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The article discusses the failure of the U.S. government in achieving good foreign intelligence that has led to the events of September 11, 2001. It informs that from the starting of the U.S. Republic, the need for good intelligence in wartime has been critical. The U.S. President George Bush mentioned that foreign intelligence forms the basic part of the constitutional authority.

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Less than a decade has passed since President George Bush left office in January 1993, and his final legacy has yet to be determined. As Ronald Reagan’s successor, Bush is remembered as a president who sought to ‘stay the course? in terms of policy while distancing himself from the stagecraft and public relations strategies during the Reagan years. Unfortunately, as Bush discovered during his one-term presidency, continuity coupled with mediocre communication skills does not make for a strong public image as an effective and active leader in the White House. This paper will provide a general examination of the public presidency of George Bush, including his relationship with the press, the communication strategies employed by his advisors, the role of public opinion polling within the Bush White House, and how these issues shaped and defined his image as a leader. As it continues to evolve, the Bush legacy will be heavily influenced by the fact that Bush, a one-term president, held office following Reagan and preceding Bill Clinton, both two-term presidents who were dynamic and skilled communicators. This paper is the start of a longer-term project that will provide an in-depth analysis and understanding of Bush’s public leadership, which is essential in order to fully comprehend the significance of the Bush years during an age when the mass media has played such a crucial role in governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether, in their day-to-day routines, presidents control their agendas or react to the institution's burdens. It utilizes minute-by-minute logs of presidential operations during the first 100 days of eight presidents, Dwight Eisenhower through George H. W. Bush. Making four empirical comparisons, the paper concludes that the patterns to their work suggest the influence of the institution over presidents' individual choices. These results suggest two "executive" dynamics: the pull of duty, like the electoral constraint on members of Congress, overwhelms individual presidential motives and agendas, and the development of operational routines that mirror primary responsibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first three post Cold War presidents, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush occupied the Oval Office during times of international transformation. All faced dangers and sometimes used force to achieve their objectives and this paper investigates the relationship between personality characteristics, especially conceptual complexity, and willingness to choice force instead of other policy options. The project relies on Margaret Hermann’s leadership trait analysis and at-a-distance measures. The paper compares scores of seven explanatory variables, e.g., conceptual complexity, distrust of others, etc., on leadership and world orientation for George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush against the scores for every American president since Harry Truman. The comparative analysis helps demonstrate the role of individual of individual level traits in creating and implementing foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush have used executive orders as prerogative powers of the presidency. John Locke, many of whose theories were influential with the Framers of the Constitution, wrote in the Second Treatise that in emergency situations when the legislative branch was unable to act, the executive could suspend ordinary governing arrangements to deal with the emergency. According to Locke, the executive was only justified in doing this when he had the consent of the citizens and when he was acting in their best interests. Locke's notion of the prerogative power has been used to justify modern use of prerogative powers by presidents, particularly during wars. Among the most important prerogatives of modern presidents is the executive order, a formal tool to manage the executive branch. When presidents use executive orders as a prerogative during wartime, they are rarely challenged by the public, Congress or the courts. For a president to legitimately and constitutionally use this power, he or she must base his or her action on the commander-in-chief powers in the Constitution or a relevant federal law. This paper examines the modern use of executive orders as a prerogative power in wartime. Using case-study analysis, this paper will examine the following executive orders: Franklin D. Roosevelt's order interning Japanese Americans during World War II; Harry S. Truman's order seizing the nation's steel mills during the Korean War; George H.W. Bush's order freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets during the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991; and George W. Bush's military orders allowing those defined as enemy combatants to be tried by military tribunals following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A model of theoretical and constitutional acceptability is devised to classify these orders and determine the implications for executive power and constitutional democracy. The theory of this paper is that presidents must consider both the theoretical limits set by Locke in the Second Treatise, as well as the constitutional limits of the American political system, when using executive orders during wartime. The executive order is not an unlimited prerogative power and the analysis in this paper will seek to highlight some needed limits on presidential prerogatives. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I use four qualitative propositions designed by Ryan C. Hendrickson to test for a diversionary use of force. I find the 1989 US Invasion was a diversionary use of force, but perhaps not a "typical" one if there is such a thing. These results suggest that "diversionary theory" might best be developed as a typological theory, as multiple causal pathways may lead to the same outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to establish an instrument to measure the environmental accomplishments of two recent presidents, namely, George H. W. Bush (Bush41) and George W. Bush (Bush43). We have examined their accomplishments paying attention to which presidents have best used the resources of their office to achieve environmental success. To assess the records of these two presidents, we made use in our analysis of an Index of Greenness, that we previously developed, that uses indicators organized into three categories: 1) political communication; 2) presidential actions, and 3) sources of support. To further assess the achievements of these two presidents we used Bill Clinton’s environemntal accomplishments during both his first term (Clinton 1) and second term (Clinton 2) as a control to provide context for observing the two Bush presidencies. Our findings show that Bush (41) ranked third among the four presidential administrations, while Bush (43) ranked last. Clinton’s second term (Clinton 2) ranked best followed by Clinton’s first term (Clinton 1) ranking second based on these indicators. George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush represent presidents who failed to meet their self-imposed obligations--namely, an environmetnal presidency and a president who wished to show compassion in his public policy initiatives toward the environment. Environmentalism clearly fared better during the two terms of Bill Clinton. We anticipate that our efforts in this paper will give us insights concerning the contributions that other presidents have made over time in their efforts to deal with the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

George Herbert Walker Bush followed into office an unusually significant predecessor whom he had served for eight years as vice president. This circumscribed President Bush’s opportunities for initiative and leadership. He realized this, but was nonetheless unable to fashion a politically successful strategy as president. The purpose of this paper is to contextualize President George H.W. Bush’s difficulties as president. Towards this end, a new category, of "successor presidents," is established. The value of this categorization is not merely taxonomic, as its elaboration yields insight into the relationship between presidential regime sequences and the party systems that have been at the foundation of American political development, despite the disappearance in the twentieth century of critical partisan realignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the words of human rights scholar David Forsythe, George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy incorporated “moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expediential concerns,” (1995:126). In short, analysts have argued that human rights was approached pragmatically during the first Bush presidency, subordinated in realist fashion to broader strategic concerns and the considerations of post-Cold War power politics. But what of the son? By contrast, the presidency of George W. Bush has seemed to feature a shifting stance on the question of balancing human rights concerns and national security interests. As a candidate and in the first months of his presidency, George W. Bush largely echoed his father’s realist and pragmatic approach. For example, while committed to the promotion of political openness and economic growth abroad, on the question of humanitarian interventions, the initial position of the Bush team was to shun such operations unless larger regional or strategic interests were at stake. Yet by 2006 the Bush administration had embraced an apparent liberal interventionist stance toward the promotion of human rights, declaring in National Security Strategy 2006 that “… the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy,” (2006:2). In this paper I will compare the approach to human rights and national security policy during the two Bush presidencies, identifying and accounting for key areas of similarity and difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have devoted much of their foreign-policy energy to matters such as the end of the Cold War, Operation Desert Storm, the War on Terror, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, one can surmise that both have mostly neglected the Americas â€" i.e., Latin America and Canada. While neglect is surely a theme, each President Bush has paid some attention to hemispheric concerns. George H.W. Bush ordered an invasion of Panama in December 1989 to remove that country’s dictator, Manuel Noriega, whom the United States sought to try as drug kingpin. That unilateral intervention contrasted with 1991’s multilateral effort to expel Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. It also presaged his son’s eponymous doctrine, which would grate many countries in the early 21st century. Like his father, George W. Bush has treated the Americas as a secondary U.S. interest. Although his first term promised close ties with Mexico, for example, the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath reoriented American policy to the detriment of hemispheric concerns. Still, the younger Bush’s administration did spotlight Colombia, the key country in America’s War on Drugs, and pursued efforts at establishing free trade in the Americas. If U.S. ties to Latin America have drawn some attention, Washington’s relations with Canada have barely registered in the United States, even though Ottawa publicly opposed Operation Iraqi Freedom. To explain the above case study, the first part of this paper relies upon a levels-of-analysis methodology, while the second adopts a policy analysis perspective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper titled "Understanding Prospects for Cooperation and Competition in U.S.-China Relations: A Review Theory and Practice" prepared for the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the volatility of the U.S. foreign relation toward China. It highlights the same assumptions of U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush on the nature of the Sino-American relationship.

Analyzes the views of U.S. political leaders George Bush and George W. Bush on Iraqi wars. Comparison between the opinions of the leaders on democracy; Assessment of the State of the Union addresses of the leaders; Perspectives of the politicians on multilateralism.

The shift of US strategy toward China from Clinton’s strategic partner to Bush’s strategic competitor has had negative impacts on relations between the two nations. Since George Bush took office, America’s diplomacy has transformed from multilateralism to unilateralism. US image has further transformed from benign to predatory hegemony after conducting the war against Iraq without consulting the UN Security Council. The change is significant because it increases the discontents, globally in general and Asia in particular. The article explains why China is one of the most dangerous discontents based on the Power Transition Theory. The theory is chosen because it has an established empirical record when applied to past periods of war and peace, and because the elements required for long-term forecasts can be roughly approximated (Kugler, Tammen, and Swaminathan, 2001, p.2). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the friction between Washington and Beijing has increased because United States has become as the sole superpower on the one hand, and China has emerged as a regional power on the other. It is consistent with power transition theory: conflict occurred because of the divergent views on status quo between the global and regional hegemonies. One of power transition theory’s hypotheses is that great powers are most likely to wage the war for control of the international status quo when a power transition occurs between the dominant state and a discontent challenger. Lemke’s empirical study (2002) finds the theory is generalizable to regional interactions, and thus relative power and the status quo do not constrain behavior only among the very strongest of states. China has dissatisfied with the status quo for two reasons, as Lemke suggested. First, it had little or no say in the construction of the existing status quo and enjoyed no direct or indirect benefits from it. Second, it employs different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in its society from those used by the dominant power. Because Lemke finds strong statistical relationships between parity, dissatisfaction, and war within local hierarchies, China’s discontent becomes significant. Worse, US war on terrorism further raise the specter of unconstrained American interventionism abroad and enhanced American domination of the international system in ways that Beijing feared could have grave long-term implications for China itself (Miller, 2002). Beijing sees China’s security threatened both in terms of the precedents it sets and in terms of the expansion of the American military and political presence around China’s periphery. Given the size of China’s stake in a stable bilateral relationship the United States, Beijing was naturally not convinced by the so-called Bush Doctrine. Clear evidence showed that China’s commitment to the status quo is declining. Politically, in addition to refuse to renounce the use of force, Beijing’s irrational rejection to Taipei’s entry to WHO exemplifies China’s discontent with US supports for Taiwan. Beijing’s enthusiasm about establishment of a free trade area between China and ASEAN is a clear sign of dissatisfying with global economic status quo. Deploying more missiles along the Taiwan Strait shows Beijing discontent with Washington’s continued arms sales to Taipei. The more America insists on constructing a unipolar world, the more resistance it is likely to generate, from China and others(Harry Harding, 2003). Thus, there are at least three implications for American diplomacy. First, Washington can accommodate Beijing by sharing with China opportunities for setting international agenda. Second, do not despise China’s role on the Korean Peninsula. For Beijing, it is unacceptable if America to extend the same logic in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to justify intervening in North Korea. Third, Washington should not push Taipei too hard because Taiwan may eventually find its interest better served by switching its diplomacy from leaning only on Washington to keeping equal distance from China and the United States. Thus, for Washington, it will be a better way to stabilize the relation across the Taiwan Strait by helping establish the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there are studies that give us some idea as to how modern presidents have dealt with environmental policy, few have given us a systematic means of comparison. The study reported here is such an attempt - - namely, the creation of an "Index of Greenness" to give us a dispassionate way of making comparisons among presidents to assess their importance as environmental presidents. As such, we compare the the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s first and second terms in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

White House polling has measured and has categorized public attitudes across constituency and policy interests, since 1969. Thus, the presidential public opinion apparatus primarily serves mass public leadership strategies and not particularized interests. Presidents instead employed Political Liaisons to connect interest groups to the White House. As the reliance on polling grew in the private and political spheres, groups recognized the value of opinion data in the battle for influence. Interest groups disseminated public opinion to connect narrow interests to the wider, presidential constituency. Moreover, by forwarding poll data, interest groups bypass the political party and link wants and needs directly to presidential programs, policies, and politics. Prior to 1989, the White House tended to ignore interest group opinion data in favor of its private polling operation, thus limiting the effectiveness of interest group polling as an influence tool. In a cost cutting arrangement, the Bush White House welcomed the influx of polling information and consequently, interest groups achieved a new degree of access to White House decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study demonstrates the effect experience has on leaders? responses to changes in the external environment. With a particular emphasis on U.S.-Soviet relations, in-depth case studies specifically address why, given changes similar in intensity although not content, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan altered policy toward the Soviet Union based on actions taken by the Kremlin, while Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Bush did not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leading scholarship on presidential appraisal identifies the results presidents get as the basis for public approval. This article tests a more fully specified model of presidential appraisal, derived from presidential history and political behavior research. It holds that three core values: effectiveness, morality and prudence, drive judgments of presidential traits and actions as well as results. Juxtaposing these values and targets yields a nine cell theory matrix. Coded findings from 855 interviews of ordinary citizens recruited during the final Bush and first Obama terms show that 81 percent of citizen criterion mentions fit the matrix, establishing its construct validity. A second prediction, that results are more often mentioned than other criteria, is also confirmed, although coding reveals that presidential actions are mentioned nearly as often. Finally, citizen emphasis of these and other criteria is shown to vary across presidencies and performance categories, highlighting a little-noted perceptiveness in citizen oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the authors comment that declaring war is not a function of the government. It focuses on powers of presidents over armed forces and views of former U.S. President George H. W. Bush on how powers of the government and presidents are separated in terms of declaring a war. It highlights powers of presidents in the U.S. constitution and sovereignty in Rome and Greece.

The notion that public managers influence organizational performance is common in public administration research. However, most works have relied mainly on qualitative case studies of particular managers and organizations. By comparison, relatively few studies have empirically examined why managers are influential, and no work we know of has quantitatively examined the determinants of managerial influence in the White House. Utilizing original survey data collected from former White House officials that served in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations, we apply empirical public management theory to explore for the first time the key determinants that shape perceptions of chief of staff managerial influence. Our large N study provides a new contribution to the literature on public management and serves as a catalyst for further research on managerial influence in political institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Soviet launch of Sputnik, presidents, regardless of party, have attempted to remake US space policy for reasons ranging from national security to the technological and societal benefits that may accrue from space exploration. The penultimate question for scholars is the following: Why do presidents succeed or fail in space policy?A comparative assessment of the efforts of George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush clarifies the perils and opportunities of presidential policymaking in this policy area. Both presidents announced their space policy proposals in the wake of major Space Shuttle disasters. Yet G.H.W. Bush's was practically stillborn on its arrival to Congress while George W. Bush's proved acceptable to Congress and related constituencies. The cases of space policy making in both of these administrations, being as they are the only full fledged presidential space policy proposals in the post-space race period, serve as perfect opportunities to study vital questions of presidential-congressional relations in a policy domain that scholars have overlooked. I argue that the presidential-legislative literature has limits in its applicability to space policy issues. This research develops a quantitative model of congressional support for presidents' space budget priorities and defines the parameters of support on Capitol Hill. I conclude that ideology, bureaucracy and centralization, and election year politics all came together to form unique contexts within which both plans played out following their introduction. These conclusions suggest that perhaps rather than relying on any one indicator of presidential success, the political environment, the sum of all the parts, is a vital determinant in presidents' relative success. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States does not seem to have a coordinated foreign policy when it comes to the Caribbean. Indeed the US seems to have all but ignored the whole of the Americas during the G W Bush administration. The Caribbean is not often thought of as a key region in the world, but for the next administration the Caribbean should be the focus of foreign policy attention. .x000d.Within the greater Caribbean are three potential threats to the region that might affect US hegemony there. One is the growing influence of China and to a lesser degree the EU. Since the Monroe Doctrine the US has viewed the Americas as its market, yet other states are making large inroads into the Caribbean market..x000d.Secondly and also related to the Monroe Doctrine, regional powers such as Venezuela and Brazil are expanding their influence. While we may not take china seriously as a threat to the US in the region, we do take Venezuela seriously. .x000d.Lastly, after 50 years, it appears that there will be some sort of change in Cuba within the next decade. The United States needs to seek a policy in the region that will ensure our hegemony and also help guide Cuba towards full participation in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article extends the research on vulnerability and responsiveness to presidential decisions from the Eisenhower Administration to the first Bush Administration. Relying on presidential disaster decision materials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), I examine the role of demographic, social, economic, and political vulnerability on the presidential disaster decisions by Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush. The current research concludes that the scope of the disaster, the actions of the governor, demographic vulnerability, and political vulnerability play a critical role in explaining a president's decision to grant a major disaster. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American opinion leaders who favored the death penalty, compared to those opposed, were substantially more likely to support the 1991 Gulf War, to condone the Iraqi death toll, and to favor escalating the war to topple Saddam Hussein. These relationships persist after controlling for ideology, nationalism, and instrumental beliefs about force, and thus probably result from individual differences in retributiveness and humanitarianism, moral values known to strongly influence death penalty attitudes. These results suggest a substantial moralistic streak in elite attitudes about war against evil-seeming states, or states that are effectively framed as such by political leaders. Moral punitiveness was attenuated by foreign-policy expertise only on the regime change issue, and moderately so, suggesting that it might also influence the thinking of decision makers. President George H. W. Bush evidently experienced real moral outrage during the crisis, but he refrained from escalating to exact further punishment on Saddam. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores why the U.S. executive branch moved toward joining United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) during the tenure of former U.S. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton and explains why the U.S. has yet to ratify the treaty. It provides a historical background of the Law of the Sea Convention. It also elaborates why the administration of former U.S. President Bush declined to accede to UNCLOS. Also mentioned is the status of UNCLOS in the Senate as of 2004.

The article presents a comparison of public approval of the handling of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 by U.S. President George W. Bush. The researcher used survey data to show that public support of the two military operations varied. He argued that public support for presidential war powers has changed, mainly due to the shift from defensive to pre-emptive military actions arising from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The article examines key themes and limitations of the government reform programs under the leadership of U.S. President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain. The researchers trace the evolution of their reforms programs, recognizing the influence of the new public management agenda of the former Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major and former U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.

In the last 25 years and especially after the Cold War, the international community is witnessing remarkable changes. More and more countries are turning away from their authoritarian past and moving towards liberal democracy. Since 1975, when there were approximately 30 liberal democratic societies, there has been a vast increase in the number of such democracies in the world. Now more than 120 countries arguably offer their citizens at least a liberal democratic constitution. These transitions toward liberal democracy have varied from country to country. Some countries such as the Czech Republic have been largely successful in achieving free and fair elections and in protecting a broad range of human rights. Other countries have made progress, but have a long way to go (e.g., South Africa), while some (e.g., Haiti) have not fared as well. As countries have attempted to implement liberal democracy, many Western governments, including the US, have developed democracy assistance programs as part of their larger foreign policy to promote liberal democracy. While some scholars offer a clearly optimistic account of the US role in these developments, this paper presents a more guarded assessment of US democracy promotion and its affects on countries undertaking transitions. During the Clinton administration some attempt was made to promote democracy around the world. The Bush administration has for the most part reversed this policy. Especially after September 11, 2001, President Bush has focused on the war on terrorism to the detriment of democracy promotion. Countries like Pakistan have been given both diplomatic and financial assistance because of their support in the war on terrorism. After comparing these two administrations and their policies on democracy assistance, this paper concludes by addressing the likely impact of neglecting democracy promotion in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines America?s foreign policy vis-à-vis Europe during the presidencies of George H.W. and George W. Bush. Both father and son occupied the Oval Office as Washington?s relations with its most stalwart ideological, economic, and military allies accommodated new and largely uncertain geopolitical realities. George H.W. Bush brought a wealth of experience to his management of the transatlantic partnership as he navigated an uncharted post-Soviet morass. A veteran of the Cold War, though not necessarily a Cold Warrior, H.W. Bush struggled to redefine U.S.-European relations in the absence of an overarching Communist threat. This paper argues that H.W. Bush, influenced by his own personal history and leadership style, crafted a mostly clever response to vexing issues such as German reunification, Eastern European democratization, and the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A decade after H.W. Bush reaffirmed the importance of the transatlantic partnership, his son, George W. Bush, alienated many European allies, whose policies diverged from the White House?s on matters such as Iraq?s alleged WMD program, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the saliency and utility of the United Nations. With a different personal history and leadership style than his father, W. Bush revamped U.S. policy toward Europe as the transatlantic partnership struggled to reconcile American primacy, European integration, and international terrorism. While both Bushes claimed to value the transatlantic alliance, this paper uses theories of cognition and leadership to explain the variance in their policies toward Washington?s European allies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, we delve into the inner workings of the Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations by examining the performance of the White House chiefs of staff. The paper begins with a brief overview of the position of chief of staff. The paper then utilizes a unique mail survey of elites who served during the Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton years to analyze the performance of the White House chiefs of staff during that period. We conclude that a hierarchical White House and a strong chief of staff seem to be essential to the organizational success of the presidency, but that they do not guarantee it. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]