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Driver assist technologies have reached the tipping point and are poised to take control of most, if not all, aspects of the driving task. Proponents of automated driving (AD) are enthusiastic about its promise to transform mobility and realize impressive societal benefits. This paper is an attempt to carefully examine the potential of AD to realize safety benefits, to challenge widely-held assumptions and to delve more deeply into the barriers that are hitherto largely overlooked. As automated vehicle (AV) technologies advance and emerge within a ubiquitous cyber-physical world they raise additional issues that have not yet been adequately defined, let alone researched. Issues around automation, sociotechnical complexity and systems resilience are well known in the context of aviation and space. There are important lessons that could be drawn from these applications to help inform the development of automated driving. This paper argues that for the foreseeable future, regardless of the level of automation, a driver will continue to have a role. It seems clear that the benefits of automated driving, safety and otherwise, will accrue only if these technologies are designed in accordance with sound cybernetics principles, promote effective human-systems integration and gain the trust by operators and the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the incorporation of decision and game theory in the velocity vector decisions found in human movement. These decisions are made by individuals when maneuvering in an environment occupied by other people or obstacles. The model developed in this paper examines how human movement can be captured as a result of a decision-making process rather than modeling the behavior directly. In this paper, a novel utility function is formed from the biological-based preference of minimizing energy consumption. This energy function is partially fashioned from the energies due to moving, colliding, and waiting. Time and risk preferences are incorporated into the utility function to uniquely capture human desires. Decision and game theories are used to model the decision making process of individuals when alone and when interacting with a range of evacuee types (panicked, distracted and alert). Beliefs are formed and updated concerning both the environment and individuals in the environment, to truly capture the knowledge of individual evacuees. Assumptions that were made during the creation of this novel decision-focused movement model are discussed throughout the paper. This work expands upon previous research performed using the obstacle avoidance technique known as the velocity obstacle method. Common human traits and tendencies are proven to exist in the model through multiple examples. Future modifications of this alternative approach to traditional behavior-focused movement models are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • Compulsory safety training is ineffective in changing safety attitudes. • Risk knowledge and intent to behave safely increases but caring about safety does not. • Gender, age and education are intervening variables in safety attitude formation. Abstract Poor safety is a perennial problem for the construction industry worldwide. While there has been a large amount of research on construction safety training and its importance in developing positive safety attitudes, much of the evidence has been anecdotal. To address this gap in knowledge, this paper presents the results of an attitudinal survey of 228 construction employees from a variety of professional and trade backgrounds operatives in Australia who went through mandatory site safety training. It was found that the training was largely ineffective in changing workers' safety attitudes. The minor change in safety attitudes that did occur were largely cognitive and behavioural in nature while the affective component of safety attitudes remained virtually unchanged. In other words, construction operatives emerged from the training with a slightly better knowledge of safety risks, a better intention to behave safely but not caring any more about safety as an issue. It was also found that gender, age and education are potential mediators in the safety attitude formation process. It is recommended that when developing safety training programs in the future, more attention should be paid to tailoring programs to the demographic characteristics of the people being trained and to the use of new interactive and immersive technologies and learner-centric andragogical pedagogies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • A validated ad hoc taxonomy of 21 Influencing Factors for HRA in surgery. • IFs influence estimated by eliciting surgeons' perception. • Rude talk and disrespectful behaviours impact surgical performance the most. • Some IFs show higher influence in mini-invasive surgery compered to open surgery. • • No statistical correlation between the influence of IFs and surgeon's proficiency. Abstract Several authors encouraged the application of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) to patient care, recognising the benefits it brought to high-risk industries in terms of human errors reduction, thanks to its anticipative approach. However, the literature on HRA in healthcare is still scanty, and shows significant gaps at methodological level. Only a very limited number of HRA studies implemented Influencing Factors (IFs) analysis in the quantification of the Human Error Probability, despite it represents a peculiar component and a well-established step in several HRA techniques. Furthermore, the need for a deep adaptation and translation of existing HRA techniques to the healthcare domain is emphasised by several authors. This paper aims at designing a taxonomy of Influencing Factors for HRA studies in surgery, and assessing their influence on surgeons' technical performance by means of structured elicitation of experts' judgement. An ad hoc taxonomy of 21 IFs has been validated through focus group and individual interviews, in Denmark and Italy; 215 questionnaires from expert surgeons in open and mini-invasive surgeries were then used for the quantification of the impact of each IF on surgeons' performance. An investigation on the possible influence of different surgical techniques revealed that only two out of the twenty-one IFs show different probability density functions (pdf) when considered in open or mini-invasive surgeries. The study offers an original and relevant contribution to the development of domain-specific knowledge and, as such, to fostering the diffusion of HRA studies in healthcare, and in surgery in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • This paper investigates the main and interaction effects of some roadway factors on bus driver behavior under daytime and nighttime lighting conditions. • Bus driver behavior was noticeably affected by guardrail existence on the segments with a narrow shoulder. • Bus drivers consistently adopt higher speeds in daylight condition, as opposed to darkness, their lateral positioning is not significantly affected by lighting conditions. Abstract Numerous studies in the literature have established a relationship between driver behavior and roadway characteristics. However, investigating bus driver behavior as a function of roadway features under different lighting conditions has been a missing link. This research aims at investigating the main and interaction effects of three roadway features – shoulder width, guardrail existence, and roadway geometry – on bus driver behavior under daytime and nighttime lighting conditions. In this regard, using driving simulator, 40 professional bus drivers were recruited to drive on 30 different segments, including the combination of 3 shoulder widths, 5 curve radii, and 2 guardrail states, under daylight and dark lighting scenarios. By examining adopted speed and lateral positioning, it was found that bus driver behavior is noticeably affected by guardrail existence on the segments having a narrow shoulder. Interestingly, the results revealed that the presence of guardrail is negatively associated with driving speed on these segments; also, it causes drivers to travel close to the centerline of the road. Regarding the correlation of lighting conditions with driver behavior, it was found that while bus drivers consistently adopt higher speeds in daylight condition, as opposed to darkness, their lateral positioning is not significantly affected by lighting condition. This finding implies that lateral movements can be more attributed to roadway characteristics, rather than visibility of the road. The study suggests that driver behavior in darkness could be associated with contributing factors in different ways, which such differences cannot be uncovered by focusing merely on one aggregate analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The paper reviews the literature from 1986 on the management of those safety rules and procedures which relate to the workplace level in organisations. It contrasts two different paradigms of how rules and their development and use are perceived and managed. The first is a top-down classical, rational approach in which rules are seen as static, comprehensive limits of freedom of choice, imposed on operators at the sharp end and violations are seen as negative behaviour to be suppressed. The second is a bottom-up constructivist view of rules as dynamic, local, situated constructions of operators as experts, where competence is seen to a great extent as the ability to adapt rules to the diversity of reality. The paper explores the research underlying and illustrating these two paradigms, drawn from psychology, sociology and ethnography, organisational studies and behavioural economics. In a separate paper following on from this review (Hale and Borys, this issue) the authors propose a framework of rule management which attempts to draw the lessons from both paradigms. It places the monitoring and adaptation of rules central to its management process. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other (Mach, E., 1905. Knowledge and Error. Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht (translated into English, 1976). The current paper is concerned with human actions and errors that have accidents with an injury outcome as their consequence. Its aims are to identify and describe the occurrence of risk-triggering and risk-creating human errors, and to analyze the cognitive regulation levels of risk-triggering actions. This provides a basis on which to discuss some difficulties involved in the assigning of regulation levels to actions. The empirical material employed in the paper consists of data from 76 in-depth investigations of accidents in automated production. Risk-creating errors were found in 93% of cases, and were made at various organizational levels in the companies. The amount of and character of the risk-creating errors point to the importance of interventions that promote learning at the levels of the work team and the organization. In 88% of cases there was also a human error that triggered the risk. Risk-triggering errors were made at all cognitive-regulation levels. The conclusions concern methodological issues and theoretical question marks arising. There emerged a need to distinguish between the outcome of an action and its further consequences. Classification of regulation levels involved in human error was found to be fraught with difficulties when drawing boundaries between levels. Actions at different levels appeared to intervene and take over from each other, leaving errors at category interfaces. The structural aspect of action as a composite phenomenon might mean that it is not always possible to assign any particular act to a specific level, and since a task or an action usually is composed of several behavioral components the action could be assigned to several levels simultaneously. This raises questions concerning the applicability of the Skill–Rule–Knowledge (SRK) model to triggering errors in automated production. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The disasters of the past years in different high risk industries (e.g. aviation, offshore, nuclear) push for a moment of reflexivity about learning from accidents. In the aftermath of these events, one wonders whether learning from accidents remains a viable endeavour for companies and states or whether recurring technological disasters such as these seriously and definitely undermine any attempt to prove the feasibility of learning. Progress has certainly been made in the past, but apparently not enough so to be able to reach the highest safety levels, even in systems with dedicated resources. As a result of the current situation, some have been able to argue that ‘we don’t learn about disasters’. Although appealing and right, this is a very generic statement. There are many studies addressing aspects of learning from accidents which are in a position to bring insights about the drawbacks of learning. But this wealth of research is also part of the problem. When one wants to step back and to look broadly at the topic, to understand the reason why ‘we don’t learn’, one is left with a fragmented scientific literature covering a very large spectrum of interests and views on the subject. This paper tackles this problem by first designing a framework to organise the diversity of studies and second, by extracting four lessons on learning from accidents, putting together for this purpose works in psychology, sociology and political science. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]