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This paper summarizes preliminary findings of a sectoral empirical case study that explores the impacts of contemporary globalization on national security. The case focuses on the Taiwanese semiconductor industry migration to China, as part of the continuous globalization of the chip sector, and the extent to which such a globalization process, under certain conditions, may pose security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper is composed of four sections. The introductory section explains why it matters to adopt a sectoral approach to the study of globalization's impacts on security and why it matters to focus on the chip industry in the proposed study. The section further defines key concepts of globalization and security as used in the paper, identifies inadequacies in the existing literature, and highlights the significance of the proposed research undertakings. The second section explains rationale behind the methodological choice for the study, and summarizes strategies used to ensure interview access, data representativeness and data reliability. Using evidence collected in more than 140 in-depth interviews with a wide range of chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data, the next two sections dissect the empirical data in two major areas: the sectoral migration and the security implications. On sectoral migration, it is argued that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the indigenous Chinese chip industry development. The ways in which non-state actors of Taiwanese firms and individuals have violated government regulations in order to migrate to China are also identified. As for the ensuing technological and defense security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved; long-term security challenges, however, may emerge taking into account two intervening factors. They involve the technological change in the sector concerning spin-on prevalence and dual-use nature of the chip technology, as well as the PRC grand strategy behind its resolve to establish a solid indigenous chip industry. These long-term security challenges are chiefly linked with three conduits of influence: the defense industrial base and the PLA modernization, technological security risks, and the dubious export control policy implementations. The concluding section argues how and why empirical findings presented in the previous sections deepen our understanding of globalization's impacts on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military threat was intensively used by China during Taiwan's presidential elections but is widely argued as counterproductive because it didn't prevent pro-independence candidates from winning the elections. To explain the logic of China's military threat and outcomes of the elections, this paper develops a formal framework in which China and the incumbent party has better information about the state of the world than voters and non-incumbent party. China's threat is interpreted as a way to transfer information to voters. Although she doesn't prevent the pro-independence party from being elected, China successfully prevents the winning party from declaring formal Taiwanese independence. In this way, China is always better off by issuing threats. In general, this paper not only attempts to improve our understanding of Taiwan Straight confrontation but also tries to shed new insight on the study of military threat in International Relations. It also offers a concrete game theoretic model to illustrate Putnam's two-level game metaphor. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper will analyze Chinese elite's ability to learn from previous policy mistakes. Having learned from policy mistakes in the early 1980s, Chinese elites adopted two distinct views on implementing an outwardly-oriented development regime based on export promotion: a more moderate, controlled opening strategy, where the state played a major role in controlling international influences; and a more ambitious opening strategy, where the state partially gave way to provincial and international market forces to promote coastal development. This paper will measure experimental policy learning and interna-tional learning by analyzing internal Chinese Communist Party and State Council documents, internal conference documents, elite writings and speeches, as well as other inter-nal documents. The paper will focus on the origins of the coastal development strategy in the early 1980s, which culminated in the elite's decision to begin its application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986. The paper will conclude that both internal and international learning took place, but that during this intermediate period of the opening, the international learning played an increasingly important role. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debate about the evolution of Chinese foreign policy is characterized by theoretical gridlock. Will the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue foreign policy strategies of engagement and accommodation in an attempt to achieve a "peaceful" rise to great power status? How will the changing nature of Chinese relative power growth qualitatively affect its relationship with the rest of the international system? What kinds of changes would push the Chinese to engage in more aggressive foreign policy behavior that might include confrontation with regional rivals like Japan and Taiwan or global competitors such as the United States?In this paper, I argue that the debate about the future of Chinese foreign policy has ignored insight offered by a formal analysis of the relationship between specific types of relative power growth and the foreign policy behavior they engender. I show that relative power growth can be divided into early and late stages. These two stages are defined, respectively, by increasing and diminishing rates of relative capability expansion. Existing international relations theory and empirical evidence suggests that this fundamental difference in the rate of relative power growth results in a divergent foreign policy incentive structures during early and late stages of growth. In the most basic sense, the early stage of relative power growth (which the PRC presently is in) cultivates a sense of optimism and leads to a general foreign policy of accommodation. The late stage of growth, however, is accompanied by increasing anxiety and a higher likelihood of confrontational foreign policy behavior. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to provide an understanding and background as to what China's cultural ethos is and whether or not it affects Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, what are China's policy priorities and how do they affect how the People's Republic of China deals with external ethnic conflicts? This study looks specifically at how China has dealt with a variety of policy decisions pertaining to issues of sovereignty in order to draw broader conclusions about the nature and causality of Chinese policy decisions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last three years, U. S. influence in Central Asia seems to have significantly waned. Decreasing U.S. influence appears to have been accompanied by a concomitant increase in Russian and Chinese influence in the region. While some have described the competition for influence in the region a “new great game,” others claim that such a description is overstated. It is clear, however, that the United States, Russia, and China all have interests in the region. It is important, then, for the United States to clearly define its interests and understand whether its interests conflict or complement those of Russia and China. In some cases, U.S. interests may in fact coincide with Russian and Chinese interests, and it should seek ways to cooperate with Russia and China to achieve them. Regardless of whether its interests conflict or coincide with other major players in the region, it is imperative that the United States understand the interests and challenges of the Central Asian countries themselves. Without such an understanding, it risks pursuing policies that diverge from the goals of Central Asian countries and the United States will find it difficult if not impossible to achieve its own interests in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I’m going to explore the factors which affect China-Iran oil relationship and Iran’s role in China’s westbound oil strategy. In addition to Iran’s strategic location in Euroasia and its oil, I will focus on the influence of the Sino-U.S. relation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China is asserting its position as a potential leader in the global economy with its participation in the World Trade Organization and with the upcoming Olympic Games to take place in 2008, the nature of Beijing's relationship with Pyongyang is becoming increasingly important. Thus, a crucial question must be answered: what does China want its relationship with North Korea to be? This question has been tackled at great length over the past decade, but has left out an important aspect of the problem: it is not only what China wants, but how North Korea sees the relationship and interprets it that matters. Therefore, this research aims at expanding knowledge regarding North Korea's potential choices and options if it decides not to follow the Chinese model of opening, which has been heralded as the most desirable policy option for Pyongyang, if the regime does not collapse on its own. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan Strait is one of the few explosive spots in today's world that has the potential to trigger military confrontations between two major powers (the People's Republic of China and the United States). Since the leader of Taiwan is determined to seek Taiwan's formal independence, which cannot be accepted by the PRC, many scholars warn that a Taiwan Strait War will break out in the foreseeable future. Other observers argue that the PRC will not risk a war over Taiwan because it can hardly afford the economic cost of such a war. What are the possible consequences of a future Taiwan Strait War? This article examines the impact of war on the PRC through the history of three major Sino- wars that occurred after the establishment of the PRC. I also look back to the Tiananmen Square Incident to see the international reactions and its damage of a quasi civil war. Although history indicates that war does not necessarily impede the development of China in the long run, the consequences of a Taiwan Strait War will be more serious because of the uniqueness of the Taiwan issue as well as the highly interdependence between the PRC, Taiwan, and the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study will seek to add to understanding of crises in world politics through application of Poliheuristic Theory (PH) to crisis decision-making for two important states, Turkey and China. The research builds on previous analysis of Chinese crises, which found a considerable degree of agreement with predictions derived from PH. The present study moves that work forward in three ways. First, it introduces a new case, Turkey, to the analysis. Second, some additional hypotheses from PH are tested on both states. Third, the results for the two states are compared to each other, with a special emphasis on finding patterns related to anomalies. This study unfolds in five stages. After a brief overview, the next stage introduces PH in the context of crisis decision-making and derives hypotheses. This is followed by case selection and coding procedures. Findings are conveyed initially for Turkey and then in comparison with China. Evidence from each state supports the main hypotheses from PH, namely, Political Primacy and Diverse Dimensions, although the fit is better for Turkey than China with the latter of the two. Conclusions and directions for future research appear last. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes and often reshapes congressional roll-call vote choices on the extension of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China? The gradual engagement policy by the Chinese government in post-Tiananmen period has opened doors not only to American business interests, but also to religious groups and human rights activists. Few studies, however, deal with how those outside influences are translated into legislative outcome in the origin country including the United States. Building upon simple, conditional, and ordered logistic regression models, I estimate what determines vote choices by members of Congress (MCs) on the NTR extension for China in Congress. There are two main findings. First, partisan politics do not stop at the water’s edge, where party dynamics matter, along with constituency pressures and ideological preferences. Northern Democrats and new Democrats, for instance, use the NTR vote as a leverage to represent and promote their own group interests. Presidential party status is critical for vote changes in 2001. Second, a typical liberal-conservative conflict does not apply to a critical foreign policy issue such as NTR extension for China. With different motivations, liberal and conservative members of Congress vote together to disapprove NTR extension for China. The results imply that congressional politics of China policy play out not only around economic interests inviting less ideological divide in recent periods but also around non-economic issues such as human rights and religious freedom involving more ideological conflicts in the US Congress. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the growing hard power of China in the world today arising out of a growing economy and increased political power, there has been scant attention paid to the rise of their soft power. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]