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T he possible future European Union (EU) membership of Turkey has become one of the most hotly debated topics both in the EU and within Turkey itself. It is true that previous EU enlargements have also attracted the attention of the wider public, but this time the arguments are exchanged with a great deal more heat and fervor. Many of these arguments are couched in terms of self-interest: ‘‘Turkey will flood us with cheap labor migrants,’’ claim opponents within the EU, whereas advocates of Turkish membership cite strategic security interests in bringing a predominantly Muslim state from the broader Middle East into the fold. Nonetheless, underlying this debate are competing principles of international ethics. It is too easy simply to dismiss those citing a concern for European values (whatever these may be) or the capacity of the EU to function properly as being merely self-interested actors trying to defend their economic or political position. On the contrary, their concerns go to the heart of the core questions of international ethics: Do we have responsibilities that go beyond our immediate political community? Are there different values that require different political orders? If so, where can we draw borders and how can we defend these borders in order to defend our values? The Turkish case is of particular interest in relation to these questions because it highlights the problems of applying principles of a world of states to one in which this order is increasingly transcended and processes of ‘‘de-bordering’’ and ‘‘re-bordering’’ are taking place. At least in Europe, the EU is the main example of this change. The debates about Turkish membership are conducted in such a heated fashion not least because of the challenge that the integration process poses to our traditional understandings of the main principles on which the international order is founded. In this context, the demands for public participation

Postmodern, poststructural, and critical theorists say that there are no universally valid foundations for norms. Whether or not we think that ethics exists in international life, or ought to, these theorists maintain that there are no firm grounds for any particular ethical belief. Rather, they argue, ethics is contextual.Many, perhaps most, students of international ethics believe that such approaches have little to offer considerations of international ethics. Christopher Norris says postmodernists are nihilists: “Postmodernism is merely the most extreme (or as some would say, most consistent and consequent) version of this desire to have done with all truth-claims beyond what is presently and contingenty ‘good in the way of belief.‘” Ken Booth argues: “If one scratches a committed post-modernist one will almost certainly find a comfortably well-off Western urban liberal. Those who live against the wall, or who have emancipated themselves from such a position, do not hold these views.… The reason for this is obvious, and relates to the fact that post-modernism—certainly that of a doctrinaire variety—does not deliver an ethics for the emancipation of victims across the world.”

As Smith points out, Reinhold Niebuhr's political ethic is closely linked to his philosophy of history. This view of history blends a dualistic understanding of human nature and rigorous contingency of experience - all sobered by a creative sense of tragedy. Niebuhr's modest sensibility was forged amid the early catastrophes of the century and fell on fertile ground early in the Cold War. But in the ironic wake of that superpower struggle there is much in Niebuhr's anitriumphalism to commend to today's international relations theorists and practitioners. Following Augustine, Niebuhr offers no escape from the complexities and contingencies of history, but neither does he view history as gloomily fixed. Rather, Niebuhr's complex and often contradictory sense of historical destiny reflects a sober hope for a more just and peaceful world order.

The end of the Cold War and the reduction of tensions between East and West have generated talk of a “new world order” in which greater cooperation between states might be possible. These developments also raise the possibility that state behavior might be constrained more than ever before by shared moral standards, contributing further to the reduction in international tensions. Brinkoetter investigates the potential role that shared moral standards - and international ethics in general - may play in this new world order. The role that one finds for international ethics in the new world order depends upon whose version of it is being evaluated - in this case George Bush's.

Weiss and Minear explore the problems associated with attempting to operationalize the evolving international humanitarian norm that civilians, regardless of location, are entitled to sustenance and medical assistance. In a host of recent civil wars in Africa, the attention of the international community has been drawn to the use of food deprivation by both governments and insurgents. The use of such deprivation has traditionally been part of the arsenals of warring factions, but the widespread and active mobilization of international public opinion against such tactics is relatively new. The authors argue that, while all historical situations are in some sense unique, Sudan is not so idiosyncratic that the lessons and the precedents cannot be replicated elsewhere to protect civilians caught between warring sides in civil wars.

Environmental degradation can no longer be handled by means of traditional local remedies in the face of the current global environmental crisis. The author outlines specific ways to overcome the crisis through international means, obliging each individual nation to reduce its own hazardous production, while enjoining a collective effort to confront the challenge of global environmental deterioration. Only through policy-making based on the recognition of shared danger and international commitments to reduce damage can we achieve a shared moral responsibility for environmental protection.

The pervasiveness and magnitude of AIDS require that it be addressed on an international, global scale. However, the issues of testing for the virus, and controlling its propagation raise questions of civil rights. Brenda Almond examines different countries' policies and ways of attempting to deal with AIDS, focusing on their positions in regard to rights. Almond makes the case that while discrimination should be avoided and fought, that recognition of the primary right, that of life, demands that public health and civil rights be considered in a less oppositional way. Ultimately, however, the possibility of defeating AIDS lies not in law and regulation but in moral education.