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After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the key developmental features of IR studies in three East Asian countries, Japan, Korea and China in terms of graduate training, academic professionalism and targeted audience. The comparison is sociological rather than directly relating the development of the discipline to the degree of feedom and democracy. Although the comparative description and analysis will be made of the three IR studies, the implicit object of comparison is the the development of IR studies in the United States. Major books and articles in local languages as well as in English will be used for this comparison. The time span that the paper covers is the last quarter of the last century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines the constructivist works on Japan’s security and shows empirically the inherent dangers in applying the constructivist framework to studies of national identity. It argues that the works discussed, besides not providing any new insights into Japan, suffer from reductionism and orientalism. In its second part the paper attempts to offer some modifications to the constructivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks into the evolution of regional co-operation in Europe and East Asia since the mid-1990s and at the policies of Germany and Japan in those contexts. Using role concepts as analytical tools for the comparative analysis, the paper assesses the specific role concepts of Germany and Japan with regard to regional co-operation, both in the economic and in the security context. It is widely assumed that East Asia represents an entirely different context for regional co-operation from Europe, and therefore has developed a new, specifically Asian way of regionalism. So far, less attention has been paid to Japan´s specific aims and policies in promoting and supporting regionalism in East Asia. Has Japan been important in promoting shallow forms of regional integration in East Asia, in contrast to Germany´s support for deep integration? If so, how should this be seen from the perspective of the civilian power role concept? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent visit to the States, Prime Minister Koizumi had been invited to join CIA’s intelligence brief with President Bush for the first time among the Japanese prime ministers. The invitation had been recognized as President Bush’s way of thanking Koizumi for his timely staunchly statement to indicate Japan’s support for U.S. and British actions against Iraq without the U.N. resolutions. Between Bush and Koizumi, they seem to be enjoying the hey day of the alliance, but in reality, what is happening between two countries can be explained that Japan has been much more deeply placed in American Grand Strategy while Japan has not realized that it does not have its own. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance has not the product of American and Japan’s grand strategies. It is a part of the American grand strategy, and Japan happens to be in the strategy. In the aftermath of 911, the United States changed its military policy from the threat based one to the capability based one. Under the circumstances, not having its grand strategy, Japan will soon face the problem of rationally deciding what Japan should do for the sake of Japan’s national interest whenever the United States calls for contribution. In this paper, I would argue that it will be high time to recognize the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. For the States, it might not become the issue as long as Japan has been following Washington’s order blindly, but for Japan, it means that Japan has missed another prime opportunity to establish its grand strategy after 911 and the swift victory of American and British war against Iraq. In this paper, I will trace back how the expectation and reality of the alliance has shifted since its establishment to the present. Then, I will point out the gap of the image and reality of the alliance between policy makers in Washington and Tokyo and its impact on the future U.S.-Japan security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by providing an overview of the dependent variable, financial crisis management and reform outcomes, in Japan. It then goes on to link these outcomes to an incremental and less than comprehensive financial reform process. The paper reviews the sequencing of financial reform measures undertaken by Japanese since the bursting of the bubble, focusing on the period of 1996-2003, with particular emphasis on the period of 1999-2003. To explain the nature of reforms, their sequencing, and the elusive outcomes to which they correspond, the paper assesses the relative bargaining power of foreign investors, bureaucratic actors, elected officials and private business in Japan’s tortuous reform process. In doing so, the paper shows the ways in which these interests are mediated by Japan’s distinctive institutional arrangements. The theoretical baseline of this paper is that different institutional arrangements not only manage change differently but are also fundamentally more difficult to change than others. More specifically, Japanese institutional arrangements have mediated the pressures of global capital in ways that minimize the impact of this capital on rules or behaviors. Likewise, these institutions have proven remarkably resilient to being fully transformed, even in the face of unprecedented regulatory breakdown and vulnerability to external pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the role Japanese comprehensive economic partnership agreements (EPAs) play within the accelerating process of regional integration throughout East Asia, which had been a comparatively white spot on the map of bilateral trade liberalization until the late 1990s. The accompanying "noodle bowl" phenomenon of individual agreements with exclusive character and various rules poses one of the central future challenges for Japan, whose economy is heavily dependent on intra-regional trade. Japanese EPAs go substantially beyond liberalization of trade in goods and services, including further so-called "WTO plus" or "deeper integration" issues, e.g. measures for promoting investment and competition or protection of intellectual property rights. However, there are also some critical points to raise, such as the low basic trade liberalization rate or the special treatment of agricultural products. The respective contract partners often make much wider concessions due to their unfavourable bargaining position. Drawing especially on these imbalances in trade liberalization, the underlying paper compares the existing Japanese trade agreements within East Asia in respect to their scope and tries to shed some light on how "comprehensive" Japanese EPAs actually are. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Japan have maintained their strategic alignment for nearly an half century. This is the longest alliance ever for Japan and the second longest one for the United States besides NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, theoretical understanding of this bilateral relashionship is relatively poor. In particular, existense of the alliance after the Cold War generated further explanative disturbance. This paper attempts to grapes U.S.-Japan alliance as an "security community," modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, that is more convincing theoretical framework than neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism. Although his model was created upon "transatlantic" relationship between the United States and Western Europe, the author considers the model is largely applicable to "transpacific" alignment. This paper argues a mechanism of peaceful change on multilateralism, military planning, and common definition of threats by examining institutions, norms and identity between the two countries in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By highlighting the phenomenon of bandwagoning for profit, Randall Schweller has made important contributions to the literature of alliance formation, including the introduction of a balance of interest theory. Yet, the validity of his arguments has not received academic scrutiny. To fill this void, the present paper examines the case of Japan and the Axis Pact, which constitutes a most likely case of his "bandwagon for profit" argument. Schweller posits that Japan jumped on the German bandwagon, like a jackal seeking a wolf's spoils. The paper demonstrates that his "Japan as a jackal" thesis is unsustainable on empirical grounds. For Tokyo, evidence shows, the Axis Pact was first and foremost meant to be a military alliance for balancing against the United States, rather than for free-riding on German power. On the basis of its empirical findings, furthermore, the paper presents an improved version of balance of interest theory on alliance formation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1368 and 1841 - almost five centuries - there were only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan. These Sinicized states crafted the stable relations with each other, and the most violence and instability arose between these states and the "nomadic" peoples to the north and west of China and Korea. The nomads and the East Asian states both operated within a unipolar system, but whereas the states accepted Chinese authority, the nomads did not. This distinction is not important if Wohlforth's argument that associates unipolarity with stability prevailed in East Asia. Yet China's relations with the nomads were characterized by war and instability whereas relations with the Sinicized states were characterized by peace and stability. Unipolarity cannot account for both of these outcomes. What this paper demonstrates is that there is a hierarchical relationship in place in the context of China and the East Asian states that was generated by a common culture defined by a Confucian worldview. These Sinic states possessed a shared sense of legitimacy which presupposes, in the context of Confucianism, that relations operate within an accepted hierarchy. The research presented in this paper helps clarify the distinction between an international system based on polarity and an international society based on culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many speak about the importance of the nonproliferation norm, few specify how an international norm can actually change policymaker decisions. This paper seeks to remedy this gap, and offers specific norm-based dissuasion techniques. This paper will address the specific mechanisms through which the international nonproliferation norm influences policymaker calculations. Drawing on the social psychology literature, I outline nine distinct mechanisms that can be used to increase pressure on elites to refrain from proliferation. I also give detailed examples of how these mechanisms have worked in past cases of nonproliferation, including Japan, Libya, and Egypt. In addition, the paper will discuss the limitations of norms: in some cases, norms are unlikely to have any impact on a potential proliferator, and in fact, the norm may backfire and provoke the opposite of the desired behavior. I discuss these specific circumstances so that policymakers can understand when norms are no longer a useful tool, and thus can focus on applying other dissuasion techniques. Finally, the paper will discuss how domestic conditions can affect the potency of the nonproliferation norm. Like any dissuasion technique, norms are not “one size fits all.” Examples of the multiple ways that domestic conditions can influence the utility of norms will be discussed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the interests of Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire clashed for the first time in the second half of the 18th century, Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, were in the center of the dispute. Furthermore, at least from the Japanese side, the notion of culture has defined the dispute. Namely, the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as expansion of superior culture, conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies which could result in the voluntary embracement of the rule of the Russian empire by the Ainu (Akatsuki 1987.)In the last five decades the same border zone, namely the South Kurile islands (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have continued to occupy the central place in Japan's agenda vis-a -vis the Soviet Union and, after 1992, Russia. However, the existent scholarship has paid little attention to the role of culture and the Ainu in the contemporary dispute over control of the islands. This paper hopes to bridge this gap by bringing together the debate on the place of Ainu in Japanese society that emerged in early 1970s and the concurrent cultural construction of the Japan's "sef" vis-a -vis Russia.The first part of this paper provides a brief review of modern Japan's engagement with the Russian and the Ainu "other" in terms of national identity construction. The second part examines the contemporary dialogue between the two "others" within the broader context of identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by analyzing the critical reevaluation of Japan's history of colonization of Ainu lands and the relocation of Ainu culture from the realm of the inferior assigned to it by the prewar discourse. This paper argues that this reconstruction presented a challenge not only to the conception of Japan as a homogenous nation but also undermined the validity of Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands as a quest for the return of inherent territory as it granted subjectivity to the Ainu "other" and allowed for the Ainu participate in the public discourse. The paper follows by introducing the cultural discourse on Russia and Japan that emerged almost simultaneously with the debates on Ainu. It argues that one of the functions of this construction of the national "self" was to suppress the challenges posed by the contemporary debates on Ainu by presenting a hierarchical construction between Japan's "self" and the Russian "other" and through this reaffirming Japan's belonging to the realm of the civilized and the normal. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will posit the argument that the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s between Japan and China are the product of a number of factors specific to both states. Using neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide in terms of ways out of this impasse, this thesis will contend that the heightened tensions over energy resources and maritime territory since the mid-1990s have developed as a result of a combination of state specific factors that have hindered Sino-Japanese attempts to find binding agreements on joint-developments and designated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea.Four major contributing factors to the East China Sea disputes are identified in this thesis. In the first place, there is the issue of the security structure in North-east Asia, a structure that remains closely related to one suited to a Cold War environment, where Beijing remains cautious of any real or imagined US-Japanese attempts to contain China; a fact that inhibits China's ability to engage in regional security activities. China thus views the security implications of the East China Sea disputes through both a traditional and non-traditional lens where new issues such as maritime piracy and terrorism provide both states with opportunities and challenges for co-operation. Secondly, there is the influence of domestic politics and nationalism in Japan and China on how the respective governments and populations perceive, address and formulate their maritime security policy . Yinan He highlights the importance of this second factor by claiming that the reason why nationalism has a strong role in this evolving era of Sino-Japanese relations is that 'the historically derived mutual antipathy and mistrust can worsen the security concerns generated by the high ambiguity in their current power balance and cause serious mutual threat perception' . A third issue relates to differing Japanese and Chinese interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) along with the importance of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs); factors closely linked to security concerns in the East China Sea. Lastly, another contributing factor is the clear lack of an adequate security management regime in the North-East Asia region . By choosing neo-liberal institutionalism as a theoretical guide and a way forward, this paper will also look at the part played by, distrust, the fear of being cheated on in negotiations, and uncertainties over Japan and China's post-Cold War roles, in contributing to the aggravation of the East China Sea disputes since the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the allied occupation of Japan from 1945-1952 as a public policy issue. It articulatesand explores the general concept of institutional continuity during an occupation; more precisely, this paper will look at resiliency in terms of the prewar political authority of the bureaucracy. At its most basic, an important pre-surrender institution—the Japanese bureaucracy—can endure and resist substantive change during a system altering transformative period: Bureaucratic resilience during an occupation. One would expect that a celebrated democratization process that began with a military occupation would be peopled with those who seek to dramatically alter a variety of institutions; instead, one discovers a more accurate blend of continuity and change—hence, the challenge. At the most general level, I am identifying instances where institutional continuity can be recognized and then observing this condition and offering the implication for budding democracy. Specifically, with a finer focus on Occupation-era Japanese bureaucracy, this paper will first introduce this concept of resiliency. This introduction is followed by short discussion of the concept resiliency in relation to the Japanese bureaucracy; then, it presents them in relation to the following four topics: It maps the landmarks of (1) the purge process in Japan, (2) the enduring and problematic role of the Emperor, (3) the secretive crafting of the postwar constitution that celebrates democracy and curbs Japan's military, and (4) the role of Japanese bureaucratic reforms in the construction of postwar political power. Goal: To understand Japan during this uncertain times, the resiliency of institutions. Use of secondary sources &archival material. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper purports to give a positive answer to the "Japanese IR Question", by analyzing some notable academic attempts arguing the concept of international society. Particular attention is paid to works between 1920s and 1940s, and the paper focuses on IR scholars, political theorists, and international lawyers.During this period, Japan was in a very peculiar place. While the country had accomplished the status of a major power in post WWI world, Japan had also struggled to identify the appropriate position between the European world of the colonizers and the world of the colonized. Thus clarifying the meaning of international society was an important part of academic activities for the country's scholars concerning international relations. In the paper, the author classifies major studies on international society into four groups or "views", namely (1) the Idealists; (2) the Kelsenians; (3) the Cosmopolitans; and (4) the Greater-Asians.The problem with these groups is that all four views were influenced by foreign theory and remained imported knowledge. However, Japanese vision of international society as a whole has one distinctive character which other countries' studies do not have. The paper points out that there are three types of arguments in the country's vision on international society, and argues that it is the third type of argument on autonomy which makes the vision of international society as "Japanese IR". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines economic integration in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). Even though market forces, the Sino-Japanese rivalry, and functional cooperation may help drive regionalism forward, the foundation of any significant integration in the East Asian trading system will be the ASEAN+1 FTAs with China, Japan, and South Korea. It is therefore important to examine the way in which these agreements structure cooperation. This study examines some of the major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEPA) and the ways in which these choices might help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. If AJCEPA is to be anything more than an umbrella for Japan's bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members, it must achieve greater uniformity in coverage of issues and, especially, rules of origin. The comparison of Japan's bilateral FTAs that closes the paper suggests the magnitude of this challenge. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine Japan’s relations with North Korea which have been deadlocked for a long time. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 and held a summit meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-Il, and signed the “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”. Since then Japan has made a continuous effort to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea. It is Japan’s desire to put the abduction issue, the nuclear and security issue, and the normalization issue on the same table and solve all these problems in a comprehensive manner. To North Korea, on the other hand, the normalization issue is the top priority, as they demand a full apology and adequate compensation for Japan’s colonial past. Meanwhile, North Korea’s repeated nuclear testing and launching of missiles over the Sea of Japan has dampened the negotiating process. The Six-Party Talks intended to halt North Korea’s nuclear development are coming to a stalemate. Furthermore, U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s efforts to retrieve money once frozen in a Macau bank have complicated the whole situation.This paper will, first, examine differences in priorities in foreign policy between Japan and North Korea. Second, the paper will focus on the reasons why the Six-Party Talks are not making the progress expected toward North Korea’s denuclearization. Third, the conflicting interests and differences among the five countries toward North Korea will be analyzed. Finally, different alternatives regarding the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea will be considered. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines changes at the global level in the discourse of climate change, and changes in Japan regarding the climate change agenda, during the 1980s to 2000s. It also focuses on the ways in which Japan has attempted to influence - successfully and unsuccessfully - the global climate change agenda. Further, the paper examines the conditions for Japan's ability to make progress on its agenda at the global level, as well as at the domestic level. What factors have led to the successful adoption of Japan's climate agenda at the transnational level (i.e. domestically and internationally)? What factors have hindered it? The cases have been taken from the domestic and international processes towards the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol and the current post-Kyoto debates. The paper presents an analytical framework which can be used at both the international and domestic levels to explain Japan's way forward in mainstreaming climate change policies in world politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and North Korea began their official talks for diplomatic normalization in 1991. Sixteen years have passed since then. Yet it is uncertain when they can finally reach diplomatic normalization. During their first summit meeting of September 2002, Japan has promised to provide a massive economic aid to North Korea after diplomatic normalization, estimated at approximately 1 trillion yen, virtually as a compensation for Japan's colonial rule of Korea. The money would be a great asset to the North Korean economy and can serve as a major incentive for DRPK's denuclearization. Thus, the normalization has a strong bearing on the regional security of Northeast Asia. However, diplomatic normalization is not yet in sight. The paper will focus on key factors for delaying normalized relations between the two countries. It will discuss changes in the eagerness of Japan and North Korea for normalization, with a greater focus on recent changes, analyzing the factors that prompted the changes, including domestic and international as well as historical, economic, military factors. The paper will also consider the future prospects for normalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the scholarly literature, the effect of electoral structure on foreign policy making is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan that resulted in a dramatic change in the electoral power structures provide a unique natural experiment, offering the potential to understand how electoral structure influences foreign policy making. This paper examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan's agricultural negotiating position changed before and after the 1994 electoral reforms by examining Japanese negotiating positions in the Uruguay and Doha WTO trade rounds. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on the Japan's trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. As a consequence of this shifted equilibrium point, Japan's agriculture trade negotiating position should change with relation to its position before the electoral change. This paper finds that the Japanese negotiating position does not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of how democracy is structured on foreign policy. This seems contra to the expectation that the nature of political power should have an impact on the policy outputs. In the Japanese case, a shift from a highly parochial and agricultural to a more urban and cosmopolitan electoral power base produced no appreciable change in Japanese trade negotiating position. This finding has a range of implications that are explored in the paper and create an agenda for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation, numerous experts were deployed from the United States to survey the postwar landscape of the Philippines. They were sent to collect images of and collect statistical information on the extent of damages to Philippine agricultural and manufacturing industry, transportation and shipping facilities, urban and village structures, and natural resources. This collection of information urgently framed the Philippine Islands as "utterly devastated." Within the U.S. congress, immediate calls were made not for short term relief, as originally thought, but rather for long term plans of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Philippines. From 1945 to 1946 discussions of a Rehabilitation Act were steadily pursued. By 1946 the "original Rehabilitation Bill had been expanded, the kinds and amounts of claimants had been extended and definitions broadened, the amounts appropriated had been multiplied over five times." Bundled along with the disappointing Bell-Trade Act of 1946, the Rehabilitation Act still ushered in a sense of optimism in the immediate postwar Philippines. By the sheer amount of money it provided, numerous projects and institutions were planned to aid in gaining the newly independent Republic the international recognition it deserved. Yet at the same time, inhabiting the shadows of optimism was the anxiety of mismanagement of money. In 1947, one particular group, the Joint Philippine American Finance Commission made up of both Philippine and American members reported their findings and recommendations. Their findings conclude that the initial years of Philippine independence was of critical importance in the "economic development" and stable future of the nation. Chief in their concerns was the potential mishandling of rehabilitation loan money entering the young nation. In response the joint commission makes several recommendations. Of utmost importance is the principle proposal of a Central Bank. The establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines, as the chief authority on national currency, can ensure that all of their other recommendations are followed. This paper thus proposes to look at the emergence of the Central Bank as an object produced out of the uncanny postwar discourses of economists. These postwar discourses center on the anxiety over the twofold possibilities of misrecognition of money as well as a collapse into a non-modern economy. In the imaginary of economists, the existence of a Central Bank guided by techno-knowledge and sound management, acts as the bulwark against such devastating possibilities. Furthermore, the potential success of the Central Bank is demonstrative of the potential success of a sovereign Philippine political economy. Yet in order to legitimate the existence of a Central Bank, this paper asserts that through disciplined economic research, a recurring non-modern economic world is created by economists. This non-modern economic world is then historically presented as inhabiting the present postwar space of the Philippines. Furthermore, it also threatens to subsume it. It does so in two interrelated ways. The first is the potential misrecognition of money as speaking a language other than the value of capital. The second is the discourse created by economists in order to produce uncanny effects through the economy. These two methods intertwine in order to combine, what they imagine as a chaotic and fragmented space of islands: peasants, rebellions, decrepit banks, atrophied agricultural industries, and other non-modern elements, into a unitary and coherent whole. The name of this object is the Philippine national economy. And like any object, once solid and tangible, it can be continuously manipulated, managed, and exploited by both state and international banking institutions... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How effective leader can exercise his/her leadership depends on the support of people. The best indicator of the support of people is public opinion of the nation. This paper examines the relations between effectiveness of leadership and the support of public opinion and its impact on foreign policy in Japan since Koizumi administration. During Koizumi era, how did he utilize the support of public opinion when he formulated Japan's foreign policy after 911? Succeeding to Koizumi, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is now moving toward the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution to allow Japan to impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Can he successfully revise the Constitution? Can he utilize the support of the public opinion like his predecessor? How does Abe’s policy sextant influence Japan's foreign policy? What kind of impact does his policy have on Asian countries and U.S.-Japan alliance? Having these questions in mind, this paper compares and analyzes leadership, foreign policy and public opinion in Japan between Koizumi and Abe administrations ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, nuclear debates in the United States have centered on the “unspeakability” of nuclear war drawing this silence from the apocalyptic power of nuclear technology. This “unspeakability” is mirrored institutionally and, ultimately, this silence leads to depoliticized and sanitized policy paths and political realities. This can manifest itself in greater secrecy in policy decisions concerning nuclear technology and the phenomenon of “nuclear reclusion” in the public realm. Given the undisputed destructive power of nuclear weapons, the US tendency toward depolitization and secrecy short circuits democratic accountability. I will examine two cases toward this end: This paper compares the memorialization of nuclear weapons in Japan and the US. How do our collective memories differ? Can methods of remembering history lead us toward different policies or aid us in creating memories of the future that include open debate and de-sanitized nuclear policy? This paper seeks to analyze how nuclear memory operates within the democratic state, and how we bridge the apparent incongruity with global nuclear realities and the (re)creation of democratically accountable nation-states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study on Japan's informal political actors and networks will not only provide a foundation for us to further understand Japanese politics and foreign policy but will also enable us to get a better idea of how networks function in a larger context, namely between Tokyo, Beijing and Washington. Social network is not only an important part of Japanese policy making but also a crucial factor in the China-Japan-U.S. triangular relationship. Instead of providing equal attention to each parties of this triangle, this paper will focus on Japan's informal political actors and networks by examining the process of normalization in its relations with China. In addition to detailed analysis of political actors in Japanese politics and society, it also provides an account of Beijing's reaction in this significant process. In the concluding part, this paper also provides some preliminary analysis in making international comparisons particularly with the United States. Thus, it will also assist us in understanding the networks between the three powers in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Impact of War and Successful Reconstruction: Evaluating the Bush Administration's Germany-Japan-Iraq Analogy" prepared for the "International Studies Association Convention" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the legitimacy of the analogical reasoning by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush in the Iraq war based upon on an assessment of the commonalities across Japan, Italy and Germany. The paper mentions different meanings of path dependence theory according to several authors.

How has the issue of climate change been framed in Japan? How has the framing of administrative/political structure influenced policy formulation in Japan? This paper examines the structure and agents in Japan to formulate climate change policies during the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol/post-Kyoto process. The Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation in the late 1980s to early 1990s, the Global Warming Prevention Headquarters in the late 1990s, and the relevant advisory councils at the present time are the central structures to be re-examined. The Cabinet, relevant ministries and agencies, NGOs, industries, and the general public are also examined. Special attention will be given to the tensions among the economy, energy and the environment. This paper illustrates the dynamics of development of the structure and the growth of diverse stakeholders in addressing the process of making different ideas into real actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers Japan?s development aid in the context of the development discourse. Questioning the dichotomy between the ?West? and the ?Third World? from Japan?s ?in-between? perspective, it argues that Japanese aid policy is not a ?third space? (Homi Bhabha) but rather a ?derivative discourse? (Partha Chatterjee) that reinforces the hierarchical discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the view that the Japanese state has been a leader in a drive toward new regional trade agreements in Asia. It acknowledges that Japan has forged pacts with Singapore and Mexico that lower overall tariffs, but suggests that these agreements -- and pending negotiations with other bilateral and plurilateral partners -- are driven more by an interest in "industrial harmonization" than in trade liberalization. This represents a continuation of Japan’s ongoing foreign policy, rather than a break from the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares the banking reform process in Japan and Korea. The two countries differ in the interaction of exogenous forces such as foreign pressures, and the domestic political institutions. I explain the circumstances that prompted each country to choose its particular course of reform and discuss the costs and prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This project introduces an original model designed to explain three key dimensions of financial market reform over the past quarter century, including why governments initiate significant reform, why reforms have been biased in the liberal rather than re-regulatory direction, and why regulatory reforms have tended to converge cross-nationally. The model demonstrates that the political economy of regulatory reform is not simply repetitive or unidirectional, but rather should be understood as a dynamic process that is itself subject to change over time as a result of market ransformations and prior policy choices. The goal of this paper is to specify more clearly both the circumstances in which unique national characteristics will dominate reform outcomes, and how the structures that create these persistent patterns in national financial market policies may themselves be subject to change. Although offered as a general model of the feedback between political and economic processes in an increasingly global political economy, the model will be assessed in light of the past 25 years of financial market structuring in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we teach International Relations in the aftermath of 911 and the war with Iraq? Does the swift victory of the war against Iraq symbolize the American answer to those responsible for 911? America won the war, so the case settled. In fact, the question concerning 911 is about to fade away in front of the victory of the war. For However, even so, it is still critical to think through 911 and the war with Iraq in the classroom of International Relations. Without this effort, it will be difficult to contemplate how the rest of the world should act in the era of America’s unilateralism and neoconservatism. At the same time, dealing with 911 and the victory of the war against Iraq will also provide students in the classroom with the opportunity to cultivate their media literacy. For example, comparing the views and programs of the Fox News Networks which had repeatedly called the U.S. forces as our forces in their broadcast and those of other networks, will challenge students’ beliefs and understanding of the events and the world. In this paper, I would like to accomplish two objectives. First, I would like to present a survey of course outlines of Introduction to International Relations at major universities in Japan and explore how scholars in Japan incorporate the impact of 911 and the war against Iraq in their courses. The results will be quite instructive because it should show how well Japanese professors incorporate the latest world affairs into their teaching, and also how their preferences or beliefs influence the content of their courses. Then, based on the findings, I will create one semester class of Introduction to International Relations, which covers the impact of 911 and the war against Iraq, and also touches upon the problem of media literacy, by including two recent videos; Why Us? An Insightful Look at the 9/11 Tragedy and What Makes the U.S. a Target (IIMCR) and The Long Road to War (WGBH). By the time of the conference, I will be able to share students’ evaluation of the class for review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, free trade agreements concluded between developing and developed countries have proliferated rapidly. By including rules for investment and services, these recent FTAs comprise much more than tariff elimination. Why the sudden proliferation of these agreements, when most-favoured-nation tariffs are at a historically low level? This paper identifies the interests behind these agreements, arguing that they are a reaction to the liberalization taking place in advanced developing countries, conditioned by specific institutional features of the global trade regime. Motivated by an accelerating competition over markets and access to foreign direct investment, countries conclude more and more bilateral agreements out of fear of being left behind. The central finding is greatly increased role of interests around foreign direct investment, a factor that has been overlooked in previous analyses. The study is based on comparative case studies of FTAs concluded by Japan, the US, and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American scholars might argue that Gaiatsu still plays an important role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the aftermath of 911. However, the Constructivist’s analysis will show Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s trauma and his complacency are the key factors and weigh more than Gaiatsu in the current U.S.-Japan alliance. It will also mean that what the U.S. and Japan seem to enjoy might not be there once Prime Minister Koizumi stepping down and Japan will not be able to deliver what the U.S. expects. In the aftermath of 911, the U.S.-Japan alliance immediately faced the problem of show the flag incident, but it did not become too big a stumbling block between Washington and Tokyo after all. Washington owed big to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His trauma concerning the Gulf War and his guts against Hashimoto, his enemy in the LDP, paved a way for Washington’s Gaiatsu (outside pressure) strategy to work. In face of the U.S. and British actions against Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi staunchly supported their actions even without the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions. On the surface, his decision signaled Japan’s departure from its postwar diplomacy, was welcomed by President George W. Bush, Jr. As a token of appreciation, during the recent bilateral summit, President Bush invited Prime Minister Koizumi for the first time to sit in on a secret meeting of the CIA. On the surface, as Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, secretary of the cabinet stated, In the century and a half since (Commodore Matthew) Perry came to Japan, Japan-U.S. relations have probably never been better. However, in reality, to the constructivists, Japan’s attitude toward the alliance has not changed at all; a dependent and blind follower. Otherwise, Japan should have made its position clearly and opted to turn the cold shoulder to the United States when the U.S. and Britain decided to act without the U.N. security resolutions. What Japan has done since 1945 is to go with the flow of the United States. Washington has no intention to comment on Japan’s action as long as Japan is in her side. However, as a result, Japan has not made an effort to develop an independent spirit and historical understanding. Dependence does not lead to mutual trust and respect. It is high time for Japan to have a realistic look at history to derive lessons that look to the future. For Japan to develop its own perspective, it is important to understand that the nature of the alliance has not changed a bit from the outset for Japan. In this paper, using the Constructivist’s approach, I will trace back Japan’s problem to the beginning of the U.S.-Japan alliance and explain why the problem remains intact more than a half century. By doing so, I will point out the way for Japan to develop an independent spirit to win stronger mutual trust and respect from the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Fuji-Kodak photo film, port business, and NTT interconnection charge disputes, which developed between the U.S. and Japan around and after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), significantly increased the importance of multilateral trade rules. The Japanese government?s response to U.S. pressure varied in each of these disputes; it was more conciliatory in the NTT interconnection charge dispute than the other two. To explain this variation, this paper presents an argument: the timing of a trade dispute in the development of multilateral rules is an important determinant of the response, because the timing determines the gap between multilateral rules and Japanese domestic government and business practices. The case analyses of the three disputes demonstrate that, since a smaller gap exists in the early and late stages of multilateral-rule development than in the intermediate stage, the Japanese government resisted U.S. pressure more effectively in the former than in the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan, the largest foreign aid donor throughout the 1990s, went through a visible transformation of foreign aid policy during this period into the first few years of the 21st century. By focusing on domestic institutional and political factors that have heavily influenced Japan’s foreign aid policy-making, the paper goes beyond the conventional neomercantilism or reactive-state based explanation of Japan’s aid policy and argues that the domestic institutional setting, in terms of aid bureaucracy, budget sources, and political constituents of each bureaucracy significantly influences aid policy. In the post Asian Crisis and post 9/11 world, the shift in aid priority emerged visible due to reformed institutional arrangement of foreign aid, and changing perceptions of security in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The linkage of developmental aid to the promotion of democratic governance in recipient countries has stimulated both policy and scholarly interest. Many aid donors (e.g., governments and multilateral organizations) have been replacing the conventional single task aid concentrating on growth promotion with this type of multitask aid. The linkage between growth and democracy is not only integral part of the liberal discourse that provides a cognitive foundation for foreign aid, but also an instrument to enhance the efficiency and political palatability of foreign aid in the early twentieth-first century. The current paper examines multitask aid in both normative and empirical terms. Normatively, it outlines three distinct conceptual perspectives on the relationship growth and politics--liberalism, authoritarianism and realism. Empirically, it analyzes the conduct of Japanese aid that directs toward mostly illiberal Asian states and is criticized for focusing excessively on growth with a limited attention to democracy. Finally, it deduces the Japanese government's beliefs from its aid practices and illuminates reasons why Japan often deviates from the international liberal norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of the Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) relocating production facilities in East Asia on economic development of the region, paying special attention to two sustainability issues, namely, poverty/equity issues and environmental issues. In Section 1, I examine the interaction between Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and rapid industrialization in East Asia since the mid- 1980s, by analyzing (1) how the business strategies of Japan's large manufacturing enterprises (LMEs) influenced the Japanese SMEs' FDI strategy and how their operations affected the trade patterns and industrial structure in East Asia, and (2) how the SMEs' FDI affected the region-wide shift from vertical to horizontal division of labor and de facto economic integration in East Asia. In Section 2, I briefly examine (1) the unsustainability issues - poverty and economic disparity and resource and environmental issues - challenging the fast-growing economies of East Asia and (2) the complementary needs and resources found in North-South relations that might well provide a basis for building a win-win strategy for the transfer of capital and technology from North to South and shift development path towards more sustainable direction. In Section 3, I explore the possibility of making the localization of FDI an alternative business principle by which to guide the revision of transnational FDI rules to realize such a win-win strategy and examine the current and potential role Japanese SMEs would play in that process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the role of public opinion since the end of the Cold War on the normalization and maturation of Japanese Foreign and security policy. Japanese foreign and security policy makers tend to make policy with little regard to public op ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether Japan is emerging as a “normal” great power able to use military power as freely as other great powers do. Since its establishment, the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to have strengthened overtime. Among the postwar prime ministers ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the extent to which Japanese bilateral foreign assistance may influence the way microstates vote within the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The literature on the IWC notes that many microstates have dubious ties to whaling as ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's post-Cold War security policy has largely revolved around the question of how to respond North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As a primary response, Japan has participated in the Six-Party Talks, which have aimed at promoting North Korea's denuclearization and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Japan has had the ability to provide North Korea with strong economic incentives to change its policy stance. However, Japan has failed to use the economic card very effectively. In my paper, I will examine factors behind the failure. Then, I will consider what Japan should do in order to play a more positive role in building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, with a particular attention to the opportunities and constraints resulting from political changes in the United States and South Korea. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronting an ugly past is often regarded as essential not only to achieving some justice for the victims but also for allowing those held historically responsible to move on. This is sometimes a prerequisite for the 'normalization' of relations between states whose shared histories may contain events in which one party believes they have been grievously wronged by the other. The paradigm case in which an almost permanent impasse exists in coming to terms with a difficult war past is Japan vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours in East Asia. The cycle of apologetics and denials will almost certainly continue as deep contestations over war memories continue within Japan while at the same time political leaders seek a more prominent role for their country as a 'normal' actor in international affairs. This paper assesses the problem of Japan's 'normalization' efforts with particular reference to issues of nationalism, state identity and normative theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the increasing economic and strategic clout of China and the vulnerability of the American power in the Gulf, the US policy makers are searching for a new strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Their ultimate purpose is to neutralize the preeminence of China.Pentagon is trying to forge a new alliance of three well-established democracies-US,India and Japan. On April 16,2007 all the three nations began a joint military drill in the Pacific. More or less at the same time, the first India-US Defence Joint Working Group met in New Delhi.These two develpments have certainly raised the temperature in Beizing.Recently China has raised its defence budget by 17.8 percent and successfully tested its antisatellite ballistic missile.No doubt the Pacific military exercise by US, India and Japan has been taken as an alarming signal by China.The proposed paper will try to explore the evolving strategy of the US in the Asia Pacific region.One has to explore as to what extent such a three nation joint exercise is addressing the unprecedented rise of China in the politico-economic and strategic affaires of the region. We will also examine as to how far the existing American policy of strategic engagement with China is being reexamined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most view China as the rising power in Asia, the future of the region will also be determined by India. Despite receiving less attention, India is a growing economic, military, and political power in the region and globally. India has the world’s 4th largest economy at $796 billion and for the past decade, has registered economic growth rates over 7 percent. India has the 3rd largest active duty armed force in the world behind China and the United States and is a nuclear power. Finally, India is a respected political player and often cited as a candidate for inclusion in the UN Security Council. Certainly, India faces significant obstacles including over 350 million living dire poverty and an economic infrastructure that needs significant repair. However, Indian leaders have ambitious aspirations and it is a country on the rise. Given India’s important and growing position in Asia, its relations with China and Japan, the other key players in region, will be crucial. This paper will examine India’s economic, political, and security relationship with these other two powers of Asia and the impact these relations have on Indian and regional security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]