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Robert Fine was among the most original social theorists in Britain of the past 30 years, and the aim of this paper is to offer a first systematic assessment of his intellectual contribution. There are sound intellectual reasons to explore Fine's scholarship. He maintained a problematic relation with mainstream sociology and, against the reduction of sociology to questions of method, culture, or class, he argued that sociologists must continue to ask difficult normative questions as part of the social world they ought to explain. And there are also pressing political concerns that justify a reconsideration of his writings. Global politics is currently marked by a populist wave that decries the very ideas and values that were central to Fine's social theory: the need to uphold the rule of law at home and abroad, the politics of cosmopolitan solidarity, and the significance of antisemitism and its relationships with different forms of authoritarian politics. My main argument is that there is a dialectics of universality that drives forward Fine's intellectual project. By this, I mean that a universalistic idea of humanity—an all‐inclusive conception of all human beings—is the most important normative intuition of modern times. This idea of humanity moves forward in history through a dual process of emancipation and domination: successful forms of social, legal, and political inclusion help make visible previous dynamics of exclusion but may also create or recreate discriminatory practices. Building on the work of French historian Michael Löwy on heterodox Jewish thinkers, I explain the three main tenets of Fine's work: (a) his reconstruction of critical social theory; (b) the notion of cosmopolitan solidarity; and (c) the significance and main features of modern antisemitism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to Nick Gane's "Against a descriptive turn". I argue that descriptive research strategies are more open and inclusive than those which purport to be causal where explanatory adequacy is assessed by expert insiders. I also show how open descriptive strategies can assist a wider explanatory purpose when these are conceived in non‐positivist ways. I argue that epochalist sociology lacks an adequate temporal ontology because it collapses descriptive specificity back into overarching epoch descriptions. Finally, I argue that if the entire range of publications associated with the Great British Class Survey are considered, that it has demonstrated a productive way of recognising the significance of class which has facilitated major research advances in its wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I want to address two question marks which arose during my reading of Michael Burawoy's inspiring piece. First, sharing his spirit of recreating the sociological enlightenment by differentiating between different types of public sociologies, I do not share his optimism that sociology can easily become an integral part of public discourse and practice. Second, I don’t think that mainstream sociology is really prepared for this adventure. My argument points in the opposite direction: all the different forms of public and non-public sociology are in danger of becoming museum pieces. Thus, sociology not only needs a public voice, it also needs to be reinvented first – in order to have a public voice at all! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." Burawoy makes a compelling case that these four types of sociology can learn much from one another and that scholars who are simultaneously public, policy or critical sociologists as they are professional sociologists make special contributions to that end. Michael Burawoy's way of thinking about the disciplines is far from completely categorical, yet tends to the categorical at the level of "standpoints": economics studies the world from the standpoint of the market, political science from the standpoint of the state, sociology from the standpoint of civil society.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." The author has some criticism with Burawoy's call for public sociology but only over conceptual categories and matters of tactics. He is in accord with the broad purposes. Burawoy's call for more public sociology is important and timely. Some differences in approach are urged but like all sociologists seeking at once the ever-greater intellectual vitality for the field and a richer public life informed by sociology, the author is in his debt.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." Focus is made on two aspects of Burawoy's arguments which would be inaccurate if they were directed to the international community of sociologists: the division of social labor or functional differentiation among the four sociologies; and the nature of the friction among them. Thus, while Michael Burawoy's challenge to sociologists to think constructively and critically about sociology is timely and welcome, his ideas should be discussed in the context of the geographical breadth of the discipline.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." While the author agrees with much of Burawoy's analysis, he addresses two concerns. First, he takes issue with Burawoy's claim that there are four sociologies, each associated with a distinct type of knowledge: professional, critical, policy and public. It is argued that these four types of knowledge are not discrete in the way he contends, and that all four are embedded in any sociological analysis. Second, Burawoy's article and wider research program concern the institutionalization of sociology and its communicative relations with other institutions. It is argued that his research should address the discrepant criteria of relevance and communication logics of different institutions and their implications for the sociological voice. Sociology does not translate easily into the discourses and practices of other institutions, for example the mass media, government inquiries, or the requirements of evidence in law. Sociological communication in these other public arenas may sometimes be impossible. When it is possible, there is often loss of sociological autonomy and influence as the analysis translates into the criteria of relevance and communication logic of the institution concerned.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." Michael Burawoy has presented 11 theses on public sociology. Some of his main claims can be summarized in three statements: public sociology is part of a four-fold bundle of disciplinary activities; public sociology is important and should be made stronger and developed as an integrated part of the discipline; and public sociology requires well functioning publics. Comments are made on: academic institutions as bundles of activities; the nature of public sociology; and why and how dissemination and public discourse should be made stronger.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." Michael Burawoy deserves much credit for bringing the role of public sociology back to the discipline's attention. Public sociologists have always been called for. However, it is hard to recall a time in which they have been more needed but less in evidence than the present day. Burawoy's four-fold typology of sociology is quite useful. A few observations concerning engaging in public sociology are hereby presented. First, one cannot be a public sociologist, and arguably a sociologist of any other kind, without taking a normative position. Second, to be public is to be in politics. And anyone who is or who is contemplating becoming a public sociologist must decide how far along the action chain he or she is willing to proceed. It is then argued that to provide a stronger foundation for public sociology, we need to add policy research to basic research. Finally, what is called for if we are to train and foster more public sociologists is discussed.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." Contrary to Burawoy, it is not that it is necessary to provincialize U.S. sociology but, rather, to recognize its "provincialism" and to pursue strategies which may open and expand it to other forms of sociological knowledge with mutual benefit to sociologists and their publics in the United States and elsewhere. The task is not an easy one and has many other dimensions which cannot be developed here. However, as he rightly notes, it is those with power who are best placed to develop strategies to further this process. Already initiatives involving groups such as the International Sociological Association, as well as the American Sociological Association, have commenced with the intention of strengthening the ability of sociology to address the major social needs of our time. The hope now is that these can be enhanced and extended.

This article points out that Michael Burawoy's call for a renewal of commitment to a public sociology has had a massive impact. Writing in the tradition of C. Wright Mills's clarion call, Burawoy seeks to defend the critical and reflexive role of the sociologist through his or her autonomous engagement in the public sphere of political decision. His argument has had a mixed reception in the United States. For the most part his views have been welcomed as re-emphasizing an important dimension of sociological activity that has, perhaps, been lost or submerged in the current political and financial climate of conservatism and retrenchment. Within the universities, many have found it easier to keep their heads down and get on with purely academic work, lest political involvement bring unwanted attention. Burawoy has been seen as re-asserting the political legitimacy of public participation. In some quarters, however, his views have met with a more negative reaction and have been seen as a scarcely concealed attempt to abandon impartiality and to advocate a leftist radicalism. This mixed reception was, perhaps, inevitable, given the political context in which Burawoy has intervened. He is, necessarily, critical of sociologists, other social scientists, the universities and the other institutions for which sociologists work, and also the wider structures of power in which these are enmeshed.

This article comments on Michael Burawoy's article "For Public Sociology," in volume 56, issue number 2, of the "British Journal of Sociology." The goal to convert the discipline into "a new policy science" of the Mertonian sort is likely to be subverted by the very complexities of the worlds we analyze. Advances in this direction will be more craft than science, made on a case by case basis. But in making these advances, professional sociology, with its rigorous methods, cumulative knowledge base, theories and concepts, insights, and legitimacy, is indisputably central to both public and policy sociology.

This article responds to Craig Calhoun and other critics of the author by defending the seriousness and coherence of public sociology as a distinct realm within a national and global disciplinary division of sociological labor, and as an antidote to external subversion. Two visions of the public sociologist are two visions of social change; the one riding on the claimed universality of intellectuals, the other riding on the organization of subaltern groups. For the traditional public sociologist the privileged site is the university, while civil society is the locus of misrecognized suffering; for the organic public sociologist civil society is the source of insight into what is and what could be, insight excavated and elaborated by the sociologist. This gives two divergent visions and divisions of sociology as a field of power. In the conception of traditional public sociology the danger comes from the invading forces of mass media, consultantships, technocracy, commodification and politicization of the university, refracted within the field of sociology as the subjugation of the academic to the extraacademic. In the conception of the organic public sociology domination appears as rationalization. Here the danger comes from science itself, such as neoliberal economics that imposes a singular model on all, precisely because it does not acknowledge the critique of its theoretical foundations or the lived experience of the people its theorizes.

This article responds to M. Bittman and J. Pixley's paper "Equality and Gender, Divided Versus Multiple Subjectivity: A Response to Allon J. Uhlmann's The Sociology of Subjectivity, and Subjectivity of Sociologists" in volume 55, issue number 3 of the "British Journal of Sociology." The criticism of Bittman and Pixley's book "The Double Life of the Family" focused on a number of selected texts in order to expose some of the analytical dynamics that prevail in the sociology of the Australian family. The book served as an example of a class-unconscious discussion of the family. It was argued that the book overlook systemic differences in subjectivity across class and gender, and did not consider the sociological significance of the variation in the contexts in which members of different classes lead their lives. Bittman and Pixley's response skirts the main issues which have been the focus of the critique.

The concept of 'identity' is central to much contemporary sociology, reflecting a crisis that manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, there is a view that identity is both vital and problematic in this period of high modernity. Secondly, while this awareness is reflected in sociology, its accounts of identity are inconsistent, under-theorized and incapable of bearing the analytical load required. As a result, there is an inherent contradiction between a valuing of identity as so fundamental as to be crucial to personal well-being, and a theorization of 'identity' that sees it as something constructed, fluid, multiple, impermanent and fragmentary. The contemporary crisis of identity thus expresses itself as both a crisis of society, and a crisis of theory. This paper explores the diverse ways in which 'identity' is deployed before turning to case-studies of its use by Anthony Giddens and Manuel Castells. This strategy demonstrates the widespread and diverse concern with identity before exploring how problematic it has become, even in the work of two of the world's leading sociologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dorfman is eulogized as the creator and curator of the definitive account of Veblen's life and work. He argued that Veblen was the archetypal marginal man and that this explains his dissenting contribution. Dissemination of Dorfman's pathography of Veblen led to its hegemony - until now. Andrew Veblen was the first to challenge Dorfman's portrait of his younger brother's life in the mid 1920s. He asserted that his family were not linguistically, socially or economically deprived. However, it was not until Dorfman's private papers became publicly available in the 1990s, that his flawed view of Veblen became more widely and comprehensively contested. An alternative appreciation of Veblen is advanced with reference to his experiences in general and the works of Bellamy, Morris and Ibsen in particular. Data sources include Dorfman's original tome, Andrew Veblen's extensive correspondence with Dorfman, and Veblen's own writings. It is concluded that Veblen's radical views are entirely congruent with his life experiences during an era of capitalist transformation. The moral of this saga is that a dose of Veblenian scepticism is essential to intellectual health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postmodernism has now established itself as normal science. Sociologist Thomas Kuhn used normal science to refer to the state of affairs, which comes into being when a group of researchers come to accept certain ways of proceeding intellectually as the basis of their future inquiries. These inquiries take for granted some past theoretical innovation, and concentrate on what Kuhn calls puzzles solving. He observes that perhaps the most striking feature of the activities to which normal science is devoted is how little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal. For many of those working in or studying the social sciences and subjects such as cultural studies postmodernism has now assumed this status. Postmodernism no longer offers the thrill of scandal and transgression it once had. In some parts of the academy at least, it is now assuming the solemn countenance of orthodoxy. Postgraduate theses are written and academic careers launched on the basis of an unquestioning acceptance of the truth of their principal claims. The books under review a mere title of the books devoted to some aspect or other of postmodernism churned out by the academic presses every year bear witness to this condition.

The significant role of Soviet sociologists in initiating the dual processes of perestroika and glasnost' has provided an unusual example of sociologists actively participating in social change. This article locates this development within longer term changes in the position of sociology in the Soviet Union. Emerging from the post-Stalinist thaw, sociology struggled to emancipate itself from both ideological and political constraints. After phases of expansion and retrenchment, contradictory developments moved towards a possible resolution through active involvement in the processes of critique which led perestroika. The article concludes with a plea for a positive response to Soviet sociology's wish for assistance and co-operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the theory and method in recent British sociology. Sociology is an academic discipline that combines a commitment to the empirical investigation of social reality with the aim of comprehending the nature of society theoretically and framing general statements about social structure and process. This twin aims have been pursued in parallel more or less since the subject first came into existence in the late nineteenth century. Yet there has been an enduring tension between them. Over a generation ago, T. H. Marshall, in his LSE inaugural lecture of 1946, called for an effort to overcome the gap which separated the general or theoretical sociologist who becomes a slave to his concepts and on the other the passionately empirical sociologist who may become a slave to his methods. Instead he advocated the pursuit of what he called stepping stones to the middle distance. Others at various times have restated this view. Robert Merton is one of the best known, in two essays dissecting the two-way relationship between sociology theory and empirical research. Edward Shils has suggested that no sociological theorist, however abstract their interests, can carry on their work without feeling that empirical researchers are looking over their shoulder and that ultimately they have to answer them.

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

This article is an attempt to evaluate the contribution of the late Erving Goffman to the field of Sociology. In doing so I have attempted to document some of the main commentaries upon Coffman's work — especially those of A. Dawe and A.W. Gouldner — and to evaluate their validity. This paper is presented within the framework of a general overview of Goffman's work and an elaboration of some of the salient themes within it. The intention of the author is to free Goffman from some of the crude overgeneralizations that his colleagues have used in evaluating his writings. In particular, I have attempted to show, in general terms, how Goffman's work is sensitive to ‘structural’ as well as ‘situational’ concerns and also to class, hierarchy and power. It is argued that Goffman's importance has been underestimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upon his death in 1920, at the age of 56, sociologist Max Weber left behind a huge and untidy mass of personal papers and scholarly manuscripts, some of the latter in the process of being edited for publication by Weber himself, others intended for intensive reworking, others yet superseded drafts. The intended characteristics of the book "Max Weber Gesamtausgabe," in the first of the publications listed below: they are those of a critical-historical edition, intended not to replace the several collections of Weber's writings currently available for the use of students, but rather to serve the needs of scholars, including the editors of such future collections. The edition is to include three sections: Writings and Speeches; Manuscripts of and notes from lecture courses. In the first section, the arrangement of material will embody a compromise between chronological and thematic grouping; that is, the numbering of volumes will reflect the shifts in the prevailing concerns of Weber's scholarly and publicistic activity, but each volume may contain again, in chronological sequence writings and speeches. From a number of years in so far as they bear on its chief theme. Each volume will contain editorial material which elucidates the circumstances of each piece of writing or speech, indicates the state of the relative sources and eventual discrepancies among them, and clarifies or corrects such parts or points in the text as might baffle or mislead even a relatively informed contemporary reader.

Most commentaries on the history of sociology have pointed out that Weber and Simmel developed strikingly divergent sociologies. Although there are undeniable differences in their views, the neglect of important affinities in their writings on political and economic rationalization has contributed to an unproductive distancing of these major figures in twentieth century sociology. The identification of neglected affinities raises questions about: the reasons for the divergent reception of Weber and Simmel into American sociology; the way the history of sociology often has been written, and; the development of sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The visibility of causal terminology in American sociology, from 1895 to the 1960s, has varied according to changing philosophies of science and patterns of scientific communication. Successive generations differed in their receptivity to the diffusion of causal concepts from traditions other than sociology. After briefly reviewing the status of causality in the pre-sociological period, causal terminology is observed across four successive cohorts of sociologists. The first generation, 1890 to 1910, spoke freely of 'causes' until the second generation, in command of method using English statistics until the 1930s, made talk of causes anathema. Following theorists called for a return to causal interpretations which commenced in the 1950s as new methods attuned to the prevailing philosophy of science were imported to sociology from other disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses some aspects of the sociology of literature in West Germany. A focus of the early sociology of literature in Germany was the question of literary success. It was typical that the discussion of literary success and literary reputation was conducted in the art pages of the press and outside the realm of academic sociology. Such were the first attempts to elaborate the connection between literary theory and literary production. The Nazis had no use for critical sociology and sociologists. On the contrary, they drove a whole generation of sociology teachers to emigration. The initial attempts to find a new basis for the sociology of literature in the Federal Republic of Germany were narrowly conceived. The fundamental question of literary sociology, points to basic social structures, that is the various literary cultures within a society, the ideas, values, ideals and guides to action expressed in the content and form of particular literary works are to be related to the different social groups. The influence of Mannheim, Germany's sociology of knowledge gives a critical account of the understanding of literature in the positivist tradition of literary sociology and then discusses the problem of the development of Marxist sociology of literature.

This article sociologically explores why the majority of British sociologists have not concerned themselves a great deal with Sigmund Freud's social theory. This contrasts with sociologists in Germany and France, many of whom have shown, both in the past and more recently, considerable interest in Freud. Freud has been more often seen by sociologists, following most psychologists and psychoanalysts, as a personality development theorist and therapist. This applies to those on the right, left and center of the political spectrum. The personality development theory, linked with the therapeutic method, is one part of psychoanalysis but is linked in with the more social process, phylogenesis. The unconscious, for Freud, is in social groups, social relationships, social institutions, and in individuals. Or rather there is no point in the distinction between a psychoanalysis of the collective unconscious and that of the personal. The unconscious is a term used to refer to emotions and feelings of which people are ordinarily unaware, but can be come aware by using their reason. One exception to the failure to treat Freud as a social scientist occurred outside British universities. This was at the Tavistock Institute, which probably has a higher reputation among social scientists abroad than in Great Britain.

It has been argued by Gerth and Mills, Coser, and others, that Weber departs from verstehen sociology in his analysis of class by applying a social-structural account of stratification. The argument below demonstrates that Weber's treatment of class and status conforms entirely to his methodological principles of social action and ideal-type analysis. It is also shown that a social-structural interpretation of Weber's theory of stratification is incoherent. Only as an account of cultural structure, of the way in which social differentiation is perceived in the social consciousness, is Weber's theory of stratification formally coherent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the thematic unity in the works of sociologist Max Weber, Economy and Society (ES), and Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE). When Marianne Weber brought out ES in 1921, she described it in the first sentence of her preface as Weber's posthumous and principal work. Even without this label, the scientific world would have been persuaded of this designation. This ambiguous designation attained a deeper significance when it appeared that ES provided a summa of the discipline, and undertook to cover and make accessible all areas of sociology. Thus ES was taken to be Weber's comprehensive and authentic testament to which he had given everything. But the best known and most widely read text was instead the PE, an early work which in spite of its peculiar importance cannot be counted as his major work. In contrast, ES is very rarely read as a whole and at no time has it been the subject of interpretation. Certainly many sociologists have concerned themselves with chapters of this work, especially with those on domination, stratification and bureaucracy. A complete interpretation though, has never been attempted. In fact the presentation of Weber's sociology has not been the outcome of a debate with his major work but rather has followed other lines.

Recent discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences exhibit a remarkable agreement about what has become one of the most urgent problems for sociological methodology. The situation may be summarized thus: ethnomethodological developments in interpretative sociology have shown that there can be no firm and certain basis on which to ground truth claims for our propositions. The conclusion drawn from this is that the traditional aspirations of conventional sociology — to be objective and scientific — cannot be attained. However, the programme of work promised by those who have developed ethnomethodology as a critique of ‘conventional sociology’ itself contains certain difficulties. Thus, the problem addressed by those writing in the philosophy of social science is this: given the contradictions in sociology as traditionally practiced, and given the problems in the programme offered by those largely responsible for discrediting it, whither sociology now? The purpose of my paper is to show that the question may be unnecessary. This is not so much because interpretative sociologists are mistaken in their understanding of the conditions in which research is undertaken, but rather because the positivist epistemological assumptions taken to be necessary for an objective scientific sociology, are not required for this and indeed are erroneous. I shall argue specifically that a Popperian account of (objective) science is wholly compatible with the understanding contemporary interpretative sociologists have of the research context, and indeed that there are striking similarities between this and Popper's ideas, most especially those developed in recent years. Thus, I shall go on to suggest that, by adopting a Popperian epistemology we may thereby recognize the validity of the fundamentals of the ethnomethodological position without being forced to abandon the effort to be objective and scientific; we may also sidestep the particular dif... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the concept of the typology of ethnic process. Sociologists, social and cultural anthropologists, ethnographers and students of other social sciences have increasingly concentrated on the problem of ethnic processes which have received an enormous impetus from the unfolding scientific and technological revolution. Ethnic processes are generally understood to imply changes in ethnic communities, so that an indispensable precondition for working out a typology of ethnic processes is a consideration of the accepted concepts on the type of ethnic communities. In accordance with the concepts of ethnic communities, the notion ethnic processes as used in modern Soviet literature embraces all the varieties and levels of such communities. Throughout its history, each ethnos is in a practically permanent state of ethno-evolutionary change due to inter-ethnic contacts as well as intra- and extra-ethnic factors. Perpetuation of the ethno-evolutionary changes is ensured by the intrinsic informational bonds of the ethnos. At the first stage, the active role is played by synchronous bonds which provide for the horizontal spreading of innovations within the ethnos. Transformational ethnic processes represent the sum of evolutionary ethnic changes and at the same time, their dialectic negation.

This article profiles sociologist David Glass. For some sociologists the unifying principle and ultimate objective lie in the building of an edifice of sociological theory. Although he read widely in sociological literature, Glass did not cultivate an interest in that direction, and he was much less at home in the academic world of sociology. He was extremely critical of some of the products of current trends, whose quality did not come up to his rigorous standards, and it must be admitted that his negative judgments were sometimes disconcertingly swift and uncompromising. Glass was thorough in all he did, including his hobbies. His friends knew they could get expert advice from him on tape recorders, first editions and cameras, because David loved music, books, and photography. He was never content to handle anything which he did not completely understand. The same thoroughness characterized his work. It could be seen in his capacity for organizing and administering, notably ion the case of his two great successes, the Population Investigation Committee and the journal Population Studies. And most conspicuously perhaps in Social Mobility. This work originated in a project to investigate channels and processes of movement from the working to the middle class, especially through educational success and qualifications.

This article attempts to redress the imbalance in the study of witchcraft and the status of women in England. European witchcraft has long fascinated historians and sociologists and one result of this has been a wide range of different, and often competing, accounts of this bizarre social phenomenon. There are those who believe in both the existence of witches as a malevolent force and in the very spirits and demons which they allegedly worshipped. Some, on the other hand, dismiss witchcraft as pure fabrication. Others have discovered in witchcraft the remnants of an ancient fertility cult which once rivaled Christianity, while still others have attributed it to a reaction against the authority of the established Church. Sociologist Richard Kieckhefer, in his recent study, explains shifts in the nature of witch persecution before 1500 in terms of the imposition of the concepts of the learned elite upon a traditional culture based upon folk magic and sorcery. He suggests that a substitution of diabolism for sorcery took place in the fifteenth century in order to align popular practices with an Aristotelian orthodoxy which refused to admit magic to be an independent type of reality.

This article is an answer to the review made by Edward G. Armstrong on article by R. E. Best dealing with phenomenological sociology. Phenomenological sociology distorts, rather than follow from, the work of Husserl, and that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and the sociological investigation of the world out there are essentially different activities, asking different questions and adopting different methodologies to answer them. Thus, whilst Husserl brackets the world of the natural attitude in his search for the eidos of reality in the subjective experience of the transcendentally reduced sphere, sociologists, by contrast, bracket the subjectivity of individual experience in order to study social phenomena empirically. A belief prevalent amongst phenomenological sociologists is that a synthesis of these activities was achieved by Schutz, making a genuinely phenomenological sociology possible. This assertion is not accepted by R. E. Best. Rather Schutz may be depicted as dabbling in transcendental phenomenology in some works, indicating new directions for social science in others, and elsewhere trying to resolve the problems posed by any attempt to do both at once. The last, it seems,would be impossible anyway: how could both the worlds of the natural attitude and of transcendental subjectivity be bracketed at the same time?

Weber's ubiquitous usage of the word ‘rational’ has been criticized by Steven Lukes, among others, as being ‘irredeemably opaque and shifting’. In the present essay, however, it is seen that Weber's usage is consistent. Six interdependent elements of the concept ‘rationality’ are identified, each of which is intended to contribute to the concept's overall meaning when any one is employed as the locus of primary significance. While ‘rational’ is thus shown to be conceptually rigorous if at times needlessly confusing, the distinction between formal and substantive rationality is examined and judged to be both theoretically confused and substantially biased, disguising the valuations inherent in the criteria by which formal rationality is assessed. This confusion, Weber's persistent usage of ‘rational’ when ‘calculable’ or ‘systematic’ would have served much better, and the implicit ironies of Weber's presentation, are traced to the Puritan schema on which Weber believed ‘rational conduct’ to be based, one precisely parallel to his own statement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares one aspect of Max Weber's explicit conception of ‘interpretive sociology’ with his actual practices in his substantive investigations. It shows that Weber's overt emphasis on the importance of meanings and motives in causal explanation of social action does not correspond adequately with the true mode of explanation involved in his comparative-historical studies of the world religions. Rather, the ultimate level of causal explanation in Weber's substantive writings is that of the social-structural conditions under which certain forms of meaning and motivation can achieve historical efficacy. A model is developed to represent the actual nature of ‘Weberian sociology’. It is proposed that this internal comparative analysis and interpretation can have useful implications for contemporary sociological debates and approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the context of history and sociology in the work of Max Weber. Weber began his academic career as a historian and ended it as a sociologist, but intellectually, this move meant for him a division of labor, not an antagonistic relationship between the roles of historian and sociologist. In the course of his career, Weber gradually came to develop a new sociology, which differed from the old evolutionary sociology, against detractors among historians and economists who failed to comprehend the difference. He expected to be recognized as a partisan in methodological matters. One significant aspect of partisanship involved the struggle against organicist and other concepts of social life, which had been basic to the old sociology and its followers among evolutionary historians. One remark anticipated Weber's elaboration in the first chapter of the book, Economic and Society, which was about to be published after his sudden death. In his introductory methodological observations, he made it plain that with regard to this individualist method, there was no difference between sociology and history, since both for sociology in the present sense and for history the object of cognition is the subjective meaning of action.

This article discusses the concept of psychology, sociology and social psychology, and how they differ from one another. The presentation of the issues does not describe what psychologists and sociologists do completely accurately. Most of them operate, not from principles chosen singly, but from a general paradigm which contains a particular configuration of methodology, conceptual and substantive interests, theory, and ideological and other applications. There is something amiss when someone argues that an individual is simply a product of his social environment while at the same time disclaiming a deterministic conception of causality, or when he is willing to be lax about either internal or external validity and still vigorously claim that psychology or sociology is a science. If social science activity is indeed a struggle between different ideologies, then the content of one's theories and not the nature of one's methodology should be the major criterion for acceptance or rejection. The privileges, and certainly not rights in this case, are the profitable and prestigeful titles of psychologists and sociologists. The desirable course of action is clear, both the disciplinary boundaries and the paradigms within them should be torn down and the latter reconstructed.

This article attempts to understand the relationship between sociology and history by examining of material relating to the position and development of sociology in Yugoslavia with the hope the distinctive nature of the position of sociology in society will be thrown into comparative relief. It must be made clear that in discussions of the relationship between history and sociology, one is dealing with highly organized professional groups, with a high level of articulate self-awareness. These groups tend to be relatively self-sufficient intellectually, and there is little cross-recruitment between them. One makes a career, in other words, as either a historian or as a sociologist. Under these circumstances the discussion about the relationship between sociology and history reads like a kind of academic diplomacy. But, like all diplomacy, it is dependent upon a highly specific set of political circumstances. One does not negotiate treaties to cover all circumstances, but only certain foreseen circumstances. A brief consideration of the position of sociology in Yugoslavia will serve to highlight just how specific and peculiar are the circumstances which govern our current understanding of the relationship between sociology and history.

The corpus of Alfred Schutz's methodological writings is directed at creating a scientific method which does not subjugate a meaning-endowing actor to objective, impersonal causal laws. Given the nature of this task, it is surprising that the list of Schutz's published writings is so small. It consists, in fact, of only one full-length book and numerous articles which have been compiled into a three-volume anthology. This relative paucity of published writings is partly due to the extreme care and meticulousness Schutz exhibits in writing and re-writing each work, and partly the result of a Jekyll-Hyde type of life in which days are spent pursuing money and success in the business world, leaving only nights to teach and write. In this paper I shall summarily describe Schutz's efforts and see if his phenomenologically defined notion of subjectivity is reasonably incorporated into a valid scientific method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the social philosophy of Karl Popper. Karl Popper is a widely influential writer on the methodology of the social sciences. To many sociologists, scientific method means Popper's account of scientific method. Yet Popper does not believe that sociology should be value-free. He believes that a commitment to scientific sociology, far from clearing us from making value-judgments about utopian thought, requires us to denounce it. Thus Poppers, supports the orthodox view that utopian thought is objectionable, but it is unusual in deriving this value-judgment from his conception of scientific method. Popper developed his views on the methodology of the social sciences and his social philosophy in the course of his critique of something he calls historicism. Popper defines historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the rhythms or the patterns, the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history. With characteristic vigor, Popper denounces historicism as logically defective, false, sterile and murderous. Poppers critique of historicism is linked with his analysis of utopianism. The connection is mainly made by a third villain: holism. Holism is the doctrine that events must be understood in the context of the social whole of which they form a part.

The term `sub-culture' is one that has been part of sociology for many years, and which, like "role," "class" and "charisma," whether or not it was in current usage before the rise of sociology, is certainly now a feature of everyday language. lying utility, even if coupled with a superficial lack of clarity. In this article the author considers three distinct but interrelating problems about sub-culture. The first of these is the general issue of culture and structure as perspectives on social relations, the second the problem of the definition of the boundaries of a sub-culture, and the last the question of the genesis, maintenance and change of sub-cultures. The concept "Culture" is often more a loose reference to social milieu than an adequate idea of social structure. Although sociologists at times write as though social relations could be empirically carved up into culture and structure, these two concepts represent only an analytical distinction, that is they cover the same actual social relations from a different standpoint, selecting different aspects for consideration.

The article focuses on various sociologists. There were a number of sociologists who were rather bemused and puzzled seeing Sorokin being idolized by the radical students and young faculty members. It seemed to them that Sorokin, who had condemned violence and revolutionary activity ever since the Revolution, was being worshipped by the wrong people. Some of the famous scholars are Pitirim A. Sorokin, Nicholas S. Timasheff and Georges Gurvitch. Timasheff, Sorokin and Gurvitch have succeeded, each in his own way, in becoming internationally famous scholars. The paths they each chose to follow seem to have been determined to a significant degree by their respective family backgrounds, as well as by the Revolution. Timasheff's approach in his sociological writings was historical and analytical. Sorokin's work and style represent a marked contrast to Timasheff's. While Timasheff used historical data as empirical facts, Sorokin used the data as means for conforming his personal apocalyptic vision. Gurvitch's ideas were also formed under the direct impact of the Revolution.

The article comments on the concept of power. Power is one of the most central and yet problematic concepts in sociological theory. Power, like love, is a word used continually in ordinary speech, understood intuitively, and defined rarely, people know what the power game is. In many instances sociologists have been no more precise than this. Yet it is possible to define power precisely without losing the core of its common-sense meaning. This section discusses critically current definitions of power, and concludes by suggesting a refinement of current definitions which maintains their essence while avoiding some of their misleading assumptions. Most sociological theorists have defined power in more restricted terms, as a specific type of relation between objects, persons and groups. The most influential definition remains that of the sociologist Max Weber: power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless the basis on which this probability rests.

The article discusses sociologist Christopher Bryant's defence of scientific sociology. Bryant rejects the idea that sociology must be exclusively humanistic and he proposed three categories of social reality. Humanistic explanations vary in a number of ways, in directness, in simplicity and according to the persistence of the action referred to. Within humanistic explanation there are levels, continua rather than dichotomies. Most famed sociology is humanistic explanation. That this has not been recognized and is frequently denied is profoundly damaging to the defence of the subject. It leads sociologists to fail to push humanistic explanations to their limits of logical and empirical rigour, it leads them to self condemnation, and provides ammunition to sociology's opponents. Bryant, in keeping with his acceptance of a rather rigid dichotomy, is inclined to accept much of the philosophical case against comparison and generalization. Bryant's argument tends to miss the strongest of the philosophical cases. This involves recourse to a fundamental relativism.

The article focuses on the author's comment on sociologists Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore's paper "Some Principles of Stratification." According to the author, the paper offers some important point but that the argument they advance is contradictory in certain of its implications and therefore defective. The source of the difficulty is to be found in one of the premises of their argument. To state it most simply, the premise asserts, "people desire rewards." This assertion is incontestable, but it is not adequately qualified in their argument. The author shows in the first part of this article how their argument, containing this premise, leads to contradictory implications. Then, in the second part of this article, the author attempts to provide qualifications which he believes will allow Davis and Moore's argument to avoid contradictions and thus give it greater force.

The article compares influentials in contemporary American and British sociology for a time span for 11 years, between 1958-68. Authors of the article have compared names of the men most cited in journals "American Sociological Review" and "British Journal of Sociology" for two time periods and have found that lists for the second time period contained a larger number of names in common than the list for the first period. This finding was interpreted as support for the thesis that sociology is becoming more international. A comparison of the two American lists revealed no essential differences in the national origin of the most important influentials for the two periods. A similar examination of the two British lists revealed that contemporary sociologists from the U.S. are becoming increasingly influential in British sociology. It was therefore suggested that the internationalization of sociology may, for the immediate future, be equivalent or almost equivalent to the Americanization of sociology.

Defending sociologist's right to exist is as old as sociology itself. So it is hardly surprising that it is possible to cite the work of classical figures in its development when rejecting the stringent criticisms of three contemporary British philosophers. Their criticisms are modern variants of the old case against social science. The three philosophers are Peter Winch, A. R. Louch, and Alasdair Maclntyre. Taken together they present three arguments which would, if acceptable, invalidate the basis of sociology. The first contends that sociologists fail to recognize quite how social reality differs from nature. The second, in its extreme form, states that the concept cause is only applicable to the natural world, so that causal accounts of social phenomena are, by definition, the product of conceptual confusion. The third holds that cross-cultural analysis is impossible. The philosopher's most profound mistake is to equate all sociology with accounting for human action qua action, i.e. explaining why actors act as they do. Correspondingly their most serious omission is their failure to consider the meaning of social structure.

This article discusses the book "Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," edited by May Brodbeck. The author gives attention to three topics discussed in this anthology. The first is the controversy over whether the account of explanation given by sociologist Hempel is applicable in the human as well as in the natural sciences. The second theme in the anthology obviously relevant to sociologist is that of methodological individualism versus holism. Many of the papers in this anthology characterize at one level the alternatives confronting a scientist whose theorizing confronts either empirical or conceptual difficulties. Just because actions are informed by intentions and purposes, and intentions and purposes presuppose beliefs, so a social role-which specifies and prescribes or permits certain courses of action for certain types of person presupposes certain beliefs. The matter of the philosophy of science may not only be regulative as regards the form of our theories and the lessons to be learnt here may well be one that the sociologist now feels have been conveyed to him almost too often-but suggestive as to their content.

The term attitude, both in colloquial as well as in scientific usage, refers to dispositions of men to view things in certain ways and to act accordingly. Attitudes are complexes of ideas and sentiments. Sociologists, one assumes, are never interested in attitudes as a final object of enquiry but always as part of an ultimate aim of studying the structure of social conduct; for them, an enquiry into attitudes must be justified by assumptions that attitudes are predictive of conduct. Sociologists who defend attitude studies must assume that social attitudes are not perfectly malleable or flexible. If attitudes were perfectly malleable then they would simply be governed by structural factors, which would also govern conduct, in any social situation, in that case, the existence of such attitudes could be inferred either from the governing factors, the independent variables, or from the conduct itself; the dependent variable, and this would give them little or no explanatory value. It is, of course, arguable, that even if attitudes were perfectly malleable.

The history of sociology is not or should not be analogous to archaeology. It is or it should be an indispensable element in the present practice of sociology and where it is not, the reason is rarely that it is genuinely superfluous. One peculiar feature of sociology, distinguishing it both from the natural sciences and interestingly from economics, is that it is rarely possible to say of it that theory has genuinely moved on, including what was valid in the past as special cases or partial truths in what is acceptable to the present. This feature is only a weakness so long as it goes unrecognized. Two primitive but prevalent, errors are then possible. Either the sociologist uses the theories of the past unconsciously, thereby accepting current and necessarily distorted, interpretations of their methods, concepts and insights or else he consciously rejects them as in principle defunct which unless he is a genius, leaves him impoverished and ill-equipped. Sociologists today still have much to learn in a substantive way, from the works of their ancestors.