakened because of an increase in public support for additional bi-lateral (such as the recent agreement with Australia) and regional security arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1960s, many American observers expected Japan to go nuclear, but their expectations have not come true even four decades later. In fact, not only did Japan not acquire nuclear weapons, it actually became a pillar of support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why?This paper argues that the forecasters were wrong because they placed too much weight on the impact of constraints on Japan's nuclear freedom of action--notably, the opions of its U.S. ally and of its "nuclear-allergic" mass public--constraints that they judged to be dangerously loosening. But in fact, for a variety of strategic and identity motivies the majority of Japanese elites themselves strongly favored the overall contours of the nuclear weapons stance that emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. Morever, even those elites who had serious objections to the majority position did not actually want nuclear weapons. Relying in large measure on Japanese-language source material, this paper offers a systematic look at the elite politics of nuclear weapons in Japan, paying special attention to delineating the cleavages in elite opinion during the crucial decade of decision from 1966-1976. It explains the deep sources of those cleavages with reference to elites' diverging domestic political interests and basic understandings of Japan's history and national identify.This paper will have significant implications for contemporary proliferation forecasts on Japan, which often eerily resemble the analyses of 1960 observers. It also will have significant implications for forecasting beyond the Japanese case, by offering tools for the analysis of domestica politics of nuclear choices. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]