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Currently, there is a large deviation between official road freight data and real road freight performance at a subnational level in China. In order to deal with this deviation, the new concept of local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers is presented in this paper based on the territoriality principle, where either the origin or the destination of goods transported is local. Also, the statistic procedures and estimation models of the local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers are proposed based on five accessible basic datasets. Finally, an empirical study in Sichuan province of China is conducted. The statistical results show that there is a large amount of local freight transported by local non-commercial trucks and non-local trucks, which is ignored in the existing road freight statistics. Especially, the higher the level of local economic development, the greater the deviation between the official road freight data and the real road freight performance at a subnational level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a low carbon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer under the condition that the demand is uncertain. We first establish three games, including manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), retailer Stackelberg (RS) and Nash according to the different power structure of the firms. We then determine that the equilibrium stocking factors, emission reduction levels, wholesale prices and retail prices for the three models, respectively. After that, we demonstrate the effects of power structure. Results show that when the power shifts from the retailer to the manufacturer, the stocking factor decreases, whereas the wholesale price increases. Finally, we discuss the impacts of the random demand. We find that the expected profits of the firms, the emission reduction levels and the retail prices are increasing with respect to the market potential and low-carbon sensitivity coefficient, respectively. Meanwhile, they decrease with respect to the price sensitivity coefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the growth of people's environmental awareness and the encouragement of government policies, the use of electric vehicles in logistics distribution is gradually increasing. In order to solve the dual demand of customers' simultaneous pick-up and delivery in the "last kilometer logistics", an electric vehicle routing problem with simultaneous pick-up and delivery and time window (EVRPSPDTW) is considered from the perspective of multi-objective distribution in this paper. Firstly, a decision-making model based on distribution cost and power consumption function is established. In this model, distribution cost includes transportation cost, vehicle use cost, penalty cost of not arriving on time and charging cost. Power consumption function is the energy loss caused by air resistance, tire rolling friction and transmission system. Secondly, a multi-objective genetic algorithm (NSGA-II) optimization solution with fast nondominated ranking and elite strategy is designed, and in view of the shortcomings of traditional NSGA-II, it is proposed to complete population initialization through greedy algorithm and random rules, introduce adaptive cross-mutation strategy in the chromosome crossing and mutation stage, and design three different neighborhood operators in mutation operation based on variant fitness function. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of traffic congestion coefficient further proves the effectiveness of the proposed model and the improved algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with a one-period two-stage supply chain, in which a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand orders products from a risk-neutral supplier subject to yield uncertainty. Marketing effort exerted by the retailer is employed to enhance the final market demand. We first establish a performance benchmark, and show that the wholesale price contract fails to coordinate the supply chain due to the effects of double marginalization and loss aversion. Then we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract in order to achieve supply chain coordination. It is verified that a properly designed revenue-cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination and a win-win outcome synchronously. Our results reveal that it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocate the total channel profit between the retailer and the supplier. In addition, we examine the effect of the retailer's loss aversion degree on contract parameters and profit allocation, and we show that both the retailer and the supplier can benefit from marketing effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain consisting of a risk-averse supplier and a risk-neutral retailer engaging in sales promoting efforts. Under the conditional risk at value, we examine three different types of contracts with the replenishment option for coordinating the VMI supply chain, namely, a risk diversification and cost sharing (RDCS) contract, an option and cost sharing contract, and a subsidy and cost sharing contract. Firstly, we derive the optimal production strategy and analyze the capability of each of the proposed contracts in coordinating the VMI supply chain. We find that all of those contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain with Pareto improvement. Secondly, we also show that both the supplier and the retailer prefer the RDCS contract over the other two contracts. Finally, we use numerical experiments to analyze the impact of risk aversion on contracts' parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quality competition and risk aversion have become more and more common in today's many industries, making it a challenge to supply chain management and coordination. This paper considers a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain comprising two risk-averse manufacturers who sell their competing products through a common retailer. Market demand shared by each manufacturer is dependent on the quality level of its own product as well as on the competitor's product quality. The Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion is employed to formulate the risk aversion of manufacturers. This study first develops basic models without coordination mechanism and analyzes the effect of the quality sensitivity, competition intensity, risk aversion degree and cost coefficient of quality improvement on equilibrium decisions and supply chain efficiency. Further, a combined contract composed of option and cost-sharing is proposed to investigate the supply chain coordination issue. The results reveal that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve a win-win outcome only when the manufacturers are low in risk aversion, and the system-wide profit of the supply chain can be allocated arbitrarily only by the option price. Also, this research examines the effect of the quality sensitivity, competition intensity, risk aversion degree and cost coefficient of quality improvement on the feasible region of option price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a combined contract composed of option and cost sharing is proposed to investigate coordination and risk‐sharing issues of the supply chain consisting of a dominant retailer and a risk‐averse manufacturer. Demand faced by the retailer is stochastic in nature and dependent on marketing effort. We adopt the conditional value‐at‐risk (CVaR) criterion to model risk aversion of the manufacturer, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is verified that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto‐improvement. Moreover, the dominant retailer can allocate the system‐wide profit arbitrarily only by option price in the premise of coordination. It is worth mentioning that coordination of the supply chain is reachable only when the manufacturer is low in risk aversion, and the manufacturer's risk aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rising environmental concerns among consumers all over the world, sustainability has received considerable attention, and numerous enterprises are adopting various practices such as investing in energy-saving to improve sustainability in supply chains. However, many previous researches always assume that decision makers are perfectly rational and neglect the behavioral concerns of decision makers. This paper considers a two-stage sustainable supply chain with behavioral concerns in order to develop more realistic models, and mainly focuses on the energy-saving and pricing decisions in the decentralized system, as well as how to improve energy-saving level and profits. We develop decentralized decision-making models under two types of behavioral concerns: fairness concern and risk aversion, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader. The effect of the behavioral concerns on the optimal decisions and corresponding profits is discussed in detail. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the fairness behavior always causes a negative effect on the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, while it could benefit the retailer in profits. The risk aversion behavior always benefits the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, whereas it could make the retailer suffer. Note that both the optimal energy-saving level and corresponding profit of the total supply chain under two types of behavioral concerns are lower than that in the centralized system, thereby we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win outcome and the energy-saving level can be improved. In addition, some managerial implications through our analytical and numerical results are summarized in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain with a loss-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. Market demand faced by the retailer is stochastic and dependent on product quality level and marketing effort level. We propose a combined contract composed of option and cost-sharing to investigate coordination and profit allocation issues of the supply chain. To model loss aversion of the manufacturer, we employ multiple mental accounts and apply the utility function to upside and downside potentials of manufacturer's production decision separately. We derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is proved that both coordination of the supply chain and Pareto-improvement can be achieved synchronously by the combined contract. In the premise of coordination, the system-wide profit can be allocated arbitrarily only by option price. Through negotiation, the retailer and the manufacturer just need to confirm an appropriate option price to obtain that neither of them becomes worse off. We also find that the manufacturer's loss aversion is a significant element for contract design and profit allocation, and the manufacturer could benefit from its own loss aversion behavior under certain condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]