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The current debate about the Kyoto Protocol and global climate changes demonstrates the most fundamental challenge behind global political initiatives: mobilizing national interests in the service of a broader, world-wide agenda. Japan played an importan ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan security alliance has faced major challenges over the last decade, including the post-9/11 transformation of the international security environment, the changing balance of economic and military forces in East Asia, and growing popular disc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in the OECD have played a significant financial role in providing foreign aid for HIV/AIDS. In accounting for the convergence of AIDS funding behaviors, constructivist international relations theories w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Competition State in the late 20th century went through two developmental stages. The first was the “strategic state” or “developmental state,” combining elements of the Japanese and French models with some aspects of European neocorporatism. The seco ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public discussions of Tokyo's potential nuclear breakoutâ€"a topic long considered far too toxic for serious debateâ€"have recently flourished in Japan. This more widespread discourse has coincided with the emergence of a more assertive Japan. Given Japan's l ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan’s mobilization of its Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) for the purpose of statecraft began in the 1990s. The notion that the SDFs contribute to Japan’s statehood and global security seems to be a new idea. Existing explanations such as the security arrang ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan became more active in dealing with international security issues in the 1990s than before the cold war. This Koizumi administration further enhanced this trend by dispatching the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the Indian Ocean to support the US led at ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does innovation affect war outcomes? Kenneth Waltz has noted that successful methods of warfare are soon widely imitated on the international stage, while William McNeill has demonstrated that innovation leads quickly evaporate. Scholars such as Barr ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite evidence of “nationalist” influences on security policies in Japan and Korea, particularly in recent years, the term “nationalism” is conspicuous for its absence in Japanese security debates and for its replacement by the more popular “sovereignty ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan are the world’s second- and third-largest energy consumer respectively. Sino-Japanese energy relations have been characterised by stiff and even dangerous competition. The two countries have engaged in a fierce rivalry for an oil pipeline ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a surging economy that demands ever more energy, China is one of the world’s fiercest competitors for the ocean’s hydrocarbon resources. Gas and oil deposits in the East China Sea could help alleviate China’s energy deficit, but a maritime boundary dispute with Japan is preventing full resource development. While China has cooperated with several of its maritime neighbors to develop disputed areas in the South China Seaâ€"most notably Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysiaâ€"the competition between China and Japan over the resources in the East China Sea remains confrontational. Why? First, because Beijing sees Tokyo as a potential rival for predominance in Southeast Asia, which despite a recent thaw in relations makes the possibility of long-term cooperation and compromise in the East China Sea less likely. Additionally, the tension between China and Japan over resources, boundaries and sovereignty in the East China Seaâ€"and especially the confrontation over Japanese administration of and claim of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands--provides a handy lever of nationalist support for the central government during times of domestic political competition. By negotiating cooperatively with its other neighbors, and remaining in controlled conflict with Japan, China balances its domestic and regional political messages in a way that contributes both to domestic stability and regional rise. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do interstate territorial disputes become indivisible and heighten the tension among the disputing parties? Under what conditions does an indivisible territorial issue become divisible, which fosters cooperation among states involved in the dispute? The conventional wisdom tells us that an indivisible territory is an obstacle to rational settlement. Furthermore, the indivisibility of the territorial issue is likely to cause the escalation of territorial disputes, sometimes to militarized conflict, and undermines the possibility of cooperation. However, it is not clear under what conditions the territorial issue is considered as indivisible among the disputing parties. We re-examine the relationship between the indivisibility and the territorial values (material and ideational ones) which we will argue fluctuates with domestic conditions. We focus on roles that domestic coalitions play in determining whether territoriality is indivisible or not by analyzing three territorial disputes in which Japan has been involved for the last two decades: the Northern Islands with Russia (the former Soviet Union); the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands with China; and Takeshima / Dokdo with South Korea. We will scrutinize how and why an internationalist coalition in the domestic political climate prevents the Japanese government from setting the territorial issue indivisible and seeks for a soft-landing policy, while a nationalist coalition contributes to clinging to the indivisibility of the territorial issue and takes an assertive policy. Our research will contribute to bridging the gap between the rationalist approach to territorial conflict and the ideational approach by focusing on the (in)divisibility of territoriality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended and ruined lives, leading to traumatic memories. Currently, Hiroshima symbolizes a metaphor and catalyst for public anxieties over nuclear war in U.S. popular culture (Farish 2003 and Trushell 2004). The Smithsonian’s 1995 nationally funded exhibit, in response to Congressional pressure, framed Hiroshima to fit the mainstream perspective that the nuclear bombings prevented U.S. and Japanese casualties (Hubbard and Hasian 1998, and Wittner 2005). In light of this, this essay explores how discourses of Hiroshima remembrance operate in spaces not wholly controlled by considerations of U.S. national politics. Of special attention will be a collection of survivor testimony poems, Outcry from the Inferno: Atomic Bomb Tanka Anthology (1995) published by a small federally and state funded-printing press, Bamboo Ridge Press, in Hawai’i. This anthology is connected with the Japanese Diaspora communities and, while not necessarily wholly representative, shows attempts by Japanese Americans to learn about the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki outside of national-level politics. This process will be analyzed in comparison to discourses in poetry from Japanese Americans who were not survivors of the attack, such as Yamada’s (1983) Dessert Run, Hongo’s (1993) “Shadow in Stone,” and the use of Hiroshima as a background to U.S. Japanese-American experience in Naomi Hirahara’s (2004) mystery novel, Summer of the Big Bachi. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leaders of both Japan and Turkey have recently made headlines with their refusal to acknowledge past atrocities committed by their states. In the case of Japan, the refusal centers on the Japanese state’s role in forcing Korean women into prostitution during WWII. In the case of Turkey the refusal is an outright denial of the Armenian genocide. It would be easy to dismiss these actions as the product of irrational nationalist bravado, put on for the benefit of a domestic audience. However, given the international character of these disputes, and their very serious consequences for the diplomatic credibility of the countries in question, international relations scholars have an obligation to explain why states act in ways which are contrary to their short-term self-interests. I argue that because of the social status hierarchy in the international system, admitting to past atrocities is more difficult for those states which are not naturally or inherently favored by the norms of the international system. In other words, it is not an accident that two Asian states with the highest aspirations to join the Western the world are also the states which have the most difficulty facing their past. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The New National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) had been approved in the Cabinet in December, 2004 worked out effective correspondence to New threats and various situations of the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles as well as the activity of international terrorism. That is the Missile Defense (MD), counter terrorism/special forces attack, prevention against islands invasion, surveillance and patrol around the waters, coping with invasion to territorial air/invasion by armed suspicious ship, and disaster assistance. This can be classified in the category of Defense of country which defined one of main mission so far, and can peel off eyes from the direct aggression. On the other hand, the role of defense power is not clearly defined about Secure safety of sea lane which used to be another main mission. Japan is a sea girt country, and the security of the sea lane is a proposition of supremacy in it for the country that imports most of resources such as food and oil via sea. Safety in the sea lane is indispensable to live of Japan. However, piracy, maritime terrorism and outrage in waters that threatens sea lane at peace time including threat of ballistic missiles when situation of the Pacific Ocean sea area of recent years is seen, the submarine that exceeds 200 in this area that will be possible threats of the sea lane regardless of peacetime or the war time. Now, it is necessary to construct "Maritime Coalition in Asia" by the cooperation with the US, India and Australia for the safety of the sea lane. Strong cooperation and interoperability with U.S. Forces is most important for Japan. Moreover, Homeland Defense of Japan which MD cooperated with our own preemptive attack capability and the U.S. Forces, the islands defense by Joint Force, and the prevention of outrage in waters is so important. To do this, it is vital to maintain the necessary maritime forces. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of East Asian international relations (IR) tend to assume that the introduction of the Westphalian state system in the late nineteenth century similarly pressured regional actors into adopting new standards of state behavior based on sovereign equality. This, however, neglects the lingeringâ€"and varying degrees ofâ€"influence from the existing Sinocentric state system with its own sovereignty norms which had guided East Asian interstate relations, based on hierarchy and unequal status among states. In fact, Japan and Korea showed contrasting responses to Westphalian sovereignty, reflecting their respective positions and sovereignty-achieving strategies within the Sinocentric order. Smaller states such as Japan and Korea have historically strived to protect their sovereignty, through different security strategies ranging from “hiding” to “revering,” while learning to deal with political penetration and pressures from powerful regional hegemons such as China. While Tokugawa Japan conducted foreign relations based on maintaining sovereign autonomy from China, the Korean kingdom of Chosŏn tried to protect its sovereign status by “revering” (sadae) China. In the late 19th century, Japan and Korea switched courses. Japan turned to a status-achieving strategy within the European state system, but Korea was less successful in asserting autonomy from China due to its incomplete internalization of Westphalian sovereignty. In sum, changing sovereignty norms were a major factor in affecting Japanese and Korean efforts to assert autonomy from China and the European great powers. Although the focus is on late 19th century politics, the analysis has clear implications for the current discussions on the possible emergence of a new regional order under Chinese leadership. While assertions are made that a culturalâ€"and therefore politicalâ€"affinity exists among Asian states and that Japan and Korea are apt to “bandwagon” with, rather than balance against, a rising China, the above analysis shows that a different spectrum of foreign policy behavior has existed in the East Asian hierarchical setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations have long studied and debated the nature of military power. Hitherto, most analysts have attempted to divine the way in which particular sets of resources - whether they be material, ideational, or related to the institutional structure of the state - affect the level of combat power that a given military may bring to bear on the battlefield. In this essay, I posit that by recognizing that militaries are organizations that vary in their capacity to translate resources into combat power, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated framework for the analysis of military power. Relying on the insights of structural contingency theorists, who suggest that organizational efficiency emerges as a function of the relationship between an organization's structure and the requirements of its environment, I trace the broad outlines of a framework that conceives of a military's capacity to translate resources into combat power in terms of the relationship between the command structure and the level of battlefield complexity. To illustrate the logic of the claim, evidence from the battle between Russia and Japan at Liaoyang in 1904 is considered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asian countries, which consist of a former socialist (China) and two capitalist (South Korea and Japan) countries with large populations, have become the fast－growing economies. They have shown relatively high levels of corruption situation in comparison with their economic influences in world economy. Specially, China is facing a serious corruption problem which prevents politico－economic development and social consensus in the long run.Recently, the hypothesis that a market－oriented democracy is the best model for economic development is accepted among many scholars. It suggests that the strategies for economic growth should be based on market principles and political democratization in the long term. From the perception that market－oriented democracy is the best solution for economic development, people in Northeast Asian countries recognize that state intervention, which undermines a self－regulating market, should be minimized in the economic sectors, and bureaucratic corruption that hinders socio－cultural progress should be eliminated in every sphere of society.Market－democracy advocates argue that the fundamental causes of Northeast Asian countries corruption originate from the immaturity of political democratization. They propose the formation of Northeast Asian anti－corruption regime as a desirable instrument of improving their corruption levels. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia is often regarded as having an uneasy atmosphere, with tensions between the countries making the region sometimes look unpeaceful. North Korean arms tests and other aggressive gestures also contribute to this view, as well as tensions between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. My study tries to look closer at the development of the relations between the most important states in the region, China, Japan and South Korea, assuming that the above-mentioned conflicts are not dominating the relations between the three countries. The study tries to assess changes in the triadic and dyadic relations which don not get as much attention as the conflicts, but will also have an impact on the future relations in the region.These changes are studied by using the concept of Security Community that has been first developed by Karl W. Deutsch and later been elaborated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The larger goal of my study is to examine the long term stability of the peace between the three countries. A pluralistic Security Community is defined as a community of states having "dependable expectations of peaceful change". Whilst Deutsch developed the concept of the Security Community with reference to the North Atlantic region, Adler and Barnett and Amitav Acharya expanded the scope of the concept to other regions in the world. They also based it on constructivist ideas, giving it more theoretical rigidity, and added the idea of a development pattern with different stages in building a Security Community from nascent to mature. This now allows to study Security Communities that have not fully developed yet, such as in Northeast Asia. Following this concept, the key factors in the development of a Security Community are transactions, norms and institutions. In my work I study the changing relations of the three countries by looking at changes in these factors in different issue areas, with special focus on the development in the maritime domain, which seems to display a case of change towards closer co-operation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has emerged in recent years as a leading donor country with African countries. At one level, Japan’s renewed assertiveness in providing foreign aid to Africa is on par with the more active approach by other donor countries. It might appear to some that Japan’s motivations to lend capital and technical assistance to African countries are shared by all lending countries. However, I argue that Japan’s Official Development Policy seeks to break away from the Washington Consensus and to demonstrate its particular leadership position in the donor community. Rather than to focus on domestic bureaucratic politics to explain Japanese ODA or on the specific targets of foreign aid, this chapter seeks to identify the basic features of Japanese national identity that explain its aid policy to Africa. Three themes of Japan’s national economic identity will be highlighted. First, an underlying theme in Japanese foreign aid is its history towards economic development both within Japan and towards Asia. Second, one of the more important aspects underlining Japan’s ODA policy is its relationship to the “Asian economic model.” The main characteristics of Japan’s ODA facilitate self-help and partnership through industrialization, production, and trade. Third, Japan has promoted its own ODA model as distinct from other donors. Japan is the only non-Western country with a history of successful industrialization and Japanese officials have at times distanced themselves from the dominant policy prescriptions embedded in the Washington Consensus. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there a Japanese IR? Some may say that Japanese IR is simply a recapitulation of Western IR discourses based on power relations and diplomacy. Some may say that there has been no such thing. I contend that there have been some, if not many, indigenous IR discourses in Japan, both in the past and in the present. Important examples in this context include Ire Akira’s “International Relations as Intercultural Relations” discourse, Hirano Kenichiro’s “Theory of Intercultural Relations” discourse, and Imai Hitoshi’s “The Structure of Modernity” discourse. Although these discourses do not appear as International Relations theories as such, they are needless to say indicative of an understanding of contemporary world affairs, especially in an age of transnational civil society.In introducing their discourses I employ the three dimensional approach initially presented by E.H. Carr in his “Twenty Years’ Crisis” and later developed into Ralph Pettman’s theory of “international politics, international political economy, international political culture”. By applying a three dimensional approach to a reading of these Japanese IR scholars, I attempt to re-organise their arguments into a coherent theoretical whole, and to show that there is in fact an important theoretical Japanese contribution to IR. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has an "associational revolution" taken place in Japan's civil society? Is civil society in Japan "robust?" We try to provide an answer to these interesting questions by drawing on data we have accumulated from a comparative survey of civil society organizations conducted between 1997 and 2007 in ten countries, including Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, Brazil and Bangladesh. In addition to the data from the ten-country survey, we used about 40,000 items of data from the 2006-07 Japan Interest Group Survey 2 (or JIGS2), which examined neighbourhood associations, social associations and NPOs in Japan. With the exception of NPOs, our analysis suggests that an "associational revolution", defined as a rapid increase in associations, does not seem to be taking place across the nation. We can confirm such a revolution at a prefectural level, however, as is the case in Hyogo. Moreover, we find that associations closely tied to the profit sector still make up the majority of the social associations that exist and are also orientated towards economic development. As we expand our focus to include neighbourhood associations and NPOs, though, we find a Japanese civil society that has a strong grass-roots foundation.In addtion, we also seek for the answer to these quetions such as how influential civil society organizations are in different countries,how they perceive their efficacy.?. Surveys in each of these states ask CSOs to evaluate their own influence, as well as the influence of other political players. Interactions between state and society, or the characteristics of political regimes, history, culture, people’s awareness, and institutional legacies all affect organizations’ self-evaluation regarding influence. I analyze such differences among countries by comparing JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey data, collected by the JIGS project from over 10,000 organizations in 10 countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreigners’ rights in Japan are highly contested between central government bureaucrats, local government officials, and social activists. National bureaucrats try to control foreigners by constructing a category of foreigners into a racialized hierarchy that produces differentiated labor entitlements and legal rights across different ethnic groups. Meanwhile, officials in some local governments are providing foreign residents with social, civil, and political rights that are conflicting with the national policy. Some local authorities also have created foreigner advisory councils as a means to elicit foreign residents’ opinions on public services and welfare needs. In addition, social activists from immigrant ethnic associations and immigrant rights NGOs also participate in reinterpreting and advancing foreigners’ rights. One immigrant rights’ group has successfully pressured the national government to grant certain overstayed foreigners “special residence permission,” while others have challenged the government to extend National Health Insurance to certain unqualified foreigners, such as victims of trafficking. In Kanagawa, local authorities have recognized the importance of immigrant rights NGOs, including those representing illegal foreigners, and have invited them to participate in the NGO advisory council. Thus, such an institutional experimentation gives “voice” to illegal foreigners through Japanese activists. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the ever growing international human rights norm against the death penalty, two advanced industrial democracies, Japan and the United States, shy away from global collaboration to abolish this "inhuman and degrading" punishment. I ask why the international human rights norm that prohibits capital punishment seems to have little impact on the United States and Japan. Why have these two advanced democracies been averse to implementing the international human rights norm? What are the salient similarities between these two cases that may help explain their divergence from other advanced democracies? How do these similarities play out in the particular context of noncompliance? In presenting these questions, I do not purport to revisit wider historical and sociological debates about why some countries exempt themselves from international human rights provisions. Instead, I highlight several of the most important characteristics. A careful comparative analysis of the similarities of these two cases may help to illuminate the forces that are likely to be brought to noncompliance of these countries beyond the area of human rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition over energy resources is deepening in Northeast Asia. While Chinese submarines and research ships are occasionally spotted around potential oilfields, the Japanese are laying out billions to turn a pipeline their way. Recent initiatives by both nations aim to increase production by domestic companies. One can argue that the race for energy security is proceeding along distinctly realist lines. That argument, however, would be mistaken. Though the governments of Japan and China play vital role in their nations’ efforts to secure energy supplies, internal coalitions of business leaders, investors, the media, and local bureaucracies interact to create a pattern of behavior that does not conform to realist theories or assumptions. This is not to say that the potential for problems between these two countries concerning energy does not exist. China’s fears of economic or political encirclement coexist with Japan’s fears of energy isolation. A close inspection of the situation finds that profit-seeking, career advancement, and government efforts to ensure economic stability explain more behavior than scenarios envisioning power balancing or grabs for resources. Competition in the region is real and the state plays a central role in each case, however, one must look farther than realism towards regional economic interests and institutions to explain actors’ behavior. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military rule, military occupation, and land grabs for military bases (even if sanctioned by international executive agreements or legislatively ratified treaties) vitiate and undermine democratization. On the one hand, democratic theorists from John Locke to Robert Dahl contrast pluralist theory with rationales for authoritarian governance. On the other hand, historical pluralism evinces elitist practices. A focus on the diversity of power sharing is missing or underdeveloped. To what extent do anti-militarist social movements demonstrate the ability of popular activity from below to outstrip elitist liabilities embedded in much pluralist theory? And how effectively have civil society organizations in Asia opposed the continued, expanded and renewed presence of the U.S. Armed Forces? This paper focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the larger anti-militarist social movements within which they have contended in the Philippines and Japan (especially, Okinawa). The paper further distinguishes among DJANGOs (Development, Justice and Advocacy Nongovernmental Organizations) and POs (People's Organizations) with only passing attention to QUANGOs (Quasi Nongovernmental Organizations) supported by government funding and sponsorship. Amplifying a preferred future for a totally demilitarized Okinawa, trend analysis and focused structured comparisons identify likely and unlikely obstacles and opportunities to a totally demilitarized Okinawa by 2025. Similarities and differences between the two cases appear policy-relevant! In turn, that identification generates prescriptions useful in guiding practical activities of organizations advocating removal of foreign military bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this research is to understand the mechanism that drives compliance with legally non-binding international standards by addressing the implementation of the Basle Accord in Japan during the period of 1988 to 2003. The major findings are as follows: First, external compliance pressures, from foreign supervisory authorities and from the market, were not effective in ensuring compliance with the substance of the Basle Accord; in essence, Japan's formal compliance with it was cosmetic. Second, although external pressures fostered, to an extent, compliance by Japanese banks in formally complying with the Accord, its effectiveness was very limited. In fact, the impact of the external pressure was, for the most part, a reflection of compliance pressure from the home supervisory authority. Third, during the mid-1990s, the Japanese supervisory authority exercised regulatory forbearance to cosmetically comply with the Accord, as they lacked the capacity to comply with it in substance and, at the same time, could not cope with the systemic costs incurred by failure to comply. Lastly, although systemic costs of compliance failure were not high after the late 1990s, the diffusion of compliance costs from banks to a politically influential sector hindered any effort by the supervisory authority to rigorously implement the Accord. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study that examines the rationales and substance of the redefined U.S.-Japan alliance. It cites the implications of the 1997 Revised Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the 2005 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee for regional security issues, particularly a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. It examines the special role that Japan plays in the U.S. security strategy in the region.

The article focuses on the position of Japan with regard to nuclear weapons and its acceptance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It cites the factors that mold Japan's security identity during the first half of the 21st century. It mentions the continuing effort of the country to acquire a national security identity during the postwar period. It details the implications of the move of Japan to assist the U.S. in the global war on terrorism.

The article analyzes the responses of the Japanese public to the participation of Tokyo, Japan in the War on Terror of the U.S. It considers whether the war on terrorism has changed preexisting beliefs in Japan about the efficacy of utilizing military force. It examines comparable data on public opinion in the U.S. and Germany for the sake of placing Japanese mass opinion in comparative perspective. Public opinion in Japan remains skeptical about the use of military force for purposes other than national defense, such as for combating terrorism.

The article examines several human security issues and regionalism in Northeast Asia. The level of economic success achieved under the government of Japan has prevented it to reconsider the transition in the nature of national sovereignty. It mentions that prospects of European-type integration and free trade agreement affect the region's economy and politics. It notes that human security and regionalism can provide a more friendly way to better address the new threats to civil society.

The article examines the national identity construction of Japan. It analyzes the discourse on Russia and Russo-Japanese relations in the post-Cold War era in order to shed light on the nature of national identity. The author believes that cause-effect attempts to link the national identity to foreign policy result in essentialism and reductionism. It notes that Russia has played a significant role in the creation of Japan's national identity by being defeated in the Russo-Japanese War.

The article discusses the autonomy in the foreign policy of Japan. It presents a historical background of Japan's relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the immediate post-World War II period. It summarizes the domestic factors within Japan that led to a different North Korea foreign policy to that of the U.S. It mentions how Japanese autonomy is maintained in policy regulations.

The article discusses the role of the Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) in establishing cooperative security in Northeast Asia. It explains that the idea of cooperative security involves cooperation based on the definition of scholars Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry and John D. Steinbuner. The strategy of cooperative security as a realistic approach is also tackled. It argues that the ODA can establish its security through bilateral and regional relations in the region.

The article discusses the defense policy of the Japanese government. It explains the progress in security policies in Japan as a result of changes in the security environment caused by the emergence of new threats. It cites the revision of the arms export control policy by a Japanese cabinet secretary on December 10, 2004. The author offers an overview on the movement of constitutional amendment in Japan's legislative bodies.

The article discusses Pax Americana II, the period after the Cold War, and the strategic choices of Japan. It states that the transformation of the international system from bipolar to unipolar results in a more assertive U.S. policy. It cites the decision of the U.S. government to restore its alliance with Japan and initiate talks with China to prevent the financial market crisis. It offers an overview of the defense policy of the Japanese government.

The article discusses the maritime defense strategy of the Japanese government. According to the new National Defense Plan Outline (NDPO), one of the primary missions of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is to keep international peace cooperative efforts. It states that the government is using the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to tackle security issues in the Strait of Malacca. The author cites the responsibility of the Japanese government to deploy forces to secure the safety of region amid the threats in the Arc of Instability.

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the economic aspects underlying the post-Cold War military expansion of Japan. It cites that the decision for the military expansion has been justified by the increased threat posed by North Korea to the country. It claims that the policy of Japan to strengthen its defense industry is intended not only for the improvement of its military capability but also of its economy. It tackles a series of new arms projects launched by the country including the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.

The article discusses the antimilitarism culture of Japan. It notes that the country is reluctant to translate its economy into military capabilities and to develop nuclear weapons despite its technological competence. It looks at the arguments by constructivist on the antimilitarism of Japan, which they claimed is a product of the experience of the World War II. It tackles the seeming erosion of Japanese antimilitarist culture indicated by its cooperation with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system.

In negotiating FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines, Japan committed to only very limited opening through expanded import quotas of certain agricultural goods and immigration quotas for healthcare workers. Nevertheless, Japan liberalized in ways it refused to even consider in APEC (1998) and the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (2002). Although most economists believe that bilateral FTAs erode the multilateral trade regime, Japan's FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines have taken the same cautious approach to market access as that in the Doha Round, albeit on preferential terms. With even a successful Doha Round likely to maintain protection for sensitive products, Japan's bilateral FTAs can advance the WTO's liberalization agenda by chipping away at the nation's agricultural protectionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the reluctance of Japan and China to take positive action or shared leadership in the institutionalization of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) +3. It stresses the significance of ASEAN +3 to community-building and proper management of a variety of emerging problems in East Asia. It argues that the ASEAN divide is the key factor affecting Chinese and Japanese leadership interest in the further institutionalization of ASEAN +3.

The discusses the involvement of Japan in regional integration and Asian crisis management, with a particular focus on the case study of Thailand. The factor that force Japan to involve in rescuing the crisis-devastated economies lies in a growing economic integration and interdependence of the continent. Also demonstrated is the emergence of Asian regionalism under Japanese economic leadership. It adds that the government of Japan showed its commitments to industrial transformation in Thailand.

The article focuses on the decline of Japanese subcontractor system. According to the Japan Research Institute, about 300,000 jobs in the country would be lost in addition to the two million already displaced by foreign production throughout the 1990s, if the current growth rate in imports from Asia were to continue. It notes that the main reasons for the trend are related to globalization. An overview of the origins and logic of the system is also offered.

The article discusses the influence of judicialization of GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure on bargaining behavior of countries. For the U.S., the two primary concepts in bilateral negotiation to force other countries to liberalize sector-specific trade are aggressive unilateralism and aggressive multilateralism. A comparative case study of U.S.-Japan negotiation on automobiles in 1981 and U.S.-Japan negotiation on automobile and parts in 1995, which illustrate various bargaining strategies used by both nations, is also presented.

The author argues that despite recent progress, Japan has been a follower, not a leader, in the long, slow march toward formal-legal regionalism in Asia. He claims that Japan's economic policy-making toward the region continues to be dominated by bureaucrats and business executives who care more about something they call industrial harmonization. He cites the reasons behind the reluctance of Asia to embrace formal-legal regionalism.

The article examines the discourses of strong leadership by modern Japanese political economic thinkers Nakatani Iwao, Ichiro Ozawa and Ishihara Shintaro. It provides a brief introduction to the theories of discourse analysis on the basis of post-structuralist thinkers including E. H. Carr, Robert Cox and Edward Said. The author explains how contemporary politicians and social scientists narrate the socio-political history of Japan and its relation to their advocacy of strong leadership.

The 1990s has been called the age of apologies due to the escalation of political apologies beginning in this time period. Apologies by governments include the British apology to the Irish and the Maoris, Japan's apology to the Korean comfort women, and the apology of the United States to the native Hawaiians. These apologies are deemed to be part of reconciliation processes for past wrongs. It is notable, however, that official acts of forgiveness rarely accompany these apologies. In fact, forgiveness is not something that nation-states or their representatives seem to do. Why not? What possibilities exist for nation-states to forgive, as part of reconciliation and justice-seeking processes? What would it look like and what meaning would it have? Drawing from literature on state apologies and on forgiveness in societal reconciliation processes, a framework is developed for forgiveness in international relations. Historical and current cases are used as illustrative examples to demonstrate the application of the framework. Five main issues guide inquiry. How does this merciful act of forgiveness fit with the primary requirements of justice in dealing with past wrongs, as evidenced by the institutionalization of war crimes tribunals and truth commissions? How can the collective nation-state forgive on behalf of individual victims? Is forgiveness applicable to inter-state as well as intra-state processes? What is the strategic value of forgiveness for nation-states? Finally, what are the possibilities of unilateral forgiveness? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study which examines the framework of gaiatsu or foreign pressure and other competing explanations of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements in Japan. It states that the country has emerged as an important actor in the international aid community since the early 1970s and its contributions to the World Bank and other multilateral organizations have increased appreciably. The results of the study suggest that aid policy in Japan responded partially to U.S. security and economic interests during the study period.