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There are increasing claims regarding the attachments that Latin American immigrants have to the home country, and their potential roles as lobbyists for the home country. These claims are not based on systematic analyses of the immigrants but reflect instead the rhetoric and aspirations of home country leaders. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which such claims reflect immigrant attitudes and behavior. Specifically, it will draw on surveys of Latin American immigrants that examine how they view home country issues, their level of involvement in activities related to home countries, and the strength of their attachments to U. S. institutions and society. The paper will pay particular attention to attitudes and behaviors directly linked to politics as distinct from those tied to cultural and social realms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Rights have had a twofold role in world politics. They contributed to forging patterns of political authority in the process of state-formation (1) and to shaping state behavior in current situations of human rights implementation (2). Nonetheless, the meaning of rights remains contested. It varies between sociocultural contexts rendering calculation and maneuvering of their potential political impact in say, foreign, defense and security policy increasingly difficult. The paper discusses rights and their changed meanings based on the related shift of impact on stateness from citizenship rights towards human rights. It argues that the transformation of intangible meanings in addition to tangible rules requires careful empirical assessment of potentially contested rights. The paper seeks to develop a comparative framework to study evolving rights norms including citizenship, human rights, gender rights and minority rights as institutions that emerge through social practices [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict resolution theorists have long posited that mediation style must be properly suited to the characteristics of particular conflicts. The focus of this paper is the varying effectiveness of three mediation styles -- facilitation, formulation, and manipulation - on international crises. Effectiveness is assessed in terms of termination in agreement, satisfaction of the parties with the outcome, the extent to which subsequent crises occur among the parties, and mediation’s influence on crisis abatement. We analyzed new data on the mediation process from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project for the period 1918-2001 to assess the impact of mediation. Congruent with our hypotheses, mediators often pursue at least one of two strategies - integration and cost maximization - and each strategy seems to have varying effects on different outcomes. Our findings suggest that mediators should use a combination of strategies and styles if they are to maximize their effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of prospect theory to develop explanations of risk behavior in foreign policy decision making is by now well established. Unfortunately, the original empirical work that serves as the foundation for this research involved gambling or medical decisions with forced dichotomous choices between prospects that included only a single value dimension. This paper reports the results of an experiment where subjects responded to foreign policy scenarios involving monetary outcomes or human lives; were allowed to choose "none of the above"; choices were made between two, four or six options; and prospects included one, two or three value dimensions. The results of this experiment illuminate the difficulties experienced when attempting to adapt a theory developed in a particular domain to a new milieu. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much research has been devoted toward understanding when states impose economic sanction and with what effect. Little attention has been devoted toward understanding when sanctions, once imposed, are removed. Ostensibly, sanctions are accompanied with a demand for a change in behavior on the part of the target; so sanctions should end if and only if this demand is met. Sanctions are often imposed as a punishment, with no accompanying demands, however. Moreover, in some cases where demands are made, the target never changes its behavior; and, when the target does make some changes, the sender’s demands are almost never fully met. The answer to When do states remove sanctions? is thus not obvious. In this paper, we explore the relationship between several factors (domestic politics, target type, costs of sanctions, issue type) and when sanctions end. We use a new data set on sanctions that occurred between 1970 and 1989. Our investigation will uncover several empirical insights upon which further theoretical development can be based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The G7 was created in the mid-1970s as a global governance mechanism in order to supplement the declining strength of the United States as well as most other member states. In order for this group to be an effective institutional group hegemon, it is critical that the G7 states act in a highly cohesive manner within the international system. Our earlier work has shown that the level of cohesion of policy preferences, as shown by voting patterns of G7 states within the UN General Assembly has been more cohesive than other groups of states both during and after the Cold War. This paper seeks to expand upon this work by analyzing which conditions affect the frequency of defections from the dominant preferences of the G7. It tests three alternative theoretical arguments: a realist/neorealist, a liberal/institutionalist, and a domestic politics approach. Hypotheses are developed for each of these perspectives by focusing upon the conditions that each views as driving the policy preferences of states. Our findings indicate that the cohesion of G7 member states is more accurately explained through the liberal/institutionalist and domestic politics explanations. The rates of defection are minimized by the types of system disturbances that the institution was designed to handle, lending support to the liberal/institutionalist perspective. Further, defection rates increase as the frequency of domestically relevant disturbances increase. This indicates that a domestic politics vision of policy preference formation is persuasive as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present a framework for approaching "emotional state behavior." I apply this framework to the post-September 11th behavior of Russia and China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "Image and Propaganda as a component of U.S. power, and the impact of the Vietnam War: From Vietnam to Iraq" that was prepared for presentation at the 46th Annual ISA Convention in Hawaii. It says that the image held of one nation by another may either facilitate or obstruct implementation of particular policies and actions. It also mentions that components such as state behavior and actions are just some of the factors which propaganda draws on to build the desired impression.

The article presents the conference paper titled "The Social Construction of Climate Change: The Domestic Salience of International Norms" prepared for a conference of the International Studies Association held in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the emergence of climate change as a major political issue in the late 1980s. It also examines the literature regarding the relationship between national behavior and international norms.

The article presents a conference paper titled "Religiosity and Protest Behavior: The Case of Turkey in Comparative Perspective," prepared for presentation at the ISA Convention in Hawaii. It focuses on the assessment of the role that religiosity in Islamic communities play in the decision of protest behavior to measure its effect against the other independent variables. It says that it is probable to explain political participation by reference to factors in Turkey that are parallel to unified democracies of Europe and the U.S.

Conceptual terms such as dynamic, multiplayer, dimensional, stochastic, or scaled, can describe set behavior or form but are not true set attributes in se. Set-wide, or global, attributes are first-order specifications from which all elements in the set inherit their initial common attributes. Awareness of or explicit specification of global attributes can be vital to reliability and validity checking or to the construction and extrapolation of choice sets for more rigorous scientific modeling. This paper discusses four among several such global attributes in the context of action-based decision theory: perspective, temporality, agency, and nullity. Variable specification of global attributes has implications for the nature of elements in the choice set and the conditions under which they interact. Global attributes have further implications for the type of decision theory under investigation: causality, strategy patterns, cognitive behavior, policy norms, agency dispersion, and more. While examples come from the international studies field, the treatment of global attributes has relevance for other fields of social scientific inquiry. The treatment also is not specific to any model type or representation but can be applied to all action-based decision models. The paper closes with summary choice set design heuristics and style suggestions for global attribute formal syntax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

n previous research on learning and crisis behavior (Frain 2003), it was found that the outcomes of previous crises do not immediately influence the choice of behavior (in terms of continuing successful behavior or discontinuing unsuccessful behavior) for states in their future crises. Instead, preliminary findings suggested that repetition in behavior was more closely associated with a repetition in certain crisis characteristics. In other words, at first glance it would appear that states behave according to how they behaved in previous similar crises, regardless of the outcome of those crises. Using large-n statistical analyses on data from the International Crisis Behavior project, along with case-study evidence where available, the proposed paper will examine this phenomenon more closely, and it is hypothesized that even in crisis episodes states and their decision-makers will rely on behaviors used in previous crises based on the similarity of previous crises with the current one. It is expected that prevalent modes of crisis behavior will present themselves in the findings. If so, the paper will also seek to explain the origins of such modes, as well as the factors contributing to their continuation or termination. Such findings may have important implications for approaches to foreign policy decision-making that emphasize standard operating procedures and organizational routines. - Christopher Frain (2003), Learning from Success and Failure: Testing Theories Regarding the Repetition of Crisis Behavior, prepared for the ISA Annual Convention, Portland, 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work contends that the current systemic view of hegemonic systems is incorrect. On one hand hegemonic actors are conceptualized as omnipotent actors that can mold the system to best reflect its goals. Still, others illustrate that such unipolar systems can never be achieved, or at most exist for a short time as other powers move to the international system. Mearsheimer illustrates a more realistic approach: that unbalanced multipolar systems can exist, in which a larger state is present in a traditional multipolar system, not a traditional vertical authority structure. He contends that such system is transient, for this larger power will eventually be reined in by other actors. This piece contends that these unbalanced systems are reality, and that current thought relies only on systemic notions and does not realize other constraints that maintain system stability for significant durations of time. This theory is based upon a series of three hegemonic constraints: international regime constraints, domestic constraints, and the degree of hegemonic power concentration. This work maintains that these hegemonic handcuffs constrict the actions of the dominant state in the international system so as to preclude traditional balancing behavior by the remaining great powers in the system, until a point in time in which the hegemonic actor begins to cast off its shackles. It is at this point in a hegemon’s life that the remaining great powers begin to balance the power of the dominant state, hence signaling the end of the hegemonic actor’s supremacy. The work will utilize the cases of Spanish hegemony in a structured focus framework to delve into the theory in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyses of the conflict behavior of established parliamentary systems have shown that governments consisting of right parties are more likely to engage in international conflict than are governments of left parties. This stems from the foreign-policy preferences of the parties’ constituencies, which may prefer hawkish, nationalist policies (for right voters) or accomodationist and diplomatic policies (for left voters). Diversionary theory argues that a government facing domestic crises might engage in international conflict to shore up domestic support during difficult economic times. Two prominent economic difficulties that established democracies face are unemployment and inflation. Does high employment and/or high inflation lead to diversionary behavior? We argue that right and left governments respond differently to these economic challenges. Our analyses show that right governments are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes when inflation is high, while left governments are more likely to initiate such conflicts when unemployment is high. These differentiated responses are consistent with Ben Fordham’s findings for the United States. They also help us tie domestic political and economic factors to international conflict behavior more directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes two anti-terrorism policies ­ deterrence and preemption ­ in an environment where a targeted nation’s people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad. A country’s deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs, while its preemption decision only gives external benefits. With damages limited to home interests, a country will overdeter, while, for globlized terror, a country will underdeter. Preemption is always undersupplied. Leader-follower behavior is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence, but worsens inefficiency for preemption as compared with Nash behavior. Policy conclusions are drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For all the attention it evokes, international terrorism, in reasonable context, actually causes rather little damage, and the likelihood that any individual will become a victim in most places is microscopic. But few people, it seems, are aware of either fact. This paper examines 1) the process by which terrorism is measured, demonstrating its limited direct consequences; 2) the fears and the behavioral consequences it creates and nourishes, including economically evasive behavior, negative health effects, and apparent support for policies that often prove expensive and of dubious quality; and 3) the potential longterm persistence of these fears, suggesting that the internalized fears about terrorism may be around for decades ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of Rogue States and the associated idea of Outlaw Diplomacy raise both practical and theoretically interesting questions about the international system in which we live. On the one hand, name-calling has always been regarded as poor diplomacy. On the other, designating states as rogues and outlaws implies an international society by suggesting both standards of behavior and an audience which cares about the maintenance of such standards. By examining US foreign policy towards the three states which its government designated the "Axis of Evil," this paper investigate the senses in which name-calling might be regarded as bad diplomacy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At what level, if any, does presence in the domains of gains or losses matter for military behavior? For example, how does a tactical commander in the domain of losses at the tactical level, but in the domain of gains at the operational level, behave in ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 90's and the beginning of the new century, the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) took part in several financial crises with different results. Even though in many of the cases it contributed to a rapid solution, in others its behavior was strongly criticized. These critiques focus on the fact that the organism not only failed in avoiding the outbreak of the crises, but also in that its intervention aggravated them. However, some divergences exist around the motivations that would explain the organism's behavior. While some point out that its intervention is the consequence of the exigencies coming from the central countries, to which the Fund directly serves, others argue that is the result of the application of politically neutral and technically expert criteria.Instead of considering the Fund as "machinery" without any autonomy or a completely autonomous technical institution, we propose to analyze the IMF as a social actor with a relative autonomy. Thus, we propose to study the IMF's actions in a dynamic and historical way that let us approach to it as the contingent result of a complex process in which multiple actors and interests intervene, none of which can determine by their own the process' outcome.In this line of work, we argue that the IMF's behavior in contexts of financial crises can be analyzed as the result of the interaction of three factors: a) the economic and geopolitical interests of the central countries; b) the interests from within the institution and its bureaucracy, and c) the behavior of the country in crisis with which the IMF enters in relationship. In order to tackle the study of the problem, a case study strategy is carried out focused on the analysis of the IMF's behavior during the most intense phase of the recent argentine crisis (2000-2002). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal scholars and political scientists typically study domestic public law and international public law as separate subjects, treating them as essentially different phenomena. Among the reasons given for this domestic-international distinction are doctrinal differences between the two realms of public law, and the claim that domestic and international public law function in intrinsically different ways. In contrast, I argue that domestic and international law have fundamental similarities, and that there may be much to gain from systematically studying these similarities. For instance, the basic doctrinal nature of domestic and international public law is the same: to prescribe appropriate government behavior. Moreover, as suggested by a review of rational choice and norm oriented theories of law, domestic and international public law may function in similar ways, influencing government behavior through similar causal and constitutive mechanisms. I therefore propose a unified concept of public law as a heuristic for exploring the theoretical, pedagogical and policy implications of thinking beyond the domestic-international distinction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This presentation offers the final results of our Globalization-Localization project--a cross cultural comparative survey of students’ attitudes and behavior about IR. Our initial descriptive findings were presented at ISA 2008, where we received construc ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English School is associated with the identification of self-reflective codes of behaviour. In theorising international society, for example, they would argue that such a society is not produced by forces that exist outside of individual human agents, such as 'the balance of power' or 'globalisation' if these are understood as processes which happen irrespective of human intention. Rather they insisted that the construction and maintenance of an international society depends upon human engagement and human understanding. In recounting the history of the emergence of such a society, or the forces that changed it, they will, accordingly, tend to prefer agency-centred forms of explanation or intentional explanation. It is true that they were sensitive to the conditions under which such an understanding might arise, and their works are peppered with insights on such conditions. They were also concerned with their identification and verification. Such concerns will make them attentive to structural theories. But it will also make them suspicious of theories which try to replace intention with structure. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]