Search

This article introduces a theoretical model of truth and honesty from a psychological perspective. We examine its application in political discourse and discuss empirical findings distinguishing between conceptions of honesty and their influence on public perception, misinformation dissemination, and the integrity of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce this special issue on Thinking about Climate Change by reflecting on the role of psychology in responding adaptively to catastrophic global threats. By way of illustration we compare the threat posed by climate change with the extinction-level threat considered in the recent film Don't Look Up [McKay, A. (Director). (2021). Don't Look Up [Film]. Hyperobject Industries]. Human psychology is a critical element in both scenarios. The papers in this special issue discuss the importance of clear communication of scientific information, the dangers of misinformation and the possible role played by motivated reasoning, all themes that are taken up in the film. Ultimately, though, it is not enough to consider psychological factors in isolation: we must also acknowledge that cognitive flaws and psychological motivations are exploited by vested interests that profit from delaying climate action. A global response to a global crisis requires us to 'look up' to recognise the threat and to 'look around' to go beyond specialist disciplines and national boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cognitive model of social influence (Social Sampling Theory [SST]) is developed and applied to several social network phenomena including polarization and contagion effects. Social norms and individuals' private attitudes are represented as distributions rather than the single points used in most models. SST is explored using agent-based modeling to link individual-level and network-level effects. People are assumed to observe the behavior of their social network neighbors and thereby infer the social distribution of particular attitudes and behaviors. It is assumed that (a) people dislike behaving in ways that are extreme within their neighborhood social norm (social extremeness aversion assumption), and hence tend to conform and (b) people prefer to behave consistently with their own underlying attitudes (authenticity preference assumption) hence minimizing dissonance. Expressed attitudes and behavior reflect a utility-maximizing compromise between these opposing principles. SST is applied to a number of social phenomena including (a) homophily and the development of segregated neighborhoods, (b) polarization, (c) effects of norm homogeneity on social conformity, (d) pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects, (e) backfire effects, (f) interactions between world view and social norm effects, and (g) the opposing effects on subjective well-being of authentic behavior and high levels of social comparison. More generally, it is argued that explanations of social comparison require the variance, not just the central tendency, of both attitudes and beliefs about social norms to be accommodated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political misinformation poses a major threat to democracies worldwide, often inciting intense disputes between opposing political groups. Despite its central role for informed electorates and political decision making, little is known about how aware people are of whether they are right or wrong when distinguishing accurate political information from falsehood. Here, we investigate people's metacognitive insight into their own ability to detect political misinformation. We use data from a unique longitudinal study spanning 12 waves over 6 months that surveyed a representative U.S. sample (N = 1,191) on the most widely circulating political (mis)information online. Harnessing signal detection theory methods to model metacognition, we found that people from both the political left and the political right were aware of how well they distinguished accurate political information from falsehood across all news. However, this metacognitive insight was considerably lower for Republicans and conservatives—than for Democrats and liberals—when the information in question challenged their ideological commitments. That is, given their level of knowledge, Republicans' and conservatives' confidence was less likely to reflect the correctness of their truth judgments for true and false political statements that were at odds with their political views. These results reveal the intricate and systematic ways in which political preferences are linked to the accuracy with which people assess their own truth discernment. More broadly, by identifying a specific political asymmetry—for discordant relative to concordant news—our findings highlight the role of metacognition in perpetuating and exacerbating ideological divides. Public Significance Statement: This preregistered study suggests that people from both the political left and the political right are aware of how well they distinguish accurate political information from falsehood across all news. However, this metacognitive insight was considerably lower for Republicans and conservatives—than for Democrats and liberals—when they faced statements that challenged their ideological commitments. People's awareness of the accuracy and fallibility of their own knowledge thus partly differs across ideological divides, which may fuel broader societal trends such as political polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change presents a challenge at multiple levels: It challenges our cognitive abilities because the effect of the accumulation of emissions is difficult to understand. Climate change also challenges many people's worldview because any climate mitigation regime will have economic and political implications that are incompatible with libertarian ideals of unregulated free markets. These political implications have created an environment of rhetorical adversity in which disinformation abounds, thus compounding the challenges for climate communicators. The existing literature on how to communicate climate change and dispel misinformation converges on several conclusions: First, providing information about climate change, in particular explanations of why it occurs, can enhance people's acceptance of science. Second, highlighting the scientific consensus can be an effective means to counter misinformation and raise public acceptance. Third, culturally aligned messages and messengers are more likely to be successful. Finally, climate misinformation is best defanged, through a process known as inoculation, before it is encountered, although debunking techniques can also be successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much concern with the abundance of misinformation in public discourse. Although misinformation has always played a role in political debate, its character has shifted from support for a specific position to a 'shock and chaos' stream of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Exposure to conspiracy theories can have considerable adverse impact on society. I argue that scholars therefore have a responsibility to combat conspiracy theories and misinformation generally. Exercising this responsibility requires an understanding of the varied rhetorical roles of conspiracy theories. Here I focus on instances in which people reject unequivocal scientific evidence and invoke conspiracy theories, or radical anti-institutional positions, based on ideological imperatives. I argue that those positions do not always reflect true attitudes. Instead, people may deploy extreme rhetoric as a pragmatic tool of political expression. I investigate this possibility by focusing on the role of conspiracy theories in the rejection of science. Conspiracist cognition and rhetoric violate the epistemic standards that underpin science. Ironically, this violation of epistemic standards renders conspiracy theories useful as a rationally deployed tool that serves political purposes. I present a study that confirms that conspiracy theories can be deployed to support worldview-motivated denial of science. I provide suggestions how scholars can debunk or defang conspiratorial rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bayesian inference offers an optimal means of processing environmental information and so an advantage in natural selection. We consider the apparent, recent trend in increasing dysfunctional disagreement in, for example, political debate. This is puzzling because Bayesian inference benefits from powerful convergence theorems, precluding dysfunctional disagreement. Information overload is a plausible factor limiting the applicability of full Bayesian inference, but what is the link with dysfunctional disagreement? Individuals striving to be Bayesian-rational, but challenged by information overload, might simplify by using Bayesian networks or the separation of questions into knowledge partitions, the latter formalized with quantum probability theory. We demonstrate the massive simplification afforded by either approach, but also show how they contribute to dysfunctional disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic may require governments to use privacy-encroaching technologies to help contain its spread. One technology involves co-location tracking through mobile Wi-Fi, GPS, and Bluetooth to permit health agencies to monitor people's contact with each other, thereby triggering targeted social-distancing when a person turns out to be infected. The effectiveness of tracking relies on the willingness of the population to support such privacy encroaching measures. We report the results of two large surveys in the United Kingdom, conducted during the peak of the pandemic, that probe people's attitudes towards various tracking technologies. The results show that by and large there is widespread acceptance for co-location tracking. Acceptance increases when the measures are explicitly time-limited and come with opt-out clauses or other assurances of privacy. Another possible future technology to control the pandemic involves "immunity passports", which could be issued to people who carry antibodies for the COVID-19 virus, potentially implying that they are immune and therefore unable to spread the virus to other people. Immunity passports have been considered as a potential future step to manage the pandemic. We probe people's attitudes towards immunity passports and find considerable support overall, although around 20% of the public strongly oppose passports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internet has evolved into a ubiquitous and indispensable digital environment in which people communicate, seek information, and make decisions. Despite offering various benefits, online environments are also replete with smart, highly adaptive choice architectures designed primarily to maximize commercial interests, capture and sustain users' attention, monetize user data, and predict and influence future behavior. This online landscape holds multiple negative consequences for society, such as a decline in human autonomy, rising incivility in online conversation, the facilitation of political extremism, and the spread of disinformation. Benevolent choice architects working with regulators may curb the worst excesses of manipulative choice architectures, yet the strategic advantages, resources, and data remain with commercial players. One way to address some of this imbalance is with interventions that empower Internet users to gain some control over their digital environments, in part by boosting their information literacy and their cognitive resistance to manipulation. Our goal is to present a conceptual map of interventions that are based on insights from psychological science. We begin by systematically outlining how online and offline environments differ despite being increasingly inextricable. We then identify four major types of challenges that users encounter in online environments: persuasive and manipulative choice architectures, AI-assisted information architectures, false and misleading information, and distracting environments. Next, we turn to how psychological science can inform interventions to counteract these challenges of the digital world. After distinguishing among three types of behavioral and cognitive interventions—nudges, technocognition, and boosts—we focus on boosts, of which we identify two main groups: (a) those aimed at enhancing people's agency in their digital environments (e.g., self-nudging, deliberate ignorance) and (b) those aimed at boosting competencies of reasoning and resilience to manipulation (e.g., simple decision aids, inoculation). These cognitive tools are designed to foster the civility of online discourse and protect reason and human autonomy against manipulative choice architectures, attention-grabbing techniques, and the spread of false information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our experiment, we tested how exposure to a mock televised news segment, with a systematically manipulated emotional valence of voiceover, images and TV tickers (in the updating format) impacts viewers' perception. Subjects (N = 603) watched specially prepared professional video material which portrayed the story of a candidate for local mayor. Following exposure to the video, subjects assessed the politician in terms of competence, sociability, and morality. Results showed that positive images improved the assessment of the politician, whereas negative images lowered it. In addition, unexpectedly, positive tickers led to a negative assessment, and negative ones led to more beneficial assessments. However, in a situation of inconsistency between the voiceover and information provided on visual add-ons, additional elements are apparently ignored, especially when they are negative and the narrative is positive. We then discuss the implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a framework for simple measurement models for working memory, and apply it to complex-span and memory-updating tasks. Memory Measurement Models (M3) use the frequency distribution across response categories to measure continuous memory strength along 2 dimensions: Memory for individual elements, potentially relying on persistent activation of unified representations, and memory for relations, relying on temporary bindings. Experiment 1 provides evidence for the validity of the parameters measuring these two dimensions of strength. The effects of experimental manipulations on these 2 dimensions can be captured by additional model parameters that reflect hypothetical processes affecting memory. Across five further experiments we illustrate how M3 can be used to measure 3 such processes: The continued strengthening of memory representations during the retention interval (extended encoding), the dampening of encoding of irrelevant information (filtering), and the removal of irrelevant information from memory. In one experiment we compare young and old adults on complex-span tasks and working memory updating. In both paradigms, old adults showed impaired memory for relations but no impairment in memory for individual elements. There was partial evidence for age differences in extended encoding and removal; there were no age differences in filtering. We suggest that M3 offer a computationally efficient approach to identifying memory processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet blogs have become an important platform for the discussion of many scientific issues, including climate change. Blogs, and in particular the comment sections of blogs, also play a major role in the dissemination of contrarian positions that question mainstream climate science. The effect of this content on people's attitudes is not fully understood. In particular, it is unknown how the interaction between the content of blog posts and blog comments affects readers' attitudes. We report an experiment that orthogonally varied those two variables using blog posts and comments that either did, or did not, support the scientific consensus on climate change. We find that beliefs are partially shaped by readers' perception of how widely an opinion expressed in a blog post appears to be shared by other readers. The perceived social consensus among readers, in turn, is determined by whether blog comments endorse or reject the contents of a post. When comments reject the content, perceived reader consensus is lower than when comments endorse the content. The results underscore the importance of perceived social consensus on opinion formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information and assurance from healthcare workers (HCWs) is reported by laypeople as a key factor in their decision to get vaccinated. However, previous research has shown that, as in the general population, hesitancy towards vaccines exists among HCWs as well. Previous studies further suggest that HCWs with a higher confidence in vaccinations and vaccine providers are more willing to take the vaccines themselves and to recommend vaccines to patients. In the present study with 2962 Finnish HCWs (doctors, head nurses, nurses, and practical nurses), we explored the associations between HCWs' vaccination confidence (perceived benefit and safety of vaccines and trust in health professionals), their decisions to accept vaccines for themselves and their children, and their willingness to recommend vaccines to patients. The results showed that although the majority of HCWs had high confidence in vaccinations, a notable share reported low vaccination confidence. Moreover, in line with previous research, HCWs with higher confidence in the benefits and safety of vaccines were more likely to accept vaccines for their children and themselves, and to recommend vaccines to their patients. Trust in other health professionals was not directly related to vaccination or recommendation behavior. Confidence in the benefits and safety of vaccines was highest among doctors, and increased along with the educational level of the HCWs, suggesting a link between confidence and the degree of medical training. Ensuring high confidence in vaccines among HCWs may be important in maintaining high vaccine uptake in the general population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A worrying number of psychological findings are not replicable. Diagnoses of the causes of this "replication crisis," and recommendations to address it, have nearly exclusively focused on methods of data collection, analysis, and reporting. We argue that a further cause of poor replicability is the often weak logical link between theories and their empirical tests. We propose a distinction between discovery-oriented and theory-testing research. In discovery-oriented research, theories do not strongly imply hypotheses by which they can be tested, but rather define a search space for the discovery of effects that would support them. Failures to find these effects do not question the theory. This endeavor necessarily engenders a high risk of Type I errors—that is, publication of findings that will not replicate. Theory-testing research, by contrast, relies on theories that strongly imply hypotheses, such that disconfirmation of the hypothesis provides evidence against the theory. Theory-testing research engenders a smaller risk of Type I errors. A strong link between theories and hypotheses is best achieved by formalizing theories as computational models. We critically revisit recommendations for addressing the "replication crisis," including the proposal to distinguish exploratory from confirmatory research, and the preregistration of hypotheses and analysis plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some well-established scientific findings may be rejected by vocal minorities because the evidence is in conflict with political views or economic interests. For example, the tobacco industry denied the medical consensus on the harms of smoking for decades, and the clear evidence about human-caused climate change is currently being rejected by many politicians and think tanks that oppose regulatory action. We present an agent-based model of the processes by which denial of climate change can occur, how opinions that run counter to the evidence can affect the scientific community, and how denial can alter the public discourse. The model involves an ensemble of Bayesian agents, representing the scientific community, that are presented with the emerging historical evidence of climate change and that also communicate the evidence to each other. Over time, the scientific community comes to agreement that the climate is changing. When a minority of agents is introduced that is resistant to the evidence, but that enter into the scientific discussion, the simulated scientific community still acquires firm knowledge but consensus formation is delayed. When both types of agents are communicating with the general public, the public remains ambivalent about the reality of climate change. The model captures essential aspects of the actual evolution of scientific and public opinion during the last 4 decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pictures often tell a story better than the proverbial 1,000 words. However, in connection with climate change, many pictures can be highly misleading, for example, when a snowball is used to ridicule the notion of global warming or when a picture of a dead crop is supposed to alert people to climate change. We differentiate between such inappropriate pictures and those that can be used legitimately because they capture long-term trends. For example, photos of a glacier’s retreat are legitimate indicators of the long-term mass balance loss that is observed for the vast majority of glaciers around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is broad consensus among economists that unmitigated climate change will ultimately have adverse global economic consequences, that the costs of inaction will likely outweigh the cost of taking action, and that social planners should therefore put a price on carbon. However, there is considerable debate and uncertainty about the appropriate value of the social discount rate, that is the extent to which future damages should be discounted relative to mitigation costs incurred now. We briefly review the ethical issues surrounding the social discount rate and then report a simulation experiment that constrains the value of the discount rate by considering 4 sources of uncertainty and ambiguity: Scientific uncertainty about the extent of future warming, social uncertainty about future population and future economic development, political uncertainty about future mitigation trajectories, and ethical ambiguity about how much the welfare of future generations should be valued today. We compute a certainty-equivalent declining discount rate that accommodates all those sources of uncertainty and ambiguity. The forward (instantaneous) discount rate converges to a value near 0% by century's end and the spot (horizon) discount rate drops below 2% by 2100 and drops below previous estimates by 2070. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Misinformation can undermine a well-functioning democracy. For example, public misconceptions about climate change can lead to lowered acceptance of the reality of climate change and lowered support for mitigation policies. This study experimentally explored the impact of misinformation about climate change and tested several pre-emptive interventions designed to reduce the influence of misinformation. We found that false-balance media coverage (giving contrarian views equal voice with climate scientists) lowered perceived consensus overall, although the effect was greater among free-market supporters. Likewise, misinformation that confuses people about the level of scientific agreement regarding anthropogenic global warming (AGW) had a polarizing effect, with free-market supporters reducing their acceptance of AGW and those with low free-market support increasing their acceptance of AGW. However, we found that inoculating messages that (1) explain the flawed argumentation technique used in the misinformation or that (2) highlight the scientific consensus on climate change were effective in neutralizing those adverse effects of misinformation. We recommend that climate communication messages should take into account ways in which scientific content can be distorted, and include pre-emptive inoculation messages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports four experiments with complex-span tasks in which encoding of memory items alternates with processing of distractors. The experiments test two assumptions of a computational model of complex span, SOB-CS: (1) distractor processing impairs memory because distractors are encoded into working memory, thereby interfering with memoranda; and (2) free time following distractors is used to remove them from working memory by unbinding their representations from list context. Experiment 1 shows that distractors are erroneously chosen for recall more often than not-presented stimuli, demonstrating that distractors are encoded into memory. Distractor intrusions declined with longer free time, as predicted by distractor removal. Experiment 2 shows these effects even when distractors precede the memory list, ruling out an account based on selective rehearsal of memoranda during free time. Experiments 3 and 4 test the notion that distractors decay over time. Both experiments show that, contrary to the notion of distractor decay, the chance of a distractor intruding at test does not decline with increasing time since encoding of that distractor. Experiment 4 provides additional evidence against the prediction from distractor decay that distractor intrusions decline over an unfilled retention interval. Taken together, the results support SOB-CS and rule out alternative explanations. Data and simulation code are available on Open Science Framework: osf.io/3ewh7. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scientifically well-established results--such as the fact that emission of greenhouse gases produces global warming--are rejected by sizable proportions of the population in the United States and other countries. Rejection of scientific findings is mostly driven by motivated cognition: People tend to reject findings that threaten their core beliefs or worldview. At present, rejection of scientific findings by the U.S. public is more prevalent on the political right than the left. Yet the cognitive mechanisms driving rejection of science, such as the superficial processing of evidence toward the desired interpretation, are found regardless of political orientation. General education and scientific literacy do not mitigate rejection of science but, rather, increase the polarization of opinions along partisan lines. In contrast, specific knowledge about the mechanisms underlying a scientific result--such as human-made climate change--can increase the acceptance of that result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Belief polarization is said to occur when two people respond to the same evidence by updating their beliefs in opposite directions. This response is considered to be 'irrational' because it involves contrary updating, a form of belief updating that appears to violate normatively optimal responding, as for example dictated by Bayes' theorem. In light of much evidence that people are capable of normatively optimal behavior, belief polarization presents a puzzling exception. We show that Bayesian networks, or Bayes nets, can simulate rational belief updating. When fit to experimental data, Bayes nets can help identify the factors that contribute to polarization. We present a study into belief updating concerning the reality of climate change in response to information about the scientific consensus on anthropogenic global warming ( AGW). The study used representative samples of Australian and U.S. participants. Among Australians, consensus information partially neutralized the influence of worldview, with free-market supporters showing a greater increase in acceptance of human-caused global warming relative to free-market opponents. In contrast, while consensus information overall had a positive effect on perceived consensus among U.S. participants, there was a reduction in perceived consensus and acceptance of human-caused global warming for strong supporters of unregulated free markets. Fitting a Bayes net model to the data indicated that under a Bayesian framework, free-market support is a significant driver of beliefs about climate change and trust in climate scientists. Further, active distrust of climate scientists among a small number of U.S. conservatives drives contrary updating in response to consensus information among this particular group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 11 articles in this issue explore how people respond to climate change and other global challenges. The articles pursue three broad strands of enquiry that relate (1) to the effects and causes of 'skepticism' about climate change, (2) the purely cognitive challenges that are posed by a complex scientific issue, and (3) the ways in which climate change can be communicated to a wider audience. Cognitive science can contribute to understanding people's responses to global challenges in many ways, and it may also contribute to implementing solutions to those problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two types of misinformation effects are discussed in the literature—the post-event misinformation effect and the continued influence effect . The former refers to the distorting memorial effects of misleading information that is presented after valid event encoding; the latter refers to information that is initially presented as true but subsequently turns out to be false and continues to affect memory and reasoning despite the correction. In two experiments, using a paradigm that merges elements from both traditions, we investigated the role of presentation order and recency when two competing causal explanations for an event are presented and one is subsequently retracted. Theoretical accounts of misinformation effects make diverging predictions regarding the roles of presentation order and recency. A recency account—derived from time-based models of memory and reading comprehension research suggesting efficient situation model updating—predicts that the more recently presented cause should have a stronger influence on memory and reasoning. By contrast, a primacy account—derived from primacy effects in impression formation and story recall as well as findings of inadequate memory updating—predicts that the initially presented cause should be dominant irrespective of temporal factors. Results indicated that (1) a cause’s recency, rather than its position (i.e., whether it was presented first or last) determined the emphasis that people place on it in their later reasoning, with more recent explanations being preferred; and (2) a retraction was equally effective whether it invalidated the first or the second cause, as long as the cause’s recency was held constant. This provides evidence against the primacy account and supports time-based models of memory such as temporal distinctiveness theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the explanatory roles that have been ascribed to various forms of rehearsal or refreshing in short-term memory (STM) and working memory paradigms, usually in conjunction with the assumption that memories decay over time if they are not rehearsed. Notwithstanding the popularity of the rehearsal notion, there have been few detailed examinations of its underlying mechanisms. We explicitly implemented rehearsal in a decay model and explored its role by simulation in several benchmark paradigms ranging from immediate serial recall to complex span and delayed recall. The results show that articulatory forms of rehearsal often fail to counteract temporal decay. Rapid attentional refreshing performs considerably better, but so far there is scant empirical evidence that people engage in refreshing during STM tasks. Combining articulatory rehearsal and refreshing as 2 independent maintenance processes running in parallel leads to worse performance than refreshing alone. We conclude that theoretical reliance on articulatory rehearsal as a causative agent in memory may be unwise and that explanatory appeals to rehearsal are insufficient unless buttressed by quantitative modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors comment on a study R. M. Dixon and colleagues on the relationship between conspiracist ideation (CY) or conspiracism and climate-science rejection. Topics include earlier studies which found association between the endorsement of conspiracy theories and the rejection of scientific findings, the three questionable data-analytic choices made by the study authors to cast doubt on the linear effects reported, and their suggestion of not using CY in climate change prediction.

Deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are required to mitigate climate change. However, there is low willingness amongst the public to prioritise climate policies for reducing emissions. Here we show that the extent to which Australians are prepared to reduce their country's CO2 emissions is greater when the costs to future national income are framed as a “foregone-gain”—incomes rise in the future but not by as much as in the absence of emission cuts—rather than as a “loss”—incomes decrease relative to the baseline expected future levels (Studies 1 & 2). The provision of a normative message identifying Australia as one of the world's largest CO2 emitters did not increase the amount by which individuals were prepared to reduce emissions (Study 1), whereas a normative message revealing the emission policy preferences of other Australians did (Study 2). The results suggest that framing the costs of reducing emissions as a smaller increase in future income and communicating normative information about others' emission policy preferences are effective methods for leveraging public support for emission cuts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major reason why some people oppose the COVID-19 vaccine is the influence of misinformation. This study suggests that the cognitive paradox of simultaneously believing known facts less and new, "alternative facts" more is the outcome of a distrust mindset, characterized by spontaneous consideration of alternatives, including misinformation. We captured this paradox and its correlates in a scale that measures individuals' ability to distinguish between the truth value of well-established facts ("Earth rotates eastward around its own axis, completing a full rotation once in about 24 h") and baseless "alternative facts" ("Earth can change its rotation direction and flip its axis, and we will never notice it"). Assuming that an anti-COVID-19 vaccine attitude arises from a chronically distrusting mindset, we sampled participants on Prolific who were pre-screened for their COVID-19 vaccine attitude based on earlier responses. We found that people who rejected COVID-19 vaccines believed well-established facts less, and "alternative facts" more, compared to supporters of the vaccine. Less discernment between truths and falsehoods was correlated with less intellectual humility, more distrust and greater reliance on one's intuition. This observed thought pattern offers insights into theoretical understanding of the antecedents of belief in "alternative facts" and conspiracy theories. • We tested a cognitive paradox that could precede acceptance of misinformation. • The paradox is skepticism of known claims but gullibility for "alternative facts". • We find the paradox in opposers of the COVID-19 vaccine, but not in supporters of it. • The vaccine attitude was pre-screened by Prolific, ruling out motivational biases. • Correlated traits are distrust, reliance on intuition and less intellectual humility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] We introduce a method for isolating a process unique to working memory updating. [•] Removal of outdated information is an active working memory updating process. [•] Removal speed can be measured reliably. [•] Removal speed is independent of working memory capacity. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Uncertainty forms an integral part of climate science, and it is often used to argue against mitigative action. This article presents an analysis of uncertainty in climate sensitivity that is robust to a range of assumptions. We show that increasing uncertainty is necessarily associated with greater expected damages from warming, provided the function relating warming to damages is convex. This constraint is unaffected by subjective or cultural risk-perception factors, it is unlikely to be overcome by the discount rate, and it is independent of the presumed magnitude of climate sensitivity. The analysis also extends to 'second-order' uncertainty; that is, situations in which experts disagree. Greater disagreement among experts increases the likelihood that the risk of exceeding a global temperature threshold is greater. Likewise, increasing uncertainty requires increasingly greater protective measures against sea level rise. This constraint derives directly from the statistical properties of extreme values. We conclude that any appeal to uncertainty compels a stronger, rather than weaker, concern about unabated warming than in the absence of uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In public debate surrounding climate change, scientific uncertainty is often cited in connection with arguments against mitigative action. This article examines the role of uncertainty about future climate change in determining the likely success or failure of mitigative action. We show by Monte Carlo simulation that greater uncertainty translates into a greater likelihood that mitigation efforts will fail to limit global warming to a target (e.g., 2 °C). The effect of uncertainty can be reduced by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Taken together with the fact that greater uncertainty also increases the potential damages arising from unabated emissions (Lewandowsky et al. ), any appeal to uncertainty implies a stronger, rather than weaker, need to cut greenhouse gas emissions than in the absence of uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Derives new prediction from decay-rehearsal model. [•] Provides evidence against the prediction. [•] Results incompatible with decay, support interference model. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Misinformation-defined as information that is initially assumed to be valid but is later corrected or retracted-often has an ongoing effect on people's memory and reasoning. We tested the hypotheses that (a) reliance on misinformation is affected by people's preexisting attitudes and (b) attitudes determine the effectiveness of retractions. In two experiments, participants scoring higher and lower on a racial prejudice scale read a news report regarding a robbery. In one scenario, the suspects were initially presented as being Australian Aboriginals, whereas in a second scenario, a hero preventing the robbery was introduced as an Aboriginal person. Later, these critical, race-related pieces of information were or were not retracted. We measured participants' reliance on misinformation in response to inferential reasoning questions. The results showed that preexisting attitudes influence people's use of attitude-related information but not the way in which a retraction of that information is processed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dissemination and control of information are indispensable ingredients of violent conflict, with all parties involved in a conflict or at war seeking to frame the discussion on their own terms. Those attempts at information control often involve the dissemination of misinformation or disinformation (i.e., information that is incorrect by accident or intent, respectively). We review the way in which misinformation can facilitate violent conflicts and, conversely, how the successful refutation of misinformation can contribute to peace. We illustrate the relevant cognitive principles by examining two case studies. The first, a retrospective case, involves the Iraq War of 2003 and the "War on Terror." The second, a prospective case, points to likely future sources of conflict arising from climate change and its likely consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Among American Conservatives, but not Liberals, trust in science has been declining since the 1970's. Climate science has become particularly polarized, with Conservatives being more likely than Liberals to reject the notion that greenhouse gas emissions are warming the globe. Conversely, opposition to genetically-modified (GM) foods and vaccinations is often ascribed to the political Left although reliable data are lacking. There are also growing indications that rejection of science is suffused by conspiracist ideation, that is the general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories including the specific beliefs that inconvenient scientific findings constitute a “hoax.” Methodology/Principal findings: We conducted a propensity weighted internet-panel survey of the U.S. population and show that conservatism and free-market worldview strongly predict rejection of climate science, in contrast to their weaker and opposing effects on acceptance of vaccinations. The two worldview variables do not predict opposition to GM. Conspiracist ideation, by contrast, predicts rejection of all three scientific propositions, albeit to greatly varying extents. Greater endorsement of a diverse set of conspiracy theories predicts opposition to GM foods, vaccinations, and climate science. Conclusions: Free-market worldviews are an important predictor of the rejection of scientific findings that have potential regulatory implications, such as climate science, but not necessarily of other scientific issues. Conspiracist ideation, by contrast, is associated with the rejection of all scientific propositions tested. We highlight the manifold cognitive reasons why conspiracist ideation would stand in opposition to the scientific method. The involvement of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of science has implications for science communicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has found a positive relationship between people's working memory capacity (WMC) and their speed of category learning. To date, only classification-learning tasks have been considered, in which people learn to assign category labels to objects. It is unknown whether learning to make infer-ences about category features might also be related to WMC. We report data from a study in which 119 participants undertook classification learning and inference learning, and completed a series of WMC tasks. Working memory capacity was positively related to people's classification and inference learning performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information changes as it is passed from person to person, with this process of cultural transmission allowing the minds of individuals to shape the information that they transmit. We present mathematical models of cultural transmission which predict that the amount of information passed from person to person should affect the rate at which that information changes. We tested this prediction using a function-learning task, in which people learn a functional relationship between two variables by observing the values of those variables. We varied the total number of observations and the number of those observations that take unique values. We found an effect of the number of observations, with functions transmitted using fewer observations changing form more quickly. We did not find an effect of the number of unique observations, suggesting that noise in perception or memory may have affected learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although nearly all domain experts agree that carbon dioxide emissions are altering the world’s climate, segments of the public remain unconvinced by the scientific evidence. Internet blogs have become a platform for denial of climate change, and bloggers have taken a prominent role in questioning climate science. We report a survey of climate-blog visitors to identify the variables underlying acceptance and rejection of climate science. Our findings parallel those of previous work and show that endorsement of free-market economics predicted rejection of climate science. Endorsement of free markets also predicted the rejection of other established scientific findings, such as the facts that HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer. We additionally show that, above and beyond endorsement of free markets, endorsement of a cluster of conspiracy theories (e.g., that the Federal Bureau of Investigation killed Martin Luther King, Jr.) predicted rejection of climate science as well as other scientific findings. Our results provide empirical support for previous suggestions that conspiratorial thinking contributes to the rejection of science. Acceptance of science, by contrast, was strongly associated with the perception of a consensus among scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article tests the assumption that forgetting in working memory for verbal materials is caused by time-based decay, using the complex-span paradigm. Participants encoded 6 letters for serial recall; each letter was preceded and followed by a processing period comprising 4 trials of difficult visual search. Processing duration, during which memory could decay, was manipulated via search set size. This manipulation increased retention interval by up to 100% without having any effect on recall accuracy. This result held with and without articulatory suppression. Two experiments using a dual-task paradigm showed that the visual search process required central attention. Thus, even when memory maintenance by central attention and by articulatory rehearsal was prevented, a large delay had no effect on memory performance, contrary to the decay notion. Most previous experiments that manipulated the retention interval and the opportunity for maintenance processes in complex span have confounded these variables with time pressure during processing periods. Three further experiments identified time pressure as the variable that affected recall. We conclude that time-based decay does not contribute to the capacity limit of verbal working memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread prevalence and persistence of misinformation in contemporary societies, such as the false belief that there is a link between childhood vaccinations and autism, is a matter of public concern. For example, the myths surrounding vaccinations, which prompted some parents to withhold immunization from their children, have led to a marked increase in vaccine-preventable disease, as well as unnecessary public expenditure on research and public-information campaigns aimed at rectifying the situation.We first examine the mechanisms by which such misinformation is disseminated in society, both inadvertently and purposely. Misinformation can originate from rumors but also from works of fiction, governments and politicians, and vested interests. Moreover, changes in the media landscape, including the arrival of the Internet, have fundamentally influenced the ways in which information is communicated and misinformation is spread.We next move to misinformation at the level of the individual, and review the cognitive factors that often render misinformation resistant to correction. We consider how people assess the truth of statements and what makes people believe certain things but not others. We look at people’s memory for misinformation and answer the questions of why retractions of misinformation are so ineffective in memory updating and why efforts to retract misinformation can even backfire and, ironically, increase misbelief. Though ideology and personal worldviews can be major obstacles for debiasing, there nonetheless are a number of effective techniques for reducing the impact of misinformation, and we pay special attention to these factors that aid in debiasing.We conclude by providing specific recommendations for the debunking of misinformation. These recommendations pertain to the ways in which corrections should be designed, structured, and applied in order to maximize their impact. Grounded in cognitive psychological theory, these recommendations may help practitioners—including journalists, health professionals, educators, and science communicators—design effective misinformation retractions, educational tools, and public-information campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article introduces a new computational model for the complex-span task, the most popular task for studying working memory. SOB-CS is a two-layer neural network that associates distributed item representations with distributed, overlapping position markers. Memory capacity limits are explained by interference from a superposition of associations. Concurrent processing interferes with memory through involuntary encoding of distractors. Free time in-between distractors is used to remove irrelevant representations, thereby reducing interference. The model accounts for benchmark findings in four areas: (1) effects of processing pace, processing difficulty, and number of processing steps; (2) effects of serial position and error patterns; (3) effects of different kinds of item-distractor similarity; and (4) correlations between span tasks. The model makes several new predictions in these areas, which were confirmed experimentally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Serial recall is often assumed to involve response suppression: the removal or inhibition of items already recalled so that they are not recalled again. Evidence for response suppression includes repetition inhibition and the separation of erroneous repetitions. Some theorists have suggested that response suppression, by eliminating competing responses, also contributes to recency in forward serial recall. We present experiments in which performance on the final item was examined as a function of whether or not the preceding retrievals entailed suppression of potential response competitors. In line with the predictions of response suppression, recency was found to be reduced when the earlier recall errors consisted of intrusion errors (which leave list items unsuppressed) rather than transposition errors (which involve suppression). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low-quality and misleading information online can hijack people's attention, often by evoking curiosity, outrage, or anger. Resisting certain types of information and actors online requires people to adopt new mental habits that help them avoid being tempted by attention-grabbing and potentially harmful content. We argue that digital information literacy must include the competence of critical ignoring —choosing what to ignore and where to invest one's limited attentional capacities. We review three types of cognitive strategies for implementing critical ignoring: self-nudging, in which one ignores temptations by removing them from one's digital environments; lateral reading, in which one vets information by leaving the source and verifying its credibility elsewhere online; and the do-not-feed-the-trolls heuristic, which advises one to not reward malicious actors with attention. We argue that these strategies implementing critical ignoring should be part of school curricula on digital information literacy. Teaching the competence of critical ignoring requires a paradigm shift in educators' thinking, from a sole focus on the power and promise of paying close attention to an additional emphasis on the power of ignoring. Encouraging students and other online users to embrace critical ignoring can empower them to shield themselves from the excesses, traps, and information disorders of today's attention economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has confirmed the prominent role of group processes in the promotion and endorsement of disinformation. We report three studies on a psychological framework derived from integrated threat theory—a psychological theory which describes how perceived threat leads to group polarization and prejudice—composed of the following constructs: group belongingness, perceived threat, outgroup derogation, and intergroup anxiety. Our pilot study suggested that need to belong and intergroup anxiety predict antiscientific beliefs (pseudoscientific, paranormal, and conspiracy theories), thus justifying the general applicability of integrated threat theory. Study 1 investigates the transition from weak to strong critical thinking regarding pseudoscientific doctrines. Besides greater outgroup derogation and perceived threats among strong critical thinkers, the model does not perform well in this context. Study 2 focuses on the intergroup conflict around anthropogenic global warming, revealing the strong predictive power of the model. These results are discussed in relation to the distinctive psychological profiles of science acceptance and rejection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of attention is central to theorizing in learning as well as in working memory. However, research to date has yet to establish how attention as construed in one domain maps onto the other. We investigate two manifestations of attention in category- and cue-learning to examine whether they might provide common ground between learning and working memory. Experiment 1 examined blocking and highlighting effects in an associative learning paradigm, which are widely thought to be attentionally mediated. No relationship between attentional performance indicators and working memory capacity (WMC) was observed, despite the fact that WMC was strongly associated with overall learning performance. Experiment 2 used a knowledge restructuring paradigm, which is known to require recoordination of partial category knowledge using representational attention. We found that the extent to which people successfully recoordinated their knowledge was related to WMC. The results illustrate a link between WMC and representational--but not dimensional--attention in category learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working memory is crucial for many higher level cognitive functions, ranging from mental arithmetic to reasoning and problem solving. Likewise, the ability to learn and categorize novel concepts forms an indispensable part of human cognition. However, very little is known about the relationship between working memory and categorization. This article reports 2 studies that related people's working memory capacity (WMC) to their learning performance on multiple rule-based and information-integration perceptual categorization tasks. In both studies, structural equation model-ing revealed a strong relationship between WMC and category learning irrespective of the require-ment to integrate information across multiple perceptual dimensions. WMC was also uniformly related to people's ability to focus on the most task-appropriate strategy, regardless of whether or not that strategy involved information integration. Contrary to the predictions of the multiple systems view of categorization, working memory thus appears to underpin performance in both major classes of perceptual category-learning tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special section brings together behavioral, computational, mathematical, and neuroimaging ap-proaches to understand the processes underlying category learning. Over the past decade, there has been growing convergence in research on categorization, with computational-mathematical models influenc-ing the interpretation of brain imaging and neuropsychological data, and with cognitive neuroscience findings influencing the development and refinement of models. Classic debates between single-system and multiple-memory-system theories have become more nuanced and focused. Multiple brain areas and cognitive processes contribute to categorization, but theories differ markedly in whether and when those neurocognitive components are recruited for different aspects of categorization. The articles in this special section approach this issue from several diverse angles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been growing interest in the relationship between the capacity of a person's working memory and their ability to learn to categorize stimuli. While there is evidence that working memory capacity (WMC) is related to the speed of category learning, it is unknown whether WMC predicts which strategies people use when there are multiple possible solutions to a categorization problem. To explore the relationship between WMC, category learning, and categorization strategy use, 173 participants completed two categorization tasks and a battery of WMC tasks. WMC predicted the speed of category learning, but it did not predict which strategies participants chose to perform categorization. Thus, WMC does not predict which categorization strategies people use but it predicts how well they will use the strategy they select. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consolidation refers to the putative process by which existing memories are strengthened over time. There is a widespread consensus within the neuroscientific community that consolidation is an important component of human memory. By contrast, the notion is rarely employed by cognitive modellers. We focus on behavioural data that have frequently been cited in support of consolidation-for example, the Ribot gradient in amnesia and the temporal effects of retroactive interference-and show that (1) those data are in fact problematic for classic consolidation theory and (2) can be explained readily within a cognitive model based on temporal distinctiveness. We suggest that this changes the evidentiary landscape for consolidation and narrows the field of supporting evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]