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This article examines six main elements in the modern story of the impact of Alfred Russel Wallace's 1855 Sarawak Law paper, particularly in the many accounts of Charles Darwin's life and work. These elements are: 1 It was Wallace's first avowal of evolution. 2 Wallace laid out the theory of evolution minus only a “mechanism”. 3 Darwin failed to see how close Wallace was approaching. 4 Lyell did see how close Wallace was approaching. 5 Lyell urged Darwin to publish because of Wallace. 6 Darwin wrote to Wallace to warn him off his patch. Each of these are very frequently repeated as straightforward facts in the popular and scholarly literature. It is here argued that each of these is erroneous and that the role of the Sarawak Law paper in the historiography of Darwin and Wallace needs to be revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the investigation of the distribution of the protein tenascin-C in canine mammary tumors. The method involved immunohistochemistry of tissue slices, performed by the application of an antibody to tenascin-C that specifically can be made visible for microscopic inspection. The first phase of the project is the making of the protocol, the second the deduction of a pattern of tenascin-C distribution in tumors and the third the writing of a paper. Each of the phases is analyzed separately, using the concept of resistance and accommodation. My purpose is to show that in each phase of the process of producing knowledge, the scientist meets resistances which force him to accommodate by changing his conceptual, technical and methodological approaches. In reverse, the details of the non-human agent (protocol, pattern or paper) have to be accommodated to the wishes and expectations of the scientist. Through this interaction a situation of stability of knowledge is reached at the end of each phase. In the protocol phase, resistance is found in the antibody and tissue slices. In the phase of pattern deduction the resistance is in the pathological diagnosis of the tumors and the expectations and hypothesis with which the scientist had entered the project; in the criteria to be used for assigning the slices to a tenascin-C pattern; and in the responses of colleagues and supervisor. In the paper-writing phase the interaction is between the scientist and the scientific community which should take on board the knowledge from the research project. When stabilization of knowledge is obtained in one of the phases, the agents of resistance turn into allies in the next phase, giving support to accommodating the resistances in this later phase. Second, the stabilization of knowledge of the protocol is further enhanced when stabilization of the pattern is achieved; in addition, knowledge of the pattern is more definite when it has become stabilized and closed knowledge within the science community. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In 1948 Ludwik Fleck published a paper in Polish discussing the use of humans in medical experiments, thereby addressing his peers. Though the paper has so far not been translated or studied, it has been taken to indicate Fleck’s deep commitment to ethical questions, notably the question of informed consent. In being written by a former victim of the Nazi policy and a survivor of the Holocaust also acting as an expert witness in the trial of the IG Farben in Nuremberg, the paper is of interest. A scrutiny of Fleck’s text and related sources discloses, however, not only the complexity of the issue at the centre of the Nuremberg trial, but also Fleck’s unexpected stance in seemingly adducing his arguments from both the German defendants and the prosecution, heavily informed by US scientists. Further, the contentious discussion of the past in Fleck’s paper reveals its links to modern bioethical discussion. Though sometimes oblivious of that past, it still faces the same questions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract In some quarters within philosophy of medicine, more particularly in the phenomenological approaches, naturalism is looked upon with suspicion. This paper argues, first, that it is necessary to distinguish between two expressions of this attitude towards naturalism: phenomenological approaches to illness disagree with naturalism regarding various theoretical claims and they disapprove of naturalism on an ethical level. Second, this paper argues that both the disagreement with and the disapproval of naturalism are to a large extent confused. It then offers some proposals to set up an agenda for future collaboration. Highlights • Naturalism is looked upon with suspicion in the phenomenological approaches within philosophy of medicine. • This attitude takes on two distinct forms: an epistemological disagreement and an ethical disapproval. • Both forms of disagreement are largely confused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Moderate pluralism is a popular position in contemporary philosophy of biology. Despite its popularity, various authors have argued that it tends to slide off into a radical form of pluralism that is both normatively and descriptively unacceptable. This paper looks at the case of biological species classification, and evaluates a popular way of avoiding radical pluralism by relying on the shared aims and norms of a discipline. The main contention is that while these aims and norms may play an important role in the legitimacy of species classifications, they fail to fend off radical pluralism. It follows from this that the legitimacy of species classifications is also determined by local decisions about the aims of research and how to operationalize and balance these. This is important, I argue, because it means that any acceptable view on the legitimacy of classification should be able to account for these local decisions. Highlights • The paper presents an argument for radical pluralism of legitimate classifications. • The paper rejects an objection to this argument that relies on shared classificatory norms. • The paper argues that local decisions about the aims of classification co-determine the legitimacy of classification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper examines a specific kind of part-whole relations that exist in the molecular genetic domain. The central question is under which conditions a particular molecule, such as a DNA sequence, is a biological part of the human genome. I address this question by analyzing how biologists in fact partition the human genome into parts. This paper thus presents a case study in the metaphysics of biological practice. I develop a metaphysical account of genomic parthood by analyzing the investigative and reasoning practices in the ENCODE (ENCyclopedia Of DNA Elements) project. My account reveals two conditions that determine whether a molecule is a part of the human genome (i.e., a genomic part). First, genomic parts must possess a causal role function in the genome as a whole, that is, their functions must contribute to the genome directing the overall functioning of the cell. Second, genomic parts must have a specific chemical structure and be actual segments of the DNA sequence of the genome. Highlights • A classical philosophical question is explored on the basis of an illuminating case study from actual biological research. • Though ENCODE researcher measure biochemical activities they identify genomic parts on the basis of their functions. • The parts of the human genome are determined by their causal role functions and by their chemical structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) constitutes a biopolitical problem, a scientific object which needs to be studied, classified and regulated. Assemblages of authorities, knowledges and techniques make CFS/ME subjects and shape their everyday conduct in an attempt to increase their supposed autonomy, wellbeing and health. CFS and CFS/ME identities are however made not only through government, scientific, and medical interventions but also by the patients themselves, a biosocial community who collaborates with scientists, educates itself about the intricacies of biomedicine, and contests psychiatric truth claims. CFS/ME is an illness trapped between medicine and psychology, an illness that is open to debate and therefore difficult to manage and standardise. The paper delineates different interventions by medicine, science, the state and the patients themselves and concludes that CFS/ME remains elusive, only partially standardised, in an on-going battle between all the different actors that want to define it for their own situated interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers what evidence is needed to establish the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy. The claim that A cures D is a particular case of a causal claim in medicine. So the paper begins with a general analysis of the evidence for causal claims in medicine. Such evidence is divided into two types: statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. These are further divided into observational and interventional, producing a 2x2 classification. It is shown that historically there have different assessments of the importance of these different types of evidence. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) puts forward the thesis that claims of the form ‘A cures D without harming the patient’ can be established using only randomized controlled trials or RCTs. This thesis of EBM is criticized by considering two historical examples: streptomycin and thalidomide. Generalizing from these, it is claimed that the effectiveness and safety of a drug therapy can only be established by using both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanism. This is a specific instance of the Russo-Williamson thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates German-speaking paleontologists' reception of Darwin's thought and the ways in which they negotiated their space of knowledge production accordingly. In German-speaking regions, the majority of paleontologists welcomed Darwin's magnum opus , since it granted paleontology an independent voice within biology, and thus a new institutional setting. However, in the process of negotiating the features of paleontology within the Darwinian framework, German paleontologists constrained their practices too narrowly, for fear of leaving open possible results at odds with the burgeoning Darwinian biological community. In doing so, they also limited the further development of German paleontology. In other words, paleontologists Karl Alfred von Zittel (1839–1904) and Melchior Neumayr (1845–1890) advocated for a handmaid's role for paleontology, which increased biologists' dependence on paleontologists for empirical evidence, but which limited paleontologists' theoretical autonomy. By analyzing both the institutional strategies and the methodology of German-speaking paleontology at the end of the nineteenth century, this paper shows the importance of scientists' ability to enter into and negotiate their place within the broader biological community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a (2016) paper in this journal, I defuse allegations that theoretical ecological research is problematic because it relies on teleological metaphysical assumptions. Mark Sagoff offers a formal reply. In it, he concedes that I succeeded in establishing that ecologists abandoned robust teleological views long ago and that they use teleological characterizations as metaphors that aid in developing mechanistic explanations of ecological phenomena. Yet, he contends that I did not give enduring criticisms of theoretical ecology a fair shake in my paper. He says this is because enduring criticisms center on concerns about the nature of ecological networks and forces, the instrumentality of ecological laws and theoretical models, and the relation between theoretical and empirical methods in ecology that that paper does not broach. Below I set apart the distinct criticisms Sagoff presents in his commentary and respond to each in turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Till late in the 20th century, biological diversity has been understood and addressed in terms of "genetic resources". This paper proposes a history of this "genetic resources" concept and the biopolitical practices it was related to. A semantic history of the 'resource' idiom first sheds light on how, in the age of empires and fossil industrialism, the Earth came to be considered as a stock of static mineral and living reserves. Then we follow how the gene became the unit of this "resourcist" view of biological diversity as static stocks of entities open to prospection, harnessing and "conservation". Erwin Baur, Nikolai I. Vavilov, Aleksandr S. Serebrovsky and Hermann J. Muller were key biologists who introduced a spatial turn to the gene concept. Beyond the space-time of Neo-mendelian and Morganian laboratory genetics, genes became understood though a geographical gaze at a planetary scale. The world became a "universal store of genes" (Vavilov, 1929). From 1926 to World War 2, this advent of genes as new global epistemic objects went hand in hand with genes' new modes of existence as geopolitical objects. The article documents Interwar years' scramble for genes as well as first collaborative international efforts to conserve and exchange genetic material (which prefigured post WW2 initiatives), and situates the rise of the 'genetic resources' category within mid 20th century's imperialism, high-modernism, agricultural modernization and biopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate the ways in which a group of scientists in Edinburgh worked across mice and sheep during the last quarter of the twentieth century. With this local episode, we show the utility of an interspecies perspective to investigate recent historical transformations in the life sciences. We argue that the emergence of animal biotechnology was the result of interactions between neoliberal policymakers, science administrators, molecular biologists, agricultural breeders, and the laboratory and farm organisms with which they worked. During the early 1980s, all these actors believed that the exportation of genetic engineering techniques from mice to farm animals would lead to more effective breeding programmes in the agricultural sciences. However, the circulation of people, money, expertise and infrastructures that the experiments required, as well as the practical constraints of working with mice and sheep, resisted a simple scaling-up from one organism to the other. This displaced the goals of the Edinburgh scientists from the production of transgenic sheep to stem cell research and human regenerative medicine. We account for this unexpected shift by looking at the interplay between science policy and its implementation via collective action and bench work across different organisms. The emergence of animal biotechnology in Edinburgh also provides historiographical insights on the birth of Dolly the sheep and, more generally, on the interactions between the molecular and the reproductive sciences at the fall of the twentieth century. • The work of scientists across mice, sheep and other species provides a new lens to look at the history of biotechnology. • Interspecies work enables historians to think differently about the interactions between developmental and molecular biology. • Agricultural biotechnology stemmed from the collective action of different people, animals, institutions and places. • Animals were as important as human actors in the configuration of agricultural biotechnology. • The birth of Dolly was a contingent product of research to produce genetically modified – rather than identical – sheep. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of representation in the brain which occurs in the writings of the neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835–1911). Jackson was immersed in Victorian physiological psychology, a hybrid of British associationism and a reflex theory of the operation of the nervous system. Furthermore, Jackson was deeply influenced by Herbert Spencer, and I argue that Spencer's progressivist evolutionary ideas are in tension with the more mechanistic approach of the reflex theory. I also discuss Jackson's legacy in the 20th century and the longstanding debate about localisation of function in the brain. • A comprehensive analysis of the concept of neurological representation, developed by John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911). • Jacksonian representations are a precurrsor to current, computational notions of neural representations. • This study of representations suggests some limitations of mechanistic explanations, as encountered in this era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the period from 1962 to 1967, the development of a meningococcal A vaccine could be considered as feasible despite all the drawbacks of working with cerebrospinal meningitis A. In this paper, I analyse why and how this programme for vaccine development was put into place, and in particular how the problem was perceived as feasible. Deploying the concept of Doable Problems developed by Joan Fujimura, I examine the complex range of factors that led to the outcome of the trial in Yako in 1967. Thus I show how the different protagonists were mobilized and their work organized at different levels in order to produce and test a vaccine. Indeed, a number of elements seemed to stand in the way of successfully producing a vaccine, but the collaboration of the different actors under the aegis of the WHO provides interesting lessons about the management of this kind of project. Seen in a wider historical context, this approach could provide ideas and lessons for approaching current questions in vaccination from a new perspective. • An original history of the development of the anti-meningococcal vaccine. • An account of the vaccine project of the Institut Mérieux. • Collaborations between private and public actors in attacking a public health problem. • Destabilisation and relaunching of vaccine development project. • Analysis in terms of Fujimura's 'doable problems' concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The notion of "progress" can be defined as a directional change towards the better, implying both a descriptive and an axiological element. "Organic progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of life, whereas "technological progress" refers to this notion applied to the history of technological artifacts. This paper aims to disentangle conceptual questions about the notion of organic progress with respect to evolutionary theory, by proposing an epistemological perspective that also accounts for technological progress. My argument is set out in four sections. In section 2, drawing on the thought of some eminent evolutionary biologists, I will pinpoint a theoretical claim according to which a specific notion of organic progress is consistent with evolutionary theory. In section 3, I show some limits and problems that arise in the application of this theoretical claim to the organic domain. In section 4, I consider why these problems with application are often underestimated: I hypothesize that this is linked to the analogy frequently made between organic and technological progress. Finally, in section 5, I will carry on the analysis of this analogy by proposing a distinction between two levels of axiology. I claim that this distinction avoids several common confusions when talking about progress. Highlights • The notion of "progress" refers to the organic and technological domain. • A notion of progress is consistent with evolutionary theory: functional improvement. • Functional improvement raises different problems in the organic and technological domains. • Analogizing organic and technological functional improvements may be misleading. • Two levels of axiology should be distinguished in organic and technological progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper evaluates the application of evidentiary standards originating from evidence-based medicine in nutrition advice. It shows that it is problematic to criticize nutrition recommendations for not being based on randomized controlled trials. Due to practical, ethical and methodological and reasons, it is difficult to conduct rigorous randomized controlled trials for acquiring evidence that is relevant for achieving the goals of population-level nutrition recommendations. Given the non-epistemic goals of the dietary recommendations, criteria of acceptable evidence should be adapted to the goals of the practice and the practical, ethical, and methodological constraints of the situation. Highlights • Nutrition guidelines are often criticized for the lack of evidence from RCTs. • Conducting rigorous RCTs in the nutritional context is problematic. • The standards of evidence used for evaluating nutrition advice should be flexible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract DNA sequencing has been characterised by scholars and life scientists as an example of 'big', 'fast' and 'automated' science in biology. This paper argues, however, that these characterisations are a product of a particular interpretation of what sequencing is, what I call 'thin sequencing'. The 'thin sequencing' perspective focuses on the determination of the order of bases in a particular stretch of DNA. Based upon my research on the pig genome mapping and sequencing projects, I provide an alternative 'thick sequencing' perspective, which also includes a number of practices that enable the sequence to travel across and be used in wider communities. If we take sequencing in the thin manner to be an event demarcated by the determination of sequences in automated sequencing machines and computers, this has consequences for the historical analysis of sequencing projects, as it focuses attention on those parts of the work of sequencing that are more centralised, fast (and accelerating) and automated. I argue instead that sequencing can be interpreted as a more open-ended process including activities such as the generation of a minimum tile path or annotation, and detail the historiographical and philosophical consequences of this move. Highlights • DNA sequencing is primarily understood by a 'thin sequencing' perspective. • I propose a 'thick sequencing' perspective. • Thick sequencing includes different stages of assembly, evaluation and annotation. • An alternative picture of the nature and organisation of sequencing is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper addresses the role of time scales in conceptualizing biological hierarchies. So far, the concept of hierarchies in philosophy of science has been dominated by the idea of composition and parthood, respectively. However, this view does not exhaust the diversity of hierarchical descriptions in the biosciences. Therefore, we highlight a type of hierarchy usually overlooked by philosophers of science. It distinguishes processes based on the different time scales (i.e. rates, frequencies, and rhythms) on which they occur. These time scale hierarchies often are connected with assumptions defended in process ontology. Due to their ability to describe interlevel dynamics of various kinds, we call these hierarchies 'dynamic hierarchies.' In order to highlight and discuss their organization, explanatory roles, and epistemic virtues we focus on dynamic hierarchies in developmental biology and evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo). In these fields, dynamic hierarchies offer crucial complementary information to descriptions of compositional hierarchies. Highlights • Parthood does not exhaust all forms of hierarchical organization in biology. • Other hierarchies order processes by means of the time scale on which they occur. • These so-called 'dynamic hierarchies' allow grasping various interlevel dynamics. • They draw on ontological assumptions of process philosophy. • They complement descriptions of compositional hierarchies, especially in evo-devo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper starts out highlighting a particular criticism that psychiatry faces and continues by investigating approaches to classification in psychiatry that operate with a "relaxed" (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. Two accounts are examined, one by Rachel Cooper (2005; 2013) and one based on the work of Richard Boyd (1991; 1999; 2003; 2010). While these accounts do not directly pursue such a goal, the main aim is to probe whether deploying a "relaxed" notion of natural kind would be able to neutralize the criticism. While the conclusion is in the negative, the analysis raises doubts that it is possible to completely neutralize this criticism without assuming an overly simplistic view of the causal structure of the world. Highlights • Critics claim that psychiatry deploys a conventionalist classification based on non-epistemic evaluative judgments. • Classification in psychiatry can operate with a "relaxed" (non-essentialist) notion of natural kind. • A "relaxed" notion of natural kind is too permissive to completely neutralize this criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The goal of this paper is to analyze a little-known set of documents referring to a "Dancing Epidemic" that took place in Itapagipe, a suburb of Salvador, capital of the province of Bahia, Brazil, in 1882. Through the studies of a group of physicians, especially Raimundo Nina Rodrigues (1862–1906), a psychiatrist and anthropologist from the Bahia School of Medicine, the medical knowledge built on this unique phenomenon in Brazilian history is examined. The case in particular involved a crowd that spread through the streets of Itapagipe, attracting the interest of the medical classes, who were intrigued by the symptoms of motor incoordination the patients manifested. Inspired by foreign literature, but developing their own theories, Rodrigues and colleagues created a unique body of knowledge about the infirmity. Highlights • Nature and the dissemination of the Epidemic Dance of Itapagipe , Bahia, 1882. • Detailed discussion on the nosological condition of the collective disorder. • Interpretation of the phenomenon by the brazilian physician Raimundo Nina Rodrigues. • Race and religion as a background for the nervous sickness outbreak. • Construction of a Brazilian theoretical framework induced by foreign literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that challenges that are grand in scope such as “lifelong health and wellbeing”, “climate action”, or “food security” cannot be addressed through scientific research only. Indeed scientific research could inhibit addressing such challenges if scientific analysis constrains the multiple possible understandings of these challenges into already available scientific categories and concepts without translating between these and everyday concerns. This argument builds on work in philosophy of science and race to postulate a process through which non-scientific notions become part of science. My aim is to make this process available to scrutiny: what I call founding everyday ideas in science is both culturally and epistemologically conditioned. Founding transforms a common idea into one or more scientifically relevant ones, which can be articulated into descriptively thicker and evaluatively deflated terms and enable operationalisation and measurement. The risk of founding however is that it can invisibilise or exclude from realms of scientific scrutiny interpretations that are deemed irrelevant, uninteresting or nonsensical in the domain in question–but which may remain salient for addressing grand-in-scope challenges. The paper considers concepts of “wellbeing” in development economics versus in gerontology to illustrate this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I track the history of post-1945 human genetics and genomics emphasizing the importance of ideas about risk to the scientific study and medical management of human heredity. Drawing on my own scholarship as it is refracted through important new work by other scholars both junior and senior, I explore how radiation risk and then later disease risk mattered to the development of genetics and genomics, particularly in the United States. In this context I excavate one of the central ironies of post-war human genetics: while studies of DNA as the origin and cause of diseases have been lavishly supported by public institutions and private investment around the world, the day-to-day labor of intensive clinical innovation has played a far more important role in the actual human experience of genetic disease and genetic risk for affected families. This has implications for the archival record, where clinical interactions are less readily accessible to historians. This paper then suggests that modern genomics grew out of radiation risk; that it was and remains a risk assessment science; that it is temporally embedded as a form of both prediction and historical reconstruction; and that it has become a big business focused more on risk and prediction (which can be readily marketed) than on effective clinical intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For scientific claims to be reliable and productive they have to be justified. However, on the one hand little is known on what justification precisely means to scientists, and on the other the position held by philosophers of science on what it entails is rather limited; for justifications customarily refer to the written form (textual expressions) of scientific claims, leaving aside images, which, as many cases from the history of science show are relevant to this process. The fact that images can visually express scientific claims independently from text, plus their vast variety and origins, requires an assessment of the way they are currently justified and in turn used as sources to justify scientific claims in the case of particular scientific fields. Similarly, in view of the different nature of images, analysis is required to determine on what side of the philosophical distinction between data and phenomena these different kinds of images fall. This paper historicizes and documents a particular aspect of contemporary life sciences research: the use of the molecular image as vehicle of knowledge production in cell studies, a field that has undergone a significant shift in visual expressions from the early 1980s onwards. Focussing on textbooks as sources that have been overlooked in the historiography of contemporary biomedicine, the aim is to explore (1) whether the shift of cell studies, entailing a superseding of the optical image traditionally conceptualised as primary data, by the molecular image, corresponds with a shift of justificatory practices, and (2) to assess the role of the molecular image as primary data. This paper also explores the dual role of images as teaching resources and as resources for the construction of knowledge in cell studies especially in its relation to discovery and justification. Finally, this paper seeks to stimulate reflection on what kind of archival resources could benefit the work of present and future epistemic historians in particular those interested on the role of images as sources of training and knowledge production in scientific disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses a Boolean method for establishing constitutive regularity statements which, according to the regularity theory of mechanistic constitution, form the core of any mechanistic explanation in neuroscience. After presenting the regularity definition for the constitution relation, the paper develops a set of inference rules allowing one to establish constitutive hypotheses in light of certain kinds of empirical evidence. The general methodology consisting of these rules is characterized as having formed the basis of many successful explanatory projects in neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers of biology disagree about an adequate explication of the concept of function. Instead of perpetuating the debate on the level of in principle-arguments, this paper aims first at reconstructing functional talk in the biological research papers of Marom and Braun, which focus on two different kinds of evolving networks, and in discussing the ontological consequences which the authors draw from their results. Marom investigates evolving neural networks controlling Braitenberg vehicles. Braun observes the evolutionary rearrangement or “rewiring” of the genetic network of genetically modified yeast on a short time scale. In both cases, the parameters under investigation are defined in functional terms. However, both authors report striking differences in the structures that realize one and the same function, as well as striking differences in the function of identical structures. From this, they construct an argument against reductionism. The second aim of my paper is an inquiry into the epistemic legitimacy of this conclusion. This requires addressing critically several concepts on which Marom and Braun's argument is built. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the context and the origin of a particular debate that concerns the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In 1965, British biologist A. D. Bradshaw proposed a widely cited model intended to explain the evolution of norms of reaction, based on his studies of plant populations. Bradshaw's model went beyond the notion of the “adaptive norm of reaction” discussed before him by Dobzhansky and Schmalhausen by suggesting that “plasticity”—the ability of a phenotype to be modified by the environment—should be genetically determined. To prove Bradshaw's hypothesis, it became necessary for some authors to identify the pressures exerted by natural selection on phenotypic plasticity in particular traits, and thus to model its evolution. In this paper, I contrast two different views, based on quantitative genetic models, proposed in the mid-1980s: Russell Lande and Sara Via's conception of phenotypic plasticity, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is linked to the evolution of the plastic trait itself, and Samuel Scheiner and Richard Lyman's view, which assumes that the evolution of plasticity is independent from the evolution of the trait. I show how the origin of this specific debate, and different assumptions about the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, depended on Bradshaw's definition of plasticity and the context of quantitative genetics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plant ecologist Anthony David Bradshaw's account of the evolution of adaptive phenotypic plasticity remains central to contemporary research aimed at understanding how organisms persist in heterogeneous environments. Bradshaw suggested that changes in particular traits in response to specific environmental factors could be under direct genetic control, and that natural selection could therefore act directly to shape those responses: plasticity was not “noise” obscuring a genetic signal, but could be specific and refined just as any other adaptive phenotypic trait. In this paper, I document the contexts and development of Bradshaw's investigation of phenotypic plasticity in plants, including a series of unreported experiments in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Contrary to the mythology that later emerged around Bradshaw's ideas, Bradshaw was engaged in a serious and sustained empirical research program concerning plasticity in the 1950s and 1960s that went far beyond a single review paper. Moreover, that work was not isolated, but was surrounded by an already rich theoretical discourse and a substantial body of empirical research concerning the evolution of developmental plasticity and stability. Bradshaw recast the problem of how to understand (and control) plasticity and stability within an epistemic framework focused on genetic differences and natural selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes how, from the early twentieth century, and especially in the early Cold War era, the plant physiologists considered their discipline ideally suited among all the plant sciences to study and explain biological functions and processes, and ranked their discipline among the dominant forms of the biological sciences. At their apex in the late-1960s, the plant physiologists laid claim to having discovered nothing less than the “basic laws of physiology.” This paper unwraps that claim, showing that it emerged from the construction of monumental big science laboratories known as phytotrons that gave control over the growing environment. Control meant that plant physiologists claimed to be able to produce a standard phenotype valid for experimental biology. Invoking the standards of the physical sciences, the plant physiologists heralded basic biological science from the phytotronic produced phenotype. In the context of the Cold War era, the ability to pursue basic science represented the highest pinnacle of standing within the scientific community. More broadly, I suggest that by recovering the history of an underappreciated discipline, plant physiology, and by establishing the centrality of the story of the plant sciences in the history of biology can historians understand the massive changes wrought to biology by the conceptual emergence of the molecular understanding of life, the dominance of the discipline of molecular biology, and the rise of biotechnology in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to use Sir William Crookes' researches into psychical phenomena as a sustained case study of the role of epistemic virtues within scientific enquiry. Despite growing interest in virtues in science, there are few integrated historical and philosophical studies, and even fewer studies focussing on controversial or ‘fringe’ sciences where, one might suppose, certain epistemic virtues (like open-mindedness and tolerance) may be subjected to sterner tests. Using the virtue of epistemic courage as my focus, it emerges that Crookes' psychical researches were indeed epistemically courageous, but that this judgment must be grounded in sensitivity to the motivational complexity and context-sensitivity of the exercise of epistemic virtues. The paper then considers Crookes' remarks on the relationship between epistemic virtuousness and the intellectual integrity and public duties of scientists, thereby placing epistemic virtues in the context of wider debates about the authority of science in late modern societies. I conclude that Crookes' researches into psychical phenomena offer instructive lessons for historians of science and virtue epistemologists concerning the complexity and contextuality of epistemic virtues, and the profitable forms that future studies of virtues in science could take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If there is any value in the idea that disease is something other than the mere absence of health then that value must lie in the way that diseases are classified. This paper offers further development of a view advanced previously, the Contrastive Model of Disease : it develops the account to handle asymptomatic disease (previously excluded); and in doing so it relates the model to a broadly biostatistical view of health (where before the model was neutral in the naturalism debate). The developments are prompted by considering cancers featuring viruses as prominent causes, since these appear to amount to cases where the prescriptions of the Contrastive Model could be followed, but aren't. The resulting Irrelevance Objection claims that the Contrastive Model is irrelevant to medical science and practice. The paper seeks to rebut the Irrelevance Objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the attitude of the British Physiologist William Benjamin Carpenter (1813–1885) to spiritualist claims and other alleged psychical phenomena in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. It argues that existing portraits of Carpenter as a critic of psychical studies need to be refined so as to include his curiosity about certain ‘unexplained phenomena’, as well as broadened so as to take into account his overarching epistemological approach in a context of theological and social fluidity within nineteenth-century British Unitarianism. Carpenter's hostility towards spiritualism has been well documented, but his interest in the possibility of thought-transference or his secret fascination with the medium Henry Slade have not been mentioned until now. This paper therefore highlights Carpenter's ambivalences and focuses on his conciliatory attitude towards a number of heterodoxies while suggesting that his Unitarian faith offers the keys to understanding his unflinching rationalism, his belief in the enduring power of mind, and his effort to resolve dualisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the relationship between the ‘elusive’ science of psychical research and experimental physics in the period approximately, 1870–1930. Most studies of the relationship between psychical research and the established sciences have examined the ways in which psychical researchers used theories in the established sciences to give greater plausibility to their interpretations of such puzzling phenomena as telepathy, telekinesis and ectoplasm. A smaller literature has examined the use of laboratory instruments to produce scientific evidence for these phenomena. This paper argues that the cultures of experiment in the established science of physics could matter to psychical research in a different way: it suggests that experience of capricious effects, recalcitrant instruments and other problems of the physical laboratory made British physicists especially sympathetic towards the difficulties of the spiritualistic séance and other sites of psychical enquiry. In the wake of widely-reported claims that the mediums they had investigated had been exposed as frauds, these scientific practitioners were eventually persuaded by the merits of an older argument that human psychic subjects could not be treated like laboratory hardware. However, well into the twentieth century, they maintained that experimental physics had important lessons for psychical researchers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the close links in medical understandings of miscarriage and abortion in the first half of the twentieth century in Britain. In the absence of a clear legal framework for abortion, and the secrecy surrounding the practice, medical literature suggests contradictory and confused views about women presenting with clinical signs of pregnancy loss. On one hand, there was a lack of clarity as to whether pregnancy loss was natural or induced, with a clear tendency to assume that symptoms of miscarriage were the result of criminal interference gone wrong. On the other hand, women who did not present for treatment when miscarriage was underway were accused of neglecting their unborn children. The paper suggests that discourses around pregnancy loss were class-based, distrustful of female patients, and shaped by the wider context of fertility decline and concerns about infant mortality. The close historical connection between miscarriage and abortion offers some insight into why both the pro-life movement and miscarriage support advocates today draw on similar imagery and rhetoric about early fetal loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary I explore how the papers here illuminate the processes of collection that have been so central to the history of human genetics since 1945. The development of human population genetics in the Cold War period produced databases and biobanks that have endured into the present, and that continue to be used and debated. In the decades after the bomb, scientists collected and transferred human biological materials and information from populations of interest, and as they moved these biological resources or biosocial resources acquired new meanings and uses. The papers here collate these practices and map their desires and ironies. They explore how a large international network of geneticists, biological anthropologists, virologists and other physicians and scientists interacted with local informants, research subjects and public officials. They also track the networks and standards that mobilized the transfer of information, genealogies, tissue and blood samples. As Joanna Radin suggests here, the massive collections of human biological materials and data were often understood to be resources for an “as-yet-unknown” future. The stories told here contain elements of surveillance, extraction, salvage and eschatology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the emergence of human population genetics in Brazil in the decades following World War II, and pays particular attention to narratives about the formation of the Brazilian nation. We analyze the institutionalization of this branch of genetics in the 1950s and 1960s, and look at research on the characteristics of the population of Brazil, which made use of new explanatory models of evolutionary dynamics. These developments were greatly influenced by the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation and by the presence of North American geneticists in Brazil, especially Theodosius Dobzhansky. One of the main points of this paper is to show that explanations of Brazilian human genetic diversity constructed in the mid-twentieth century closely followed interpretations that had been produced since the end of the nineteenth century, in which notions of ‘racial mixing’ played a central role. Even as population genetics was conditioned by nationalist concerns that had long marked Brazilian history, we argue that its emergence and institutionalization was closely associated with global, post-World War II socio-political contexts, especially with regards to modernization projects and growing scientific internationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-war era saw the emergence of large-scale and longitudinal social and medical surveys in Britain. That these surveys were both representative of an entire nation and could follow individuals throughout their lives, gave them a privileged position in relation to policy-making. This paper will focus on two closely interrelated surveys, both instigated by the Population Investigation Committee at London School of Economics—the National Survey of Health and Development, which began in 1946, and the Scottish Mental Survey of 1947. These surveys had a critical role in educational research and policy and, more specifically, in changing perspectives regarding the concept and measurement of intelligence. They were seen to privilege social and environmental factors as determinants of mental ability, and they shifted attention away from genetic factors and eugenic concerns. However, while the surveys were indeed powerful tools, their structure, the questions they asked, the methods they used and the choices made over the data to be tabulated, also determined what could be known. The paper will examine the growing criticism and debate over the large-scale survey. Many argued that smaller-scale studies were more effective in understanding the social and biological causes of intellectual differences, and better for identifying the benefits and dangers of using intelligence and merit as a means of organising society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Creationism is an ambiguous term used in a variety of contexts: political, scientific, religious and educational. This paper attempts to trace the discourse on creationism in two European countries (France and the United Kingdom) and show how different cultural backgrounds shape the construction of its meaning. The striking difference between the total redefinition of the narration on creationism in France after the Harun Yahya's case, and the practically oriented steady development of the discussion in the United Kingdom seems to result from two different political sensitivities, deeply rooted in local cultures. The goal of my paper is doublefold. It attempts to present the emergence of two distinct incommensurable conceptualisations of a social problem and in the same time it tries to answer how to discuss them in a democratic framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology's research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology's adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology's attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology's adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently there has been a practice turn in the philosophy of science that has called for analyses to be grounded in the actual doings of everyday science. This paper is in furtherance of this call and it does so by employing participant-observation ethnographic methods as a tool for discovering epistemological features of scientific practice in a neuroscience lab. The case I present focuses on a group of neurobiologists researching the genetic underpinnings of cognition in Down syndrome (DS) and how they have developed a new mouse model which they argue should be regarded as the “gold standard” for all DS mouse research. Through use of ethnographic methods, interviews, and analyses of publications, I uncover how the lab constructed their new mouse model. Additionally, I describe how model organisms can serve as abstract standards for scientific work that impact the epistemic value of scientific claims, regulate practice, and constrain future work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many have argued that there is no reason why natural selection should cause directional increases in measures such as body size or complexity across evolutionary history as a whole. In this paper I argue that this conclusion does not hold for selection for adaptations to environmental variability, and that, given the inevitability of environmental variability, trends in adaptations to variability are an expected feature of evolution by natural selection. As a concrete instance of this causal structure, I outline how this may be applied to a trend in phenotypic plasticity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'levels of organization' has come under fire recently as being useless for scientific and philosophical purposes. In this paper, we show that 'levels' is actually a remarkably resilient and constructive conceptual tool that can be, and in fact is, used for a variety of purposes. To this effect, we articulate an account of the importance of the levels concept seen in light of its status as a major organizing concept of biology. We argue that the usefulness of ‘levels’ is best seen in the heuristic contributions the concept makes to treating and structuring scientific problems. We illustrate this with two examples from biological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the impact of diverse aspects of Darwin's works on the practices of mammal paleontology in different moments of nineteenth-century Argentina. Starting with Darwin through the publications of Florentino Ameghino, it shows the extraordinary complexity of systematic paleontology that characterized the second half of the nineteenth century. Neither “natural selection” nor “struggle for life” seemed to have shaped the practices of vertebrate paleontology in Argentina. Darwin's earlier work as a voyageur and geologist together with later concerns about intermediate forms and variation allow for an assessment of the impact of Darwin's work on the practice of paleontology in Argentina. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the social, cultural and disciplinary factors that influenced the reception and appropriation of Darwinism by China's first generation paleontologists. Darwinism was mixed with Social Darwinism when first introduced to China, and the co-option of Darwinian phrases for nationalistic awakening obscured the scientific essence of Darwin's evolutionary theory. First generation Chinese paleontologists started their training in 1910s–1920s. They quickly asserted their professional identity by successfully focusing on morphology, taxonomy and biostratigraphy. Surrounded by Western paleontologists with Lamarckian or orthogenetic leanings, early Chinese paleontologists enthusiastically embraced evolution and used fossils as factual evidence; yet not enough attention was given to mechanistic evolutionary studies. The 1940s saw the beginning of a new trend for early Chinese paleontologists to incorporate more biological and biogeographical components in their work, but external events such as the dominance of Lysenkoism in the 1950s made the Modern Synthesis pass by without being publicly noticed in Chinese paleontology. Characterized by the larger goal of using science for nation building and by the utilitarian approach favoring local sciences, the reception and appropriation of Darwinism by first generation Chinese paleontologists raise important questions for studying the indigenizing efforts of early Chinese scientists to appropriate Western scientific theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the “non-reception” of Darwin's works and concepts in French palaeontology and palaeoanthropology between 1859 and 1914. Indeed, this integration was difficult, biased and belated, for ideological, intellectual and epistemological reasons: Clémence Royer's biased 1862 translation of Darwin's Origin of Species pulled its ideas toward “social darwinism”, making them less attractive to the natural sciences. - French nationalism and the authority of religion, which imposed Cuvier's thinking until late into the century - the dominance of Lamarckian and neo-Lamarckian transformism in France, both in biology and in paleontology, which proposed the notion of orthogenetic laws and environmental determinations, and refused darwinian evolutionary mechanisms - obstacles inherent to the application of Darwin's concepts to palaeontology, namely the impossibility to identify evolutionary mechanisms through the fossil record, which was stressed by Darwin himself and underlined in turn by 19th century French palaeontologists. However, as I argue, in the course of the examined period, French palaeontology grew from refusal to a better understanding and evaluation of Darwin's thinking. The quest for intermediary forms, the construction of branching evolutionary trees and the attempts to reconstruct human biological and cultural evolution were important efforts toward an integration of some aspects of Darwinian views and practices into French palaeontology and plaeoanthropology. The 1947 Paris conference which brought together American Neo-darwinists and French paleontologists made Darwinian concepts better understood and triggered a revival of French palaeontology from the 1960s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the tension between Darwinian evolution and palaeontological research in Britain in the 1860–1914 period, looking at how three key promoters of Darwinian thinking – Thomas Henry Huxley, Edwin Ray Lankester and Alfred Russell Wallace – integrated palaeontological ideas and narratives of life's history into their public presentations of evolutionary theory. It shows how engagement with palaeontological science was an important part of the promotion of evolutionary ideas in Britain, which often bolstered notions that evolution depended upon progress and development along a wider plan. While often critical of some of the non-Darwinian concepts of evolution professed by many contemporary palaeontologists, and frequently citing the ‘imperfection’ of the fossil record itself, Darwinian thinkers nevertheless engaged extensively with palaeontology to develop evolutionary narratives informed by notions of improvement and progress within the natural world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last six decades there has been a consistent trend in the philosophy literature to emphasize the role of causes in scientific explanation. The emphasis on causes even pervades discussions of non-causal explanations. For example, the concern of a recent paper by Marc Lange (2013b) is whether purported cases of statistical explanation are “really statistical” or really causal. Likewise, Michael Strevens (2011) argues that the main task of statistical idealizations is to distinguish between the causal factors that make a difference to the phenomenon to be explained and those that do not. But, the philosophy literature poorly reflects the history of the development of statistical explanation in the sciences. Francis Galton's (19th century) explanation for the laws of heredity is our case. Galton's statistical explanation was both innovative for his time and influential to our contemporary sciences. The key points to understanding Galton's statistical explanation for reversion is that it is autonomous from the real-world biological properties that make up an instance of reversion while still being approximately true of many real-world biological phenomena. Ours is an expanded discussion of ideas originated in Hacking (1990) and Sober (1980) . We will articulate these features and compare our account with that of Lange and Strevens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the vast literature on Darwinism and race, the way in which Darwin's opinions on race were received and used by non-Western circles has been little studied. In the case of the Turks, Darwin's comments have been related to British-Ottoman relations, and Darwin was blamed for stoking anti-Turkish sentiment within Europe. This allegedly resulted in the British occupation of Egypt in the 19th century, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, as well as contemporary Neo-Nazi arson attacks in Germany which targeted Turkish migrants. Consequently, Turkish anti-Darwinists perceive Darwinism to be not merely a false scientific theory, but also a political-ideological instrument of Western hegemony wielded against Turkey and the Islamic World. Turkish Darwinists who responded to those claims, on the other hand, presented Darwin as an egalitarian who could overcome the prejudices of his social class. Further scrutiny, however, proves both accounts to be over-simplistic. This paper aims to throw some light on the context within which Darwin expressed his opinions on Turks and thus contribute to the broader discussion of the relationship between Darwinism and race. More importantly, it aims to familiarise Western readers with one of the cultures of creationism which is very little known, despite its great impact on Muslim masses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Introduces “Fifth Business” concept to critically analyze less prominent scientists. [•] Argues the need to broaden analysis of historical actors in bioscience. [•] E.g.: Ray Wu solved a stubborn problem for sequencing complementary DNA base pairs. [•] Yet Wu’s crucial contribution to DNA sequencing history has been little acknowledged. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The use of ‘race’ as a proxy for population structure in the genetic mapping of complex traits has provoked controversy about its legitimacy as a category for biomedical research, given its social and political connotations. The controversy has reignited debates among scientists and philosophers of science about whether there is a legitimate biological concept of race. This paper examines the genetic race concept as it developed historically in the work of Theodosius Dobzhansky from the 1930s to 1950s. Dobzhansky’s definitions of race changed over this time from races as ‘arrays of forms’ or ‘clusters’ in 1933–1939, to races as genetically distinct geographical populations in 1940–1946, to races as genetically distinct ‘Mendelian populations’ in 1947–1955. Dobzhansky responded to nominalist challenges by appealing to the biological reality of race as a process. This response came into tension with the object ontology of race that was implied by Dobzhansky’s increasingly holistic treatment of Mendelian populations, a tension, the paper argues, he failed to appreciate or resolve. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Many epistemological terms, such as investigation, inquiry, argument, evidence, and fact were established in law well before being associated with science. However, while legal proof remained qualified by standards of ‘moral certainty’, scientific proof attained a reputation for objectivity. Although most forms of legal evidence (including expert evidence) continue to be treated as fallible ‘opinions’ rather than objective ‘facts’, forensic DNA evidence increasingly is being granted an exceptional factual status. It did not always enjoy such status. Two decades ago, the scientific status of forensic DNA evidence was challenged in the scientific literature and in courts of law, but by the late 1990s it was being granted exceptional legal status. This paper reviews the ascendancy of DNA profiling, and argues that its widely-heralded objective status is bound up with systems of administrative accountability. The ‘administrative objectivity’ of DNA evidence rests upon observable and reportable bureaucratic rules, records, recording devices, protocols, and architectural arrangements. By highlighting administrative sources of objectivity, this paper suggests that DNA evidence remains bound within the context of ordinary organisational and practical routines, and is not a transcendent source of ‘truth’ in the criminal justice system. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]