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This paper presents a new cosmological argument based on considerations about grounding. I argue that, by assuming three plausible principles about grounding, we can construct a cosmological argument for the existence of a unique ungrounded being that ultimately grounds everything else. At the end of the paper I consider two possible objections, and offer my replies to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Berkeley's 'master argument' for idealism has been the subject of extensive criticism. Two of his strongest critics, A.N. Prior and J.L. Mackie, argue that due to various logical confusions on the part of Berkeley, the master argument fails to establish his idealist conclusion. Prior (1976) argues that Berkeley's argument 'proves too little' in its conclusion, while Mackie (1964) contends that Berkeley confuses two different kinds of self-refutation in his argument. This paper proposes a defence of the master argument based on intuitionistic argument. It begins by giving a brief exposition of the master argument and Prior's and Mackie's criticism. The following section explains why we might read the master argument along intuitionistic lines. The final section demonstrates that, according to intuitionistic logic, Berkeley's argument withstands the criticisms of Prior and Mackie. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cosmological arguments for the existence of God face a gap problem. This is the problem of convincingly arguing that their intermediate conclusions that some first cause or necessary being exists provide evidence for their main conclusion that God exists. This paper develops a simple and innovative approach to solving this problem, applicable to many cosmological arguments. According to the proposal, the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. Since a perfect being would be God, the intermediate conclusions of the relevant cosmological arguments provide abductive evidence for their main conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Variations on the argument “Inferences are moves from meaningful statements to meaningful statements; hence the meanings cannot be inferential roles” are often used as knock-down argument against inferentialism. In this short paper I indicate that the argument is simply a non sequitur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ambiguity theory of 'knows' is the view that 'knows' and its cognates have more than one propositional sense – i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in 'knows that' etc. constructions. Given that most of us are 'intuitive invariantists' – i.e. most of us initially have the intuition that 'knows' is univocal – defenders of the ambiguity theory need to offer an explanation for the semantic blindness present if 'knows' is in fact ambiguous. This paper is an attempt to offer such an explanation. Section 1 contains a general argument for the ubiquity of semantic blindness for ambiguous; the upshot being that semantic blindness for the ambiguity of 'knows' is thus unsurprising as a result. And Section 2 offers more specific arguments for why 'knows' is the type of ambiguous word we're very unlikely to quickly recognize is ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of semiotic arguments against the commodification of certain goods face the following challenge: formulate your argument such that it does not appeal to immoral consequences, nor is really an argument showing that we ought to reform the meaning we give to commodification. I here attempt to meet this challenge via appeal to the notion of what I call proto-on-a-par value. Under this construal, the semiotic argument yields that the commodification of certain goods necessarily signals value choice, where value choice ought not to be signaled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss (Analysis 2017) seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer (the 'worse-off requirement'). He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of being unable to explain nearby cases; and even worse, that account fails to distinguish cases of telling lies from cases of telling the truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the collection of manuscripts, called Truth and Truthbearers, on the aspect of a proposition. It provides a general information on aims and objectives, specific arguments, and methodology. The collection deals with propositions that have fixed and unchanging values that can change over time.

An essay is presented on the strengthened consequence argument for incompatibilism. It aims to show the truth of determinism from the remote past and the laws of nature with argument that relies on two inference rules. It explores the relationship between unavoidability and logical necessity represented by material implication.

In this article, the author argues that the consequence argument does not support any thesis that could reasonably be called incompatibilism. It highlights the most important argument for incompatibilism. It explains the difference between Strict Incompatibilism (SI) and Restricted Incompatibilism Schema (RIS). Steps that the author follows in formalizing the consequence argument are mentioned.

The article discusses the difficulty of the theoretical questions about conditionalization in the Bayesian argument. It examines the probability theory of standard Bayesian argument with adequate conclusion. It also cites the indefinite probabilities of direct inference in Bayesian argument that involve relational properties.