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This article comments on the paper Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, by Talcott Parsons. In his paper, Talcott Parsons addresses a problem on which little headway has been made since 1934 when he submitted the paper for publication to the Journal of Social Philosophy. This problem is the development of a theory of institutions, or a basis for such a theory. Parsons called his paper a prolegomena to a theory; but the prolegomena never led to the development of the theory itself either by Parsons or by others. The surfacing of Prolegomena now provides an opportunity to ask just how that theory might most profitably be developed. Prolegomena can be seen as an attempt by Parsons to establish a footing for the subjective approach to institutions based on a theory of rational action, opposing the objective approach. What Parsons calls the objective approach defines an institution as a set of social relations, a concrete social structure or organization. Parsons never explicitly defines institution in his subjective approach, but it seems clear that he means the set of regulatory norms that give rise to a concrete social structure or organization. Parson's subjective institution thus constitutes a way-station between the micro level of individual actors and the macro level of structures of relations or systems of action. In Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, a product of the early Parsons, there is a flawed but rich introduction to a theory of institutions.

The article asserts that mainstream sociology, or more specifically the nonproblematic sociology found in introductory sociology textbooks treats gender, race and class in profoundly unequal ways. Inequalities of Race, Class and Gender are quantified in Introductory Sociology Textbooks. By the mid-1990s, sociology textbook authors were no longer de-emphasizing gender in comparison to race and class. Discussion of the role of socialization in relation to group differentiation is more common for gender and is discussed in more detail than for either class. While there is on average almost one page more of aggregate cross-societal text on class than on gender, the proportion of texts including a significant amount is identical for class and gender. Thus, the overriding impression about mainstream sociology conveyed by the F&H paper fails to capture the growing impact of feminist questions on research agendas in the field of social stratification in general as well as on introductory textbook authors.

The paper proposes reorienting sociology so as to give special attention to the, discovery, description, and evaluation of social inventions. The significance of this focus is illustrated with cases of social inventions found in the Mondragén system of worker industrial cooperatives in `Spain and in new models for, agricultural research and development in Central America. The paper concludes with reflections on the implications of a social inventions focus for research methods, for social theory, and for applied sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Black's (1979) comment, when read in conjunction with The Behavior of Law (Black, 1976), raises several questions pertaining to the scientific adequacy of his theory of law. This paper assesses Black's theory against two criteria of scientific adequacy: generality and falsifiability. Black (1979) rejects our use of victimization survey data to test his theory because these data do not allow a comparison of that conduct initially labelled as crime and that conduct not so labelled. Our interest was not in this first-stage labelling, but in the second-stage decision by victims to increase the quantity of law by calling the police, given that the respondent had labelled some behavior as a crime. Black argues against such second-stage tests of his theory and also argues that his theory must be viewed as valid only with respect to the initial labelling of conduct as illegal; as a result, all labelling decisions predicated on the initial labelling decision are beyond the province of his theory. We also note that the basis of Black's(1979) restriction of the generality of his theory is inconsistent with his original statement of the theory (Black, 1976) in which he uses results from victimization surveys (of the same kind he now argues are irrelevant to the theory) to support his theory. In addition, Black's (1979) criteria for data sufficient to test his theory reduce the potential for testing his theory. Finally, we discuss some issues regarding conduct and its seriousness as they relate to Black's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recurrent theme in the literature on modernization is the importance of Westernization in non-Western societies-the purchase of Western commodities and the emulation of Western styles. This paper critically examines this theme in relation to a negative case, the lack of Westernization in nineteenth-century China. Three different theories of consumption that have been offered to explain the nonacceptance of Western products in China-an economic theory, a cultural theory and a sociological theory_are analyzed from comparative and historical perspectives. On the basis of this analysis, it is suggested that Westernization during the nineteenth century can often be viewed more accurately as an indicator of stratificational continuity with the premodern era than as an indicator of modernizing changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions, an essay by Talcott Parsons first published in the American Sociological Review. Parsons's Prolegomena is an object lesson for those who would read past theoretical work in terms of present-day conceptual categories. Written more than a half century ago, before it became standard sociological practice to differentiate the micro from the macro, a voluntaristic approach from a functionalist approach, a focus on action from an emphasis on social system and social structure, the paper escapes latter-day pigeonholes. Prolegomena shows that the early Parsons upheld a package of ideas that circumvents such polarities by combining what he terms a voluntaristic conception of human action in which the factors of will and effort are central, with a functionalist analysis that views economic, political, educational, and other social institutions as constituting a system that regulates action in relative conformity with the ultimate common values. The goal of the essay is to arrive at social institutions and certain aspects of social structure by beginning with human action, understood subjectively in terms of the means-end schema, and proceeding from there to action systems composed of long and complex [means-end] chains--chains analytically divisible into the conditional factors of heredity and environment, an intermediate sector made up of technological, economic, and political elements, and the sector of ultimate values.

The epistemology of symbolic interaction derives from the pragmatic model of Dewey and Mead, close associates. This paper argues that the methodology of pragmatism and symbolic interaction permits the perspectives of the researcher and the people in interactive situations to bias the research. influenced by Hegel, Dewey and Mead adopted an evolutionary, holistic view of reality; progress was inevitable and people were naturally rational. In addition, their notion of the logico-theoretic component in science deviated sharply from the more common hypothetico-deductive model, in both she pragmatic and symbolic interaction approaches, the theoretic component is ambiguous; to formulate theory prior to research is thought to be risky for it may bias the research. instead, theory emerges fro,n the research process; the participants in an interactive situation contribute to it. Thus the social givens of the researcher and the participants serve as a theoretical framework, giving the research a bias which reflects the social perspective of the researcher and the distribution of power in the interactive setting. That many researchers in this tradition are liberal humanitarians obscures the problem of bias inherent in this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-examines the social mechanisms that lead lower-class youth to make use of college as a mobility channel. It focuses on a select group of lower-class youth who, by their enrollment in a high-status university, already give unmistakable evidence of being engaged in the process of upward mobility. The findings reveal that upward mobility is linked to a distinctive pattern of maternal authority within the nuclear family and to dependence upon the outside social structure for support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine sources for high social status, using the physician as an example. Functional theories and the "argument from usefulness" are examined. They are rejected primarily for the unwarranted assumption of a well integrated social system. Findings of greater or lesser Junctional importance of the various occupations seem to lack objective justification. The hypothesis is advanced that high social status is attached to those functions that appear to combine the contradictory standards of social stratification and the charismatic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sections planned for the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society in December 1945 are Social Research, Social Theory, Social Psychology, Population Sociometry, Community and Ecology, Family Criminology, Political Sociology, Educational Sociology, and General Sessions. In addition to these formal sections, members may submit papers for possible inclusion under a special category, "Contributed Papers." The membership the Committee to be in charge and the final date for submitting proposed papers will be announced in a subsequent issue of the journal "American Sociological Review."

This article comments on Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience, a position paper written by Randall Collins. Randall Collins' (1989) recent position paper seeks to defend sociology proper from disparate attacks questioning its status as a science. Interestingly, Collins's citations supporting the premise of external attack on sociology are actually quite limited. His single extensive example involves more the quest of sociobiologists to legitimate themselves through a general critique of all social science rather than a focused assault on sociology itself. Singled out specifically by Collins are approaches that deviate from his version of sociological theory, rather than from the scientific project of sociology per se. In Collins's discussion, Michael Foucault's complex ideas are homogenized and described by a nominalist label that has no basis in his work. Collins characterizes Foucault as a discourse theorist who reduces society to a text and social action to the field of discourse. Collins simply has displaced by Foucault's emphasis on the field of power. Collins reduces the complex work of important theorists to misleading and nominalist labels that compartmentalize and trivialize serious thought. Discourse analysis cannot replace the investigation of, and theorizing about, social action and societal structures. If the above comments are instructive, however, then there is a place for textual analysis when confronted by the obfuscating metatheoretical discussions and the biblical exegesis of the classics that passes for much of sociological theory today.

This paper presents the author's reply to comments on his article Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational-Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization. The comment by Markovsky, Willer, Simpson and Lovaglia (MWSL) contains fundamental flaws in their discussion of the main properties of my theory and mathematical model and in their criticism of my method of comparing predictions from the model with the empirical results which I presented in my original paper. MWSL claim that internal contradictions exist between my theory and predictions from my measure of power. My model assumes that demands for exchange are expressed for each actor by his or her partners. This structural basis of power exists regardless of whether demands for exchange among the multiple exchange relations of each actor are substitutable, complementary or independent. The elasticity of substitution among each actor's multiple exchange relations is a key parameter. They also argue that the predictions of power from my model fail empirical tests based on their method. However, the method I employed is correct; their method is wrong and is inadequate for the purpose of testing my theory.

The study of adult development is in need of theoretical reformulation. It is suggested that the paradigm of scientific inquiry that underlies the dominant mode of studying adult development, the ontogenetic model, is not an appropriate foundation for its subject matter because it tends to treat the individual as a self-contained entity and fails to recognize the profoundly interactive nature of self-society relations and the complexity and variability of social environments. Major lines of developmental theory that employ the ontogenetic model are critiqued, and it is argued that sociological applications of developmental work that do not recognize the inherent limitations risk an "ontogenetic fallacy." Drawing on findings and insights from various strands of social research, some essential elements of a "sociogenic paradigm" are identified. The paper ends with a brief illustration of how a sociogenic perspective can lead to a reinterpretation of findings that have been interpreted developmentally by sociologists interested in change in adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The causes and effects of Third World urbanization have been addressed in theories of modernization, urban bias, and economic dependency, but no single cross-national study has tested the arguments advanced by all three theories. This paper uses panel regression analysis to assess the validity of the three perspectives in sixty-one underdeveloped countries between 1960 and 1980. The results provide some support for each theory and also contradict previous studies that do not consider several important variables. Thus, future studies must transcend current theoretical and ideological particularism to avoid incomplete or false representations of urbanization and underdevelopment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper hypothesizes that official labeling gives personal relevance to an individual's beliefs about how others respond to mental patients. According to this view, people develop conceptions of what others think of mental patients long before they become patients. These conceptions include the belief that others devalue and discriminate against mental patients. When people enter psychiatric treatment and are labeled, these beliefs become personally applicable and lead to self-devaluation and/or the fear of rejection by others. Such reactions may have negative effects on both psychological and social functioning. This hypothesis was tested by comparing samples of community residents and psychiatric patients from the Washington Heights section of New York city. Five groups were formed (1) first-treatment contact patients, (2) repeat-treatment contact patients, (3) formerly treated' community residents, (4) untreated community cases, and (5) community residents with no evidence of severe psychopathology. These groups were administered a scale that measured beliefs that mental patients would be devalued and discriminated against by most people. Scores on this scale were associated with demoralization, income loss, and unemployment in labeled groups but not in unlabeled groups. The results suggest that labeling may produce negative outcomes like those specified by the classic concept of secondary deviance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Almost all work on anomy to date has employed "sociological" explanations to the virtual exclusion of all others. This paper claims that the standard sociological theory of anomy has serious conceptual weaknesses and cannot satisfactorily account for many of the relevant facts. Data are resented from two extensive surveys, employing a large battery of personality and attitude scales. The results show that anomic responses are powerfully governed by cognitive and personality factors (e.g., hostility, anxiety, inflexible defensiveness, etc.), and that these relations hold either independently of, or in combination with, social influences. Indirect support is furnished for the view that anomy--defined as a sense of normlessness-- results from impediments to interaction, communication, and learning, and is a sign of impaired socialization. These impediments can be intellectual, attitudinal, social, or psychological in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to show that both functionalism and the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic present one-sided, but complementary and reconcilable, views of society. The basic postulates of functionalism and the dialectic reveal strengths and limitations which suggest a reformulation of both approaches in minimal form. Basically, the problem is to arrive at a theory of society that achieves an adequate balance between stability and the various sources of endogenous and exogenous change, between consensus and conflict, and between equilibrium and disequilibrium. After examining Dahrendorf's efforts in that direction, we conclude that convergence and overlap between the two theories show promise of a fruitful synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All sociologists are aware that questionnaire responses are a function of more than the particular value, attitudinal, or behavioral systems being investigated. It is a truism that the wording of an item may have a marked effect on the responses obtained. It is also very likely that alterations in the wording of questionnaire items produce considerably different responses among persons having differential educational or socio-economic backgrounds, or among respondents from various sized communities. These observations are discussed in practically every social research methods textbook. However, it is not always easy to predict bias in wording of questionnaire items. Data are presented in this paper which show considerably different response patterns for slight variations in two questionnaire items. Differential responses associated with rural-urban residence areas were also studied. The rural-urban differences are consistent with differences which are generally predicted from social theory. Rural areas are generally considered to be more conservative than urban areas.

This paper is concerned with a little explored area of social theory—the structural strains and supports between a contained community and the larger society of which it is a part and on which it is dependent. Presumably, the body of theory used for analyzing a community must be translated, qualified, or changed when that community exists within a larger society. Examples of such communities are fraternal orders, secret or extreme political parties, ethic islands whether rural or urban, organized political or economic interest groups, or a specific profession such as medicine. From a broad inquiry into such structural relations between the contained community and the larger one, it may later be possible to derive important hypotheses about the forces that maintain both of them. The community studied is the professional community, which is different in important respects from the other examples. Only two sets of links have been chosen for exploration—socialization and social control, and client choice or evaluation of the professional.

This paper is an attempt to examine the efficacy of the means-end schema, the conceptual core of a voluntaristic theory of action which, it is claimed, emerged from the positivistic tradition in the work of various researchers and from the idealistic tradition in the work of researcher Max Weber. Postulates which underlie the means-end schema may be enumerated briefly. Most of its apologists insist, as rigidly as any positivist, that social science use all of the observational and mensurational techniques available. They claim that they respect the necessity for the objectification of social data and that their results are derived in such a way as to be consistent with the most stringent methodological criteria. They resist attempts to indict them as opponents of whatever objective instruments have been developed for the advancement of sociological research, whether these instruments be observation, measurement, statistics, symbolic logic, or anything else. The conclusion seems inevitable that the means-end schema violates most of the canons and repudiates most of the criteria of objective scientific methodology.

The article focuses on the comment upon the new social philosophy which has emerged from the ruins of a noisily disintegrating and over-ripe sensate culture. The sheer magnitude of Social and Cultural Dynamics, together with the prodigious research Professor Sorokin displays in analyzing all the compartments of culture over a period of twenty-five centuries without overlooking any part of the contemporary civilization, demands that a critic proceed warily. It is unfortunate in one respect that these pontifical tomes cannot be considered in their entirety, for such a possibility would relieve the impression that a few weak points have been singled out for attack. The purview of this paper is stringently confined to an examination of the author's contribution to the methodology of sociology. After a cursory discussion and definition of "culture" Professor Sorokin classifies the interrelations of the elements and traits of culture into four basic types, spatial or mechanical adjacency, association due to an external factor, functional or causal integration, and internal or logic meaningful unity.

The article presents a comment by the author on an article "Rejection of the Mentally Ill: The Influence of Behavior and Sex" by sociologist Derek L. Phillips. According to Phillips in several studies respondents asked whether they considered various descriptions to be those of mentally ill persons were unable to recognize certain symptoms of seriously disturbed behavior. According to the research conducted by the author Phillips study did not find evidence to support the concept that there is a tendency on the part of the public to deny mental illness. The focus of this article is not to misquote Phillips paper but the persistence in social theory of a premise regarding the extent and nature of rejection of the mentally ill. The general tenor of social theory is that considerable social distance is maintained between those known to be mentally ill and others in the community. Contemporary social theory seems to be based rigidly on the assumption that behavioral deviance is punished by social rejection. Since mental illnesses are largely manifested by behavioral symptoms, virtually every social study of the mentally illnesses starts with the premise that the mentally ill are rejected.

Researcher Francesca Cancian's paper on "Functional Analysis of Change," published in the December 1960 issue of the periodical "American Sociological Review," proposes that "functional analysis" be identified with a certain logical structure or judgment of causal argument. The logical structure is that some "state G" can be maintained by either of two causal variables, and that when it is not maintained by one variable then it tends to be maintained by another. The article questions this logic of judgment as an exercise in social theory. To elaborate this argument, it compares substantive sociological results of this logical exercise with results of a work which gets rather short shrift in the paper, that of sociologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. Radcliffe-Brown's theory of "G states" is more powerful and based on real conditions under which lineage systems develop. The development of the discipline depends more on the development of such elegant, powerful, and economical theories, which explain a wide range of data, than on fitting these theories into various logical structures.

This paper presents the authors' opinion on the article Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational-Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization. Yamaguchi offers a new theory of power in social exchange networks, claiming empirical support superior to that of alternative theories. Internal contradictions are self-defeating to a theory and Yamaguchi's theory (Y's theory) has at least two. Yamaguchi fails to provide a model to specify the value of the coefficient of elasticity of substitution and this failure greatly broadens the range of potentially supportive results. In the computerized Iowa protocol, for instance, the partner offering the best deal is selected automatically which prevents any special commitments or costs of switching partners. However, several factors bias his presentation of the data and each factor reduces the apparent discrepancy between the prediction of Y's theory and the experimental data. Yamaguchi's model simply does not work when the data transformations are done correctly. In sum, contrary to Yamaguchi's claim predictions from his model are inconsistent with results from experimental studies of power in exchange networks.

In this paper I propose a generational model of continuity and change in social movements. Building on political generation and cohort replacement theories, I offer three propositions about generational processes in social movements: (1) The collective identity of an activist cohort remains consistent over time, contributing to movement continuity; (2) cohorts construct different collective identities based on the external contexts and internal conditions of the movement at the time they enter; (3) cohort replacement contributes to change in social movements. These three generational processes interact with organizational factors and political opportunity structures to shape movement continuity and change. I illustrate these propositions by drawing on an in-depth case study of the women's movement from 1969 to 1992 in Columbus, Ohio, and I suggest key questions about generational processes in other cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Designs for the analysis of mobility effects are flawed by the manner in which the effects of origins and destinations are parametrized. Consequently, suggestions that mobility experiences do not affect attitudes and behaviors are inconclusive. A new class of models (diagonal mobility models) for the analysis of mobility effects which are demonstrably grounded in sociological theory is proposed, and estimation of these models is discussed. To illustrate the use of these models, a reanalysis of the relationship between fertility and intergenerational mobility is presented, using data from the 1962 Occupational Changes in a Generation (OCG-1) survey. The effects of origin and destination on fertility do not depend upon particular origin or destination classes; the effect of destination on fertility appears to be stronger than the effect of origin; and there is only weak evidence of mobility effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the author's reply to the comments made by Carrell W. Abbott, Charles R. Brown and Paul V. Crosbie on his article "Exchange As Symbolic Interaction." The notion of exchange in social life existed long before it was claimed for "exchange theory." It is fundamental for understanding many aspects of social organization. De facto exchange theory was first "claimed" by behaviorists and then modified through the introduction of institutionalization, power and cognitive processes. Throughout this development, the subjective and symbolic processes which mediate exchanges have been hinted at and partly discussed but never systematically stated in general concepts and assumptions. Assuming that such processes are real and ought to be examined by social scientists, I have made a modest attempt in this direction. However, I am really not very interested in paradigms beyond their utility in. making sense out of the world. They have no right of their own but are bound to the interests of scholars.

Surveys since World War II have invariably found that, contrary to the expectations of traditional social theory, the lower classes are least, rather than most, likely to be involved in religion. The proposed explanation of these findings is that the lower classes find radical politics a more attractive outlet than religion for their status dissatisfactions, and that this propensity accounts for their greater religious apathy. This interpretation is supported by findings based on a survey of British adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parsons' classificatory system defining the social act is analyzed for tautologies and restrictions in the relationships among its elements. This generates a set of all possible viable social acts. It is also Productive to view this system as a statement of Process in the act. From this stand point, prediction of human behavior becomes possible based on the Probabilities of the occurrence of each type of act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even a casual reader of current research literature gets the impression that the word "model" is one of the latest in scientific language. Linked with the equally fashionable concept of system, model has become a powerful and prestigious tool. This article proposes the prosaic task of underwriting, if possible, the rather elementary generalizations which are as follows. One tends to think in terms of systems, system is itself a model, the primordial model in fact, the history of science indicates a succession of models by which systems have been explored and explained, the dominant model of system analysis today is the organic image, and any model-patterned analysis, organic or otherwise, involves valuable possibilities as well as serious but often overlooked limitations. The formulation of a model consists in conceptually marking off a perceptual complex. It involves, moreover, replacing part or parts of a perceptual complex by some representation, or symbol. Every model is a pattern of symbols, rules, and processes regarded as matching, in part or in totality, an existing perceptual complex.

The field of social anthropology or comparative sociology, as rests upon sociological conceptualizations and anthropological data. The problem is more than interdisciplinary: the sociologist's penchant for broad general theory is contrasted to the ethnologist's concern with detailed cultural data. The immediate need is for more modest theory on one hand, and more conceptualized comparative ethnography on the other. The purpose of the present article is to discuss this intermediate area with respect to one very crucial element, namely the analysis of values. This article attempts to show the two ways in which social anthropology should contribute to the development of general sociological theory. These are the establishment of (1) general social imperatives, and (2) requisite functional relationships between certain cultural forms in different departments of social life. To fulfill this broad purpose, empirically based examples are offered. This article introduces substantive theoretical analysis through the comparative examination of cultural systems.

This article has both a methodological and a substantive aim. The first of these is to illustrate an application of William Stephenson's Q-methodology to a type of problem commonly encountered in sociological theory. The second purpose is to examine some of the major American writings on stratification in U.S. published since World War I. These two purposes, while interrelated, are also independent. That is, if the theory selected for testing is trivial, uninteresting or confused, the outcome will be of little utility. Furthermore, even though the theory be an interesting and useful one, if it is not sensibly applied, the findings would also be unclear. Regardless, then, of the particular substantive outcome of this analysis,it is believed that the Q-methodology is a potentially powerful tool for sociological research. Aside from its methodological implications, the problem of this article is to analyze the different ways in which social scientists have perceived American stratification during the time following World War I.

For the purpose of the sociological theory it seems best not to attempt a critical survey of relatively recent contributions to sociological theory. This decision is further justified by the fact that there have been relatively few publication of first rate theoretical significance in recent years. This is of course, largely a consequence of the war and of the fact that so many people in the field have been preoccupied with work outside their normal professional interests. Rather than attempting such a critical survey, it seems more fruitful to present the outline of a positive orientation to the problem of sociological theory and a broad program for its development over the next few years. This is a wholly tentative attempt but can, it is hoped, serve as a focus for discussion and clarification of the fundamental methodological and theoretical problems involved. It seems possible to lay down a few fundamental propositions which can serve as general guiding lines for the more technical task of building a systematic treatment of sociological theory. Systematic theory itself is of fundamental importance to any science. There is, of course, no intention to deny that work which can be quite legitimately called scientific can develop without systematic theory. Morphologies, classifications and empirical generalizations of various sorts have played very important parts in the development of a variety of sciences.

The article presents a reply of the author to the critique of his article on social change, by researcher Arthur L. Stinchcombe, published in the December 1961 issue of the periodical "American Sociological Review." The author agrees with Stinchcombe that the development of sociological research depends on the development of elegant, powerful, and economical theories, which explain a wide range of data. Many types of work are essential to constructing a valid theory; specification of fruitful theoretical assumptions, logical relations among them, and the manner of making deductions from them; identification of classes of empirical data which fit respective theoretical concepts; collection and analysis of data; and development of research techniques. However, the author argues that much confusion over the functional analysis of social change can be overruled by examining logical implications of a precise, formal definition of functional analysis. Logical relations involved in any theory must be carefully examined, specially in a theory that deals with complex relationships concerned with functionalism.

The attempt on the part of Nancy K. Jack and Betty Schiffer in their paper "The Limits of Fashion Control," appearing in the December 1948 issue of the "American Sociological Review, "to integrate their empirical research into the larger framework of social theory is commendable. The procedure is suggestive of the comments by Robert Merton concerning the relationship between research and theory appearing in the October 1948 "American Sociological Review." The consequence of a great deal of research has been negated by a failure to set the research into a significant framework of general theory. The application demonstrated by the authors of "The Limits of Fashion Control" is all to the good. However, there is another facet to the problem which restricts the significance of research besides relating specific research to larger and more general frames of reference. This area is concerned with the matter of focus of the research and its level of significance. It is seen how important is it in the area of social control that the "woman-on-the-street" did not follow the exact dictates of the fashion creators, that there are limits to the extent of dress length in this conformity pattern.

The article presents the authors comment on sociologist Wilbert E. Moore's revisitation of the functional theory of social differentiation. According to the author some of Moore's statements perpetuate the competitive fallacy of the original Davis-Moore theory. This theory is supposed to apply to certain features found in most, if not all societies, but in doing so it appeals to concepts appropriate to the atypical case: the competitive-achievement syndrome of contemporary industrialized societies. Moore points out, this theory rests essentially on two propositions: the unequal functional importance of positions" in any society, and the unequal supply of talents for filling in any society. Moore leans heavily on the proposition that social differentiation which is a universal and necessary fact of social existence. But he also notes that this proposition entails no inference whatsoever concerning social classes, strain, conflict, and change. Moore is subscribing to the popular theory of the myth of social classes.

This article presents views of the author on an article on social theory by sociologist Theodore Abel, that appeared in the April 1952 issue of the periodical "American Sociological Review." According to the author, Abel is well aware that his view of theory is uncommon and unpopular within a discipline now marked by a preponderant interest in specific empirical investigations where conceptualization is admitted only in the full-dress uniform of the "heuristic device" or the timid hypothesis bordering on a tautological statement about trivia. Respect is due the courage with which he undertakes a defense of theory in the "grand style." Abel's practical point of departure seems to lie in the observation that while current research interests are dictated largely by basic ideas inherited from several sociologists, insufficient attention is paid to the kind of theoretical activity in which such men were engaged and to the need for a continuation of that activity. While the debt to them is acknowledged, researchers fail to recognize their responsibilities in carrying on the kind of work they did.

This article presents the author's views on Social Theory. The author believe that sociological theory should henceforth be stricken from the list of subject topics of annual meetings. It doubtless served a purpose of sorts in the salad days of sociology when lip-service to the canons of science would legitimize many a soaring flight of philosophical speculation. But to continue to list theory as it is done today, simply as one more field of sociological interest and endeavor, ignores one of the crucial developments in sociology during the last generation. This is the accelerating tendency of theory to permeate all research that is worthy of the name. A growing recognition of the inevitable linkage between "fact" and "theory" has made sociologists realize that even the simplest descriptive statement has its quota of theory. Every sociologist worthy of the designation of scientist, no matter what may be the subject of his research, will shape his work in terms of the best and most relevant theory known to him and will then try to improve upon it.

The article focuses on the sociological theories. The basic claim of the economists is that certain sociological arguments cannot be used to explain the world of financial markets. Economists refers to the taking of a specific sociological theory to a market context.

A new status value theory of power is proposed that bridges two previously distinct research literatures. The theory asserts that exchangeable objects controlled by high-status actors are perceived to be more valuable when relevant to positive status characteristics. This phenomenon is predicted to confer power to high-status actors who exchange with low-status actors. The theoretical argument represents an important link between exchange theories of power and the research on status hierarchies--two areas that until now have been sharply demarcated. The theory is tested with a series of experiments in which status-differentiated subjects negotiate exchanges using a computerized bargaining system. The results indicate: (1) Positive status characteristics accentuate the perceived value of resources; (2) high-status subjects are most often chosen as the preferred exchange partner; and (3) high-status subjects obtain the greatest share of resources indicating power use. The implications for sociological theories of power and status are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite much speculation in classical sociological theory, urbanization and industrialization are not systematically related to individual mental health. The "interpersonal environment" mediates between larger system properties and individual realities. Two kinds of interpersonal environments are noted in classical theory: a gemeinschaft environment of high social density, and an overlapping specialized social circle environment. Using stress reactions (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) of Vietnam veterans to combat as an example, it was found that social density predicts lower levels of stress reaction only in smaller cities and rural areas, whereas interaction with a circle of Vietnam veterans is associated with reduced distress in cosmopolitan metropolitan areas and with increased stress reactions in medium sized cities and rural areas. Because combat is exogenous to the men's current urban setting, the findings are less likely to be confounded by "drift" and self-selection. Implications for classical urban theory are developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sociological theory of social control predicts and explains how people define and respond to deviant behavior. One kind of social control is known as self-help: the expression of a grievance by unilateral aggression such as personal violence or property destruction. It is commonly believed that self-help was largely displaced by law in the Western world during the Middle Ages, and that it has survived primarily in the traditional-especially stateless-societies studied by anthropologists. In fact, much of the conduct classified as crime in modern societies such as the United States is similar to these traditional modes of social control and may properly be understood as self-help. Several implications follow, including the possibility of predicting and explaining a significant amount of crime with a sociological theory of self-help, itself a branch of the theory of social control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies cross-level network analysis to modify the Two-Step Model of communication flow, focusing on marginally positioned individuals and pointing out the "bridging function" of marginals in the flow of information between groups. The hypotheses examined derive from the concepts of the Balance Theory, applied to network analysis, suggesting that the "Strength of Weak Ties" and the related tendency toward intransivity are the structural advantages of marginals in the process of communication flow. By and large, the findings support the claimed importance of marginals, suggesting the ability of network analysis to provide a micro-macro bridge in current sociological theory and research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents authors' response to comments made by sociologist George Ritzer's on paradigm analysis in sociology. Ritzer, according to the authors, doesn't try to indicate directly that they are wrong. The authors state that Ritzer criticizes them for supposedly claiming that political socialization, status attainment, and ethnic relations are examples of "at least potential exemplars (paradigms) in sociology," but he himself considers job satisfaction, alienation and role conflict as paradigms. The authors say that Ritzer does not understand their position when he relates to the difference of their positions in the study of sociology. The authors declare Ritzer as one who cites sociologist Thomas S. Kuhn as a source without taking seriously the implications of his position. They say that Ritzer's argument that exemplars are not useful when one is interested in metasociology is not true. They maintain that if Kuhn's argument is accepted, it must be based on the exemplar idea to be coherent.

The article focuses on the measurement and conceptualization of problems faced by sociologists. These problems or tasks require a concerted effort of scholars with diverse substantive, theoretical, and methodological interests and persuasions. The author also discusses the productive interplay between theory and research in the field of sociology. Through an examination of the implications of random and nonrandom measurement errors for data analysis and theory testing, and through frustrating efforts to make sense of the theoretical and empirical literature in sociology the author feels that conceptualization and measurement problems are much complex that he had previously thought. The author discusses the problems that illustrate the complexity of the type of analysis needed in the face of missing information. These problems are: The plethora of theoretical definitions of generic behaviors and their implications for measurement, and the confounding of measured and unmeasured variables when individuals are aggregated in macrolevel analyses. The author concludes that sociologists need to work together solve these problems.

contemporary discussions of Parsons `s thought have faltered because they are insufficiently generalized. Only after his theoretical and epistemological logic has been explored, for example, can his more specific, ideological purpose be correctly understood. Parsons's theoretical ambition has been to resolve long-standing antinomies in social thought. His theory, to the degree it succeeds, formulates two central points: the social basis of individual autonomy and the multidimensional basis of social order. These positions present the heart of Parsons's formal theory. In his analysis of historical development as differentiation cultural, structural, and psychological-Parsons combines this formal logic with an ideological commitment to the expansion of individual freedom and conscious control. Incorporating elements of liberal, idealist, and materialist arguments, he outlines a theory of substantive voluntarism that is, potentially, neither conservative nor static considered as a whole, Parsons's theory contains serious contradictory strains. Nevertheless, his analysis of formal and substantive freedom represents a major contribution to social thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

World-system and dependency theories suggest that the specialization of some countries in the export of raw materials and lightly processed goods is an important cause of their underdevelopment. The rare empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is inconclusive because the variables and the designs used are defective. A diachronic multiple regression test using a, new version of the theoretical independent variable also fails to provide support for the hypothesis. The test suggests that internal processes play a role that should not be ignored in the economic growth of nation-states. , [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents response of the article to the comments of C.S. Fischer, Dennis J. Moberg and Allan Mazur, on his biosocial theory of aggression. The author says that his intent was not to state dogma, but to move sociologists away from dogmatic social environmentalism and to suggest a conceptual framework wherein human behavior could be reinterpreted in terms of a complex interplay between biogenic, ecological and sociogenic factors. The author says that he is delighted that his piece is provoking controversy and even sincere distress, and he fully expects to be shown wrong on a number of points. The author says that he generally prefers to opt for fertile error rather than for sterile exactitude. Fischer raises several important issues, a full reply to each one of which would require a piece of article length. The behavior of a species determines whether territory is important for that species, not the mere abstract existence of physical space. The general conclusion is that one must always be prepared to entertain the hypothesis that behavior, though species-specific, is the product of the interaction of genetics and environment, so much so that to conceive of nature and nurture as alternative explanations is no longer tenable.

This article comments on the concept of moral freedom by understanding the theories proposed by Emile Durkheim. It is opined that Whitney Pope appears to be taking an ultra "strict constructionist" stance concerning Durkheim's work. He will have nothing of reinterpretations which put Durkheim's ideas in a frame of reference different from Durkheim's. Pope's position overlooks the unquestionable theoretical tensions present in Durkheim's work. Pope asserts that Durkheim was never a positivist, implying that this proposition holds in every sense of the concept of positivism. It is opined that from the beginning, Durkheirn had a strong concern for the role of morality in human societies. From the beginning, Durkheim also entertained the idea of the internalization of cultural components. In the course of his career, Durkheim improved on this idea. It is further informed that Pope links the concept of the voluntaristic characteristics of action with a religious or metaphysical entity called free will. The belief in free will may have been a feature of theology and philosophy in the history of Western thought, but it is not the only position which is tenable.

Human aggression is explained in terms of resource competition. Resource competition results from both the pressure exerted by population on material resources and from socially created demands for material and psychic resource & Resource competition produces aggression which is in turn mediated through territoriality and hierarchy. The latter two have the paradoxical effect of both regulating and provoking aggression. Drawing comparative evidence from primates, I suggest that Homo sapiens rates high on territoriality, hierarchy and aggression, and that these forms of behavior are biologically predisposed. With the food growing revolution, the cultural elaborations on these biological predispositions became increasingly important; but an understanding of human behavior must necessarily be both biological and socio-cultural. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]