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En el presente trabajo se publica la traducción de La ciencia perspectiva (1684-1686), de G.W. Leibniz. Entre 1679 y 1686, el pensador alemán escribe una serie de textos dedicados a la ciencia perspectiva. Esos escritos son los siguientes: La construcción y el uso de escalas en la perspectiva; Las asistencias del cálculo; El fundamento de la perspectiva; El origen de la regla del arte de la perspectiva; La relación de los puntos con el plano del espectador; La ciencia perspectiva. El último de ellos, que es también el más acabado formal y argumentativamente, es el que se traduce en este trabajo. En La ciencia perspectiva, Leibniz define la disciplina, presenta una metodología y descubre la regla de dicha ciencia. La ciencia perspectiva es, de acuerdo con él, el arte de exhibir en la Tabula la apariencia del objetivo y, en dicho arte, el análisis geométrico de la intersección resulta central para el descubrimiento de la regla universal de la representación. Antes de presentar la traducción, se puede encontrar un estudio introductorio del texto, cuyo objetivo es facilitar la comprensión del lector en relación con lo defendido por Leibniz en La ciencia perspectiva.

El objetivo de este artículo es intentar establecer una línea de continuidad entre Montaigne y Leibniz respecto del tema de las pasiones y la vida feliz, entendiendo como parte de ésta una adecuada gestión de las pasiones. Se sostiene que hay puntos de contacto entre Montaigne y Leibniz, que a menudo pasan por la intermediación de Descartes. Tras comparar las propuestas de estos tres autores por lo que respecta a las pasiones y la vida feliz, se concluye que el tratamiento moderno de las pasiones tiene su antecedente en Montaigne, y que llega hasta Leibniz por una consideración cada vez más “racionalista”. Se sugiere además que en los tres autores es posible considerar su filosofía como una forma de vida, y que más allá de que cada uno parta de posiciones metafísicas diferentes sus propuestas de vida feliz son similares.

En este trabajo analizaremos la concepción de Leibniz acerca de la aplicación de la matemática a la física entre los años 1677 y 1690. Reconstruiremos esta concepción fundamentalmente a partir de algunos conceptos relacionados, como son los de “atributos” o “cualidades acompañantes”. Veremos que, por aplicación de la matemática a la física, Leibniz entendió específicamente la posibilidad de dar explicaciones mecánicas que dan cuenta de la causa inmediata e inteligible por la cual tienen lugar las cualidades confusas, en un sentido que debe ser dilucidado. Estas explicaciones revelan, por lo tanto, la estructura a parte rei a partir de la que tienen lugar las sensaciones.

This paper aims to clarify the evolution of the notion of primary matter in Leibniz’s philosophy. The analysis takes the scholastic discussion on the reality of primary matter as a framework to explain the development of Leibniz’s ideas. It will be shown that Leibniz argued in his earlier writings for a conception of primary matter as some sort of being (similarly in line with some scholastic philosophers like Scoto, Ockam, and Suarez). In contrast, in his mature metaphysics, he deployed this primary matter of reality, approaching Aquinas’s position in a creative and novelty manner.

Abstract In the present paper, I intend to show the role in Leibniz’s overall philosophy of his definition of a complete notion as a concept that contains every predicate of a certain subject. I will try to argue that this definition consists in an exoteric and more intuitive or accessible device directed to those unfamiliar with the intricacies of his views on logic and also that it plays a pedagogical role in his writings. In addition, I intend to explain away the seeming mismatch between this definition and that of individual substance, as well as Leibniz’s definitions of truth and proposition based on the relation of concept containment. In doing so, I will try to show that the definition above of a complete notion provides an important argument for the existence of such notions based on our ordinary talk about individuals and also how my proposal deals with Donald Rutherford’s problem of this definition’s extensional correctness vis-a-vis accidents.

O presente texto tem por objetivo apresentar um dos assuntos mais controversos da modernidade, a saber: o princípio de individuação. Em ambos os autores, John Locke e G. W. Leibniz, a questão quanto a necessidade desse princípio diz respeito à moralidade: ações, justiça e Divindade. Contudo, nenhuma dessas construções filosóficas seriam possíveis sem a fundamentação do Cogito, por René Descartes, o eu. Portanto, este artigo inicia pela caracterização do Cogito cartesiano. Em seguida, apresentaremos a compreensão lockeana da consciência como constituidora da identidade pessoal ou moral para, posteriormente, elucidarmos as críticas depreendidas por Leibniz a tal exclusividade.

This essay investigates the way in which Wolff takes an interest in the hypothesis of an emendatio of the prima philosophia from Leibniz’s incitement in De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae (1694) to re-found metaphysics. This makes it possible, secondly, to examine the way in which Wolff takes Johannes Clauberg’s ontology as a model, even though it represents in his view only a failed attempt at that same emendatio. Through the analysis of the texts, this article considers the possibility of a new reading of the ‘failure’ attributed by Wolff to Clauberg, which would consist in his having ‘emended’ first philosophy by expelling it from the domain of ontology and finally identifying it with Cartesian prima philosophia.

Cet article a pour but de faire une brève discussion sur les critiques de Leibniz à la philosophie de Descartes. Ayant ce but en vue, on va d’abord discuter l’attaque que Leibniz a déclenchée contre la méthodologie cartésienne. Ensuite, on présente les raisons qui ont aménées Leibniz à rejeter les notions fondamentales de la métaphysique cartésienne. Après cela, on arrive à l’analyse du vigoureux refus dont la physique de Descartes a été l’objet. Finalement, de ces discussions on pourra conclure que, Leibniz se voyait et agissait comme un penseur tout à fait anti-cartésien et qu’il a été l’un des plus agressifs opposants au système philosophique élaboré par Descartes.

El texto tiene como propósito la confección de la reseña con el fin de ofrecer a las personas lectoras una aproximación a la obra de Ensayos de Teodicea del filósofo G. W. Leibniz la cual contiene, análisis académicos profundos para hablar del tema de Dios de la forma más ordenada posible.

Is Immanuel Kant’s critique of the proofs of God’s existence accurate? In order to answer this question, I analyse Leibniz’ proof in his “Monadology” and I determine the relation between the cosmological and the ontological version of this proof. Since Kant often refers (implicitly) to Leibniz’ argument, I examine Kant’s critique of rational theology in the Critique of Pure Reason in the light of Leibniz’ strategy. Kant’s critique of Leibniz’ argument is partly biased by his own concept of “transcendental idealism” and fails to reject it. On the other hand, many questions in Leibniz’ attempt remain still open.

The idea of automation of reasoning in science, which is extremely high-ranking nowadays in connection with the development of computer technology and research into artificial intelligence has been presented in the history of mind since taking up a cohered with the idea of mechanization of reasoning. It is therefore proper to present the greatest enthusiast every of this idea on the threshold of the contemporary science, who treated the idea of mechanization in reasoning very widely, assuming that every mind process can be expressed in some physical manner – Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

Throughout his correspondence and writings, Leibniz made a number of passing references to the religion of the Mohammadans (Islam) and to several Islamic commentators. Recent literature on these references has placed them in the context of Leibniz’s political and historical interests that largely reflect his Eurocentric prejudices. The purpose of this paper is to extract a more detailed and systematic view of Leibniz’s knowledge of and interest in the religion, through Leibniz’s remarks on Islam in relation to Christian doctrines such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, through the commentary of Maimonides and the Christian Averroists, and through a (partly speculative) comparison of three types of theodicy. The paper concludes that while Leibniz knew very little about Islam’s actual doctrines, and that he was subject to the prejudicial views of his time, he understood Islam, as he did Christianity, as largely in conformity with natural (rational) religion. At the same time, his interest in its specific doctrines was primarily instrumental, that is, as correctives to certain abusive practices and misunderstandings persisting within Christianity, which could then explain for him why Islam prevailed in the East.

The main aim of this paper is to provide an account of Leibniz’s engagement with the doctrine of cosmic dualism in his Theodicy, i.e., the view that there are two distinct fundamental principles that are responsible for the existence of the created world, one good and the other evil. Leibniz’s discussion is primarily a response to arguments in favour of cosmic dualism that he finds in the writings of Pierre Bayle. However, in addition, he presents a genealogical argument that appears to be intended to provide reasons to reject the view. The paper also contains a critical discussion of Leibniz’s case, and finishes by drawing attention to some issues which arise that are worthy of further consideration.

The focus of this paper is a suite of Latin papers from 1685, some of which are still unpublished, in which Leibniz writes in the guise of a Catholic in order to defend Catholicism and counter Protestant objections, and this despite him being a lifelong Lutheran. After providing an overview of these writings (which I refer to as Leibniz’s “Catholic” writings) and the grounds for dating them to May–June 1685, I consider their purpose, arguing against the claim that they were intended to support Church reunion and suggesting instead that they were apologetic in nature, intended as a reactivation or reimagining of Leibniz’s earlier “Catholic Demonstrations” project. I identify the patron Leibniz had in mind for these writings as Landgrave Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels and support this by a detailed comparison of the “Catholic” writings with the Leibniz-Landgrave correspondence and the Landgrave’s still-unpublished essays. This reveals that the Protestant arguments Leibniz uses in the “Catholic” writings are the very ones that he himself used when writing to the Landgrave, and that the responses Leibniz gives to these arguments are the very ones that the Landgrave used. I also consider the context of the writings, suggesting they were crafted during a period of personal uncertainty for Leibniz and possibly aimed at securing a position under the Landgrave.

The aim of this paper is to show how the understanding of Leibniz’s notion of toleration in matters of faith should be considered not merely as a pragmatic, but also as an epistemologically and metaphysically relevant concept. Following Maria Rosa Antognazza’s account, I will argue that Leibniz’s view on the belief of mysteries is ‘above reason’ and the relation between faith and experience plays an important role in his discussion of transubstantiation with Des Bosses, but also that Leibniz allows for presumptions based on faith to enter metaphysical discussions. Doing so, despite the fact that we cannot achieve certainty in these matters and have to accept a variety of different beliefs regarding the same objects, enriches our understanding of the world and of God—and also gives us reason to take seriously Leibniz’s engagement with corporeal substances, albeit only as presumptions rather than as necessary consequences of his basic metaphysical system. Finally, I will illustrate this point by showing how it is also in play in Leibniz’s response to Tournemine regarding the mind-body-union.

For the mature Leibniz, the organic bodies of living beings or substances are “machines of nature” containing both infinitely many (a) functional bodily organs and (b) further substances. These latter substances are said to be dominated by or subordinate to the original substance. I show that commentators have tended to conflate subordinate substances with organs, thus committing Leibniz to the position that organs are individual subordinate substances, i.e., living beings. Against this view, I argue for a “Dual Component” account of Leibnizian organic body according to which Leibniz distinguished organs and subordinate substances as distinct types of organic bodily parts. On this account, organs are not equivalent to individual subordinate substances, and are, in fact, aggregates of such substances. I thereby shed light on the metaphysical relationships of domination between substances as well as the mechanical structure of Leibnizian organic body.

El presente artículo se centra en el esclarecimiento de las nociones de percepciones inconscientes («petites perceptions»), percepciones y apercepciones en la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz con el fin de responder dos preguntas: 1) Ad intra, es decir, intra-sustancialmente: ¿Cómo un evento inconsciente se vuelve consciente dentro de una misma sustancia simple?; 2) Ad extra, es decir, inter-sustancialmente: ¿dónde puede decirse que surge la conciencia en la jerarquía de mónadas? Para responder estas preguntas, seguiré la siguiente metodología. En primer lugar, presentaré la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz enmarcada en su visión metafísica. Presentaré a su vez los pasajes más conflictivos y el problema que surge al momento de definir la conciencia. En segundo lugar, presentaré las interpretaciones más comentadas que existen actualmente acerca de este problema. Me centraré en las posturas de Rocco J. Gennaro, Larry M. Jorgensen, Christian Barth y Alison Simmons. Finalmente, propondré una interpretación propia de la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz.

In the XXI century, network communication generates its own philosophical discourse of thinking. However, network discourse and network interaction appeared at the dawn of axial time, first, in the Eastern philosophy and, eventually, in the Western one. The authors used the information and communication approach, as well as the historical method, to trace the network discourse from traditional Chinese philosophy all the way through Leibnizianism and classical German philosophy. The research also covered the manifestations of triadic network thinking in the Western philosophy of the XX century, including the Russian philosophy of the new and modern history. It featured the Taoist and Confucian categories of trace, void, and dynamic stability, which were rediscovered by Postmodernism. When the network discourse took over the linear one, it opened up prospects for new, digital thinking. The obtained data develop the ontological aspects of network existence and facilitate the applied studies of network communications.

Leibniz’s jurisprudence and theory of natural law, which began development as early as the 1660s, has implications for his mature theodicy. In this essay, it is shown that based on an analysis of a few key jurisprudential texts, the Nova Methodus (1666), the Elementa Juris Naturalis (1670–1671), and the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (1693), Leibniz developed the legal term ‘obligatio’ from Roman Law and the Spanish Jesuit traditions, but that his usage shifted at different stages of his life. Nevertheless, these views are compatible and provide a grounding for his philosophical optimism. It is further shown that Leibniz took the concept of obligatio to provide something like legal standing (locus standi or klagebefugnis) so that rational minds can undergo the theodicean project, that is, because God has obligations to substances, they can seek an explanation for their suffering from God. And because human reason is analogous to divine reason, according to Leibniz, God provides the explanation that the actual world is the best possible world. The goal, then, is to prove that we should take Leibniz’s insights into jurisprudence more seriously, at least in part, because they help to explain his philosophical optimism.

Este artigo tem como objetivo apontar alguns problemas lógicos ilustrativos das dificuldades que a linguagem pode acarretar, quando aplicada a propósitos científicos, para justificar o surgimento da filosofia da linguagem. Os comentários aqui realizados, porém, se restringem à tradição da lógica clássica, destacando as contribuições de Aristóteles, Leibniz e Frege. Mas busca-se mostrar também que, posteriormente, houve uma grande elevação da complexidade das questões envolvidas, dado o aprofundamento do vínculo da lógica com a matemática.

La presente contribución se propone investigar las variaciones que se han producido en la elaboración teórica de la teodicea – entendida en sentido clásico como el tratamiento del problema del mal frente a la bondad y la justicia de Dios – en la filosofía moderna, desde Leibniz hasta Rosmini. Para la comprensión de la teodicea leibniziana resulta de importancia fundamental la evolución moderna de la ontología de la posibilidad, en relación con el ser real. El cuadro teórico es ingeniosamente reconsiderado por Rosmini sobre el fondo de su metafísica de las tres formas categoriales del ser, gracias a la cual el filósofo roveretano puede dar mayor solidez a las perspectivas delineadas, superando algunos puntos críticos de la concepción leibniziana.

In the 20th century, Leibniz studies flourished in Italy, as attested by the large number of scholarly articles and translations of his main works. Articles on Leibniz’s philosophy were published in the Archivio di Filosofia, which has long been the journal of the Italian Philosophical Society. This paper examines articles on Leibniz published in Italy, and notably in the Archivio di Filosofia. It is divided into three parts. The first one examines Italian research on Leibniz from 1900 to 1930. The second one takes into account articles on Leibniz published in Archivio di Filosofia from 1930 to 1945. The last part is dedicated to Leibnizian studies published in the same journal after 1945.

The attention paid in the Giornale critico della filosofia italiana to the major exponents of seventeenth-century philosophical rationalism, from its foundation by Giovanni Gentile in 1920 until 1979, reveals important changes that provide us with interesting information on Italian Neo-idealism. The small number of articles on Descartes can be interpreted as the result of an overall approach – sanctioned by Gentile – different from that of Hegel, who considered Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy. For Gentile, Descartes represents a stage in the history of philosophy spanning from Humanism to Spinoza, and, in a more particular Italian perspective, from Campanella to Vico. This interpretative scheme persisted also under the direction of Ugo Spirito, when Cartesianism continued to receive little theoretical and historical attention, with the exception of Eugenio Garin’s contributions. In the years from 1945 to 1979, the Giornale critico emphasized instead the interest for Spinoza, a very important author for Gentile, up to the double monographic issue published on the occasion of the third centenary of Spinoza’s death (1977). In turn, the lack of interest for Leibniz was constant and evident from the small number of articles published from 1920 to 1979, which were furthermore not particularly connected with the international, coeval Leibniz scholarship.

Examining the period from the 1920s to the 1970s, one of the key features of the Rivista di filosofia is a lasting interest in the Renaissance and Vico, while the focus on seventeenth-century metaphysics is significantly more time-bound and linked to the activity of some prominent figures in the journal such as Piero Martinetti, Eugenio Colorni, and Gioele Solari. The rise of the Neo-Enlightenment caused a radical change in the editorial choices, and turned the journal’s focus toward the empiricist tradition and the debate on historiographical methodologies.

Immanuel Kant has addressed the problem of evil in many of his works. The neglected part of Kant’s thought -especially among Muslim scholars- is his philosophical objections and defenses regarding the problem of evil in pre-critical and early critical periods. Many of his ideas in this subject remained unchanged until the end of his scientific life and were inspiring for the formation of his later theories. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines the principles of Leibniz’s Theodicy (i.e., evil as privation, theory of the best of all possible worlds, natural evil as punishment, and linking moral evil to free will) from Kant’s viewpoint and shows their role in the formation of his Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Contrary to Leibniz, he defends the positive reality of evil by distinguishing between logical contradiction and real contradiction. Moreover, based on the principles of Newtonian physics, Kant does not consider natural evil as punishment. However, he is in agreement with Leibniz in justifying moral evil according to mankind’s free will. Regarding the best of all possible worlds theory, it plays the most important role in Kant’s Theodicy in the pre-critical period. Although some objections to this theory are found in Kant’s articles, he seriously has upheld it even at the beginning of the critical period and after his Copernican revolution.

Cet article analyse l’idée Leibnizienne d’une caractéristique universelle, partant du livre de Genèse 2, 19 : ‘’Yahvé Dieu modela encore du sol toutes les bêtes sauvages et tous les oiseaux du ciel, et il les amena à l’homme pour voir comment celui-ci les appellerait : chacun devrait porter un nom que l’homme lui aurait donné. Cet acte de nomination sera dans la Bible dévolu, à Adam avant le péché. La Bible fait ressortir l’affirmation selon laquelle l’imposition des noms n’est pas l’apanage de tout le monde. C’est l’œuvre du premier homme : législateur ou l’Adam de la Bible, d’où sortira la langue adamique chère aux mystiques.

G. W. Leibniz fue un lector frecuente de la obra filosófica de Suárez, lectura que dejó una huella profunda en su metafísica. En concreto, el uso que Leibniz hace de los principios se puede ver como una aplicación práctica del tratamiento que hace Suárez de los principios en las Disputaciones metafísicas.

En este artículo se presenta la recepción que tuvo en la modernidad la teoría de Leibniz conocida como doctrina del optimismo. Aunque son las interpretaciones de Kant y de Hegel las que nos van a ocupar, para contextualizar la doctrina del mejor de los mundos posibles, será imprescindible referirnos a la acogida inmediata que la tesis tuvo en la Ilustración. A continuación, se analizará el texto de Kant «Algunas observaciones sobre el optimismo» y su defensa de las tesis de Leibniz. Dedicamos el último apartado del artículo a la lección que Hegel dedicó a la cuestión del optimismo de Leibniz en sus Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía.

En el presente artículo, se tratará de dilucidar la caracterización del Barroco europeo que Deleuze propone en El pliegue, con miras a aislar los rasgos idiosincrásicos que comparte con el Barroco hispano, definitorios como son de un ethos encaminado hacia una Modernidad alternativa a la que finalmente se impuso. Transitaremos así de la interpretación de la filosofía leibniziana del sujeto como un «manierismo» que ofrece Deleuze a la caracterización graciana del héroe y el mundo, con miras a mostrar que en ambos planteamientos hay una ontología de la potencia que desmiente el esencialismo a propósito del sujeto característico de la Modernidad de cuño cartesiano, en provecho de una evaluación interna o inmanente del sujeto conformada en tiempos de crisis y con una marcada inspiración estoica.

This paper is a reaction to Watumull and Roberts (2023, https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.12393).

This paper is a rebuttal to Gärtner (2023, https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.11715).

Due to its crucial role in acquiring knowledge, sense perception and its philosophical foundations have consistently been among the major topics in the history of philosophy. Avicenna, as a peripatetic (Aristotelian) Muslim philosopher, dedicated special attention to this problem. He advocated the unity of the soul despite the separation and multiplicity of the soul’s functional powers, leading him to posit an interaction or correlation between sensory and intellectual faculties. In the modern era, characterized by an emphasis on reason (intellect) and a perceived separation between reason and experience, Leibniz took a different approach. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of scholastic and ancient philosophers, he sought to reconcile elements of both old and new philosophies in forming his metaphysics. He based his metaphysical framework on select principles from Aristotelian logic but developed a unique theory regarding the unity of sensory and rational faculties. This paper aims to examine and compare these two philosophical viewpoints. Both philosophers held that it is impossible to fully grasp the truth of sensible objects, as knowledge is limited to understanding the properties and accidents of objects rather than their true nature. However, they diverged in their philosophical thinking, rooted in their respective worldviews and their stances on unity and plurality. Consequently, they both acknowledged the necessity of sense perception and the experimental method in acquiring knowledge, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of reason and rational methods.

It is shown that the proposal of identifying Merge and the Leibnizian addition operator runs up against the obstacle that the latter is associative while the former is not. The confound is attributed to insufficient appreciation of the difference between a calculus for natural language syntax and a calculus of concepts.

Entre los años 1678 y 1685 Leibniz compuso dos tratados – Circa Geometrica Generalia (C.G.G.) y Notationes Generales (N.G.) – en los cuales expone una críptica teoría del origen de los números enteros positivos estrechamente vinculada al Misterio de la Trinidad. Este trabajo propone una interpretación de las ideas matemáticas del filósofo mediante el concepto de determinatio. Tal hipótesis se utiliza para esclarecer el sentido teológico de la proposición leibniziana.

La ética política de la Escuela hegeliana se caracteriza por el perfeccionismo post-kantiano, un enfoque que difiere de las teorías perfeccionistas precedentes en que tiene por objeto la promoción de la libertad y las condiciones de su ejercicio. Las ideas de actividad espontánea o iniciada por sí misma desplazan los puntos de vista antiguos de la felicidad o la prosperidad (eudaimonia), basados en concepciones fijas de la naturaleza humana. Las nuevas teorías están también pendientes de los intereses conflictivos en la sociedad civil moderna emergente y de la necesidad de transformar sus prácticas e instituciones. Dentro de este enfoque se distinguen dos variantes en la década de 1840, las de Bauer y Marx, de las cuales aquí se examinan sus respectivos compromisos normativos y metaéticos.

En el presente trabajo analizamos la posible influencia de la noción spinozista de sustancia en el desarrollo de la metafísica de Leibniz. Luego de exponer el contexto en el que el filósofo alemán accede a la Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico y su evaluación general de la misma, presentamos esquemáticamente los cambios en la comprensión leibniziana de la sustancia y argumentamos que, a pesar de los reparos particulares que Leibniz hace a la definición de Spinoza, el modo en que este último comprende la actividad de la sustancia tiene repercusiones en la metafísica del primero y constituye un punto de contacto entre sus sistemas filosóficos.

Reflektiivinen ajattelu liittyy olennaisesti oppimisen ja kasvatuksen teorioihin sekä käytäntöihin. Sitä koskevalla teoretisoinnilla on polveileva historia. Saksalaisrationalisti Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnizin (1646–1716) filosofia sisältää reflektiivistä ajattelua koskevan näkemyksen. Selvennän tässä artikkelissa kyseistä näkemystä ja sen tulkintaa, kritiikkiä sekä yhteyttä hänen oppimis- ja kasvatuskäsityksiinsä. Johtopäätökset ovat seuraavat: ensimmäiseksi Leibnizin reflektiivistä ajattelua koskeva näkemys on yksityiskohtainen mutta ongelmallinen, toiseksi se liittyy muun muassa kokemusperäisen ja järkiperäisen tiedon sekä minäkäsityksen ja moraalisen toiminnan syntymiseen, ja kolmanneksi sillä on tärkeä yhteys Leibnizin oppimis- sekä kasvatuskäsityksiin siten, että reflektiivinen ajattelu mahdollistaa oppimisen ja kasvatuksen.

This paper offers a fresh interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s idea of non-ideal relations inhering in one subject. Such single-inhering relations should not be understood in terms of non-relational, absolute properties, but in terms of perspectival relations. Through the notion of perspective, we can understand how a relation between two relata inheres in only one of those relata. For example, my perception of you involves my point of view. Therefore, it is individual to me. My perception of you is not equal to your perception of me. However, it does relate me to you. Perspective can thus explain how relations only inhere in one subject while nevertheless really relating one thing to another. This leads to a novel understanding of the rejection of purely extrinsic denominations and the supposed isolation of substances.

The Briefportal Leibniz is a digital collection of selected letters from series III (Mathematischer, naturwissenschaftlicher und technischer Briefwechsel) of the ongoing critical print edition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’ works and letters, edited by the Academies of Sciences in Berlin and Göttingen. The main corpus of the selection, 157 letters, consists of Leibniz’ correspondence with Johann Bernoulli between 1693 and 1701 which centres mainly on mathematical matters. The portal offers a reader friendly chronological overview of these and several other correspondences but lacks some of the commentary and other material of the printed edition as well as download options for the underlying data. Despite these desiderata, the Briefportal Leibniz is still a promising part of the digital augmentation of the monumental Leibniz edition.

La presente contribución tiene por objeto examinar y describir la génesis y la elaboración de los Nuevos Ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano de Leibniz (1704 (?)). El interés de este estudio recae no sólo en transparentar la articulación histórica y teórica en que tienen lugar las etapas que preceden la redacción misma de los Nuevos Ensayos de Leibniz -equivalente a un período de casi diez años y que coincide con el punto de arranque de la maduración definitiva de su filosofía-, sino también en atenuar la connotación estrictamente epistemológica que suele atribuírsele a dicha obra, subrayando las motivaciones metafísicas y teológicas que lo impulsaron a redactarla en respuesta al Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano de Locke (1690).

Al igual que el mito o como parte de él, la utopía pertenece a una proyección del campo simbólico por la cual la sociedad expresa sus deseos de corrección de los desajustes del contrato social. Tras un repaso muy breve por la idea de utopía en América y más específicamente en Argentina, analizamos tres novelas de César Aira (La fuente; La serpiente; El juego de los mundos) que parten de esta tradición, sin dejar de reflejar la recurrencia del mythos utópico a las islas así como la dependencia filosófica del género, que en Aira se expresa a través de la teoría leibniziana de los composibles.

Leibniz uses the concept of probability in both epistemic and non-epistemic contexts, as do many of his contemporaries. Some commentators have claimed that this dual-use is inexact or confused. In this paper, I describe Leibniz’s understanding of the concept of probability and discuss its dual usage in his work. Then, building on Leibniz’s creation theory, in conjunction with Russell’s interpretation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, I endeavor to justify this dual usage and to show that this justification is also valuable for the contemporary discussion of the concept of probability.

In the literature, it is usually assumed that Leibniz described proof for the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (FTC) in 1693. However, did he really prove it? If the answer is no from today’s perspective, are there works in which Leibniz introduced arguments that can be understood as formulations and justifications of the FTC? In order to answer this question, we used a historiographic methodology with expert triangulation. From the study of Leibniz’s manuscripts describing the inverse problem of tangents and its relationship with the quadrature problem, we found evidence of a geometrical argument from which the FTC can be inferred. We present this argument using technological resources and modern notation. This result can be used to teach the FTC due to the existence of dynamic and geometrical software, which makes it suitable for the classroom. Moreover, it provides another interpretation of the FTC complementary to the interpretation using Riemann sums.

To achieve the common origin of "I" and nature, Schelling takes a new approach to the philosophy of nature; demonstrating the falsity of dualism between "I" and nature and showing how nature cannot be reduced to a mechanistic series of causes and effects. By integrating Leibniz's principle of inner purposiveness, Spinoza's monism, and the Kantian concept of teleology, he interprets an organic idea of nature as a totality and founds "I" on the ground of this organic nature. Schelling turns to Leibniz's vitalistic philosophy for presents a self-organizing scheme of nature, and he uses the intensive doctrine of substance to overcome the dualism of modern philosophy. In this view, the parts are to be deduced, in a purely analytic way from the whole, and each unit must include an infinite plurality, so the difference between subject and object is in degree, not in type; Nature is all alive, and no real object is entirely inorganic but is only in a lower degree of organic. In Schilling's point of view, the highest degree of organization of the infinite is the creativity of the artist, who is the culmination of all the organic forces of nature. The main question of this essay is about the fundamental role of Schelling's organic interpretation in his aesthetic essence. in this regard, while the impact of Leibniz's vitalistic approach is analyzed, the reinforcement of the activity of "I" in Schilling's system of thought is examined.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)—the principle that everything has a reason—plays a central role in Leibniz’s philosophical system. It is rather difficult, however, to determine what Leibniz’s attitude towards the modal status of the PSR is. The prevailing view is that Leibniz takes the PSR to be true necessarily. This paper develops a novel interpretation and argues that Leibniz’s PSR is a contingent principle. It also discusses whether a merely contingent PSR can do the metaphysical heavy lifting that Leibniz aims for. The paper shows that, despite appearance to the contrary, this is possible. In a nutshell, the argument is that the only possible PSR violation Leibniz allows for is God’s creation of a suboptimal world; there is no Leibnizian possible world, though, which intrinsically violates the PSR. Despite its contingency, then, Leibniz’s PSR is modally robust enough to serve as a foundational principle of his metaphysics.

Neste trabalho apresentamos uma tradução do artigo “Sobre uma geometria altamente oculta e a análise dos indivisíveis e infinitos” de Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, publicado na Acta Eruditorum, edição de junho de 1686 (número VI), tomado como o trabalho que fundou e aporesentou pela primeira vez o cálculo integral em bases gerais.

By studying the school editions of Leibniz’s Monadology published on the occasion of this work’s introduction to school programmes in 1880, we will demonstrate two points. First, how the intellectual and political context shapes the interpretations of Leibniz. Then, how these editions can be considered as philosophical positions. We will show how the figure of Leibniz is used to defend secularism, to fight against the eviction of metaphysics by the positive sciences and to found the autonomy of morality. We will also consider how publishers use it as a resource to fuel their own philosophical thought. Editing and commenting the classics contributes to a political and intellectual debate whose actors and issues will be retraced. Thus, the objective of this study is to consider these school editions from a philosophical point of view, and to show the importance of the context of the period for the practice of the history of philosophy.

The author studies Leibniz’s views of vindicating God for the existence of evil in the world, as well as the idea of the best of all possible worlds, including the past and present criticism. Following Leibniz, he opted for the presentation of Herder’s philosophy of history as one of the most significant forms of philosophical optimism that influenced the first half of the 19th century, including contemporary debates on and critiques of the topic. He defines Herder’s concept as the philosophy of historical progress, which also significantly influenced Slovak philosophy of the given period. The main goal of the article is to present Leibniz’s and Herder’s views as a starting point for the Slovak philosophy of optimism and historical progress of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century.

Integrar aspectos históricos y epistemológicos de las matemáticas de Newton y de Leibniz en lo que actualmente conocemos como Teorema Fundamental del Cálculo (TFC), permite mejorar la accesibilidad (entendiéndola como “una herramienta para la preparación de profesionales” [1]) de los estudiantes de ingeniería a este objeto matemático, por cuanto Newton y Leibniz se relacionaron con este teorema como un resultado que emergió al resolver un problema [2]–[4], en concordancia con la necesidad de la ingeniería de diseñar artefactos que funcionen en la práctica, cumpliendo con el propósito y especificaciones que lo motivaron [5]. Este escrito busca entonces colaborar con el tránsito del conocimiento científico de Newton y Leibniz al saber pedagógico actual, proponiendo una nueva entrada a dicho teorema, vía el software GeoGebra. Se presentarán tres relaciones del TC: su relación con los textos universitarios actuales y precedentes; el TFC en los trabajos de Newton y de Leibniz; y, por último, la historia y las prácticas docentes de los formadores de ingenieros.

Este artigo busca caracterizar a matéria musical desde os pontos de vista epistemológico e semiótico de Leibniz. Por um lado, argumenta-se que, segundo a teoria da percepção de Leibniz, nosso acesso ao fenômeno musical é simbólico no sentido de uma percepção do múltiplo na forma de uma unidade. Por outro lado, busca-se explicar a composição em termos de manipulação cega de signos, tendo como exemplo o uso da notação musical tradicional na música tonal. Assim, sustenta-se que, segundo as ideias de Leibniz, o uso de algum sistema semiótico na composição não é um recurso meramente psicotécnico, mas é um elemento constitutivo da própria música.