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The paper proposed here aims at unraveling the effects of political institutions on public’s support for democracy. Many students of democratization have regarded public support for democracy as one of the quintessential elements leading a country to democratic consolidation. Countries without substantial level of public support for principles and practices of democratic politics has been degraded as merely “electoral” or “delegative” democracies even though they have competitive elections. Consolidated democracy can stand only on the culture in which ordinary citizens habitually believe in and behave according to the norms and rules of democracy. Some students of new institutionalism argue that certain institutions can encourage breeding higher levels of public support for democracy than others (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999). Focusing upon how institutions make winners and losers, their analyses show that more inclusive and consensus oriented institutions are better to produce more democratic support than majoritarian institutions. It is a very interesting finding broadening topics and knowledge of institutional engineering. However, previous studies have several problems. (1) Their cases are usually limited in western and matured democracies. (2) More significantly, they do not consider the recent achievement of the studies of democratic support: Public support for democracy is multidimensional and multidirectional. (3) Measuring institutional variable is very limited and too simplified. In this paper, using World Value Survey data and other the most recent datasets, not only do we increase the number of cases significantly including old and new democracies, but also we compose new indicators measuring institutions: executive systems, electoral systems and levels of decentralization. More importantly, we conceptually divide public support for democracy into four dimensions: supports for democratic principles, performance of democracy, democratic institutions and personnel in democratic government. Following Lijphart works (Lijphart 1999), we believe consensus oriented institutions due to their nature of inclusiveness are better tools to raise public support. Unlike previous works, however, we hypothesize that not only do each institution make diverse influences on public support but also they are differently embodied in each dimension of democratic support. Our project will reveals more complicated patterns of institutional impacts on democratic support, which has been hidden in the previous studies. Ultimately, it will contribute to enrich current theory and knowledge of institutional designing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will investigate the role of political culture in the democratization process in three post-Soviet States. The paper is an extension of an earlier paper, written and researched over two semesters for graduate research seminars. This study used a most similar case approach involving Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. These three cases are similar in a variety of ways, but vary on the dependent variable, democratization success. The original hypothesis was based on the common argument that a democratic political culture in a state will improve that state’s democratization success The original study’s findings rejected the hypothesis of a positive connection between political culture and democratization, as no clear pattern emerged across the three states or even within them when the indicator questions were analyzed separately. One possible explanation for these findings involves the operationalization of political culture in the original study, as the questions used may have been capturing attitudes toward government policy performance rather than deeply held beliefs about democracy. The proposed paper will employ a different set of questions that arguably capture better the underlying values and beliefs of the population. Following an overview of the original findings, the paper will present an in-depth and critical analysis of the previous survey questions used. The responses of each state will be assessed and analyzed with the intent of finding a pattern within subsets of the original questions. It is not expected that such a pattern will emerge, thus showing the validity issues raised by poor operationalization choices. The paper will then present the results of a new analysis using different survey questions that are arguably more valid indicators of political culture as it is conceptualized in the existing literature. The expectation is that this new study will support the relationship between a democratic political culture and the democratization success of a state. In addition to providing findings important for the ongoing, broader examination of the relationship between political culture and democratization, the study will highlight the importance of question selection in the operationalization of political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the political implications of language policy in Ethiopia. Clearly, language policy is not simply about administrative efficiency or pedagogical concerns. Language, since it is both the vehicle and subject itself of vital political goods for citizens, will always have a political nature. This work considers the types of political goods which language policy is meant to deliver in a multicultural society such as Ethiopia, as well as discusses the various ethical and institutional options available with respect to language policy, in particular assessing where Ethiopia’s current language policy fits. Finally, the paper includes a presentation of initial findings from a series of interviews and focus group sessions with government officials, school administrators, parents, teachers, and students in two Regional States of Ethiopia, particularly as these relate to the larger questions of language and ethnic identity. Attention is given to the theoretical issues which language identity and language choice have for our understanding of political culture and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, where language choice in the multicultural, multiethnic polity is often a contentious policy issue. Despite what one might expect about the present language policy, there is surprisingly little of this type of assessment, from either Political Theory or Comparative Politics. Yet, the interesting thing is that most people in Ethiopia today will tell you right away that language choice is political. This is as opposed to purely pragmatic or pedagogical. Choices of language of instruction in education, for instance, are not only about what helps children learn best, but also about what their identity is, particularly what identity is recognized by the state. Therefore, in culturally diverse societies such as Ethiopia, language policy is a crucial indicator of the nature of the nation-state project, even when such a policy is informal or unspoken. However, political scientists and theorists have paid remarkably attention to the practical and normative dimensions of language policy itself, preferring instead to fold it into a more general discussion of federalism, ethnic conflict or multiculturalism. This gap in the literature means that our understanding of the role of language policy in the development of democratic political culture on the continent remains insufficient. Addressing this question requires careful attention not only to theories of language choice but also the specific political context in which language policy is executed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1974 and 1990, the international system experienced what Samuel Huntington has termed “the third wave of democratization in the modern world” (Huntington 1991). During this sixteen-year period, approximately thirty countries, from southern and Eastern Europe to Latin America to Asia, transitioned to democracy while a handful of other countries significantly liberalized their political systems. In the years following, states continued to democratize, including even apartheid-weary South Africa. Indeed, much of the transition literature touts the peaceful nature of the third wave. The result is that there is a dearth of information regarding political violence and the role it plays in democratic transitions. This paper seeks to explore the issue of political violence as it relates to the transition process. Specifically, does political violence hinder the democratic transition process? Instances of political violence that occur during the transition period are as important to study as instances of peaceful transition; to understand only one type of transition is to misunderstand the idiosyncratic nature of transitions. The gap in the literature that currently fails to address the role of political violence in countries moving toward democratic rule has mistakenly resulted in broad generalizations that violence is only detrimental to the prospect of democracy. Instead, political violence should be understood to be one of many factors affecting the process, sometimes creating problems for the success of the transition but other times emerging as the only option. What this paper finds is that, first, while violence may act as a hindrance to the transition process, other aspects of the transition can be just as much of a barrier. Second, the degrees of obstruction should be qualified – while political violence may be a hindrance, it is by no means detrimental to the transition process. Democratic transitions can successfully occur in the presence of political violence. Finally, democratic transitions should be studied as idiosyncratic phenomena as broad generalizations often do not apply. This paper will explore these three arguments and will also briefly discuss five transitions in which violence occurred– Portugal, El Salvador, South Africa, Romania, and East Timor (Timor Leste). This research will have implications for the sub-fields of comparative politics, international relations, and political violence. How we study democratic transitions and the presence or absence of political violence will be altered as we address the explanatory value of broad generalizations. These “formulae for democratization” have deemed violent transitions as inherently dangerous to the subsequent success of the democratic state. However, the research shows that democracy can indeed arise alongside political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose for this research paper is to investigate the reasons behind the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) initiation of democratization in Taiwan in using the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico as comparison. The KMT should be consider as one of the rare hegemonic ruling party in the world to survive democratic transitions intact, even though the nature and structures of the party have been changed tremendously through democratization. The PRI possess the same qualities. However, the reasons for initiating liberalization of the two parties were somewhat different. Ultimately, four explanatory factors (two internal, two external) emerged as the main contributors to the democratization process in Taiwan. They are: first, the development of Taiwanese identity different from that of the Chinese; second, the political demands and activism of a growing middle class due to the economic success; third, the changes in United States foreign policy towards the encouragement of democratization; and fourth and most importantly, the competition with China for support and the recognition from the international community and the need for the Taiwanese government to enhance its appeal to international supporters, particularly the United States. In addition, while the four factors mentioned above all contributed to the KMT-led democratization in Taiwan, the influence of the United State’s foreign policy in the Fast East and its support of democratic states should be considered the most significant factor contributing to the democratization in Taiwan. In sum, the hypothesis proposed by this research paper is that the accumulation and interaction of all four factors made democratization in Taiwan and the end of the KMT one-party dominance inevitable, with the external pressure from the U.S. essentially playing the most significant role in impelling the KMT elites’ decision to liberalize, adopt electoral reform and stop the persecution of the opposition. The theoretical approaches of the paper are as the following: this paper will adopt the definition of “democracy” provided by Linz and Stepan (1978) to serve as guidelines for whether there is democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. The definition from Linz states that the criteria of democracy are: “ [The] legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without excluding any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability” (Linz, 5). The paper will also posit that Lipset’s take on modernization theory (1959) holds valid in the case of Taiwan. The economic success in the 1970s and 1980s created a large, well-organized middle class that in turn demanded more political freedom, equality and liberalization. In addition, the paper also addresses Linz and Diamond’s (1989) claim that the genesis and maintenance of democracy is ‘greatly facilitated by values and behavioral dispositions, particularly at the elite level, of compromise, flexibility, tolerance, conciliation, moderation and restraint” (Linz, 12). The methodology use by the paper will be comparative analysis on both the KMT and the PRI’s initiation to liberalize. The paper will also provide historical analysis on the nature of the KMT and its 50-year dominance on Taiwan. Lastly, the paper analyzes voter turn-outs and the results of the 2000 presidential election, which validated the consolidation of democracy in both Taiwan and Mexico. Maybe it is because of the geographic distance; Taiwan and Mexico are not often compared and studied together. Even though there are great differences between the KMT and PRI authoritarian regime, the end result of democratization and the eventual ousting of both parties from power were the same. The paper hopes to shed light on the reasons behind an elite-led liberalization by comparing two difference cases with the same end results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

April 2004 marks the 10th anniversary of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, an approximately 100 day calamity in which 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus – or nearly 10 percent of the Rwandan population – were murdered. Using extensive secondary data, interviews and observations collected from 2003 study at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICT-R), this paper reviews the progress made by the Rwandan people and government in the decade since in the areas of economic growth, criminal justice, human rights, democratization, and social development. The economics section focuses on Rwanda’s efforts at reconstruction, including its attempts to diversify from dependence on agricultural commodities (particularly coffee) to a service-centered economy. The section on criminal justice compares the Rwandan experiment with traditional tribal communal justice (the gacaca) to the international community’s westernized approach (the ICT-R) and the initial, abandoned western-derived approach used by the Rwandan government between 1995 and 2002. The section on democratization looks at the recent return to multiparty elections (the first in over two decades), the status of women, international assessments of the freeness and fairness of those elections, and the status of various civil liberties. The paper concludes that Rwanda’s progress in all areas is real and substantive, but also fragile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been little consensus about whether economic crises affect regime stability. Unfortunately, there is also little research directly testing these possible effects. Research that can be found in regard to this topic focuses mainly on whether economic crisis foster regime change, but they do not usually discuss the extent or degree that these regimes might be affected by crisis. In addition, while some authors examine the direction of regime change (democratization or democratic breakdown) they do not account for changes in these directions that do not result in a full transition or breakdown. This paper will explore the more specific role played by economic crisis in fostering regime change. First, the effects of economic crisis and other structural variables on general regime change are tested. Second, this paper considers the factors influencing the direction and degree of regime change. In addition, this paper uses economic crisis to bridge the gap between mobilization theories that rest on the idea of political opportunities and those that point toward relative deprivation. Economic crisis can affect both political opportunities and the quotidian. On the one hand, economic crises may present an opening in the political opportunity structure that may give rise to regime change in general and perhaps influence the magnitude of this change. On the other hand, theories of relative deprivation and disruption of the quotidian would suggest that economic crises may increase levels of discontent and thus result in greater mobilization against the regime, thus affecting regime change. The findings of this paper suggest that economic crisis is significantly related to the degree of regime change, thus greater crises produce changes of greater degree. In addition, this paper finds that economic crisis has different effects (in both degree and direction) according to regime types (democracy versus autocracy) and GDP per capita. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of democratization in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has led to a proliferation of political parties, many of which are historically seen in Western Europe and in other advanced democracies. While on the whole this is seen as a step in the right direction, some parties may have a destabilizing influence on the political system. This paper will focus on one family of parties, far right reactionary parties (FRRP), and what factors lead to their popularity or disfavor among the voting population. Theory indicates that factors regarding immigration, national security and the economy are integral pieces of the FRRP philosophy. If voters feel that there are problems associated with immigration, national security and the economy, FRRP should receive more votes. FRRP should lose votes if the voters feel that the above factors are not problematic. As the literature on FRRP in Eastern Europe is almost non-existant, this paper borrows heavily from work done on FRRP in Western Europe for its theory As the two regions are politically distinct, the theories from Western Europe may not apply to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The researcher treats this paper as a first step in formulating a theory of the reactionary right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When language barriers prevent distinct language groups within a country’s population from meaningfully communicating with one another or with agents in a government purported to serve their interests, it can be difficult to understand how an open public realm of debate, contestation and democratic competition can be sustained. For scholars in sociolinguistics, the answer to the puzzle has by and large been “language planning.” The idea governing language planning is the notion that government policies directed at altering or shaping the linguistic behavior of its citizenry can also indirectly achieve other desirable social outcomes. This paper builds on work a theoretical framework advanced by Jonathan Pool (1990), who argued that political and language regimes mutually constrained one another – to empirically assess the manner and extent to which language regimes – the configuration of linguistic diversity in a given political environment – observably affect the practice of democratic politics. These claims have largely rested on assumptions about the negative consequences of linguistic diversity for social, political, and economic life. Empirical study assessing the effects of different language regimes on the political opinions and behaviors of different language groups is severely lacking. In South Africa, however, a natural laboratory has emerged; opportunities to rectify this shortage of empirical research now exist. The new post-apartheid South Africa is a multilingual country with a Constitution that embraces linguistic diversity. It is a democratic society with decisions made at all levels of government about language and language usage in the public realm; hence, it is characterized by high levels of intra-country variation in terms of the distribution of language groups and language regimes. Finally, it is characterized by a research infrastructure that has produced, since 1996, a great deal of survey data on individual political behaviors and attitudes throughout the country. Language barriers that might stand in the way of a single researcher gathering data on individuals in any of eleven official languages can be overcome. The paper proposed for MPSA presentation uses survey data generated by South African researchers to make inferences about the effect of different language environments on political competition in a new democracy. The first hypothesis tested is that the extent to which a language groups are linguistically included or “enfranchised” by a language regime is positively related to the quality and quantity of that groups democratic participation. The second hypothesis is that language groups linguistically included or “enfranchised” by a language regime are less likely to view ethno-linguistic cleavages salient political boundaries and more likely to exhibit political tolerance. Qualified support is found for both propositions, and “next steps” are outlined in terms of a plan for field research that will provide the basis of a Ph.D. dissertation. The results of the work presented and proposed in this paper have important implications not only for South Africa but for all democratizing countries struggling with an answer to the “language question.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Enhanced political competition is a crucial element of the “resurgence of the states,” and many American states are significantly more competitive than they were a generation ago. What effects have these changes had on their political processes? Since V. O. Key examined the American South a half century ago, scholars have celebrated the positive effects of political party competition. Strategic politicians in competitive states are expected to mobilize new participants into politics, leading to more responsive outcomes. Furthermore, because these formerly passive citizens are generally of lower economic status than those who are already active, such mobilization is predicted to result in greater economic redistribution. A generation of scholars has challenged these expectations, however. First, empirical tests have been largely inconclusive and suffer from methodological and substantive limitations. Second, the logic of this classic argument excludes important political realities. This paper is part of a larger project that alters the terms of this debate in several important ways. Its first contribution is substantive. Many studies link enhanced inter-party competition to policy outcomes, such as increased welfare spending. Assertions about why such changes take place are implicit in these accounts but rarely examined. To construct a convincing account of why competition matters, it is essential to look at this missing link. Scholars often speculate that policy changes result from shifts in the amount of electoral participation, the types of individuals that are mobilized into the process, and the responses of political leaders to these changes. In this paper, we examine this last domain. We test the hypothesis implied by theories of party competition that state legislators from more competitive districts are more likely to be involved in redistributive legislative activity. The second contribution of our paper is methodological. With few exceptions, studies of inter-party competition look exclusively at cross-sectional variation. In contrast, our paper looks intensively at developments over time within three states that have differed considerably in trends in party competition since World War II: Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas. Texas represents a logical candidate for inclusion because the state has undergone a postwar transition from a state dominated by Democrats to one where Republicans hold the levers of power. In contrast, Massachusetts was once competitive but is now dominated by a very liberal Democratic Party. Maryland provides a control case, remaining solidly Democratic throughout the period. Therefore, at the state level, we assess if changes in competitiveness over time are linked to changes in redistributive legislative activity over time. This case selection allows us to account for two important challenges to hypotheses about the effects of party competition. First, many analyses fail to consider the role of race, a curious omission given the importance of the South in these discussions and the likely role of race in creating the new competitiveness within states. Second, the proponents of party competition often fail to address the nature of one-party states. The uncompetitive Southern states of the mid-twentieth century were ruled by conservative coalitions, and several studies link policy outcomes to liberal party control rather than competition. By looking at both Northern and Southern states that vary considerably in ideology and racial composition, we can account for these possibilities. Party competition plays a peculiar role in accounts of American politics. Textbooks note its desirable properties, and comparative politics scholars have incorporated these insights into their discussions of democratization. At the same time, the empirical record is actually quite ambiguous. This paper is a step toward the construction of a more compelling account of the role of inter-party competition in our political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains why some opposition groups can inspire millions to stand in the cold for days while others generate little popular attention? This issue is not sufficiently understood by scholars of social movements and opposition processes, who tend to focus more on underlying and longer term conditions that promote or inhibit action and less on the moment when protests by small numbers of activists expand into mass popular demonstrations. Understanding this moment may help us see why "electoral revolutions" occurred in some former communist countries but not others. My claim in this paper is that cultural context, particularly the limits and opportunities provided by social understandings of nationalism and remembered history, greatly affects whether activists can convince large numbers of people to act together. I defend this claim by analyzing original interviews with youth activists in Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia. My paper shows that the structure of opportunity that activists face includes dominant cultural values and popular expectations that may constrain the story activists hope to tell. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This papers seeks to examine the role of external actors within the democratization efforts of post-Soviet eastern Europe.Much scholarship has focused on the domestic conditions which can breed democratic norms, however,little is discussed of the role of external actors wtihin democratic transitions. This is becoming an increasingly important question due to the growing interdependence between the consolidated democracies of Europe and North America and the emerging democracies of the former Soviet Union.This paper seeks to explore and analyze the role of the European Union within the democratizating states of eastern Europe.The EU has provided much in the way of technical and financial assistance, however,due to the implementation of competing and divergent policies with regards to democratic promotion this institution has fostered the emergence of 'two worlds' within eastern Europe.The EU has succesfully promoted democratic norms within states such as Poland and the Baltic republics,while stifling democratic promotion within states falling under the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Policy.Due to the institutional and domestic interests of EU member states,the EU can no longer serve as a tool democratic promotion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a theoretical argument for conducting inter-regional comparisons of social mobilisation in Eastern Europe and Latin America within the broader scope of democratization theory. Theoretically, the paper examines how two schools: one of Transitology and the other of Democtratisation or Democratic Development have assigned themselves regional boundaries (the first Post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the second Post Authoritarian Latin America).‘Transitologists’ such as V.Bunce (1995,1997) have fiercely defended the isolation of their study of ‘transition’ in EE from the study of democratic development or democratization in LA basing their theory in the perceived explanatory power of 'legacies' (communist or colonial). More a game of intellectual wordplay then empirical substance, the two schools used different terms and frameworks to discuss the same processes..x000d.Based on initial empirical research, I find that there are similar types, trajectories and developments of social movements in LA and EE, and thus that historical legacies (cultural, political or economic) are not sufficient explanatory variables in predicting participation and mobilization (both understood to be necessary for democracy). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how different existence of social capital under the socialist system affected different outcomes of democratization and economic growth during the transition period in Poland and Russia which adopted same transition policy. So far, studies on how social capital impacts democracy and economic development has mostly focused on developed or developing countries. Meanwhile, this paper examines how to define and measure social capital in post-communist countries, and seeks to apply theoretical analysis on correlation between social capital and development to transition countries. Distinguishing periods into communist and transition, this paper analyzes how different degree of social capital existed during communist period and how it has affected different process of transition in Poland and Russia. Using data from World Values Survey, this paper estimates the degree of voluntary civic participation and trust of Poland and Russia as operational definition of social capital. It also analyzes the correlation between social capital and economic growth/stability, and democracy respectively, using data from World Bank, IMF, 'Corruption perception index' from Transparency International, and 'Democracy score' from Freedom House. As a result, this paper suggests emphasis on reconstruction of social capital should be accompanied with establishment of formal system in transition countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution and characteristics of the Polish party system in the period 1991-2007, using the framework of institutionalization. Key moments in the development of the party system are identified by analyzing the results of six consecutive parliamentary elections. At the onset of the development of democratic politics, the party system was characterized by instability and under-institutionalization. By the end of the second decade, it displayed strong signs of structural stabilization and some evidence of the stability of interparty competition and party institutionalization, implying that the Polish party system is quasi-institutionalized. Moreover, the paper attempts to explain the results by focusing on elite behaviour and institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the overall role of the U.S. Foreign Policy's consequences for democratization in Latin America, in an era when Latin America has democratically elected left presidencies, and when new-born democracies (in most cases at least) are supposed to become consolidated. After a historical overview of the U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America during the 20th century; showing that doubts consistently could be raised on the issue of U.S. democratic assistance and Latin America; the paper moves into three main parts. In the first part cases when the United States promoted democratic development and liberal democracy with capitalism is explored. In the second, cases when the United States defeated democratic left-wing rule with strong anti-capitalism is explored. Finally, the third part deals with the question that this paper conclusively attempts to address - what implications the U.S. historical democratic record toward Latin America might have for democratic development and democratic setbacks when the region once more is facing the reality of democratically elected left presidents? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tests the assumption in recent democratization literature that economic inequality declines after democratization. Existing research fail to address theoretical and methodological problems. The theoretical problem is the similar treatment of different levels of democracy. There is no reason to believe that the relationship between democratization and inequality is linear. This paper tests the relationship between different levels of democratization and inequality. It also addresses two methodological problems in previous studies: unobserved heterogeneity and missing data. By relying on cross sectional regressions, earlier studies produce biased results. I construct a panel analysis using and updated dataset and employ a fixed-effects model. Existing research employs list-wise deletion to deal with missing data. I use multiple imputations to eliminate bias and get more tractability from the data available. The finding of this paper is that the assumption in the democratization literature that upon transition to democracy the majority will benefit from greater income equality does not hold. This paper finds a non-monotonic relationship: low levels of democracy are associated with higher levels of income inequality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread of democracy around the world raises important theoretical questions. What affects the process of democratization? Some countries have started this process from similar experiences. They have broken with the authoritarian regime at the same time, and implemented the same type of reforms, but still, some are more successful than others. The answer to this question will allow officials to take better measures and implement better reforms to speed up the process of democratic consolidation. This paper investigates if corruption has a negative effect on the process of democratization. Corruption can slow down the process of democratic consolidation by creating economic inefficiencies, increasing income inequality, and perpetuating obstacles to participation and competition, thus diminishing the legitimacy of the political regime by negatively affecting people’s trust. Using a two stage least squared regression model, this paper controls for endogeneity in the relationship between corruption and democracy by using the level of tariffs in one country as an instrumental variable for corruption. The results are significant supporting the hypothesis that corruption negatively affects the level of democracy in one country. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed paper aims at exploring what ordinary people want their governments to do in the wake of globalization and democratization in East Asia. Specifically, it first examines mass attitudes toward government responsibilities for taking care of various specific social and economic problems. Second, it investigates mass attitudes toward government spending on various specific policy programs. Third, it examines mass attitudes toward government action on various economic policies. Ultimately, the proposed paper explore whether East Asian mass publics are supportive of state expansion or retrenchment and on which areas or policies they demand for more or less state action..x000d.These and other related questions are explored in the context of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) surveys recently conducted in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Through an analysis of the survey data, we highlight key features of East Asian beliefs in the scope of government, account for differences between countries and differences within countries in demands for government action, and ultimately shed light on the changing relationship between citizens and the state in capitalist democracies of East Asia where state activism is deeply rooted. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The democratic gap in the Islamic world has led to a debate regarding the causes of the slow movement towards democratization in Muslim majority states. Leading the debate are Cultural-essentialist Theory and Modernization Theory. This paper utilizes a political culture approach with the assumption that ordinary citizens' political beliefs are critical for democratization, and subsequently tests the two competing theories at the individual level. Unlike prior studies, this paper comprehensively tests these theories across all Islamic regions, allowing for an examination of region specific trends. Using World Values Survey data, this paper finds that throughout the Islamic world, Modernization Theory is overall more influential in explaining variation in democratic attitudes than Cultural-essentialism. While personal religiosity does not impact democratic support, there is evidence that political Islam may negatively effect support for democracy. This study also finds that both theories fail to explain political attitudes in the North African Arab region. This suggests that treating Muslim states as a homogeneous entity effected by a single set of factors has its limitations, requiring supplementation by regional studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil society has been encouraged by scholars as necessary to the successful democratization of developing countries. Women have also been cited as important actors in democratization processes, specifically in the context of post-conflict, peace-building activities (PCPB), but are often overlooked and/or excluded members of civic participation in developing countries. This paper seeks to further expand existing research about the role of women in African democratic transitions, using the Sudan as a case study, in which civil society and the role of women are vital to the future rebuilding of the country. In discussing the establishment of sustainable peace in Sudan, PCPB organizations, as well as other domestic civil society NGOs, with women as active leaders and participants, are providing support in the face of illegitimate, largely ineffective state structures. This paper considers relationships between the state and civil society in the Sudan, highlighting the current struggles and contributions of Sudanese women in assisting their country in peace-building and democratization processes offering insights for overall African state growth and democratization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By examining democratic institutional developments within post-communist Ukraine, this paper challenges the conventional political wisdom positing that patterns of democratization are necessarily inhibited by high levels of societal fragmentation. In the case of Ukraine, these societal cleavages only become inimical to greater democratic institutionalization when combined with the variety of preexisting administrative and institutional characteristics within the Ukrainian political system. Such factors include the nature of Ukraine’s problematic semi-presidential model of government, a weak and fragmented political party system, and the abuse of administrative resources by political incumbents. The effects of such intervening factors are measured by analyses of parliamentary voting patterns, presidential-parliamentary interactions, and coercive clientalistic linkages under the Kuchma presidency with respect to a quadraregional model. Secondly, from a methodological perspective, this paper contends that conceptualizing societal cleavages in regional, as opposed to ethnic or linguistic terms, is a more accurate unit of analysis to be used in the examination, comparison, and categorization of social difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Turkey's relations with the European Union from December 1997 to December 2004 to understand the major dynamics behind the recent democratization and human rights reforms in Turkey. For this purpose, the study focuses on three factors: (1) the impact of EU, particularly the Copenhagen conditionality (2) the government structure (coalition vs. majority government) (3) the governing party's/parties' commitment level to the EU membership goal. The comparison across three periods of Turkey-EU relations (1997-1999, 1999-2002, 2002-2004) makes it possible to identify the relative significance of each factor for the reforms. In combining the international and domestic origins of Turkey's political reforms, the paper emphasizes the central importance of the domestic-international linkages for theoretical and policy purposes.The study uses (comparative) case study method to observe whether the theoretical framework proposed in this paper successfully applies to the cases. A temporal comparison across the three different periods of Turkey-EU relations is expected to show the relative salience of each explanatory factor to understand the development of Turkey's democratization and human rights reforms. In doing so, the paper looks at how EU conditionality has affected the Turkish political elite (government and parties) in realizing the reforms. In other words, how the Turkish elite have taken EU conditionality into account in handling the reforms. For this purpose, the study uses the statements made by prime ministers, party leaders, and the members of parliament. Also, it draws on the European Council decisions, and the European Commission reports. To measure the explanatory factors and the dependent variable, the following sources will be utilized: the EU harmonization law packages, the adoption of civil and penal code, the constitutional amendments, the establishment of new institutions regarding the EU membership process, the statements by Turkish officials, the Commission reports, the views of Turkish columnists, party programs, government programs, Turkey's National Program for the adoption of EU acquis, and the Freedom House ratings for civil liberties and political rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics considering the interplay between democratic transitions and market policies implementation.Latin American politiesâ??political parties, social movements or networksâ??have in recent times moved towards different forms of leftist options, whether in discourse or in policy making. Although the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic régimes were coupled by more center-to-right régimes, the present leftist trend should come as no surprise. Democracy was reestablished almost at the same time as pro-market policies following the then dominant Washington consensus were implemented. Almost two decades after these policies were launched, their basic promise of increased welfare for all citizens has not been fulfilled. Although social, economic and cultural inequalities are deeply rooted in Latin American societies and were already notorious well before the Washington Consensus, it is more or less a generalized impression that neoliberal policies have aggravated these inequalities. Even if there is still debate on their precise impacts on inequality, poverty and economic growth, what can be said beyond contestation is that strengthening democracy has made social inequalities more apparent, public policy responses more transparent, and hence political representation more accountable. Secondly, expectations concerning high rates of economic growth have not been met in any country in the region, except for Chile. The public's impression of policies largely failing to respond to increasingly visible social inequalities has triggered a shift of political preferences towards the left, which is evidenced by recent elections as well as the general discourse in the political debates throughout the region. The purpose of this paper is to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying logic and possible consequences of this leftist trend in Latin American politics. In doing so, I address the current debate on populism and the extent to which it poses a threat to democracy. This debate has been obscured by extreme views that either condemn all forms of policies that seek to confront inequalities or hail such policy efforts blindly. I argue that this debate needs a more nuanced examination of the specific institutional characteristics of populism in contemporary Latin American democracies. As Alexis Tocqueville works remind us, during times of changeâ??even radical onesâ??there are important strings of continuity that ought to be considered because they are crucial determinants of potential restorations. The de facto governance structures in modern Latin America are often shaped by traditional relationships between members of the oligarchy rather than by recent political reforms. Culture and its norms continue to shape interactions in contemporary Latin American politics. Various paths are being pursued to overcome the crises related to governance structures, the vulnerability of governing coalitions, and mechanisms of representation in Latin America. However, success in pursuing these paths requires addressing the major issue of inequality. This takes us back to another of Tocqueville's main concerns. As Vincent Ostrom put it, "Tocqueville's task in Democracy in America was to understand the American efforts to organize a republican system of government and to determine whether it offered a promise of maintaining liberty under conditions of equality." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper was to reflect and identify the agents of the demise of multiparty politics and democratization in Côte d'Ivoire between 1990 and 1999. Following a historical and paradigmatic approach, the paper articulated two points: 1) that multiparty politics and democratization caused political instability in Côte d'Ivoire and 2) that the political parties, political leadership, and masses failed to re-invent a new political consensual culture to deal with the post-1990 exigencies of multiparty politics. Taking the political behaviors, discourses, and ideologies that prevailed between 1990 and 1999 as variables of analysis, the paper concluded that the transformation of political institutions and structures was achieved without political actors committing to provide a political education that would empower the masses and erase the impact of ethnicity, corruption, and militarization. In fact, the paper concludes that the multiparty and democracy project failed in Côte d'Ivoire because of the prevalence of the one-party culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to lay the foundations for conceptualizing a normative conception of "the political" in a manner that is consistent with the prospects for the democratization of transnational organizations. In order for theories of transnational justice to establish themselves as critical theories concerned with issues of political justice, they must contain an explicit theory of the political. Without a coherent conception of the political that takes into account transnational relations, claims for political justice lodged on transnational levels cannot be adequately defended. This leaves theories of transnational justice open to criticism by statist theories that privilege a conception of the political that is bound to the sovereign nation-state alone. In this paper, I will argue for a concept of the political that is decoupled from the concept of the sovereign state. This does not mean to say that the sovereign state is not political, but that within the contemporary context, the sovereign state is no longer, if it ever was, the sole site of political struggle. Such a concept of the political would have normative implications for democrats. If the political exists with relation to transnational organizations, democrats must inquire into the condition and prospects for democratic politics beyond the frame of the nation-state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of international relations and comparative politics examine the various determinants of democratization. The international aspect of democratization is mostly perceived as a state to state process while Intergovernmental Organizations' (IOs) role on this process is disregarded. This paper attempts to empirically show the association between IOs and democratization. It concludes that IOs play a significant role in democratization process of authoritarian regimes and nascent democracies. In this paper, potential role of IOs over democratization is discussed theoretically. Second, an alternative way of measuring IOs democracy leverage is suggested. The major conclusions are threefold; Duration of membership in democratic IOs increases the levels of civil liberties but not political rights. The democratic leverage of IOs is prevalent for both political rights and civil liberties; and, there is no evidence that the trade with democratic IOs have indirectly promoted democratization in the member states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much recent research demonstrates that the structural conflict between the propertied and the poor in non-communist authoritarian states affects the likelihood, timing, and outcome of democratization. In highly unequal societies, democratization has a strongly redistributive effect.The effect of transition in postcommunist democracies was quite different. Given the absence of private property in most means of production, the deliberate policies of wage compression, the widespread availability of income-support mechanisms, and the importance of collective consumption funds in such social goods and services as housing, healthcare, education, transportation, cultural goods and recreation, both income and consumption differentials were narrow compared with democratic capitalist societies at similar development levels. The transition, therefore, brought substantial increases in aggregate income inequality to the post-communist countries, with some post-communist countries reaching levels higher than those of some West European countries.Much political economy literature suggests that democratization is expected to make government more responsive to wider segments of society, more inclined to supply universal collective goods and services such as security of person and property, health care, education, and infra-structure, as well as to provide some minimum level of social insurance against the hazards of catastrophic income loss. These public goods and services should foster productive behavior on the part of economic agents, and thus growth, as well as the mitigation of extremes of poverty and inequality.However, collusion in rent-extraction by post-transition elites might be consistent with high rates of economic growth under some circumstances. If the elites take advantage of the new institutional environment of a post-communist state and capture control over productive assets for themselves, they might well use them to increase their own incomes, yielding rapid aggregate growth the benefits of which are concentrated in a narrow elite. The institutional advantages of democratization and property rights might be restricted to those holding monopolies over property, and not broadly shared. Their policies would lead to higher growth rates after an initial period of disorganization was overcome. But the benefits of the growth would be distributed unequally. An oligarchic democracy would complement an oligarchic form of capitalism. This paper examines the effects of the dual political and economic transition on income inequality trends, taking Russia's subnational regions (the subjects of the federation) as the units of observation. Noting that the regions differed widely both in their starting conditions and in the increase in income growth and differentiation as a consequence of the transition, it seeks to identify the political mechanisms that explain variation in income and inequality growth following the transition. Using both direct and instrumental measures of democracy by region, the paper finds evidence consistent with the "oligarchic democracy" model. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even after March 2006 presidential elections, Belarus remains the last dictatorship in Europe. When democratic opposition planned to launch a "color" revolution, its protest caused little commotion on the nation's political arena. Belarusian opposition failed to unleash public uprising, necessary to topple the government of A. Lukashenka and authoritarian regime still remains firmly entrenched in Minsk.This paper argues that at least two factors contribute to such lack of accomplishment on the part of Belarusian opposition. First, Belarus lacks an established civil society and its population suffers from a want of political knowledge and understanding. Such situation is resultant from the actions of authoritarian government, which limit the scope of liberal education and interfere in the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The study examines this first factor within the contemporary framework of authoritarian rule in Belarus, which has lasted for eleven years (1996 - 2007). Second, Belarusian people are still experiencing a severe identity crisis. Belarusian nation remains the most "soviet" amongst all the former Soviet Union republics. Lack of nationalism and inability to create common identity further contribute to political apathy. The paper examines lack of nationalism from a historical perspective, bringing to light historical underpinnings of Belarus' identity crisis.Methodologies used in this study include literature review, content analysis, case studies, and comparative analysis. This study contributes to understanding of both, democratic transitions in general and obstacles, which hamper democratic development in the former Soviet nations. Additionally, it increases the amount of scholarship written on the political situation in Belarus and helps evaluate the scope of the issues at play. Finally, the study could be translated into concrete policy suggestions, which could potentially lead Belarusian people to embark upon the path of democratization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses U.S. neoconservative policy prescriptions for democratizing and empowering political Islam and considers the sources of the neoconservative understanding of the Arab world. The analysis of the Middle East is almost exclusively normative, arguing what U.S. policy toward the region should be. Neoconservative aims are ambitious and inherently controversial. The paper examines what various neoconservatives have said and written about Islam and its democratic prospects.

Our paper investigates how changes in perceived threat levels, democratization, and alliance politics have brought about falling military expenditures in Taiwan since the early 1990s, even as the military threat from mainland China has intensified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impacts of the EU's political conditionality on the democratization of Turkey to argue that compliance with the admission criteria requires not just legislation but more significantly, implementation of democratic measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous work in post-Soviet states suggests support for democratic values legitimizes democratic institutions. This paper builds on this literature and links it with support for socioeconomic gender equality using survey data gathered in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of Brazil's New Unionism in the context of regime consolidation. Changes in democratic practice are understood as by-products of factional responses to challenges posed by broad economic and political transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the origins, structures, and functions of three types of environmental NGOs in China. It examines how various political and resource constraints have shaped their impact on civil society and democratization in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to fill an empirical void in the literature that treats the relationship between transition to democracy and economic growth. Most studies in this area examine the impact of a state?s level of democracy on its economic prospects. Few studies have addressed the impact of democratization itself on economic performance. We use an interrupted time series technique to study the link between democratization and economic growth in 22 countries that experienced transitions to democracy during ?The Third Wave? of democratization. Our findings show that transition to democracy has an inconsistent impact on economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the conflicting hypotheses of ethnic hatreds and elite persuasion as causes of ethnic nationalist conflict. These theories essentially differ on the acceptance of culture as a factor in the ethnic nationalist conflict that arises with democratization. The ethnic hatreds theory, that nationalist conflict is caused by ancient culture-based hatreds, has tended to be discredited among scholars who argue that culture is not an adequate explanatory feature in examining conflict. It places its sole emphasis on culture, thus making it insufficient in explaining the causes of nationalist conflict. The elite persuasion theory proposes that leaders orchestrate nationalist conflict for political purposes. In Jack Snyder’s formulation (in his work From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict), as a state democratizes, elites, those in control of government or society, begin to lose power. In an attempt to regain power, they control the press and make nationalist appeals. As people divide into ethnic nationalist groups, this either intentionally or unintentionally causes conflict. However, this theory focuses on WHY elites persuade, rather than HOW they persuade. Its proponents argue that culture is not a factor and conflict is instead provoked by leaders. Because the elite persuasion theory discredits culture as a cause, it also is an inadequate theory. This study thus synthesizes the two theories and incorporates culture as a cause by introducing the idea of elite manipulation to explain the causes of nationalist conflict. Using the case of Serbia from 1988 to 1999, this study will focus on HOW elites persuade, specifically concentrating on elite manipulation of ethnic nationalism through an examination of political speeches, government documents, and media sources. Culture is a tool elites use to gain power. It will be shown that elites do in fact make appeals to a common history and culture at certain key points. In this case study, this was at the point when leaders were gaining power. Key speeches increased power by mobilizing mass support. Once elites gained power, explicit appeals to a shared history decreased, and they maintained power through control of the media. Nonetheless, culture continued to play a role. What past studies emphasizing elite persuasion have failed to consider is that not only are elites appealing to one ethnic group, but they are also suppressing competing ethnic groups to gain and maintain power. Competing groups were culturally suppressed in Serbia as elites attempted to influence every aspect of life from language to education. Therefore, in place of the elite persuasion theory, which sidelines culture and focuses on populist appeals to one ethno-nationalist group, this study suggests that a more complete theory includes the aspect of culture. Ethnic nationalist conflict is not only caused by elite persuasion but by elite MANIPULATION, including both cultural appeals and cultural suppression. This concept best explains the case of Serbia from 1988 to 1999 by synthesizing the competing theories explaining the ethnic nationalist conflict that occurs as a result of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic modernization has been thought to promote democracy on two levels: first, making democratic transitions more likely (the endogenous link), and, second, making democracies more stable (the exogenous link). While the latter link has gained widespread acceptance, the former is still very controversial. This paper re-conceptualizes the endogenous link between democracy and development as a conditional probability problem, suggesting that, when a transition takes place, it is more likely to be democratic in more economically developed states. The study demonstrates that such an understanding is consistent with previous findings and theory on modernization, and then tests this conception of modernization in an original dataset spanning 348 transitions in 116 countries from 1950-2000. The results provide strong support for the conditional probability interpretation of modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the collapse of Soviet power in the Eastern bloc and the upheaval of the debt crisis in Latin America, the political agenda in both regions was dominated by struggles over creating free market economic systems. Just as striking, those economic experiments were accompanied by a wave of political opening in both parts of the world. Such simultaneous transitions naturally spawned investigations into how these processes might be causally related. Scholars, however, have encountered a number of difficulties in exploring that link. First, many studies, especially the more common small-N analyses, have had trouble distinguishing between the effects of economic liberalization and other, often collinear, potential influences on political outcomes. Second, large-N studies of a cross-sectional nature are unable to evaluate the expectation of many scholars that the short- and long-term effects of economic liberalization on politics are quite distinct. Finally, studies focused on a single geopolitical region cannot say which of their findings will travel to other parts of the world. In this paper we seek to overcome these challenges in two ways. First, we use a time-series/cross-sectional framework, which allows us both to evaluate the short- and medium-term effects of economic liberalization on democratization and to hold constant the influence of international pressures, the weight of the agrarian sector, and the level of socioeconomic development. Second, we evaluate the generality of our findings by conducting parallel analyses in two distinct geopolitical regions: Latin America and the formerly communist countries of the Soviet bloc. Our approach yields four preliminary findings. First, we find that the establishment of free markets has little to do with the consolidation of democracy. We find no relation between the two in the short run, and we argue that the positive medium-run relationship in Latin America is a function of the way that free-market reforms undermine the ability of material losers from liberalization to organize. Second, we find that a large agrarian sector impedes democratization in both regions, even controlling for other factors. Third, on questions of international influence, we find that generic linkages between a developing country and industrialized democracies have no discernible effect on democratization. By contrast, the explicit and consistent democratic conditionality attached to EU accession appears to have a very strong (and positive) influence on political liberalization. Finally, while our analysis is not aimed at evaluating the much-debated modernization thesis linking socio-economic development and democracy, our results are consistent with recent work that has called into question a causal link between these two phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A comparative analysis of democratization in Eritrea and Uganda, this paper surveys the viability of the ?Movement System (MS) Democracy? as a suitable approach to democratization in Eritrea and Uganda. Following an appraisal of the arguments for and against the MS democracy (also known as No-Party Democracy), and a historical analysis of political pluralism in Uganda and Eritrea, three underlying criteria are employed in assessing the potentials of MS for a peaceful, and participatory democratic transition in Eritrea and Uganda. The first criterion, the participatory criterion, deals with whether the MS provides a veritable transitory modality of democratization by promoting meaningful and extensive grassroots participation in transition processes. The second criterion, the development criterion, asks if the MS creates a favorable political and policy environment for equitable socio-economic development. The third criteria, the conflict resolution criteria, assesses the effectiveness of the MS in creating national consensus and unity in the midst of real or imagined ethnic fragmentation by bringing together historically polarized social and political groups, and giving them the opportunity to coalesce behind ideals of democratic and socio-economic transformation. The application of the three criteria to the MS of Eritrea and Uganda produced mixed outcomes. In both Eritrea and Uganda, transition processes such as constitution-making were profoundly popular and participatory, even though organized political participation remained relatively limited, and immensely controversial. The introduction of the MS has been relatively constitutional and participatory, where as in Eritrea; the MS has been superimposed from above even though the Eritrean constitution provides for multi-party elections. Uganda has been able to consolidate the MS democracy through village level participatory institutions such as the RC (Resistance Council) system. In Eritrea, the MS is still in its infant stage, lacking such institutions as the RC. Uganda continues to suffer from debilitating internal conflict in the North, even though opposition groups have been willing to operate within the MS framework to negotiate with the incumbent regime, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), on issues of further democratization such as the introduction of multipartyism. In Eritrea, shrinking political space due to recent post-war crackdown on internal opposition and private press has created a worrisome, highly volatile, conflict-prone situation due to polarization between the government and banned Diaspora opposition groups and parties. Overall, the MS has been a highly contentious and elusive approach to democratization, much more so in Eritrea than in Uganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continued economic reform has brought up a new social group in China – the private entrepreneurs, also called “new capitalist class, who have held quite a large power to bargain with the government. They are expected to lead political democratization in China. However, public opinion surveys of this group indicate that rather than rapid political changes, they prefer social stability. And they hardly look like an opposition of the current regime judged by their support to it. How to explain this conservatism of the “Chinese capitalists”? Are they an exception or actually reflecting some general features of the capitalist class worldwide? What kind of role will they play in future Chinese political arena? To answer these questions, this paper reviews the previous theories and tries to bring the Chinese case into a theoretical frame. Some theories view bourgeoisie class as determinant in democratization (i.e. Marx, Weber, Barrington Moore, etc.). Others believe they are not the necessary carrier of democracy (i.e. modernization theory, Rueschemeyer and Stephens and Stephens (RSS), etc). Though different from each other at many aspects, many of them used the comparative historical approach. One limitation to this is that it observes the agents (i.e. the political elite, a social class) through retrospection of the history. Therefore the class interests and class behaviors were mostly inferred by the historical outcomes. It is like archeologists to infer the historical changes by examining the fossil. They did not get the chance to know the real thoughts and motivations behind the behaviors of the agents. In this consideration, when dealing with the Chinese case, the author started from a comparison of two public opinion surveys (done by Margaret M. Person in 1995 and Bruce J. Dickson in 1999) to get a general idea of how the political beliefs of the Chinese “new capitalists” changed along with the increase of their economic power. It shows that they are still quite conservative on political change, even though they have developed some democratic values in the past. They would rather sacrifice economic reform for social stability; they prefer elite-oriented politics to mass participation; and they favor political structural change initiated by government instead of by the people. The reasons are 1) the adaptation of the CCP and 2) the informal (personal) ties with the governors have earned the private entrepreneurs large amounts of economic and political benefits. Therefore, they do not have the necessity and incentives to challenge the government. In contrast, we see mutual reciprocity and more collaboration between the CCP and Chinese capitalists. This coincides with the RSS theory. The problem is how long this cooperation between the government and the “capitalists” will last in China. RSS theory and experiences of other regions show that potential conflicts in the future however cannot be excluded completely. Besides, the Chinese case also challenges some ideas of RSS theory, including the concept of “alliance” of different social classes and the role of working class in democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that two important causes of international integration are given insufficient weight in the integration literature. First, poor countries seek to integrate with rich countries in order to secure budgetary transfers, import improved political institutions and increase political stability, increase the inflow of foreign capital, and secure large gains in market access for their firms. Second, rich countries integrate with poor countries when political instability in the poor country generates significant negative externalities for the rich country. An important determinant of whether those negative externalities will accrue is the relative geographic proximity of the countries. Because the benefits of integration with rich countries tend to be large for poor countries, and because democracy tends to be a prerequisite of integration with rich countries, credible prospects for integration increase the likelihood of democratization. For those countries for which dictatorship prevents beneficial integration, the opportunity cost of dictatorship is relatively high. Hence, their pro-democracy forces are more likely to successfully organize, attract political support, and establish democracy. I apply the argument to the case of EU expansion and regime type variation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). I argue that a country?s geographic proximity to the EU core determines the credibility of its EU membership prospects, while credible membership prospects increase the likelihood of democratization. I claim that data from CEE are consistent with this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dictators and Democrats: The Political Sources of Success in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment. by Oksan Bayulgen and Jeffrey W Ladewig Among the top ten recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1990s are a number of non-democracies (UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002). This seems to run in the face of neo-liberal arguments that posit a positive relationship between democratization and globalization. To explore this inconsistency further, this paper examines two aspects of this relationship: democratizing countries’ institutional performance in attracting foreign direct investment. In a global economy where competition for scarce international financial resources is increasingly acute, political reasons for success become increasingly important. In addition to economic determinants, many FDI theories explain investment patterns in terms of the host government’s policy framework and investment promotion. Much of this literature, however, fails to offer a systematic analysis of the political institutions that shape the constraints and opportunities of the decision-makers in host countries. In light of this, we develop and statistically test a theory of FDI Performance that is based on regime type and executive constraints. We argue that, given the institutional capacity typically found in authoritarian, hybrid and democratic regimes, the constraints on executive authority (i.e. the number and strength of veto players and the degree of accountability of decision-makers to these veto groups), is a significant determinant of FDI performance. Importantly, the relationship is not exclusively positive. Contrary to the Washington Consensus and expanding on a growing body of research (Li and Resnick, 2003), we argue and find that the relationship between democratization and globalization is nonlinear. In particular, we argue that the degree of executive constraints and the institutional capacity typically found in authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies help to explain the attractiveness of investment environments. Conversely, the transitional nature of the executive in hybrid regimes (i.e., low institutional capacity and strong pressures from pluralistic interests) creates tremendous difficulties in constructing similarly successful investment environments. This is due to either the lack of executive flexibility (as often found in authoritarian regimes) or the lack of executive credibility and co-opted pluralism (as often found in consolidated democracies). In addition to challenging the conventional assumptions for success in the global economy, these results have significant implications for institutional development of democratizing countries. To test our hypotheses, we employ a ‘large-n’ statistical analysis. Our dataset is constructed largely from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2002 and the Polity IV datasets. This provides us with a dataset of over 100 non-OECD countries from 1970 to 2000. Using the appropriate cross-section time-series procedures, we find that the hypotheses of our theory are confirmed. The effects of institutional development on FDI performance are significant and nonlinear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists have studied the causes of democracy for decades, and despite these scholars? valiant efforts, there is still little known about what causes the transition to democracy or stability in newly established democracies. One possible reason for this lack of knowledge is the failure of many political scientists to use, or even consider, political culture in systematic studies of democratization. Although almost all political scientists admit political culture plays a role in the democratization process, there has been virtually no empirical work done on the relationship between political culture and the transition to democracy. The following paper seeks to fill this void in the literature by empirically testing the relationship between Mary Douglas? theory of culture and consolidation of democracy. Using Douglas? theory, one can predict that a country undergoing consolidation of democracy should have an increase in the number of individualist and hierarchical cultures and a decrease in the number of egalitarian and fatalist cultures. These predictions are tested using with an OLS regression model, where democracy is regressed on political culture. From the data gathered from a sample of twenty-three countries, there seems to be strong support of the predictions made by the theory, but as pointed out, there are some problems to be solved through future research in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been growing interest in the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. The Arab world is the only region to be virtually untouched by the Third Wave of democratization, and since the World Trade Center terrorist attacks and the U.S. war in Iraq, the prospects of democracy within this region have increasingly preoccupied both academics and policymakers. Recent scholarship, in an attempt to move beyond cultural explanations of the lack of democratic institutions in the Middle East, has explored the relationship between the nature of authoritarianism and political change. Most of this research, however, has attempted to shed light on this relationship by using comparative case studies. In addition, these studies tend to be informed by only one theoretical framework, and thus do not integrate other important explanatory variables. This paper attempts to address some of these shortcomings. In particular, we consider which combination of structural characteristics within the Middle East is most conducive to regime change in general, and democratization more specifically. These structural conditions include both traditional variables such as modernization, oil rent and ethnic fractionalization, as well as more recently introduced factors such as the nature of Middle Eastern authoritarianism (i.e. Sultanism, Dynasticism, etc.). To explore these relationships, we combine case studies with statistical analysis to gain a more nuanced understanding of these processes over time. Moreover, we draw on different theoretical traditions to provide a more complete account of the relationship between structural characteristics and regime change and democratization. Our findings suggest that the explanations of regime change and democratization in the Middle East are much more complex than many scholars suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists have studied the design and political impacts of different election systems for some time now, but it is only recently that they have turned their attention to the question of why governments choose to alter the rules under which their respective politicians stand for office. One important consequence of this increased scholarly attention is the finding that this phenomenon occurs more frequently than originally thought. Indeed, the growing literature on this important topic has shown that election system change occurs not only in the world’s established democracies but also in countries that recently made the transition to democracy. Moreover, a small number of studies have shown that manipulations of electoral rules have even occurred in countries that have not completely made the transition to democracy. Between 1948 and 2000 inclusive, sixteen elections were held for the South Korean National Assembly, and, in ten of these national contests, politicians stood for office under election rules that had been altered. While most of these changes were minor and involved shifts in the number of district and PR seats, three were substantial. The first involved the replacement of the SMD system with a mixed system while the second change involved retaining the PR portion of the mixed system but replacing the SMD portion with a system of multimember districts. The final change also retained the PR portion of the mixed system but abandoned the multimember districts by returning to a SMD format. Two of the substantial changes and half of the minor changes discussed above occurred before South Korea made the full transition to democracy. Indeed, the non-democratic governments that enacted these changes, while not extensively popular, were hardly in danger of being eliminated through the electoral process. This raises the interesting question of why these governments found it necessary to support such institutional changes. We show in this paper that such governments, like their counterparts in democratic nations, are concerned less with the imperatives of short-term seat maximization than with how the eventual inclusion of increasingly popular opposition groups will affect their ability to remain in power and influence policy outcomes. The examination of the Korean case allows us to accomplish this because of that fact that election system changes occurred both under conditions of democracy as well as under conditions before the democratic transition have been completed. We evaluate this hypothesis by showing that the governments of South Korea acted in accordance with long-term imperatives under both political conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Campaign contribution limits have been a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. The use of contribution limits was seen as an important mechanism to lessen the influence of so-called ?special interests? and to encourage citizen participation. Contribution limits could ?democratize? the system of contributions by forcing candidates to rely on a larger number of smaller contributions thereby reducing the ?value? of any single contribution. In this paper we focus on the alleged ?democratization? effects of campaign contribution limits. We examine 58 gubernatorial elections in 42 states during the period of 1990 to 2000. Analyses of the number of contributors, the dollar amount of contributions, and the average amount of each contribution suggest that contribution limits do have a democratization effect. The nature of the effect, however, does depend upon whether one examines all contributors, just particularistic contributors, or just individualistic contributors. Kihong Eom (keom0@uky.edu) Donald A. Gross (pol146@uky.edu) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the state-dominant structure of Communism and the undertaking of state-building in post-Soviet Russia, this paper focuses on state actors and institutional arrangements which structure the development of civil society within the dynamic context of state-society relations. Political context matters for civic engagement in terms of the timing of its collective action, the outcomes of its activity, and the form of its organizations. In the protracted process of democratic transition, the origins, formation, strength, and weakness of civil society in the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia have been shaped by political opportunity structure and institutional arrangements unique to the national context in which they are embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present two alternative paradigms of democratization The first paradigm is the dominant approach in contemporary comparative politics and is exemplified by the work of Robert Dahl. This dominant paradigm focuses on procedural aspects of democracy. The proposed alternative paradigm moves beyond procedure by drawing upon Aristolelian traditions to create an explicitly normative concept. This approach is teleologically oriented to the ends of a democratic polity and builds upon the work of contemporary Aristotelians. The aim is to adapt these Aristotelian concepts to an applied, alternate notion of democratization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International actors play a prominent role promoting democratization throughout the world. However, social scientists have not yet thoroughly explained why sovereign nations accept these intrusions into their domestic political processes, and what the consequences of various forms of external ?assistance? may be. This paper explores the causes of one increasingly popular method of promoting democratization: international monitoring of elections. I argue that international election monitoring first occurred because it allowed leaders of countries truly committed to democratization to signal their type to international and domestic audiences. By distinguishing themselves from ?pseudo-democrats?, they were able to gain additional benefits in terms of legitimacy and additional economic assistance from Western nations. In order to continue to be viewed as a leader of a democratizing country, pseudo-democrats also invited monitors to their elections, even when they risked the documentation and exposure of non-democratic practices. Western democracies and intergovernmental organizations funded and supplied monitors because of their two pronged goal of supporting the spread of democracy and gaining additional information about less transparent political regimes. These incentives eventually led to an international norm under which all leaders of democratizing countries invite international monitors to their elections. As more pseudo-democrats attempted to mimic the signal of inviting monitors, the strength of the signal decreased, and international democracy promoters and ?true democrats? found ways to make inviting more costly for pseudo-democrats. This produced increases in the sophistication of monitoring methods, the number of monitors, and the duration of the monitoring missions. The trend is documented and the explanation is tested with an original dataset of all elections from 1970-2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]