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Criminal justice systems have traditionally relied heavily on human decision-making, but new technologies are increasingly supplementing the human role in this sector. This paper considers what general limits need to be placed on the use of algorithms in sentencing decisions. It argues that, even once we can build algorithms that equal human decision-making capacities, strict constraints need to be placed on how they are designed and developed. The act of condemnation is a valuable element of criminal sentencing, and using algorithms in sentencing – even in an advisory role – threatens to undermine this value. The paper argues that a principle of "meaningful public control" should be met in all sentencing decisions if they are to retain their condemnatory status. This principle requires that agents who have standing to act on behalf of the wider political community retain moral responsibility for all sentencing decisions. While this principle does not rule out the use of algorithms, it does require limits on how they are constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore whether or not the use of risk assessment tools in criminal sentencing can be made compatible with a retributivist justification of punishment. While there has been considerable discussion of the accuracy and fairness of these tools, such discussion assumes that one's recidivism risk is relevant to the severity of punishment that one should receive. But this assumption only holds on certain accounts of punishment, and seems to conflict with retributivist justifications of punishment. Drawing on the broader desert literature, we explain the source of this conflict, and suggest that a retributivist approach on which the severity of punishment partly depends on one's character in addition to their acts offers some hope of reconciling retributivism with the use of risk assessment tools in considerations of sentencing reduction in particular. Ultimately, however, even this limited attempt at reconciliation fails, so long as risk assessment tools fail to distinguish between risk that one is responsible for, and risk that one is not responsible for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 75 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003 overturned the principle in English law that a person cannot be retried for an offense of which he has been acquitted, recognizing advances in forensic science that uses modern analysis of DNA in adducing in evidence. The special plea of autrefois acquit can be overturned based on finding of compelling evidence after a previous acquittal of a suspect who can now be tried again for the same offense. The double jeopardy arises only after a lawful acquittal or autrefois convict of the accused for the first offense and these principles have allowed exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy developed by the courts. There is an analogous rule in common law courts based on the unreasonable splitting of the case when there is a severing of indictments which overrides the bar on the accused being retried for the same offense. This paper examines the difficulty of trying a defendant fairly in the English courts when the defense has pleaded an abuse of process and there is no clear overall argument for trial. This question needs an appraisal of legal ethics in criminal courts because a retrial of the accused on the same charge breaches the autrefois acquit doctrine, and severing of an indictment can cause the fair trial process to be undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For persons serving life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences in California, a commutation usually offers them the sole glimpse of hope for release from prison. While governors were reluctant to consider any sentence reductions from 1975 to 2016, commutations—including those for LWOP—have become a more frequent occurrence since. Yet, little is still known about how governors have justified reducing a sentence that initially offered no prospect of release from prison. Given the apparent change in practice, themes emerging from the content of 177 gubernatorial commutation summaries granted to persons serving LWOP sentences between 2017 and 2021 are analyzed in this paper. Through open coding, rehabilitative indicators (programming and institutional conduct) emerged as necessary preconditions for a commutation, while retributive factors (a reassessment of the nature of the crime and the prerogative to adjust excessive prison sentences or to correct sentencing errors) complemented sentence reductions. The findings expose the ethical issues that arise from an LWOP sentence and the subsequent commutation. More specifically, they shed light on the commitment offenses underlying commuted LWOP sentences and raise questions regarding the penal objectives that are supposed to be accomplished with permanent imprisonment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper questions the notion that states may be justified in denying certain prisoners the right to vote as a means of distancing themselves from particularly grave wrongs. Christopher Bennett has recently defended prisoner disenfranchisement as a fair and deserved retributive punishment for crimes, and Mary Sigler and Andrew Altman have argued in favor of prisoner disenfranchisement as a civil restriction. All three proponents agree that disenfranchisement should be reserved for those guilty of the most serious offenses. I assert that it is inappropriate to treat citizens in this manner and will advocate for the right to vote, whether disenfranchisement is perceived as a form of punishment or as a civil measure. I will present two arguments against disenfranchisement as it impacts both citizens and political community at large. First, it excludes citizens from the democratic arena and restricts the opportunity to reintegrate offenders into the political community. While a criminal sentence is intended to be burdensome, the burden associated with disenfranchisement extends beyond the appropriate penal scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an appealing and common view, the moral status of an action – whether it is wrong, for example – is sometimes important in itself in terms of the moral status of other actions – especially those that respond to the original action. This view is especially influential with respect to the criminal law. It is accepted not only by legal moralists but also by adherents of the harm principle, for example. In this paper, I argue against this view. The main arguments emphasize the distinctions between the moral status of actions, consequences, and agents. I argue that what matters, in terms of other actions, is not the moral status of the original action but rather other factors that may be confused with it, such as the moral status of its consequences – whether they are good or bad – and the moral status of the agent – whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy. The intuitive appeal of the common view is, I argue, at least partly due to a conflation of these factors. Most importantly, once we recall the distinctions between these factors, we can see more clearly that this view lacks a compelling rationale. Or, at least, that it is based on assumptions that, first, are much more controversial than their conclusion, and, second, do not support every aspect of this view – and thus do not offer a unified foundation for this view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One way to seek to reduce the risk of potential offenders engaging in certain types of crime in a public or semi-public area is to make it much more difficult, or even impossible, for them to gain access to the area in question and subject them to a sanction if they do enter the area. This paper considers whether preventive exclusion of this kind should be considered a pro tanto morally impermissible means of crime prevention because it violates the agency of those excluded. Several variants of this agency objection to preventive exclusion are identified and critically assessed. It is argued that none persuasively show preventive exclusion to be pro tanto morally wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most influential agenda for progressive police reform today aims to shrink the police footprint by reassigning many problems they currently manage to other institutions. This paper argues that this agenda relies on faulty understanding of the police role, and that a more promising agenda based on a better understanding is available. Police are a residual institution, charged with managing the crises that other institutions cannot handle adequately on their own, and it is not easy to reassign that work to anyone else. In the course of doing it, however, they develop expertise in the nature and sources of these crises that positions them to identify and help repair the institutional failures that generate them. The paper illustrates these claims with case studies of the challenges that efforts to reassign police work elsewhere have encountered and the role that police have played in institutional repair. It concludes by considering he normative concerns that this important aspect of the police role raises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policing in many parts of the world—the United States in particular—has embraced an archetypal model: a conception of the police based on the tenets of individuated archetypes, such as the heroic police "warrior" or "guardian." Such policing has in part motivated moves to (1) a reallocative model: reallocating societal resources such that the police are no longer needed in society (defunding and abolishing) because reform strategies cannot fix the way societal problems become manifest in (archetypal) policing; and (2) an algorithmic model: subsuming policing into technocratic judgements encoded in algorithms through strategies such as predictive policing (mitigating archetypal bias). This paper begins by considering the normative basis of the relationship between political community and policing. It then examines the justification of reallocative and algorithmic models in light of the relationship between political community and police. Given commitments to the depth and distribution of security—and proscriptions against dehumanizing strategies—the paper concludes that a nonideal-theory priority rule promoting respect for personhood (manifest in community and dignity-promoting policing strategies) is a necessary condition for the justification of the above models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his paper "Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment," Zachary Hoskins develops and defends an idea of "public reason" that might be applicable to debates over punishment in the Western world. This short reply takes issue with some of Hoskins' conclusions (while agreeing with many of his premises), and suggests that contra Hoskins, many versions of retribution are not compatible with the ideal of public reason as Rawls articulated it. Instead, debates over criminal justice and punishment should properly revolve around the goods of public safety and harm reduction—rather than around any of the supposed metaphysical goods achieved by retributive punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Stand Your Ground" (SYG) laws are subject to controversy within both the philosophical literature and the legal literature; and of course they are hotly debated outside of academia as well. In this paper I show that a great part of these discussions is predicated on often very serious errors about what SYG is or isn't, and I explain them in the context of self-defense law. Though my main purpose is clarification and the correction of some errors in the literature, I close with some brief thoughts about the moral status of SYG and a proposal regarding SYG laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists of criminal law widely agree that state punishment involves harsh treatment and stigma and that states must therefore provide protections for targeted individuals. But certain regulatory measures can also be used to impose harsh treatment and stigma. This paper addresses the stigmatic impact of harsh regulatory measures. It argues that harsh regulatory measures that label targeted individuals as risky impose a stigma that has the potential to significantly affect these individual's personal and professional relationships. Such measures include area restrictions applied to alleged terrorists and registration requirements for convicted sex offenders. I recommend ways of implementing legal safeguards for targeted individuals against the stigma involved in the employment of such measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim in this article is to set out some counter-intuitive claims about the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) applications to the protection and enjoyment of human rights and to be your guide through my unorthodox ideas. While there are familiar human rights issues raised by AI and its applications, these are perhaps the easiest of the challenges because they are already recognized by the human rights regime as problems. Instead, the more pernicious challenges are those that have yet to be identified or articulated, because they arise from new affordances rather than directly through AI modeled as a technology. I suggest that we need to actively explore the potential problem space on this basis. I suggest that we need to adopt models and metaphors that systematically exclude the possibility of applying the human rights regime to AI applications. This orientation will present us with the difficult, intractable problems that most urgently require responses. There are convincing ways of understanding AI that lock out the very possibility for human rights responses and this should be grounds for serious concern. I suggest that responses need to exploit both sets of insights I present in this paper: first that proactive and systematic searches of the potential problem space need to be continuously conducted to find the problems that require responses; and second that the monopoly that the human rights regime holds with regards to addressing harm and suffering needs to be broken so that we can deploy a greater range of barriers against failures to recognize and remedy AI-induced wrongs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of philosophers argue that law enforcement officers may have good reasons to racially profile suspects under certain conditions. Their conclusions rest on a claim of epistemic rationality: if members of some races are at an increased risk of criminality, then it may be rational for law enforcement officers to subject them to increased scrutiny. In this paper I contest the epistemic rationality of racial profiling by appealing to recent work in criminology and the sociology of race and crime. I argue that recent studies indicate that race is a comparatively poor baseline for judging criminality. Law enforcement officers are therefore not making a cognitive error by ignoring race to focus on other correlates of crime but are keeping up with our best social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in philosophy and in criminology indicate that there are significant respects in which the two disciplines can be mutually informing. Many philosophers are increasingly interested in exploring empirical aspects of philosophical claims, and criminologists are finding their way past the alleged fact/value distinction and are rediscovering the moral significance of facts, especially regarding punishment and desistance. In some recent criminological studies there are implicit links to the British moralists such as David Hume and Adam Smith, and to Aristotle as well. This paper explicates those links and some of the possibilities for philosophy and criminology to be mutually informing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Restorative justice conferences that operate as sentencing mechanisms involve the making of a trade-off between empowering lay participants to make their own decisions, and the requirements of consistency and proportionality, which are established principles of sentencing. In current restorative justice practice, this trade-off tends to be made more in favour of consistency and proportionality, at the expense of the empowerment of lay participants. Empowerment is central to key benefits of restorative justice, such as reducing recidivism and increasing victim satisfaction. However, its importance to the effectiveness of restorative justice is not always properly acknowledged. In addition to this lack of acknowledgment, there are both conceptual and practical problems with the principles of consistency and proportionality (particularly in the way that they are presented when considered in relation to restorative justice) that are often overlooked. As a result, the tendency is for assumptions to be made about the necessary supremacy of these principles over empowerment. This paper urges more acknowledgement of the importance of empowerment in restorative justice, together with a greater appreciation of the problems with consistency and proportionality, with a view to challenging assumptions about the way that the trade-off must be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A basic principle in sentencing offenders is proportionality. However, proportionality judgments are often left to the discretion of the judge, raising familiar concerns of arbitrariness and bias. This paper considers the case for systematizing judgments of proportionality in sentencing by means of an algorithm. The aim of such an algorithm would be to predict what a judge in that jurisdiction would regard as a proportionate sentence in a particular case. A predictive algorithm of this kind would not necessarily undermine justice in individual cases, is consistent with a particularistic account of moral judgment, and is attractive even in the face of uncertainty as to the legitimate purposes of punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

T. M. Scanlon's contractualism is a meta-ethical theory that explains moral motivation and also provides a conception of how to carry out moral deliberation. It supports non-consequentialism––the theory that both consequences and deontological considerations are morally significant in moral deliberation. Regarding the issue of punishment, non-consequentialism allows us to take account of the need for deterrence as well as principles of fairness, justice, and even desert. Moreover, Scanlonian contractualism accounts for permissibility in terms of justifiability: an act is permissible if and only if it can be justified to everyone affected by it. This contractualist thesis explains why it is always impermissible to frame an innocent person, why vicarious punishment is impermissible, and why there has to be a cap on sentences. Contractualism therefore allows us to take deterrence as a goal of punishment without the excess of utilitarianism. This paper further argues that the resulting view is superior to pure retributivism. Finally, it shows why legal excuses and mitigation can be justified in terms of the notion of negative desert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rehabilitation and conversion within the penal context are deeply ambiguous concepts. This ambiguity stems in part from the fact that little consensus has been reached among scholars as to the meaning of the terms beyond their ability to foster adjustment to institutional rules and obedience to law. This paper argues that each concept receives greater clarity and practical significance when understood in terms of moral transformation. The article will utilize the methodological framework of social scientific studies to underscore a contention, most commonly found in theological literature that conversion, and a fortiori rehabilitation, signal a shift from a divided to a unified consciousness based upon the experience of unconditional acceptance and, ultimately, its bestowal upon others and upon all forms of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many possible goals could be achieved by punishing offenders, the reality of punishment in today's criminal justice system is that lawmakers have created the illusion of purpose in punishment when in fact the expectations are unrealistic and the options for punishment too few to expect the simultaneous accomplishment of all possible desirable goals. This lack of clear purpose has led to a punishment policy shaped largely by what some scholars refer to as “paranoid politicians,” who have used public fear of crime as a fulcrum to launch “tough on crime” policies. Over a long period of time, this process has created a punishment system that many scholars argue has become too harsh and exceeds what a system of just deserts would allow for. This outcome has led some to propose that systematic mercy be implemented where appropriate, in order to offset the perceived harshness of the criminal justice system. While such a proposal is problematic, a re-evaluation of punishment policy seems appropriate. This paper suggests that any re-evaluation of punishment policy should include provisions for a broader consideration of victims' issues in sentencing as an integral part of the implementation of punishment in a truly just system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper my concern is with the collective moral responsibility of criminal investigators for the outcomes of their investigations, bearing in mind that it is important to distinguish collective moral responsibility from, and relate it to, individual moral responsibility. In what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for their success (or, for that matter, their failure) in gathering sufficient evidence to identify, arrest, and charge an offender who has committed a serious crime? Alternatively, in what sense are they morally responsible in cases where they identify, arrest, and charge an innocent person? And in what sense, if any, are police detectives individually and collectively morally responsible for the ultimate outcome of the trial, the finding by the courts of someone they have investigated and charged with a serious crime to be guilty or innocent? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper addresses the question of prison inmates' right to privacy from an ethical perspective. I argue that the right to privacy is important because of its connection to moral agency and that the protection of privacy is warranted by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. I discuss the practical implications of this argument by addressing two potential problems. First, how much privacy should be allowed during imprisonment in order to meet the criteria of respecting inmates as moral agents? Second, how should the conflict between privacy and other rights, including the rights of the public and the prison staff, as well as those of the prison inmates, be handled? Consequently, from an ethical perspective, the invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible without compromising other important values and rights to safety and security. In defending this position, I argue that respect for inmates' privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment to better effect in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper objects to certain forms of punishments, such as supermax confinement, on grounds that they are inappropriately contemptuous. Building on discussions in Kant and elsewhere, I flesh out what I take to be salient features of contempt, features that make contempt especially troubling as a form of moral regard and treatment. As problematic as contempt may be in the interpersonal context, I contend that it is especially troubling when a person is treated contemptuously by her political community's institutions—such as by certain forms of punishment. Punishment is contemptuous if it fails to respect offenders as moral persons, who as such are always capable of moral reform. Respect for offenders therefore requires, at least, that punishment not tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’ reform. I flesh out this constraint by considering various ways in which punishments may tend to undermine offenders’ reform. In particular, I discuss ways in which supermax confinement tends to violate the reform-based constraint. Finally, I address several potential objections to my account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institution of war is the broad framework of rules, norms, and organizations dedicated to the prevention, prosecution, and resolution of violent conflict between political entities. Important parts of that institution consist of the accountability arrangements that hold between armed forces, the political leaders who oversee and direct the use of those forces, and the people in whose name the leaders act and from whose ranks the members of the armed forces are drawn. Like other parts of the institution, these arrangements are responsive to changes in military technology and needs, to geopolitical facts, and to moral and political norms. In particular, they are sensitive to the forms that military organization takes. Since the emergence of modern states in Europe some 500 years ago, there have been three main such forms: private providers--in the form of mercenaries, in early modern Europe--then professional standing armies, which in turn developed into citizen armies. Although elements of the three organizations have coexisted in many armies, the citizen army model has dominated until recently. That model brought with it a particular conception of the accountability relations between the army, the state, and the people. The state had authority over and directed the army, which was accountable to it. In turn the state was accountable for its use of the army to the people, on whose behalf it acted. The dominance of state authority over the military is now under strain, with the professional and private elements--in the form of private military and security companies (PMSCs)--having increasing importance. As those elements increase in power and presence, so it becomes more difficult to make the state accountable to the people for its use of the military, and more difficult for the people to act as a restraining force on the way in which the military used. In this essay, I outline and assess these developments--with particular emphasis on the emergence of PMSCs--in the light of a liberal view of (political) violence. The essay focuses on the situation in the United States, which possesses by far the most important military force in the world today, and in which the use of PMSCs is most developed. The paper has three main sections and a brief conclusion: the first section sketches the liberal view of violence and its implications for organizations dedicated to its use; the second outlines the salient characteristics of the three historically dominant forms of armies; and the third looks at the current situation in which the three forms coexist uneasily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The leadership of the black community is concerned with welfare, with equality, with unemployment, with discrimination, with racism, with the pay gap, and with dozens of other such traditional issues. Oh, yes, they are also apprehensive about the use of addictive drugs. But, as we speak, young male members of this community are being incarcerated at frightful rates, and, even worse, are killing each other to boot. One would think that this latter issue would occupy the interest of black leaders front and center. After all, there are few worse problems than being jailed or killed. The present paper is dedicated to making the case that the black leadership has its priorities all wrong; that if they were to exercise true leadership, they would see the jailing and murder of young black men as perhaps the greatest threat to their community; and, if so, they would fervently support the legalization of all drugs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his early work in political philosophy, Amartya Sen advanced an interesting and provocative thesis – the egalitarian thesis. This is the claim that every conception of social justice that has received support in recent times is egalitarian. This paper argues that Sen's account of capabilities and his more recent critique of transcendental justice have implications for the truth of the egalitarian thesis. It also discusses how the rejection of the egalitarian thesis bears on the larger, and more general, issue of the overall plausibility of egalitarian conceptions of social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The use of informers is morally problematic for police institutions, for investigation managers, and for those individuals either who act as informers or who have daily responsibility for handling informers. This paper examines the moral issues concerning informers at each of these levels. Recourse to informers can be accommodated within Miller and Blackler's moral theory of policing. Within this context, criteria for the morally justifiable deployment of informers are proposed and supplemented with further proposed criteria for morally justifiable informer participation in crime. Morally justifiable recruitment of informers is also considered. Despite directly serving the purpose of policing, informers do not incur police professional obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Provides information on the book "Private and Public Corruption," edited by William C. Heffernan and John Kleinig. Focus of the book; Papers included in this collection of commentaries.