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Understanding international transmission mechanism that generates the world business cycle is of immense interest. In this paper, we compile a rich global dataset and utilize a trade‐linked structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model with a relatively realistic identification scheme to construct a worldwide dynamic interdependency system. Empirical results indicate that the trade‐linked SVAR system can largely capture the common dynamic properties of national business cycle fluctuations, providing a meaningful transmission foundation to the world business cycle derived from dynamic factor models. Based on the worldwide trade‐linked SVAR system, we further shed light on three crucial topics in international economics. The findings and methods in this paper help to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of recent trade dispute between world major economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the transmission mechanisms that underlie China's house price fluctuations using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model is estimated with Bayesian methods, which accounts well for business cycle properties of the housing market. Results show that shocks to housing productivity and the government land supply to housing developers are the primary contributors to house price volatility, accounting for 37% of house price volatility in the short run and 32% in the long run. The importance of housing valuation shocks and shocks to migration only increases in models without the supply side of the housing market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the implications of idea production and knowledge capital for monetary business cycles. We construct a sticky‐wage model where workers produce goods based on firm‐specific knowledge capital and researchers develop new ideas aided by economywide knowledge. As a quantitatively small group in the economy, researchers are inconsequential for the real effects of monetary shocks when the returns to research are low. However, when the returns to research are high, the result can be overturned. Monetary shocks can have significant real effects, even if wages are perfectly flexible for workers, who are quantitatively dominant in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until the 1980s, standard models with two large open economies (i.e., the United States and Europe) provided plausible representations of the world economy. However, with the emergence of many developing countries since the 1990s, this approach no longer seems reasonable. In line with this change to the global economic environment, cross‐country output correlations between the United States and other countries have risen. This paper extends the standard two‐country model to many countries to show that doing so produces closer cross‐country correlations to the data. In particular, based on analytical investigation with a simple model and quantitative analysis with a more general model, I show that the cross‐country output correlation rises and the cross‐country consumption correlation falls as the number of countries in the two models increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The characteristics of firm-level risk over the cycle and across countries are studied in this paper. Low idiosyncratic firm-level risk is found to be a feature of highly developed, stable economies, whereas the countercyclicality of firm-level risk is associated with flexible as well as stable economies. These facts are uncovered with the help of a theoretical model where small, risk-averse firms display procyclical risk, whereas larger, risk-neutral firms have countercyclical risk patterns that depend on the rigidity of the business environment. The predictions of the model are then confirmed by the data using a large international firm-level database (ORBIS) together with the World Bank Doing Business Database, during the 'Great Recession' across 55 countries. The findings are critical for the growing literature of uncertainty driven business cycles, and show that firm-level uncertainty cannot be treated as an exogenous parameter. ( JEL D21, D22, E32, F44, L11, L25) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document shifts in the lead‐lag properties of the U.S. business cycle since the mid‐1980s. Specifically, (1) the well‐known inverted leading indicator property of real interest rates has completely vanished; (2) labor productivity switched from positively leading to negatively lagging output and labor inputs over the cycle; and (3) the unemployment rate shifted from lagging productivity negatively to leading positively. Many contemporary business cycle models produce counterfactual cross‐correlations revealing that popular frictions and shocks provide an incomplete account of business cycle comovement. Determining the underlying sources of these shifts in the lead‐lag properties and their consequences for macroeconomic forecasts is therefore a promising direction for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mainstream real business cycle (RBC) model, labor can be viewed as temporary employment since the firm's demand for labor behaves directly in response to stochastic productivity shocks in each period. This paper provides a tractable way of analyzing fluctuations in permanent and temporary employment over the business cycle, as well as the underlying driving forces. This inclusion of heterogeneity helps reconcile the RBC model with the U.S. data given that temporary employees in general only account for a small proportion of total private‐sector employment (about 2%–3%). We draw an explicit division between permanent and temporary employment and resort to this separation to account for stylized facts that characterize a two‐tier labor market. In particular, with regard to the U.S. labor market, our benchmark model can well explain the motivating facts: (1) temporary employment is much more volatile than permanent employment, (2) the share of temporary employment (the ratio of temporary to aggregate employment) exhibits strong pro‐cyclicality, (3) permanent employment lags by two quarters on average, and (4) the correlation between temporary employment and output is stronger than that involving the permanent counterpart. The quantitative analysis suggests that our proposed channels explain the main facts well and the model further provides plausible reasoning for a firm's labor hoarding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Google Trends data are a popular data source for research, but raw data are frequency‐inconsistent: daily data fail to capture long‐run trends. This issue has gone unnoticed in the literature. In addition, sampling noise can be substantial. We develop a procedure (available in an R‐package), which solves both issues at once. We apply this procedure to construct long‐run, frequency‐consistent daily economic indices for three German‐speaking countries. The resulting indices are significantly correlated with traditional leading economic indicators while being available in real time. We discuss potential applications across disciplines and spanning well beyond business cycle analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest-rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a 'leaning-against-the-wind' policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade-off between inflation and financial stabilization. ( JEL E32, E44, E52) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Estimating a large‐scale factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model for 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member countries, we quantify the global effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. More specifically, we check whether the signs, the magnitude, and the persistence profile are consistent with the literature on the real and financial sector effects of uncertainty. In that respect, we compare the impacts of a U.S. and a Euro area policy uncertainty shock. According to our results, an increase in economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on economic activity (gross domestic product), consumer prices, equity prices, and interest rates. Uncertainty shocks cause deeper recessions in Continental Europe (except Germany) than in Anglo‐Saxon countries. U.S. uncertainty shocks have a bigger impact than those for the Euro area. Economic policy uncertainty does not only affect that country where the shock originates but also has large cross‐border effects. We also find a high degree of synchronization among the responses of national variables to a (foreign) uncertainty shock, indicating evidence of an international business cycle. With respect to the responses of national long‐term interest rates to an economic policy uncertainty shock, our results reveal a strong "North‐South" divide within the Euro area with rates decreasing less significantly in the South. Moreover, economic policy uncertainty shocks emerging in one region quickly raise uncertainty outside the region of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do steep recoveries follow deep recessions? Does it matter if a credit crunch or banking panic accompanies the recession? We look at the American historical experience in an attempt to answer these questions. The answers depend on the definition of a financial crisis and on how much of the recovery is considered. But in general recessions associated with financial crises are followed by rapid recoveries. We find three exceptions to this pattern: the recovery from the Great Contraction in the 1930s, the recovery after the recession of the early 1990s, and the present recovery. The present recovery is strikingly more tepid than the 1990s. Possible factors to explain the slowness of this recovery include residential investment and policy uncertainty. ( JEL E32, N10, G01) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To estimate state‐dependent US output multipliers of government spending, we build a Markov‐switching fiscal VAR assuming that the economy is subject to unobservable regime shifts. We combine variables in the VAR and external qualitative indicators to infer the regimes and find that they match well with the business cycle. To account for the possibility of regime shifts after a shock, we compute generalized impulse responses using a novel recursive method. We find the multipliers smaller than 1 in both regimes, but statistically larger in recessions than in expansions. We reconcile our results with the main findings in the previous studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a duopsony model, we study how earnings inequality, firm size distribution, and labor market slack vary across local labor markets and the business cycle. In booms, due to high aggregate productivity, there is fierce competition with resulting high wages and full employment. During recessions, there is labor market slack and firms enjoy local market power. In periods in which the economy is moving into or out of a recession, there is an "accommodation" phase, with firms shrinking their labor forces and paying lower wages instead of competing for poached workers. We show that the impact of economic shocks on wage dispersion and inequality may vary not only due to the nature of the shock, but also based on which equilibrium the economy may have settled in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the theoretical as well as quantitative interrelations between endogenous business cycles, increasing returns to product variety and sector‐specific productive externalities within a two‐sector real business cycle model. In a calibrated version of our benchmark closed‐economy setting, the threshold level of investment externalities needed for equilibrium indeterminacy is found to be monotonically increasing in the degree of market competitiveness. We also study the model's local stability properties (i) when the parameters that govern the level of intermediate‐good producers' market power and the strength of variety effects are disentangled; and (ii) in the context of a small open economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data for the Spanish case (1994–2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter‐cyclical), but if the tax administration prioritizes taxpayers' welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy. In particular, it presents a prevailing counter‐cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mass of recent research shows that investment shocks are primary driving forces of business cycles. A thorny issue, however, arises due to countercyclical consumption behavior following the investment shocks. This article contributes to the literature by resolving this anomalous issue in a model that features time inconsistency, modeled as naïve hyperbolic discounting. The proposed model delivers positive responses of consumption to an investment shock and thus produces comovement of key macroaggregates, which is in line with the observed U.S. business cycles. Furthermore, this article also substantiates the validity of the proposed model by producing comovement following an investment news (or anticipated investment) shock. Additional analyses on changes in model structure and parameter value do not reverse the main finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate a medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the Euro area with limited asset market participation (LAMP). Our results suggest that in the recent European Monetary Union years LAMP is particularly sizable (39% during 1993–2012) and important to understand business cycle features. The Bayes factor and the forecasting performance show that the LAMP model is preferred to its representative household counterpart. In the representative agent model the risk premium shock is the main driver of output volatility in order to match consumption correlation with output. In the LAMP model this role is played by the investment‐specific shock, because non‐Ricardian households introduce a Keynesian multiplier effect and raise the correlation between consumption and investments. We also detect the contractionary role of monetary policy shocks during the post‐2007 years. In this period consumption of non‐Ricardian households fell dramatically, but this outcome might have been avoided by a more aggressive policy stance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios. Growing inequality produces debt‐led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend. Instead, when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated, aggregate demand and output fall. Our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy: acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the influence of business cycles in childhood on economic performance later in life. I relate unemployment rates between the year before one's birth and the year of one's 15th birthday to schooling, employment, and income as an adult. The analysis exploits variation in macroeconomic conditions across states over time. I address a number of identification challenges related to cohort effects, linear trends, current events, and economic persistence. The caregiving behaviors and background characteristics of parents are also studied. The average unemployment rate in childhood normally has a negative effect on human capital in adulthood. ( JEL J11, J24, J31) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article exploits the international transmission of business cycles to examine the prevalence of attribution error in economic voting in a large panel of countries from 1990 to 2009. We find that voters, on average, exhibit a strong tendency to oust the incumbent governments during an economic downturn, regardless of whether the recession is home-grown or merely imported from trading partners. However, we find important heterogeneity in the extent of attribution error. A split sample analysis shows that countries with more experienced voters, more educated voters, and possibly more informed voters-all conditions that have been shown to mitigate other voter agency problems-do better in distinguishing imported from domestic growth. ( JEL E3, E6) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of 35 years of previously unstudied survey data shows how the American public evaluates the health of the macroeconomy. Survey responses are multidimensional, distinct from indexes of 'consumer sentiment,' and based mostly on genuine perceptions of economic conditions, not media reports of economic statistics. As such, they contain unique information about current and future values of these statistics, particularly consumption growth, a longstanding focus of the literature. Both 'intangibles' and macroeconomic fundamentals explain substantial variation in the survey data; the public equates 2 to 5 percentage points of inflation with 1 percentage point of unemployment. ( JEL E32, E27, E01) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]