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Previous research on social mobility in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has confined itself exclusively to the linkages between male occupational origins and destinations. In this paper, three unique aspects of the Irish occupational mobility experience is investigated. First, the question of women's intergenerational occupational mobility is considered for the first time. Second, as in some recent North American research, traditional models of male intergenerational occupational mobility are modified to allow only the occupational achievement of mothers in the portrayal of a woman's occupational origins. Third, the occupational category of housewife is included as one possible occupational outcome for Irish women. The general conclusion of this paper is that not only does a mother's occupational attainments more realistically display the influence of occupational origins on women's subsequent occupational activities, but one vital component of this influence must be the occupational category of housewife. Only via the introduction of both these elements may the notably ascriptive nature of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in relation to female occupational mobility become understandable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper data from a nationally representative British longitudinal study are used to analyse exchanges of support between Third Age parents (aged 55–75) and their adult children. Results show that between two thirds and three quarters of parents in this age group were involved in some sort of exchange relationship with at least one of their children. Generally, more Third Age parents were providers than recipients of help, but there was a strong reciprocal element to intergenerational exchange with, for example, married parents who provided support to at least one child being twice as likely as those who did not to receive support from a child, after allowance for a range of relevant parental and child characteristics. Parental characteristics associated with higher probability of providing help included higher income, home ownership and being married or widowed rather than divorced. Higher income and home ownership were, however, negatively associated with odds of receiving help from a child, again after adjustment for other co-variates, suggesting socio-economic differences in the balance of support exchanges. Children seem responsive to parental needs in that receipt of help from a child was positively associated with older parental age and with parental disability. The paper shows that in Britain, as in the USA, the balance of intergenerational exchanges involving Third Age adults is downward rather than upward, in contravention of depictions of older adults as‘burdens’ on younger generations. Current demographic and social changes are, it is argued, likely to increase support demands from adult children to Third Age parents in coming decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using in-depth interview data on nominal marriages - legal marriages between a gay man and a lesbian to give the appearance of heterosexuality - this paper develops the concept of performative family to explain the processes through which parents and their adult children negotiate and resolve disagreements in relation to marriage decisions in post-socialist China. We identify three mechanisms - network pressure, a revised discourse of filial piety and resource leverage - through which parents influence their gay offspring's decision to turn to nominal marriage. We also delineate six strategies, namely minimizing network participation, changing expectations, making partial concessions, drawing the line, delaying decisions and ending the marriage, by which gay people in nominal marriages attempt to meet parental expectations while simultaneously retaining a degree of autonomy. Through these interactions, we argue that Chinese parents and their gay adult children implicitly and explicitly collaborate to perform family, emphasizing the importance of formally meeting society's expectations about marriage rather than substantively yielding to its demands. We also argue that the performative family is a pragmatic response to the tension between the persistent centrality of family and marriage and the rising tide of individualism in post-socialist China. We believe that our findings highlight the specific predicament of homosexual people. They also shed light on the more general dynamics of intergenerational negotiation because there is evidence that the mechanisms used by parents to exert influence may well be similar between gay and non-gay people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the debate on value change by advancing a new explanation of the relationship between political parties and generational-based values in advanced industrialized nations. Through multivariate analysis of World Values and other survey data from 29 countries, we show that the relationship between generations and values tends to vary between polities dominated by major parties and those in which many parties achieve electoral success. Green parties enhance the uptake of postmaterialist values and speed the decline of materialist ones, particularly among younger generations, by promoting a political discourse and agenda that contributes to the formative experiences underpinning value change. This research suggests that institutional structures and political parties need to be given far greater prominence in theories of postmaterial value change.

Sociologists theorizing the concept of 'generation' have traditionally looked to birth cohorts sharing major social upheavals such as war or decolonization to explain issues of generational solidarity and identity affiliation. More recently, theorists have drawn attention to the cultural elements where generations are thought to be formed through affinities with music or other types of popular culture during the 'coming of age' stage of life. In this paper, we ask whether developments in computer technology, which have both productive and cultural components, provide a basis for generational formation and identity and whether generational discourse is invoked to create cultures of difference in the workplace. Qualitative data from a sample of Information Technology workers show that these professionals mobilize 'generational' discourse and draw upon notions of 'generational affinity' with computing technology (e.g. the fact that people of different ages were immersed to varying degrees in different computing technologies) in explaining the youthful profile of IT workers and employees' differing levels of technological expertise.

A debate over whether the 'service class' is a unitary middle class or is divided between professionals and managers remains unsettled. This qualitative mobility study seeks to elucidate mobility processes of how professional and managerial groups secure their advantages throughout their working lives and over generations. Using data on contemporary Hong Kong, this paper compares the career strategies and intergenerational mobility strategies of forty teachers and thirty managers. Despite employing somewhat different career strategies, managers do not seem less able than teachers to secure their advantages through their work lives. Using the same intergenerational mobility strategies, teachers and managers exploit economic, cultural, and social resources in a similar way for their children's education. So far as demographic stability over generations is concerned a unified service class is in the making.

The paper explores the mutuality of values, claims and social relations in the process of social change. Values are not separable from social relations but are embedded in the shaping and reshaping of social difference and interdependence. The paper focuses on developments around the turn of the twentieth century, and analyses changes in the relative social positioning of children and adults, and women and men, shifting patterns of interdependence, and linked values and ideas about difference. The reconfiguring of generational and gender relations was integral to the first fertility decline, to transformation in family life and societal divisions of labour, and to the embedding of particular values and claims regarding gendered difference, identities and gender appropriate roles. Analysis of these developments reveals the mutuality of 'cultural' and 'material' processes and holds lessons for interpreting social change today.

The ageing population structure, and claims on resources by non-working groups, are seen by many to be contributing to a growing welfare crisis. In their arguments, relations between age groups and generations will become increasingly fraught, and welfare arrangements will be undermined, as 'unacceptable' levels of taxation blight the experience of a contracting workforce, required to resource a growing welfare population. However, more seems to be known about researchers' views on distributive justice than is known about the perceptions of their subject populations. It has not been demonstrated that members of age groups share interests which are consonant with their cohort experience, or perceive their interests to be in conflict with those members of other age groups or generations. This paper analyses empirical evidence on people's perceptions of who should get, and do, what, in developing an argument that standard processes do not place age groups or generations in antagonistic relationship. Understanding the relations between age groups and generations is essential to explaining change in patterns of inequality, but the interdependence of these relations suggest that they are part of a coherent social structure, and not likely to give rise to crisis in the ways predicted.

Debates regarding the status of age in social analysis are foundational to the sociology of aging, with scholars continually questioning the role of age as a social force. The contemporary politicization of age in British politics sheds useful light on this debate. During the past decade, age has emerged as a potent predictor of political preference in the United Kingdom, encompassing numerous intertwined political economic developments. At face value, the emergence of age as a key political variable substantiates the status of age in social analysis. However, I argue that it is articulations of age‐stratified politics, as much as the associations themselves, that should be of principle concern for the sociology of aging, because such articulations are reformulating age, aging and intergenerational relations. The sociology of aging should, therefore, engage with the contemporary politicization of age as a new answer to foundational debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although urbanized western society is generally assumed to be increasingly secular, empirical studies of reasons for this increasing secularity are rare, doubtless to some extent because of their methodological complexity. This paper presents findings on generation differences in religious beliefs from a national cohort study of two generations. It compares possible cohort and age effects from a wide range of social and psychological data, and contrasts the effects of apparently important factors associated with generation differences in religious beliefs, amongst them especially higher education, with generation differences in voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article a new theoretical framework is applied to a research field that is somewhat fragmented, namely that of intergenerational solidarity in ageing welfare states. Inspired by utilitarian considerations many scholars tend to problematize the lack of reciprocity characterizing intergenerational exchanges. As some generations are longer old and more numerous they may receive excessive state-administered support of the younger generations, especially in a democratic setting. However, in reality there is limited empirical evidence of intergenerational conflict and theoretical explanations of this paradox are rare. An integrated and dynamical approach that incorporates Durkheim's solidarity theory, Honneth's intersubjective recognition theory, and the current work on reciprocal exchange is necessary in order to understand the survival of intergenerational solidarity in ageing welfare states. According to this model reciprocal recognition leading to the empathization of exchanges is the driving force of intergenerational solidarity in a prefigurative and democratized culture where the status of the young has risen dramatically. Hence, we come to the paradoxical conclusion that attempts to preserve intergenerational solidarity by openly denouncing excessive transfers and trying to bypass them institutionally sometimes might be counterproductive because they may erode their empathic underpinnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Britain in recent years social mobility has become a topic of central political concern, primarily as a result of the effort made by New Labour to make equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition a focus of policy. Questions of the level, pattern and trend of mobility thus bear directly on the relevance of New Labour's policy analysis, and in turn are likely be crucial to the evaluation of its performance in government. However, politically motivated discussion of social mobility often reveals an inadequate grasp of both empirical and analytical issues. We provide new evidence relevant to the assessment of social mobility – in particular, intergenerational class mobility – in contemporary Britain through cross-cohort analyses based on the NCDS and BCS datasets which we can relate to earlier cross-sectional analyses based on the GHS. We find that, contrary to what seems now widely supposed, there is no evidence that absolute mobility rates are falling; but, for men, the balance of upward and downward movement is becoming less favourable. This is overwhelmingly the result of class structural change. Relative mobility rates, for both men and women, remain essentially constant, although there are possible indications of a declining propensity for long-range mobility. We conclude that under present day structural conditions there can be no return to the generally rising rates of upward mobility that characterized the middle decades of the twentieth century – unless this is achieved through changing relative rates in the direction of greater equality or, that is, of greater fluidity. But this would then produce rising rates of downward mobility to exactly the same extent – an outcome apparently unappreciated by, and unlikely to be congenial to, politicians preoccupied with winning the electoral ‘middle ground’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines intergenerational class mobility in Japan using cross-national comparisons with Western nations and cross-temporal comparisons of five national surveys conducted in postwar Japan. Cross-national comparisons highlight the similarity in relative mobility pattern between Japan and Western nations and at the same time the Japanese distinctiveness in absolute mobility rates especially regarding the demographic character of the Japanese manual working class. The results of cross-temporal comparisons of mobility pattern report some systematic trends in total mobility, inflow and outflow rates, reflecting the Japanese experience of late but rapid industrialization. The pattern of association between class origin and class destination, however, was stable in postwar Japan. It is therefore the combination of distinctive absolute mobility rates and similar relative mobility rates that characterizes the Japanese mobility pattern in comparison with the Western experience. Furthermore, Japan's distinctive pattern of postwar social mobility is characterized by a combination of rapidly changing absolute mobility rates and comparatively stable relative mobility rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The apparent tendency for the time period referred to by the term "generation" to shrink, and the corresponding tendency for the duration of an "age" to contract have been explained as the cultural consequences of the increased pace of technological change and the repeated cataclysmic social upheavals to which the century has been witness — upheavals which create sudden discontinuities between the age groups upon which they have had a sharp impact and the age groups to which they are only "history." But even putting aside the circular logic that usually lies behind this kind of formulation, there is really very little evidence to suggest that recent generations are coming to maturity in quicker succession than in previous centuries. Far from generations coming to maturity more rapidly today than in previous centuries, what little evidence there is seems to suggest the opposite. The age at which one enters adolescence appears in general to be getting lower, whereas the age at which one becomes a mature adult appears in general to be getting higher; the period of adolescence is thus expanded.