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Constructivist theories of securitization are built on a foundation of communicative action tenets. While this represents an important and innovative advance in international relations theory, securitization ignores some of the components involved in a successful communicative act. Williams (2003) calls for securitization theory to incorporate the hitherto ignored effects of mass media and in this paper we answer this call. We first show that securitization's specification of leaders' speech acts and audiences' legitimative discourse presumes mass media actors are indifferent in how they convey leader representations and justifications of crises. We take this presumption as an empirical question and execute a study of whether the national presses of ally countries differently emphasized the frames Bush invoked in their news coverage of key September 11th speeches. We show from comparisons of chi-square distributions and regression analyses that, far from being passive conveyers of speech frames, the national presses of the US, Canada, France, Britain and Ireland (1) did not convey all of Bush's securitizing problem representations and response justifications proportionate to the extent Bush invoked them in his speeches, and (2) that for each national press factors based on professional norms and/or organizational routines increased the likelihood that a speech sentence would be conveyed in a news story. We discuss the implications of our findings for how securitization theory should conceptualize media actors when redressing this gap in its explanatory models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the United States' recently elevated attention to terrorism, the issue of national security has become of great importance to the American public in recent years. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) is one of the most significant courts in the judiciary to deal with such issues. Curiously, the business of the court is very different in comparison to other federal courts. The problem is attempting to balance important national security issues with ensuring that civil rights are not violated due to the secret nature of the court. The paper delves into analyzing known functions of the court, reasons for secrecy, structural issues, the quasi-executive nature, affects of the Patriot Act,wiretapping issues and purpose as stated in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. In doing so, we reveal problems that arise with lack of oversight, the non-adversarial process, the structure of the court, ex parte opinions, and the constitutional and civil liberties issues in general. We believe the court could be structured otherwise and still achieve national security objectives. Among the suggestions are using a panel of judges, a Special Amicus to represent the accused, and doing away with the current appeals process the court has. Our arguments are normative due to the secrecy of the court, and our suggestions will promote legitimacy and accountability within the FISA Court. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a formal model of peace negotiations with terrorist or insurgent groups. I model the negotiation process as an offer by the government for the demilitarization of the militant group. The model examines payoff thresholds for offers to the militant leader and offers directly to the population of supporters under asymmetric information. The model yields predictions as to when the government will make an offer to the leader or directly to the population as well as predictions as to when such offers will be accepted or rejected. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following analysis will look at what are believed to be the conditions, motivations, and goals for terrorism worldwide, and then examine how China fits into this picture. It will look specifically at China?s state security policies, policies that might spawn grievances and lead to terrorism, China?s status and identity within the international community, and Chinese culture for answers to the question of why there is not more terrorism in China. It will also look at the specific cases of Tibetans, who have used violence but not terrorism against the Chinese state, Uyghur (Muslim) secessionists from Xinjiang Province, who have used terrorism; and the Hui (Han Chinese Muslims), who have not been supportive of Uyghur terrorism in the name of self-determination for Xinjiang. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11 scholars have increasingly analyzed terrorism prosecutions affecting judicial behavior during wartime. Whereas research centers on judicial deference to the executive, an under-explored topic concerns how the degree of the threat posed affects outcomes, which is vital to explaining behavior as judges wrestle with competing demands of safety and freedom. Although studies anecdotally suggest different levels of terror prosecutions based on the actual threat to public safety, empirical analyses of terrorism cases have not employed a systematic measurement of the degree of the terror threat posed. We construct a multi-tiered terrorism case type variable that registers distinguishable types of terrorism threats, which then may generate different degrees of judicial deference. We draw off Chesney's typologies to identify terrorism-related prosecutions that consider the nature of the threat that terrorism poses to the polity to test whether judges exhibit different levels of deference in accordance with type of terrorism case at issue. We construct four separate terror threat variables, each one with a different ordinal measure of the terror threat, and we test each variable in a judicial decision-making model based on an original dataset of U.S. District Court post-9/11 USA PATRIOT Act cases. We expect to find judges give more deference to prosecutions punishing egregious terrorism acts but less deference to prosecutions attempting to prevent terrorism by using strategies of suspect surveillance, anti-terrorist funding mechanisms, pre-textual prosecutions, which involve minor crimes or non-criminal immigration laws, or cases that do not present a threat. We also expect that the variables reflecting more detailed ordinal measures of a terror threat will perform better than variables with less detailed measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars disagree over how effective terrorism is in achieving political goals, and therefore how rational terrorists are. It is thus important to determine whether certain conditions make terrorism more or less effective. I propose that terrorism is more effective when its policy goals are moderate rather than extreme, and when the targets are not civilians. To test this theory I will perform a single case study of terrorism in Chechnya from 1991 to 2009. I will examine the changes in goals and targets over time and determine whether they correlate with Russian policy changes. My findings will have implications for debates over terrorism's effectiveness and for deterrence-based models of counterterrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on project developed by the U.S. Combating Terrorism Center Information which utilizes information operations to fight against extremism. The research project aims at saturation of messages across networks for understanding mechanism adopted by existing social or political network structures to convey legitimacy and maximize saturation. The article also demonstrates the best strategy for facilitating message transmission and resonance.

In waging its Global War on Terror, U.S. pursuit of conventional combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is not really a strategy which will eliminate transnational Islamic militant terrorism. This paper argues that the enemy which poses the gravest threat to the U.S. in the future is the transnational Islamic militant who is driven by ideology. In order to eliminate this threat, the U.S. needs to focus its future efforts in the broader global war against terrorism toward the enemy's center of gravity, which is its recruiting base. This paper takes a liberal institutionalist approach and argues that the U.S. should use a softer multi-lateral approach toward future operations. The U.S. should consider leading the creation of a new multi-national organization under the auspices of the United Nations. This organization would be focused on taking initiatives that would pre-empt the ability of transnational Islamic militant organizations to recruit new members into their ideological fold. This paper attempts to build on the writings of Andrew Krepenevich, who has argued in favor of an "oil spot strategy" for securing Iraq, Robert Perito, who argues in favor of establishing a sustainable security force to operate in post-conflict environments, and Chandra Leka Sriram and Karen Wermester, who have argued n favor of strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system and its family of agencies in the goal of conflict prevention. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of Democrats and Republicans:Congress' Failure to Provide Meaningful Oversightof the U.S. Intelligence Community Since 9/11Robert D. StaceySteven RybickiThis paper will examine three case studies with an eye toward assessing Congress' record of oversight of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11. First, we look at the 2005 exchange between former House Intelligence Committee Chair Peter Hoekstra and former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte on the release of classified documents seized in the early stages of the war in Iraq. Second, we review the selective leak and subsequent declassification of the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate. Finally, we examine the 2007 revision of rules governing FISA court orders and surveillance of terror suspects. Among our conclusions is that in each case Congress and other actors have tended to politicize counterterrorism and national security related issues. Furthermore, each case highlights the difficult tension between the need for openness in a democratic republic and the need for secrecy in counterterrorism/counterintelligence operations. In each case, Congress has not performed in a manner that could be said to improve effective oversight or mitigate the openness versus secrecy tension in a useful way. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the more controversial areas of government policy in the Bush administration's War on Terror has been the rules surrounding the capture, detention, and legal processing of suspected terrorists. Since 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court has handed down four decisions with ramifications for the administration's detention policies: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Rasul v. Bush, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. What effect have these decisions had on government policy in this area? Using a judicial implementation framework initially offered by Bradley Canon and Charles Johnson (1984) this paper systematically examines how these cases have been implemented over time. More specifically, it will test the hypothesis that an active, energetic executive branch has the ability to powerfully shape the implementation process in a policy area it has deemed important. It concludes that the President, though just one of many actors in the implementation process, wields considerable influence and has a variety of tools that can be used to achieve his policy goals and shape the manner in which judicial decisions are implemented. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is another front that has slowly and dramatically opened in Iraq; it is a front comprised of legal and illegal drugs. This is nothing new to warfare. All our wars have pit enemies using one set of drugs against those using the same or different sets. Yet, it is common street criminals, brutal insurgents and charismatic religious leaders who are contributing to the creation of a thriving illegal drug trade in the cradle of civilization. As the debate continues over whether Iraq represents the central front in the Global War on Terrorism, the increasing presence of illegal narcotics in Iraq is making contemporary Mesopotamia fertile ground for the emergence of another front in the war on drugs. Without prevailing on this front, the broader conflict in Iraq will likely become more protracted even after the seating of a new Iraqi government and the eventual withdrawal of US and coalition forces. The vicious cycle of a protracted conflict in Iraq appears poised to be set in motion and a genuine quagmire for American strategy may emerge. This paper identifies those groups in Iraq who are involved in the drug trade, how they contribute to the perpetuation of the violence and instability and examines the steps needed to prevail in this new front. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the implications for democracy in the context of citizens and their misperceptions regarding a crucial event in any nation's actions-the decision to attack another country and exert force around the world. Nothing is more sobering than the coercive powers that governments have to put their citizens in a position to take life and to have life lost. Still, during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, evidence of crucial misperceptions amongst the populace suggest that the ideals of democratic theory have fallen short. Many Americans have falsely concluded that weapons of mass destruction have been found, that close ties between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda have been discovered, and that the majority of the world supports the invasion of Iraq.In this study I find that having accurate information matters, and those who misperceive hold different preferences than those who do not. I examine what leads to misperceptions, and what the obstacles are for citizens to learn the truth. I find that a host of demographic factors are related to misperceptions, but that the most powerful factor is the perceptual bias of partisanship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There was a large amount of optimism surrounding the first meeting between President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in June of 2001. Five years later, history has gained a bit more perspective on each of these two world leaders and the relationship between their respective countries. Each President has largely used the same narrative to write their history: fighting terror. The purpose of this paper is to compare how Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin have reshaped the democratic landscape since 2001 to fight terror. Recently, our administration has become more critical of Mr. Putin's authoritarian tendencies. I argue that what has been largely overlooked in this stick shaking is the similar way in which both Presidents have relied on institutional centralization and restriction of individual freedoms to construct and orchestrate their respective campaigns against terror. This suggests that when Mr. Bush looked into Putin's eyes and got a sense of his soul, he "found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy," not only because Mr. Putin was "deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country," but because each shared a similar vision of how to fulfill these commitments and serve these interests.This research is important in rethinking American expectations abroad in terms of stopping terrorism and promoting democracy. In some societies, fighting terrorism could benefit from, or even require, the hindrance of democratic practices. Ironically, our current rhetoric toward Russia in this particular area does not correspond with our experiences at home. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The presenters have discerned three broad themes in the critical camp's attack on orthodox terrorism studies, which represent their core conflict with what they believe to be mainstream discourse. Firstly, they claim that orthodox terrorism scholars remain uncritical of government counter-terror measures. Secondly, they assert that the orthodox camp often aligns itself financially with government agencies. And finally, they claim that mainstream theorists refuse to acknowledge the prevalence of state terrorism in the international system. This study proposes to do a content analysis of the body of work of the five most quoted mainstream theorists in the critical terrorism studies literature, with an eye towards addressing the empirical claims critical terrorism scholars make in order to justify the division of the discourse into what they believe to be mutually exclusive camps. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronted with the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the international community—through its representatives at the United Nations—gave its support to the Bush administration in its launching of the "War on Terror" (WOT) with the understanding that all the States will comply with their obligations under international law. However, soon allegations of non-compliance with these obligations surfaced and detracted legitimacy from the WOT.Based on international law and with a focus on the practices developed by the Bush administration as part of the WOT, I will assess what accountability mechanisms are adequate to confront practices that may violate international law. For that purpose, I will first examine those practices that more directly violate international law. Second, I will analyze the position of the current administration taking into account that President Obama promised to change certain practices, linked to the WOT, of the previous administration. Third, I will assess which accountability mechanism is the most adequate to confront the practices developed during the WOT and I will tentatively conclude that a truth commission will be the best first step against the allegations of abuses on the part of the US. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If to assume terrorism is now an A-list security threat for many countries, then it is necessary to evaluate how governments have responded to address this threat? Responses to terrorism typically reflect a wide range of activity. We observe new security policies, changes to laws and the creation of special anti-terrorism laws, and reordering bureaucratic priorities. Such changes, however, work only on the fringes of the broader security problem. Ashton B. Carter (2001/02) suggests reorganizing in the form of counterterrorism (CT) program. A CT program entails a coordinated effort in the areas of detection, prevention, interdiction, containment, attribution, and analysis and invention. This study analyzes the nature of government reorganization for counterterrorism in the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and India using Carter's program model. Analysis of these CT programs reveals the dominant tendencies in a government's response. More importantly, this analysis reveals that these governments are not adopting wide ranging CT programs, and instead are focused primarily on detection and prevention, with all other priorities falling by the way side, meaning government responses may be incomplete and limited. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]