Search

This paper discusses the revision process of the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The ETS has so far operated on the basis of a main directive adopted in 2003 and a 'linking directive' adopted in 2004. In January 2008 the European Commission put forward a formal proposal for a revision of the system and hence new rules for trading in the 2013-20 period. The proposal was debated in the EU decision-making bodies in the course of 2008 and the final revised directive was adopted in December 2008. With the outcome of the process and the significant changes adopted as the dependent variable, the paper discusses three main explanations. First, applying 'intergovernmentalist' lenses, the key determinants for EU policy are found at the level of member states. The member states are the ultimate and main decision-makers, through decisions in the Council. Second, applying the lenses of multi-level governance theory, key determinants for EU policy are (increasingly) found in the positions and actions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission is the formal agenda-setter in the EU, but has also formal and informal influence in the decision-making phase. The Parliament has become a formal co-decider in the EU. Third, looking through global lenses, key determinants for EU policy may be found in global factors and institutions. Not least, EU policy-making is often embedded in global regimes/institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International legislative agreements have become a central mode of governance at the supranational level. The European Union has emerged as a regulatory state enabling the efficient and institutionalized coordination of international legislation in Europe. The regulatory nature of the European Community implies such political systems derive their efficiency and legitimacy through compliance with international laws by member States. However, although member states have engaged in such form of international agreement through voluntary treaty ratification and institutional bargaining, the European Union has been reported to suffer from an implementation deficit whereby national states may fail to comply with their obligation. This paper addresses the issue of state compliance to supranational law by focusing on the European Union political system through cross-country analysis of the application of EU directives promoting trade and environmental agreements since 1980. Trade and environmental policies have high political salience. They define the current context of economic competition and reduce the negative externalities of market mechanism at the national and European level for member states. Using econometric techniques the following research finds functional institutional designs delegating enforcement mechanisms to non-state actors are the main determinant of state compliance. In addition, variances in observed levels of compliance are not the product of rational cost benefit calculations alone and are determined by institutional capabilities and learning. This papers draw empirically verifiable recommendations for the design of efficient institutional models of governance and should provide valuable implications for EU and international political economy research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]