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The insistence on knowledge accumulation in modern educational discourses has led to the formation of exclusive dichotomies in various forms, most tangibly observable in the division of people into 'knowledgeable' and 'unknowledgeable'. What underlies this dichotomy is a conception of rationality based on which knowledge is seen as an 'instrument' which must necessarily result in a usable, profitable product. From a Levinasian perspective, the latter situation inevitably, if not purposefully, leads to the formation of the Other being located at the side of irrationality, hence an unnecessary entity within the knowledge economy. Analysing Werner Herzog's film, The Enigma of Kasper Hauser's (1974), this paper aims to show how irrationality, contrary to the belief of dominant educational/pedagogical discourses, can act as a source for creative thinking. The paper argues that by accepting the Other as the unknowable, we allow them to resort to their singularity as a source for imaginative thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSchools self-identify as caring communities and teach young children to be caring for each other. But schools also teach other contradictory and competing messages, such as individualism and self-reliance, rationalist concepts of justice and meritocracy, and other neoliberal approaches to life and community. Furthermore, while endorsements of care are commonly found in educational institutions, caring is not always (or even often) practiced or regarded as a major aim in schools, in contrast with human capital approaches to youth development. This essay examines how schools do and don’t care. At its core is the rearticulation of care ethics in education, and what caring means within the contemporary field. Over time, enthusiasm for care ethics has peaked and waned. It begins with a brief explanation of what caring is within the field of care ethics, before it considers how caring is ideally involved in education. In this case, discourses of care ethics and caring in education can be coopted against the writings of care ethicists to complement positive psychology, socially conservative character education and civic education, and individualistic and neoliberal approaches to education. As a result, schools can appear to care, but do so in highly distorted ways. These distortions, I argue, do not reveal fundamental limitations or flaws within care ethics approaches to care. Instead, they demand a reconsideration and rearticulation of care ethics in the contemporary education landscape: a context which has changed considerably since debates and articulations of care ethics in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with "Forms of Education: Rethinking Educational Experience Against and Outside the Humanist Legacy" author Emile Bojesen is presented. She talks about her criticism of the humanist legacy in education and its relationship to the title of her book. She discusses the concepts of humanist forms of education. She explains the moral aspects of humanist education.

There have been questions that are directed toward the outcome of using an exemplar in moral and character education. Meanwhile, the role of the narrative in the context of moral and character education has often been viewed as being didactic and being used to indoctrinate moral lessons only. On the other hand, some scholars have also attempted to explore the significances of the exemplar and the narrative for moral and character education. In classical Confucianism, the exemplar refers to the Junzi. Moreover, there were many narratives concerning the lives of the exemplars mentioned by Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi for their students to emulate and aspire to. This paper argues that the utilization of the exemplar and the narrative in classical Confucianism can offer us another perspective for conducting moral and character education. This paper firstly illustrates the notion of the Junzi as an exemplar in classical Confucianism. Then, it explores the role of the narrative of the Junzi as an exemplar in classical Confucianism. Lastly, it discusses its four implications for moral and character education, comprising: (1) assisting students to discover the commonality of their exemplars and themselves as the starting point to emulate their exemplars; (2) helping students to build their morality and character through their interaction with 'many others;' (3) guiding students to create a proper narrative of themselves to form an integrative view of their lives; and (4) emphasizing the exemplary function of the teacher in moral and character education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Education has a responsibility to respond to the threat of deteriorating democracies. The post-truth era is marked by an erosion of trust in public institutions and extreme polarisation. This paper begins with an examination of the ways by which current literacy and media literacy education is not simply outmoded, but also limited by a grounding in neoliberal conceptions of rationality and individualism. Offering a counterpoint to the status quo, and foregrounding the significance of affect, I work with Levinas's conception of ethics (1979, 1989) to illustrate the tensions between affective reactionism and non-intentional affectivity, enjoyment and its disruption as a premise for intersubjectivity, and contrasting manifestations of anger. I conclude the paper with a proposal for literacy education that comprises intentional focus on relationality, responsibility, and affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on covering issues from cheating, human subject research, academic integrity, research on animals, environmental ethics, and the ethics of sexual harassment. Topics include governing ethics of the university sector, the growing international student mobility, and global trends and policymaking on internationalisation; and using against the brutal and visceral violence of the first wave of colonisation.

The purpose of the article is to contribute to the discussion about the relevance of existential issues in contemporary education. Analysis presented in the paper is related to the problems of self-awareness, becoming oneself and self-development. First, the author begins by depicting the meaning of human existence in the light of philosophy. The following aspects have been analyzed: being true to one's own beliefs and values, recognizing personal truth, making existential choices and finding one's own voice. A special attention is paid to the language as an essential, constitutive element of being. Second, the article attempts to consider some educational implications resulting from the existential approach to education. Some of the issues discussed are learning to philosophize and to discover meaning, the concept of encounter in education and the role of language in self-development. While describing them the author indicates that the ignoring of crucial existential questions in education contributes to spiritual vacuity in life of young people and reduces educational thinking merely to instrumental, pragmatic problems concerning qualification and transfer of communicative skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Values, moral values and democratic values are attracting the attention of education researchers in general and mathematics education researchers in particular. Little research has studied pre-service teachers' perceptions of values in the classroom, their perceptions of the relationship between the different variables of values in the classroom, as well as their relationship with the democratic society. The present research attempts to do so. Twenty-two graduate pre-service teachers who participated in 'New trends in mathematics education' course discussed how to cultivated values in the mathematics classroom. Moreover, they answered survey questions related to the cultivation of values in this classroom. We used a combination of deductive and inductive content analysis to characterize the pre-service teachers' texts. The research results indicate that the pre-service teachers perceived values as encouraging students' activity in the mathematics classroom. In addition, the pre-service teachers perceived values as encouraging specific categories of values needed as skills for the citizen in a democratic society, as creativity, critical thinking and metacognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I try to make sense out of Kant's unusual concept of grace, particularly as regards its uneasy relationship to education within the context of the effort to overcome evil. The key to the puzzle, I argue, lies in what I call 'moral receptivity'. Part of education's job is to make us morally receptive to grace by preparing us for its possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses and examines Deleuze's Foucault as a means of investigating intellectual resources for a new sociology – one that, in Foucault's name, is neither foundationalist nor representationalist but genuinely other than the modernist discourse with which the discipline began and grew up. The paper begins with a brief historiography of sociology in order to broach the relationship between Deleuze and Foucault, and then focuses on Deleuze's book on Foucault as a means of moving 'from the archive to the diagram' and to a topology of 'thinking otherwise'. Finally, the paper moves to reformulate a new vocabulary no longer anchored in modernist categories to a non-dialectical reconfiguration of explanation and comprehension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with the Tracey Bretag, director of the UniSA Business School Office for Academic Integrity, Australia. Topics discussed include information on the students’ cheating behaviors as a part of the academic dishonesty; discussions on the research projects that Tracey is associated with related to academic integrity; and the information on the conduct of students particularly in relation to behaviours such as plagiarism and cheating.

This article takes up the educational challenge of the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, the author explores the question of: how can we talk about a universal conception of human rights in a way that both respects the need for cultural pluralism and the necessity to protect those rights and freedoms that all people—regardless of differences such as race, class, culture, or religion—are entitled to? What metaphor or metaphors can be useful for us to speak clearly and coherently about the issue of universal human rights in a diverse world? The author examines a prevailing yet problematic metaphor, which Makau Mutua critiques in his well-known essay ‘Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights.’ He then attempts to articulate some common values that can serve as a foundation for an alternative conception of human rights. Next, he proposes an alternative metaphor—the Buddhist notion of equalizing and exchanging self and other—that more aptly captures the complexity and contradictions of talking about universal human rights. Finally, he turns to the role of education in helping people become familiar with and respect this alternative metaphor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I present the argument that educational theory has specific character, which distinguishes it from most scientific disciplines. It requires the application of not only strictly scientific methods, which essentially consist of descriptions and explanations, but also normative ones, which indicate how it is related to philosophy and ethics. Its essential connections with philosophy and ethics cause that clear and final thesis (e.g. about educational aims) are actually impossible to claim, but from the other hand, it is the only discipline (excluding normative ethics) which, according to its definition, tries to answer practical-moral questions.The crucial elements of this analysis are (1) the presentation of the justification of a thesis on the specific character of educational theory, which will be accomplished with the concept of “research potential”, formulated for its purposes, and (2) showing the consequences of this particular characteristic of the discipline being discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper outlines a theoretical context for research into ‘the subject of ethics’ in terms of how students come to see themselves as self-reflective actors. I maintain that the ‘subject of ethics’, or ethical subjectivity, has been overlooked as a necessary aspect of creating politically transformative spaces in education. At the heart of egalitarian politics lies a fundamental tension between the equality of voices (or ways of being) and the notion that one way of being or one voice may be deemed more legitimate than another; which in turn puts the equality of beings into question. Building from Michel Foucault’s work regarding ethics and subjectivity, I suggest that a ‘subject of ethics’ can be viewed, in part, as a series of relations of self that form the horizon upon which a subject comes to work on themselves relative to moral codes and power relations. Ethical relations of self can be a useful concept for those interested in educational research that furthers social and ecological justice. In the conclusion of this paper I also discuss the limitations of locating ethics entirely within a constituted human subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral education and ethical reflection are always dependent on the content of the internalized norms, principles and values of the individual. As we demonstrate, this also means that there is no instance offeeling,emotion,spontaneity, orcarethat can be independent of norms, rules, and values outside human discourse. In light of this, Noddings’ theory of the ethic of care is a contentious theory of child education, as it is linked with the presupposition that we can turn a blind eye to the symbolic field, to the network of rules/principles and their values, when we educate. Education that is derived only from caring, without being derived from reflection on education’s specific values, can lead to education that supports, for instance, racist ideology and racist education. This is not, of course, something that the ethic of care would advocate; however, as an educational theory, it is flawed in that, due to the rejection of reflection through principles in general, it fails to provide the educator with a conceptual apparatus through which he/she could analyze and reflect upon—could understand—what he/she is doing with regard to the norms of his/her culture. Society and educators cannot tacitly allow or be benevolent toward such fundamental mistakes in moral education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 15 years, scholars in education have focused on Levinas’s work largely in terms of his understanding of alterity, of the self-Other relation, of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ and the significance these concepts have on rethinking educational theory and practice. What I do in this paper, by way of method, is to start from a slightly different place, from the assertion that there is indeed something ‘new’ to be explored in Levinas’s philosophy – both in terms of ideas to be found within his work, and also in terms of the demands educational ideas and practices place on his work from without. That is, how does the actual, lived specificity of educational encounters occasion a different set of questions than one would otherwise pose if thinking only from within the discipline of philosophy, or from a purely theoretical point of view? In light of this, this paper explores Levinas’s ideas of sensibility, materiality, and embodiment. I see these not simply as supports for his ethical thought, but as the very core of incarnation without which his ethics makes no sense. I propose that these ideas are quintessentially pedagogical aspects of his thought – that is, they are always already rooted in a relational context of change and alteration of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the influence of Émile Durkheim on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in order both to open up the political significance of Levinas’s thought and to develop more expansive meanings of moral and political community within education. Education was a central preoccupation for both thinkers: Durkheim saw secular education as the site for promoting the values of organic solidarity, while Levinas was throughout his professional life engaged in debates on Jewish education and conceptualized ethical subjectivity as a condition of being taught. Durkheim has been accused of dissolving the moral into the social, and his view of education as a means of imparting a sense of civic republican values is sometimes seen as conservative, while Levinas’s argument for an ‘unfounded foundation’ for morality is sometimes seen as paralyzing the impetus for concrete political action. Against these interpretations, I argue that their approaches present provocative challenges for conceptualizing the nature of the social, offering theoretical resources to deepen understanding of education as the site of an everyday ethics and a prophetic politics opening onto more compelling ideals for education than those dominant within standard educational discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Increased global attention to early childhood education and care in the past two decades has intensified attention on the education of infants and assessment of their learning in education policy. This interest is particularly evident in the focus upon infants in the early childhood curriculum frameworks developed in recent years in many countries. To date, there has been little examination of implications of this policy/curriculum emphasis in relation to its possible implications for how infants are understood. In this article, using Levinas’ notion of ethical encounter, we present a critical reading of curriculum for infants. Drawing on his ideas of the ‘Other’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘unknowability’ we argue that the rapidly growing corpus of knowledge about infants and their inclusion in education policy and curricula texts, has the potential to narrowly define educators’ responsibilities and prescribe pedagogies in ways that may have unintended consequences. Using the Australian National Quality Framework (NQF) and its associated Early Years Learning Framework as examples, this article highlights the tensions inherent in a system that aims to provide equity, consistency and certainty, premised on a particular ‘knowing’ of the infant. We draw on Levinas’ ideas about ‘said’ and ‘saying’ to propose ways of working with policy and curricula texts that recognise that they can offer only partial understandings of the possibilities for infants’ learning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country in which the government gives preferential treatment in education, employment, and ownership to its majority ethnic group: Bumiputera. However, affirmative action policies in the current Malaysian context should work according to John Rawls’ Theory of Justice by being based on income rather than ethnicity. Certainly Malaysian Government should be praised for giving freedom to the Chinese and Indians to select their preferred school and this is partly consistent with Amartya Sen’s view of freedom; however this article argues that these communities are apparently given constraint freedom of choice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article draws on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas to consider, from an ethical perspective, the current transparency and accountability agenda in Australian schooling. It focuses on the case of theMy Schoolwebsite and the argument that transparent publication of comparative performance data via the website provides a basis for making things better in schooling. The article argues that while technologies of accountability may have potential benefits, they cannot provide a basis for this ethical project. Instead, the ethical experience described by Levinas arises from an encounter with opacity in the face-to-face relation with the Other, who is harshly illuminated by the transparency promised through calculation and comparison. Such encounters with opacity hold the potential to disrupt the politics of visibility promoted by transparency agendas and provide an alternative to the growing practice of ‘accountability at a distance’ based on performance data. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the role of physical education in the process of moral education, and argues that physical education is a necessary prerequisite for the possibility of human virtue. This discussion is divided into four parts. First, I examine the nature of morality and moral decision-making. Drawing on the moral theories presented by Plato, Aristotle and Kant, I argue that morality is connected with reason and the attainment of objectively good goals. Second, I examine the role of moral education in helping individuals to cultivate a virtuous character state. I outline the approaches to moral education taken by Plato, Aristotle and Kant—dialectic, dogmatic and catechistic—and examine the ability of each approach to develop the appropriate moral disposition within individuals. Third, I examine the cultivation of this disposition by considering the connection between virtue and happiness and the possibility of producing an individual who is both virtuous and happy through moral education. Fourth, although there is disagreement about the means of moral education, I argue that there must be agreement concerning one necessary component of moral education: physical education. Physical education, while connected to non-moral exercises, allows individuals to develop the strength to become apathetic to bodily desires (e.g. the desire to obtain pleasure or pursue pain), desires that lead them away from virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article states that the concept of time we generally hold is a spatial version of time. However, a spatial time concept creates a series of problems,with unfortunate consequences for education. The problems become particularly obvious when the spatial time concept is used as a basis for the education function that is connected to the individuality of the pupils. In order to examine this problem more closely, the article turns to literature in order to get a new and different insight into education. In part four of the novel Ada or Ardor: A family chronicle (1969) the Russian-American author Vladimir Nabokov claims, by way of the protagonist Van Veen, that a spatial notion of time will lead to a determinate and reduced view of the future. Not only does one in this way sweep the very notion of time under the carpet, but one will moreover hinder the possibility of appearing as a unique and individualised person. Van is preoccupied with a pedagogic question: viz., the question of how one can become individualised through time. This is also the reason he attempts to re-create a time concept that can give him the status of a free and independent individual. With a background in Van’s analysis of time, the article attempts to derive two forms for education. First, formal education, which bases itself on a spatial time concept. Secondly, non-formal education, which bases itself on a time concept that has freed itself in the greatest possible manner from space. Neither of these two solutions is appropriate in regard to education’s individualising function. Therefore, the article draws on Nabokov’s best-known novel, Lolita (1955), so as to broadenVan’s understanding of time. In the end, then, the article articulates a time concept that introduces a notion of education where time occurs through acts of responsibility. Not until education has such a time concept as a basis, can one, so the article argues, attain the education function that has as its goal to individualise and make responsible children and young people. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is the epistemic as well as the ethical responsibility of academics to aim to approach their research and teaching with a proper understanding of the ultimate ethical purpose or telos of their defining activities and products,which is the practical aim of promoting human flourishing. Minimally, academics should aim at understanding, and a key component of understanding is to understand the ideal ethical purpose of what is being researched and taught. For instance, sadistic Nazi medical researchers and teachers—Mengeles of sorts—in addition to having reprehensible commitments,would be significantly ignorant about their own intellectual concerns by virtue of their abject (belief-expressing) commitments. I will show that insights drawn from extreme cases such as this one apply across disciplines and in less extreme cases. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we argue that ubuntu (human interdependence) is not some form of essentialist notion that unfolds in exactly the same way as some critics of ubuntu might want to suggest. Rather, we offer a philosophical position that (re)considers the situation of the self in relation to others. The article starts from the general issues at stake in the debate concerning particularity and universalist ethics. We then reconsider the general position of the ethics of care, and particularly how it has recently been revisited by Michael Slote. Following this, ubuntu is characterised as a particular kind of ethic of care. With this in mind, what we shall put forward is an extension of Seyla Benhabib's (2006) view that the self and others should iteratively and hospitably engage in deliberation. Although we agree with Benhabib that iterations (as arguing over and over again and talking back) are worthwhile in themselves, considering ubuntu ('a person becoming a person in relation with other persons'), we find Stanley Cavell's (1979) idea of 'living with skepticism'-particularly, acknowledging humanity in the Other and oneself-as more apposite to extend the theoretical premises of ubuntu. Although the practice of ubuntu is lived out differently amongst Africa's people, we want to add to the diverse ways in which ubuntu can both disrupt and offer ways as to how challenges of human conflict and violence can possibly be resolved. The article finally addresses a couple of educational examples and argues that this approach, by being well-grounded in the life experience of learners, can critically assist the central role of education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While assessment is regarded as integral to enhancing the quality of teaching and learning, it is also a practice fraught with moral and ethical issues. An analysis is made of current assessment practices of teachers in South Africa which seem to straddle the domains of accountability and professional codes of conduct. In the process the position of the teacher as mediator between policies and diverse learner needs is explored in the light of moral and ethical considerations. Based on the notions of ethical caring and caring about, the article suggests the infusing of principles of ubuntu in assessment practices may provide a framework to embed and strengthen morality and ethics in South African school assessment practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay applies the material developed in The Wounded Researcher to education. The core issue in that book is the necessity to make a place for the complex unconscious in research in order to lay a foundation for an ethics that is based in deep subjectivity. The therapy room has characteristically been the place where this kind of work has occurred, and in this regard therapy has been a form of education. The boundaries of the therapy room have, however, exploded and, given the awesome powers of technology to develop and communicate information, how do we make a place for the unconscious in our educational practices? Drawing upon the work of Carl Jung this essay addresses the following questions: How does one make a place for the unconscious in the classroom, without turning teaching into therapy?; How does a teacher make a place for the unconscious dynamics in the complex interactive field among himself/herself, the students, and the material without overwhelming students?; What are the limits and dangers of this effort?; What are the consequences if we continue to ignore these dynamics in the bodies of knowledge we build? Examples from teaching my book to graduate students in psychology are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]