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How did New York City's climate politics change after Hurricane Sandy, and why? Prevailing accounts of extreme weather's impact on climate politics draw on survey data and characterize climate policy in vague terms. However, weather does not do the work of politics; the specifics of climate policy matter. I develop a relational sociological approach focused on mobilized actors, political economy, and event theory. Drawing on interviews and document analysis, I show how senior disaster officials, New York's Mayor Bloomberg and his Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, community groups and Occupy Sandy activists responded to Hurricane Sandy. Actors maintained outlooks and practices consistent with their position in the city's power relations. This selective continuity shifted New York's climate policy from decarbonization-focused tentative cosmopolitanism to adaptation-focused defensive parochialism. I term this convergent prioritization of adaptation a 'fortress of solitude' social logic. Only subsequent events explain New York's 2019 low-carbon legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adaptation to impacts of climate change is a key pillar of climate change policy, and local governments have historically played a major role in the design and implementation of these policies. An array of political, economic, institutional, social, and individual factors influence adaptation policy instrument choice. At the local government level, these choices also reflect inter-governmental dynamics that can constrain or support local efforts. We analyze eight hypothesized drivers of local adaptation policy instrument choice using fractional regression analysis and multilevel modelling. Local governments are pursuing diverse adaptation policy implementation styles that are associated with different levels of internal capacity, local political economies and problem perception. Dependence on national governments, the presence or absence of national adaptation mandates, national decision-making traditions, and national adaptation policy approaches may also influence local policy instrument choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research consistently finds a relatively weak relationship between environmental concern and pro-environmental behavior, as environmentally concerned individuals often fail to act pro-environmentally, both in the private and public spheres. While the strength of the concern–behavior relationship varies considerably across countries, existing research has yet to provide a complete account of these cross-national differences. In this study, we add to previous cross-national research on the concern–behavior relationship by focusing on the quality of government. Using multilevel analysis and data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), we demonstrate that people who are environmentally concerned are more likely to act pro-environmentally (in the public sphere), in countries where government institutions are fair, effective and impartial. We also find that people are generally more likely to engage in pro-environmental behavior in both the private and public sphere in countries where the quality of government is high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has turned the Arctic simultaneously into an environmentally highly fragile space and a region offering manifold economic opportunities. The notion of 'Arctic Paradox' aptly captures the trade-off between environmental protection needs and economic prospects. We investigate how the European Union has positioned itself regarding this Paradox by asking to what extent its Arctic policy discourse integrates environmental concerns. Analysis involving the main strategies of EU institutions, and the EU's Arctic and major non-Arctic members finds three co-existing coalitions with differing visions of environmental policy integration in the Arctic. The aggregate EU discourse on the Arctic is currently 'green by omission', that is, by explicitly avoiding a clear stance on the trade-off embodied in the 'Arctic Paradox'. We attempt to explain this, and conclude by discussing the likelihood of the EU developing a genuinely environment-oriented Arctic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence is presented of how the Great Recession affected prioritisation of environmental protection. World Values Survey data from both before the recession's onset and its aftermath shows that increases in unemployment rates had significant, negative effects upon prioritisation of environmental protection while changing growth rates or gross domestic product (GDP) had none. These results hold not only among advanced industrial democracies, but also generalise to Latin American countries. Additionally, the findings offer no evidence that the recession changed the way in which individual wealth relates to the prioritisation of environmental protection. As a strong environmental public opinion is an important factor in the successful implementation of environmental policy, the findings suggest that, if policymakers wish to maintain public support for implementing environmental protection measures, they should prioritise low unemployment over economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental taxes are often argued to be key to more effective environmental protection. People's willingness to pay such taxes in contexts with varying levels of quality of government (QoG) is investigated. Applying multilevel analyses on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the QoG Institute, links between environmental concern, ideology, and QoG are explored. The results show that people who state that they are concerned about environmental issues and live in high QoG countries are more willing than people in low QoG countries to pay environmental taxes. Moreover, people in low QoG countries holding leftist political value orientations are less willing to pay environmental taxes than rightists and other value groups. Environmental concern and leftist political ideology are more important drivers of public support for environmental taxes in high QoG countries than in low QoG countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines success of the green parties in Swiss federal elections of October 20, 2019. It reports the Green Party (GPS) won 13.2 percent and the Green Liberal Party (GLP) 7.8 percent of the votes, and two green forces together thus secured more than one fifth of the votes for the National Council, Switzerland's lower house of Parliament. It mentions although neither party was able to achieve representation in the government, their success has shaken the foundations of Swiss party politics and, if repeated, may see them enter government.

The article explores the concept and practice of regenerative culture drawing on our experience as activist researchers within Extinction Rebellion Manchester from August-December 2019. It defines relationship between regenerative culture and a foundation of self-care, people care and planet care. It reports how in 2018 in Great Britain Extinction Rebellion (XR) launched itself as a mass environmental movement aiming to achieve systemic change through non-violent civil disobedience. It mentions need of establishing a citizens assembly to oversee the transition towards climate justice.

Over the last decade, innovative governance architectures have been progressively promoted across European Union (EU) environmental and climate policies with the purpose of improving the effectiveness of intervention through better cross-sectoral policy integration and increased involvement of sub-state and non-governmental actors in the policy process. By combining the theoretical insights of polycentric governance and the concept of usage, the case of the Covenant of Mayors (CoM) is analysed to uncover the extent to which this voluntary programme has empowered local authorities within the EU strategy for sustainable energy by encouraging coordination and learning. This illustrates how a range of policy variables determined the dynamics of the programme's implementation in Italy and the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades. The EU's deepening and widening has led researchers to expect more non-compliance with EU environmental legislation. In fact, however, the implementation gap has narrowed over the past 25 years. Except for Southern enlargement, taking on new member states has not exacerbated the EU's compliance problem in the field of environmental policy. Nor has the expansion of the environmental acquis. This is explained by the European Commission's strategies of managing and enforcing compliance. EU environmental policy has become less demanding on member states since it increasingly tends to amend existing rather than set new legislation. Simultaneously, the Commission has developed new instruments to strengthen member state capacities to implement EU environmental legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear energy was a defining topic of German environmentalism from the 1970s to 1990s. An analysis of the transformation of Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) shows that anti-nuclear protests, which are frequently depicted as a prototypical example of ‘new’ social movement activism, were only a temporary phenomenon. From the 1970s, NABU gradually transformed from a traditional nature conservation organization into an environmental lobby organization that addressed nuclear energy, other health hazards and environmental risks. These topics were perceived through the notion of mutual assured destruction that emerged with the cold war nuclear arms race. With the end of the cold war and the government’s decision to phase-out nuclear energy, NABU began to rediscover its neglected focus on nature conservation. Nature walks and wildlife monitoring schemes replaced sit-ins, political rallies and civil disobedience against the construction of nuclear reactors. Since 2000, the goals and strategies of German environmentalism have increasingly turned back to the ‘old’ social movement activism of traditional nature conservation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) has contributed to the institutionalization of environmentalism. Putting environmental INGOs in comparative perspective, it is argued that differences in authority among INGOs are an important determinant of the strategies that INGOs adopt and the ultimate influence they are able to achieve. This claim is illustrated through an examination of the changing political opportunities for INGOs and a case of a recent private governance initiative, The Sustainability Consortium. The status maintenance concerns of leading INGOs encourage them to adopt incrementalist and pro-market policies that help launch weak governance schemes and frustrate many other environmental INGOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on environmental nongovermental organizations (ENGOs). It refers to the support of activities of less-institutionalized, more radical activists by ENGOs in various ways. It describes the symbiotic relationship between ENGOs and radical environmental activists. It explains the role of ENGOs in some sociologists of social movements. It highlights the external institutionalization of ENGOs which did not eclipse less institutionalized forms of direct action and should not be exaggerated.

The European environmental movement has been reconfigured since the introduction of the pan-European public interest environmental law group based on the model founded in the USA around 1970. Yet it has been claimed that there is a low degree of success in transplanting legal practices from one national space to another. Examination of the successful transplantation of a US legal model to the European context by the law group ClientEarth shows both that this claim is false and why it is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friends of the Earth’s (FoE) ‘Big Ask’ campaign played a critical role establishing the path-breaking UK Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008. FoE exploited the window of opportunity that opened in climate politics during 2006, first to win cross-party support for the Bill and then to strengthen its content. It then rolled-out the ‘The Big Ask’ across Europe, helped by an innovative collaborative seminar programme with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Multiple Streams Framework is used to identify FoE as an effective policy entrepreneur shaping the agenda-setting process. This contributes to the policy entrepreneurship literature where there are relatively few examples of effective collective entrepreneurship by environmental non-governmental organizations and makes an original empirical contribution through a detailed analytical narrative about a remarkably successful environmental non-governmental organization campaign. Qualitative methodology is employed, drawing on public and private documentary sources and interviews with key campaigners, politicians and officials involved in climate policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which organisations saw their positions on two contentious issues reflected in the Irish climate law of 2015, and what role did advocacy coalitions play in the policy process? These questions are answered drawing theoretically from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and by conducting a network analysis of survey data collected from the organisations involved in the national climate policy process. The study finds that several institutionally important or economically powerful organisations, particularly those involved in the agricultural sector, as well as the government parties saw their preferences reflected in the law. This resulted in legislation that excluded binding emission reductions targets, differentiating it from similar laws introduced in other European countries. Organisations in favour of stronger regulation formed a coalition to advocate for their positions, but they largely failed to get their way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tackling China's grave environmental problems increasingly turns on questions of sub-national interjurisdictional relations. What are the conditions under which neighbouring localities cooperate in stewardship of the natural environment? What factors give rise to interjurisdictional conflict such as pollution spillovers? Through a combination of empirical and theoretical reflections, a research agenda to better understand these issues is outlined. First, China's recent innovative approaches to the promotion of interjurisdictional cooperation are examined. An in-depth case study of interjurisdictional ecological protection 'redline' zones underscores the difficulties of inculcating environmental neighbourliness between local governments. Yet, a precise diagnosis of the problem remains elusive because too little is known about the underlying drivers of interjurisdictional relations in China. An analytical framework that draws insight from contemporary China studies and comparative environmental governance scholarship is offered for the study of inter-jurisdictional environmental relations in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the space of a few years, China's global image with regard to environmental matters has significantly improved. Particularly since Xi Jinping's coming-to-power in 2012 China's reputation in the global climate change regime has improved markedly and it has gained accolades for a new determination to reverse environmental degradation at home. China's incipient green transformation is partly due to a new actor constellation in environmental governance, a striking feature of which is the prominence of ad hoc campaigns that offer quick results but that may undermine the creation of law-based enforcement mechanisms in the long term. Another development -China's increasing use of emerging technologies and big data analytics - has given rise to new forms of government-business alliances. These new players and innovative approaches have injected momentum into China's environmental governance system and suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, authoritarian regimes can be responsive to citizen demands under certain circumstances. Yet it remains to be seen whether long-term environmental goals can be met, due to a pervasive lack of accountability, the weakening of civil society and heavy constraints on public participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit, donors pledged to 'jointly mobilize' $100 billion/year for climate finance by 2020. The Copenhagen Accord and other agreements do not specify who should provide how much of this collective target beyond the general principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC), according to which the more responsible a country is for climate change and/or the more capable of paying, the more climate finance it should provide. Two additional burden- sharing mechanisms may explain how much climate finance donors provide: willingness to pay or 'greenness' and self-interest. These mechanisms are tested to determine which best explains current patterns in climate finance commitments by analysing bilateral climate aid. There is evidence for capability--richer countries provide more climate aid. In contrast, responsibility, greenness or self-interest do not induce more climate aid commitments. Better understanding the drivers of climate aid helps to mobilize more climate finance, and advances understanding of (sectoral) aid allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese state is squarely 'back' in the business of environmental governance with an increasing number of policy innovations or experiments to resolve environmental issues. These have been mostly enacted through the 'experimentation under hierarchy' framework, undergirded by compensation- for-performance incentive structures for local agents. Based on on-site ethnography in local China, a critical analysis is presented of low-carbon city policy experiments - one of the most prominent environmental policies introduced in the past decade. Using lessons from the agency theory, it is hypothesized that outcomes of these policy innovations are contingent on different policy dimensions. Although a number of positive outcomes have been achieved in output-oriented dimensions, the fundamental difficulty of specifying all aspects of complex, multidimensional work tasks involved in low-carbon city development has frequently led to policy unmaking. The findings raise important questions about China's tendency to rely excessively on compensation- for-performance structures to promote environmental policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions do critical events trigger large-scale public discussion and mobilisation, and can these lead to policy change? In a comparative study of nuclear energy policy after the Japanese Fukushima disaster in March 2011, a theory-development approach is adopted, mobilising data collected from national news agencies’ newswires, public surveys, legislation and parliamentary databases, and newspaper editorials in 12 established democracies between March 2011 and March 2013. The analysis suggests two main hypotheses that can guide future research: critical events are more likely to trigger policy change when intense (contentious) mobilisation from policy challengers aligns with the views of the general public, and is backed by major political allies; and critical events are more likely to trigger intense (contentious) mobilisation when policy challengers articulate their opposition around pre-existing policy debates on the issue and resort to pre-existing organisational and mobilisation resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global circulation of the word ‘fracking’ seems to testify to a setback for energy transitions, a nexus that has not yet received much scholarly attention. In light of this, the controversy over fracking is understood as furthering infrastructural changes that are central to energy transitions. Infrastructure should not be understood as materialityper sebut instead as sedimented but ultimately discursive elements that can be reactivated and rearticulated. Examining ‘infrastructure’ from the point of view of discourse theory places the focus on infrastructural change. Prior to 2011, the oil and gas infrastructure in northern Germany was largely invisible to the public. The subsequent reassembling of production with fracking facilitated the politicization not just of that term but also of the whole infrastructure. Instead of routinely reproducing the infrastructure, subjects that had formerly dominated the field were confronted with new and heterogeneous voices that challenged their agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new framework for analysing subnational policymaking is applied to climate governance in the ‘twin towns’ of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen. Low levels of resource interdependence between central and local government in England mean that Newcastle Council has to rely heavily on other horizontal actors to achieve its climate objectives. In contrast, Gelsenkirchen Council receives substantial support from higher tiers of government, which gives it greater control over policymaking within the locality. Greater independence between tiers of government can make it more difficult for subnational bodies to adopt the kind of ambitious policies that may be necessary to combat wicked and/or significant policy challenges such as climate change. Instead, interdependent ‘joint-decision’ systems, which facilitate mutual support across tiers of government, may be better equipped to ensure that subnational public bodies have the capacity to act appropriately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main achievements of the debates on deliberative democracy and democratised science are investigated in order to analyse the reasons, meanings and prospects for a democratisation of global environmental policy. A deliberative systems approach, which emphasises the need to explore how processes in societal spheres interact to shape the deliberative qualities of the system as a whole, is adopted. Although science plays a key role in this, its potential to enhance deliberative capacity has hardly been addressed in deliberative theories. The democratisation of science has potential to contribute to the democratisation of global environmental policy, in that it also shapes the potential of deliberative arrangements in the policy sphere. Deliberative arrangements within the policy sphere may stimulate the democratisation of science to different degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The politics of climate change is much discussed, but there has been little investigation into how politicians themselves understand or articulate the issue. Corpus analysis, a method developed within linguistics, is used to investigate how UK politicians talk about climate change, using the example of the 2008 Climate Change Bill. Corpus techniques, including keyword analysis, collocation and semantic tagging, are used, alongside critical reading of the text. The analysis shows that politicians frame climate change as an economic and technical issue, and neglect discussion of the human and social dimensions. They are selective in their use of scientific evidence, with little mention of abrupt or irreversible change. In doing so, they attempt to ‘tame’ climate change, rather than confronting difficult realities. While this strategy has the benefit of political acceptability, it does not allow for discussion of the full political and social implications of climate change, and precludes more radical responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The divergent roles of education in predicting environmental support among liberals, conservatives, and moderates in the United States are explained by integrating ideological-consistency and information-deficit models. Increased political polarization among elites has led to divergent environmental positions advocated by liberal and conservative political and media leaders; it was predicted that education would increase public attention to these elite cues and, consistent with the ideological-consistency model, increased education would lead to attitudes in line with consensual positions endorsed by party elites. Across two nationally representative data sets, higher levels of education were associated with stronger environmental support among liberals and weaker environmental support among conservatives. Moderates were predicted to have fewer elite cues on which to base their attitudes; consistent with the information-deficit model, higher levels of education among moderates were associated with strengthened environmental support. A moderated-mediation model supported the differential application of these two theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-level public opinion on the environment within the US is examined, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from 2000 to 2010. A Multilevel Regression and Post-Stratification (MRP) approach is taken to estimate three different survey items on environmental issues at the US state level. This allows for a comparable understanding of state-level public opinion on environmental issues, which is then connected to economic, environmental, and political conditions, and representation in policy making. The findings indicate the MRP technique is a sophisticated way to make accurate estimations of state-level public opinion, and those estimates provide further insight into the shaping of public opinion and public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seas and oceans are confronted with a plethora of environmental problems, caused by land-based activities (agriculture, industries, and ports) and by maritime activities (such as shipping, fishing, oil and gas drilling, tourism, and navigational dredging). Environmental problems at sea challenge the efficacy of state sovereignty. Who is responsible, accountable, and regulates environmental and spatial problems at the level of regional seas, and what is the role of states in these processes of governance? In the regional seas and on the high seas, the environmental state is challenged by two developments: states become players at different levels, and states are confronted with the activities of big market players where they have no or little jurisdiction. The different forms of the environmental state in Europe’s regional seas and in the Arctic Ocean are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Are a country’s environmental attitudes linked to its level of economic development? In recent decades, rapid industrialization and the use of cheaper but older production technologies have reduced environmental quality in less developed countries (LDCs). Moreover, these countries have been disproportionally affected by global pollution in that they suffer the effects while having emitted less than industrialized countries. To what extent are people in LDCs ready to make sacrifices to improve environmental conditions? International Social Survey Program 2010 data reveal that people in LDCs are less supportive of international agreements forcing their country to take necessary environmental measures than are citizens in the developed world. Moreover, they are more likely to think that wealthier countries should make more effort to protect the environment, and are less willing to make personal economic sacrifices or change their consumption behavior to accommodate environmental concerns. These results hold even after controlling for post-materialist values, political ideology, personal income, and several other demographic variables. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China presents a paradox for scholars of environmental politics. Environmental politics and policymaking in China now includes elements critical to environmental protection in the West, including non-governmental participation and stringent environmental legislation. Yet the country’s authoritarian system constrains popular participation, and environmental outcomes are generally poor. China’s South–North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP) embodies this puzzle: despite the pluralisation and development of environmental politics and policymaking, the SNWTP is a technocratic mega-project that imposes high social, economic, and environmental costs. What explains this puzzle, and what are the implications for understanding environmental politics in other authoritarian developing countries? I evaluate two current theories – Ecological Modernisation and Authoritarian Environmentalism – against the SNWTP case, and argue that it illustrates the ability of governments to co-opt environmental politics to pursue other strategic objectives, in turn necessitating greater attention to the mix of persuasive and coercive strategies in environmental politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A key dimension of the debate about policy innovation is the extent to which new policies achieve significant and lasting effects on the problems they purport to address. However, little is known about such effects. We break new ground by investigating how far current evaluation practices in a policy system with relatively ambitious climate policies – the European Union – identify the most effective (carbon-reducing) policies. We find that a small number of policy instruments are projected to deliver the lion’s share of emission reductions. Setting aside the special case of emissions trading, these instruments are not particularly innovative. If significant practical and political obstacles can be addressed, more (detailed) evaluations could enhance the evidence base and also the political prospects for delivering deeper emissions cuts through to 2050. An evaluation perspective could also offer a very different way to consider policy innovation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous scholars have used political philosophy to characterise the US environmental justice (EJ) movement’s conception of justice. I build upon that work by identifying and critically evaluating the ideas of justice that manifest in mainstream (non-EJ) environmental politics. I do so through a comparative analysis of two groups of activists concerned with the threats posed by pesticides to human health in California. Mainstream agri-environmental activists’ narratives and practices evince libertarian and communitarian ideas of justice that support the neoliberalisation of an already compromised regulatory system, as they motivate and legitimise policies, practices, and discourses that undermine the state’s environmental protections and shift environmental responsibility to individuals. In contrast, California’s EJ activists, like the broader EJ movement, marshal a pluralist notion of justice as distribution, recognition, participation, and capabilities, which rejects the neoliberal project and explicitly criticises the social inequalities and relations of oppression that help produce environmental inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the law Canada's environmental policy of ecological protection which has come under the new Canadian Conservative Party by its victory. Topics discussed include importance of environmental protection for the people of Canada, Harper Government designed environmental policy rejected Kyoto and attacked the Liberal Party's carbon tax and environmental strategy, and proposal of environmental allowance into a single omnibus spending budget implementation bill for jobs and growth in Canada.

Mainstream analyses have often understood environmental effectiveness as a consequence of the shape of interests and policymaking, and have tested their models through statistical techniques. Results have, however, proved quite erratic. It is argued that these weaknesses reflect a misconception about causality, thus highlighting the need for a shift in both model and method. A different model is therefore developed that explains effectiveness through policy tools and ideas. The model is then applied to the performances of the EU15 member states in mid-2000s, and assessed using Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Cases are polarised around two classic cleavages (‘environmentalists’ vs. ‘productivists’, and ‘pro-marketers’ vs. ‘protectionists’), but give evidence that all the related tool mixes are able to deliver – while the relevant difference between leaders and laggards lies in the use of evaluation devices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite a peak in activism against climate change in the UK, new environmental direct action networks have not yet received much academic attention. Taking perhaps the most prominent of such networks – the Camp for Climate Action – which held several high-profile protest events between 2006 and 2011 as a case study, and using a theoretical framework that understands society as being distinctly ‘post-political’ in character, we ask questions about the knowledge claims that form the foundations of radical environmental politics. Drawing on published statements and press releases, as well as from our insights as active participants in the Camp, we analyse the strategy of environmental protest where climate change has become its focus. The Camp for Climate Action was a contested political arena. We argue that the Camp's strategy was characterised by ‘scientised’, ‘post-political’ politics which operated within an ethical framework that prescribed individual responsibility as the primary basis for action. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was known as the leading innovator in environmental policy. Other OECD countries found much to emulate. Two decades later, Japan appears to have lost its innovative edge to other OECD countries. Why has Japan fallen from its position as the global leader? How should Japan regain its reputation? Possible causes of the rise and fall of Japanese environmental policy are examined by exploring its domestic policy subsystem, the international arena and the arena where domestic and foreign issues converge, the emerging space in which sub-national authorities have become increasingly recognised as direct contributors to global environmental strategies. Each of three approaches – the domestic/foreign divide, interaction and convergence – offers a partial answer to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing climate change mitigation policies are particularly concerned with the reconciliation of two seemingly conflicting aims: environmental protection and economic efficiency. The normative principles underlying these policies meanwhile focus on two central ideas: fair burden-sharing and agents' responsibility. However, both existing policy instruments and their supporting philosophical principles are highly problematic in terms of intergenerational justice and truly effective climate change mitigation. Three competing conceptions for allocating and distributing the burdens of climate change mitigation (cap-and-trade schemes, carbon emission taxes, and personal ecological space quotas) and their compatibility with principles of intra- and intergenerational justice are analysed and evaluated. None of the proposed instruments is able to satisfy the demands of effective mitigation and egalitarian justice on its own, which suggests that existing proposals for the distribution of emission rights and climate change-related costs need to be supported by a thicker account of intergenerational justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do stakeholder demands in response to environmental impacts and top management (TMT) motivations for environmental protection (EP) influence the integration of environmental management programmes within corporations in China? Substantial differences are observed in the way different stakeholder groups influence TMTs' motivations for EP. Local government demands for EP are associated with perceptions of risk from noncompliance. Industry pressure for EP not only has a broader effect but also enhances a belief in the 'business-case' for such programmes, and TMT's commitment to EP. Yet societal pressure is associated with a reduction of enterprise motivations for EP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current generation of crop-based biofuels is heavily contested for its negative consequences for the environment and the poor. Hence, the current biofuel system needs to be transformed in the direction of what can be labelled 'fair fuels': (bio)fuels that are environmentally and socially sustainable. Conventional state environmental authorities have limited power and legitimacy to effectively regulate the sustainability of current global biofuels. Hence, we witness the emergence of private market environmental authorities, moral environmental authorities and all kinds of hybrid authorities in biofuel regulation. These new forms of environmental authority should neither be condemned as ineffective and undemocratic nor celebrated as the modern answer to transnational environmental problems that face state failure. Further critical inquiry into the changing environmental authority structure under conditions of globalisation is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the implications that the 2008 election of U.S. President Barack Obama have for environmental protection and legislation within the nation. Sustainable development, renewable energy, and environmental accountability were all driving factors in his platform. The author contrasts Obama’s platform with that of his Republican opponent, John McCain. While Obama heavily favored fiscal appropriations to support biofuels and scientific research, McCain was a proponent of nuclear power and offshore drilling for oil. Alterations made in policies that had been instated by former U.S. President George W. Bush are discussed.

The article focuses on changes which have been seen in governmental and consumers attitudes towards environmental justice as a result of an increase in awareness of global warming and climate change. An overview of climate related obligations and environmental policies that have been developed as a result of global warming is offered. A discussion of the scope and content of climate justice, and of the impact global and intergenerational democracy may have on climate change in the future, is presented.

An increasing number of green political theorists now base their arguments on some form of deliberative, or discursive, democracy. Some of these argue that through its commitment to the all-affected principle, deliberative democracy requires contemporary deliberators to be able to justify their decisions to persons in future generations, which would lead to significant environmental protections. This article cautions against such a strategy. It argues that the green deliberative democrats propounding it have paid insufficient attention to Derek Parfit's 'Non-Identity Problem'. It is claimed that a reading of the basic principles of deliberative democracy shows that it is based on a narrow person-affecting view, and is hence vulnerable to the non-identity problem. It therefore cannot by itself justify inclusion of future persons. An alternative approach, based on broadly Rawlsian lines, is offered as a solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental scepticism denies the seriousness of environmental problems, and self-professed 'sceptics' claim to be unbiased analysts combating 'junk science'. This study quantitatively analyses 141 English-language environmentally sceptical books published between 1972 and 2005. We find that over 92 per cent of these books, most published in the US since 1992, are linked to conservative think tanks (CTTs). Further, we analyse CTTs involved with environmental issues and find that 90 per cent of them espouse environmental scepticism. We conclude that scepticism is a tactic of an elite-driven counter-movement designed to combat environmentalism, and that the successful use of this tactic has contributed to the weakening of US commitment to environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are consensus democracies more likely to enact environmentally friendly policies than majoritarian democracies? The relationship between democratic type and environmental effectiveness is more complex than previously assumed. What matters are not only institutions but also the nature of the policy issues, the types of institutions and veto players in the system. Four measures of effectiveness emerged from the data: mundane environmentalism; environmental taxation; conservation; and nuclear energy production. Environmental effectiveness in democratic systems differs depending upon which measure of effectiveness is examined and whether or not one looks at representational or organisational aspects of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has failed to develop an effective policy to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases responsible for climate change. This policy failure is the result of many factors, one of which is the inherent limitations of 'interest group politics' in producing the kinds of broad political and economic changes required to reduce the threat of disruptive climate change. This article first examines interest group politics in environmental policymaking, emphasising the role of groups in institutionalising the broad social movement that produced modern environmentalism in America. It then explores the nature of climate change and its political and policy implications, and explains why an interest-group-centred model of policymaking is insufficient to address the threat posed by climate change. It then analyses what kind of political actions might be better suited to produce the kinds of dramatic policy developments the likely consequences of climate change compel us to make. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers perspective on the challenges to environtalism in the U.S. It suggests that the American environmental movement has been quite energetic. From the growth of state and local groups and to the development of a variety of alliances and approaches, environmentalism in the country remains alive, active and vibrant. Moreover, the environmental movement to which it refers not only the professional interest groups focused on national environmental policy, but also the multitude of additional groups, organisations, and networks, from mainstream to environmental justice to radical environmentalisms.

Using the Blackwood (South Wales) roads protest during February to April 2004 as a case study, the article discusses the potential for a re-emergence of UK eco-action, examining the possibility that re-engagement with ‘single issue’ environmental protests is a probable direction for the UK direct action movement. Tactically and strategically, Blackwood could be a signifier for a new environmentally focused ‘cycle of contention’ which explicitly makes the links between the environment/climate change, and the frames of oil, war and capitalism which have been some of the key discursive repertoires of the anti-globalisation and anti-war movement(s). A potential return to ‘single issue’ eco-action should not be seen as ‘wheel reinvention’ but rather evidence of a movement which has reflexively built capacity over an activist generation. The article provides evidence of predisposed and latent mobilisation potential; emergent networks and campaigns focusing on eco-action in the United Kingdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the mid-1970s well into the 1980s, the Federal Alliance of Citizens' Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU) was one of Germany's most visible and influential environmental organisations, an unusual achievement for a network of local organisations. Lacking strong competitors, it was able to become a central movement organisation for Germany's rapidly growing anti-nuclear power and environmental movements. However, after institutionalisation of environmental concerns robbed the movement of some of its impetus, competing social movement organisations appeared, and government subsidies ended, familiar problems of grass-roots networks, which had plagued the BBU from the beginning, intensified. The resulting downward spiral cost the BBU most of its members and its prominence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If approximately 80% of the public in the UK support wind energy, why is only a quarter of contracted wind power capacity actually commissioned? One common answer is that this is an example of the ‘not in my backyard’ (Nimby) syndrome: yes, wind power is a good idea as long as it is not in my backyard. However, the Nimby claim that there is an attitude–behaviour gap has been rightly criticised. This article distinguishes between two kinds of gap that might be confused, namely the ‘social gap’ – between the high public support for wind energy expressed in opinion surveys and the low success rate achieved in planning applications for wind power developments – and the ‘individual gap’, which exists when an individual person has a positive attitude to wind power in general but actively opposes a particular wind power development. Three different explanations of the social gap are distinguished, only one of which depends upon the individual gap. In the second section of the article the relevance of our three explanations for policy is considered. It is argued that the different explanations suggest different policy responses and that the success of efforts to increase wind energy capacity may depend on developing a better understanding of the relative significance of the three explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the debate on governance the concept of responsibility is frequently invoked but remains underdeveloped. This article aims at showing its analytical relevance as a means of interpreting ongoing changes in policy approaches and for evaluating their ability to cope with environmental challenges. Four dimensions of responsibility are singled out: care, liability, accountability and responsiveness. The caring state has been overtaken, to a remarkable extent, by new arrangements centred on the expansion of liability and above all accountability, while responsiveness remains a rather neglected aspect. Such neglect represents a major reason for the debatable results of governance as regards environmental protection and the recovery of institutional and corporate legitimacy and social trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]